This.
More I study Japanese WW2 history more incomprehensible it gets. Japan simply had no resources and they had not even defeated China. Still Japanese military was eager to attack into Siberia and later against allies.
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More I study Japanese WW2 history more incomprehensible it gets. Japan simply had no resources and they had not even defeated China. Still Japanese military was eager to attack into Siberia and later against allies.
I agree. Many people think that in WWII Japan suffered Victory disease. They had won many battles and wars during the last 100 years and rarely suffered defeats. They became arrogant and complacent and ultimately paid heavy price regarding that.
Well yeah but it kind of explains almost unrealistic Japanese military plans.
It is definitely a thread in the tapestry, but it's not the whole picture. It does explain why Tojo demands a war against America his best admiral is convinced they cannot win, and why Tojo shouts down anyone who dares disagree with him.
That's just it - plans. There was not one, but a bunch... because there wasn't any one authority running the show.
The civilians were not in charge, the military was. It was split between army and navy. The generals and admirals didn't exactly have a tight grip of the reins either, (relatively) low ranking officers could and did come up with their own 'initiatives' that dragged everybody else along... plus all the usual background of the emperor, court politics, secret societies, business interests, etc.
It seems that the consensus is that the building of the IJN Fleet in accordance to a decisive victory like they did in the Russo-Japanese War.
So I ask what do you all think would have been a more logical fleet for them to have built? I would say no yamato class and I would guess Japan could have built 2 modern carriers for the price of one Yamato class.
A much larger shipping fleet was badly needed, not sure what to sacrafice in it's place, but it was not even close to being up to that task it had and could not even closely make up for losses they had during the war.
So I ask what do you all think would have been a more logical fleet for them to have built? I would say no yamato class and I would guess Japan could have built 2 modern carriers for the price of one Yamato class.
A much larger shipping fleet was badly needed, not sure what to sacrafice in it's place, but it was not even close to being up to that task it had and could not even closely make up for losses they had during the war.
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Which is why you end up with the massive, heavily armored Shinano; built on a Yamato class hull, but capable of only carrying 47 planes in its incorrectly designed hull. Four more Shokaku class CVs with Mogami escorts could outrun anything in the US fleet and would have been a terrible burden on the strained USN resources early in the war. Four Shokaku class CV's at Coral Sea, and Midway never happens, and the two additional flight decks at Pearl would have dealt the US a much more severe blow.
And Yamamoto himself is on record as having said he'd rather have another thousand zeros at the oubreak of hostilities than the Yamato class ships.
First goal in the Japanese OOB is to first completely and totally reorganize the fleet roles of individual ship prior to the beginning of war. Japanese admiralty was competely sold on the concept of the decisive battle, like Tsushima and Jutland. They either forgot or looked past the lessons they learned while while japanese DD's hunted U-boats alongside their British teachers during WWI in the Atlantic. Sub hunting and convoy escort were considered. . . unmanly . . . within the Japanese navy.
A true Samurai would only commit himself against the heaviest warships the enemy had, not commerce raiding like some pirate. Even a lowly destroyer force could go toe-to-toe with a line of capital ships with their torpedo spreads before popping smoke and dispersing. Same for the I-boats, their commanders would not waste valuable torpedoes on sluggish merchantmen, they were reserved for capital ships.
Japanese ships were rather good. The Tone and Mogami class cruisers were every bit as good as their US counterparts until the Baltimore class CA's joined the fleet. The light cruisers and destroyers using the long-lance torpedo were absolutely lethal to surface ships, but their failure to use the light cruisers and destroyers in any meaningful ASW role until it was too late.
Fortunately, for the good guys, its a fun discussion, but completely and totally moot.
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I didn't know that the aircraft capacity of the Shinano was so pitiful for it's size. I guess that makes sense since it was halfway done as a SHBB, and most conversion were not all that great at plane capacity. It does suprise me with all that armor it only took 4 torpedos to take her out. The Yamato took a hell of a lot more. Though the ones used on the Shinano might have been set to exactly the right depth to go off under her keel, while plane launched torpedos at the Yamato would have been much more shallow and hit it on the side of the ship only.
It would have been scary if the Japanese did have 4 more modern CVs at the early part of the war like at Coral Sea as you mentioned. Though if the US wasn't taken out of the war by mid 1943, which even with much of her fleet being at the bottom of the Pacific, there was no hope for Japan. The US aircraft were getting far better than the Japanese one and the totally insane ship building capacity of the US. Despite building a gigantic merchant fleet, the US built more warships and of better design in 1943 than Japan did from 1930-1945.
It might be enlightening to study ship and aircraft fuel consumption for 1941-1942 and extrapolate it out to an extra four flight decks and air wings. Something tells me that any early advantage will be self limiting based purely on how much they could move.
Then we have the pilot training/replacement problem. I think decisive victory at coral sea is no more likely than fuel/ personell exhaustion in 43.
Then we have the pilot training/replacement problem. I think decisive victory at coral sea is no more likely than fuel/ personell exhaustion in 43.
The Japaneese were building a third Yamato class BB, laid down in 1940. It wasn't until after the Midway disaster that the decision was made to convert it to CV instead; had the Japanese not lost that battle that decision might not have been made.
If I remember correctly, the plan for the Shinano wasn't for it to act as a conventional carrier. Rather, its job was to act as a mobile "pit stop" for the air groups of other carriers to refuel before proceeding to their primary objective- allowing the mainbody of the Japaneese CV force to remain outside of the range of US airpower while striking at them. Unfortunately the Japaneese CV force and fleet had been all but obliterated by the time it was nearing completion- so its a moot point anyway.
Poor damage control and only bare bones crew. An exprerienced crew would have saved her.
Regarding Shinano, her hull was finished outside but her watertight compartments hasn´t been finished. IJN decided to move her from Tokyo region to Kure because they expected new bombing attacks against Tokyo and they couldn´t afford the Shinano being hit by US bombers.
The fuel situation is a great question for that kind of a hypothetical scenario. They were already becoming concerned with their fuel reserves by the Guadalcanal campaign in late 1942.
I'm guessing but I believe that the pilot training problem would have been less of an issue. They would have adjusted their pilot training program when they realized they weren't producing enough air crews. I could be wrong, they never really solved the problem when they were faced with the horrendous attrition rates of the first year of the war but in a peacetime setting prior to the war (with America anyway) they probably could have adequately trained the required number of aircrew for 4 extra flattops.
I wonder how long American Submarines had been operating near the Japanese coast by that point? They may have not expected a submarine presence because they hadn't seen any in home waters before. I'll have to try and look that up.
IIRC, IJN expected US submarines but they were confident that the Shinano would outrun them. Also, the Shinano was escorted by three veteran destroyers. The real problems for the Shinano really started she had to slow down because of some of her machinery broke down.
Thanks. From what I've found so far, the US was sending subs towards Japan from the first month of the war so yeah, it shouldn't have been a surprise.
