Oooh! I want a piece of that action!
Rozhestvensky was not a great battle admiral, but he was a great administrator. I don't think anyone could have beat the Japanese with the Russian Fleet, they were just too incompetant. However, at the time, I can't think of another fleet of that size which made a journey like that. However, the Russians had the disadvantage of being unable to practice their gunnery during the voyage, because resupply was so diffcult.
Thank God you remembered the name, I sure wasn't going to.
Well, Mussolini hadn't much control on the Armed Forces, and never made a military plan. He gave orders often based on wrong informations: Ciano, Fieldmarshal Badoglio and Adm. Cavagnari were his worst advisers, and in my opinion they are who must be blamed (most of all Badoglio: he had been the Chief of Supreme General Staff for 15 years: 1925-1940, and we know what was the outcome of his administration).
Makarov, I believe. When the Russians captured German warships, they tended to rename them Admiral Makarov. At any rate, while the Far Eastern Fleet might have been able to beat the Japanese if it hadn't been destroyed and had been allowed to improve itself.
The Dutch throwing their wooden shoes (sabots) into machines in order to jam them up, I believe during the Naploeanic War. Thus, the french called it 'Sabotage'.
I think you overestimate Hipper's force. Although the five German battlecruisers at Jutland were well built compared to their British counterparts, they could hardly be called dreadnoughts. Indeed, the British heavily outgunned the German ships, even though the German shells were of higher quality. Indeed, the British had their six battlecruisers plus the 4 QE-class BBs in the 5th BS (because the Queen Elizabeth was undergoing refit) against 5 German battlecruisers all the way between 1430 and 1630. At 1630, Beatty sighted Scheers fleet and turned tail and ran, leaving the 5th BS exposed to fire from the entire front of the German fleet, although Evan-Thomas eventually turned away under withering fire from the High Seas Fleet, which left Warpite dead in the water. He ran back to Jellicoe, who was lined up for battle. They crossed the German's T, so the Germans quite calmly blew up another battlecruiser and two armored cruisers, and then turned away. Because of the mist, and the fact that it was already 1900 by the time the Germans were turning away, the British lost them in the dark, and only unimportant skirmishes were fought in the dark, usually when some poor lost ship ran into the opposing battleline, such as the Black Prince or the Pommern did.
Tell that to the crew of the Queen Mary. At any rate, he was daring enough to do the job, but it was a job that should never have been done. Engaging Hipper was not what he should have done. Instead, he should have done what Hipper did, and tried to lure the opposing battlecruisers back to his battleline.
I wouldn't call it a major strategic victory. It was an affirmation of the status quo. It was a prevention of a strategic disaster. After all, control of the seas the day after Jutland provided the British with no advantage they had lacked the day before. I think it is often misrepresented exactly what the Germans hoped to gain from a victory at Jutland. It was not the breaking of the blockade, because to do that they would have to engage the Grand Fleet, which they wanted to avoid. For the Germans, all they really wanted to do was to take out the battlecruisers, and they did a respectable job, eliminating a full third of the BCF in an afternoon. Moreover, because the German fleet did virtually nothing of military value, having them out of service for any length of time was not as great an advantage as it might otherwise be. If the Germans had accomplished their goals, Jutland would have been a major strategic victory for them. Even if the British had sunk the entire High Seas Fleet at Jutland, it would remain a victory, but not one that would affect the outcome of the war in any substantial way.
Forgive me if I'm not entirely impressed with Beatty destroying some German light cruisers with his battlecruisers. The only way he could have lost at any point was to accidentally scuttle both his BCs.
I'll grant that the Japanese ships were more advanced, but in terms of guns and armor, the opposing sides were pretty much even, or at least close enough that the Russians would have stood a chance. I maintain that what killed the Russians is their inability to hit what they were shooting at, and what allowed the Japanese to kick ass was the concentration of accurate fire that was attained by intensive drill and the 'crossing of the T'.
After all - as you say it confirmed the previous position of the HSF being bottled up in port. From the British perspective then calling it a strategic victory seems perfectly reasonable.
Granted, it's not really a distinction. The British achieved what they needed to. It's a strategic victory, but I just don't like calling it that, since they really didn't gain anything. Indeed, it was never really at stake.Originally posted by stnylan
I think saying that Jutland was the prevention of a strategic disaster rather than a strategic victory is rather semantic
True, it was a fault of the battlecruisers. But Beatty knew about it, after nearly losing the Lion at Dogger Bank. He knew that he was going up against dreadnoughts or battlecruisers, and to charge them was the height of folly. If it had been most other officers, they could have engaged at a distance, then sailed just out of range and drawn the enemy battlecruisers towards the Grand Fleet.
Except throughout their battle, Hipper was doing the right thing. Beatty was not. Thus, I am far more forgiving of Hipper than Beatty. Besides, Beatty was a prick.
Maybe, maybe not. But since the High Seas Fleet wasn't going to fight a pitched battle with the Grand Fleet, crossed T or no, I don't see it as being terribly important. On the other hand, Beatty deserves some marginal credit for allowing Jellicoe to get himself between the HSF and Wilhelmshaven. Keeping the Germans engaged long enough for Jellicoe to work his magic and come around the HSF was the one achievement I give him credit for.
On the other hand, Sturdee at the Falklands and Beatty at Heligoland Bight showed that battlecruisers were extremely effective for what Fisher had intended them for. However, getting caught up in the idea of symetrical, status driven warfare eliminated their usefulness. Eggshells with hammers, and all that.
I imagine it would take him about five minutes to resign his commission under those circumstances. I think that Beatty would have made a great commander of 2nd or 3rd BCS, but not the entire BCF. If he had been used carefully, like at Heligoland, Beatty could be an effective officer. But the CinC would have to ensure that Beatty was kept away from the HSF at all costs.
Oh, Scheer's conduct was by no means exemplary, I'll agree. I think he suffered from his hesitancy, as well as his unsureness of what he was doing out there, and what his objectives were. He wanted to engage the enemy, but he also wanted to avoid any force stronger than his own, as well as not losing any warships in combat.
