The Germans planned to seize sections of Poland to make the Polish salient less dangerous to their eastern frontier. Plus, areas adjacent to East Prussia were to be annexed. The Baltics would be liberated and turned into German satellites.
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Yakman said:
Incorporation into the Habsburg Empire to make it a Tri-, not a Dual Monarchy seems the most likely to me, with Macedonia being handed to Bulgaria. To offset any potential problem raised by the dilution of Hungarian power in the empire by such an arrangement, some different settlement might have been reached, however....
Yakman said:
Yep, which as the game portrays it, Germany simply gets the lands there. But to the serbia thing, it would have remained independent, but would also technically be a sattelite of A-H.
Perhaps. They wouldn't be good natured about it though.
The Orient could end with the Ottomans keeping their old borders OR they could grab Egypt OR they could grab the Caucausus AND maybe attempting for Central Asia--but this is unlikely...
Russia was promised the Straits by secret treaty.
The Orient could end with the Ottomans keeping their old borders OR they could grab Egypt OR they could grab the Caucausus AND maybe attempting for Central Asia--but this is unlikely...
Russia was promised the Straits by secret treaty.
Different political factions within Austria-Hungary had different war aims, and even these changed over time. Some of their politicians, like Count Tisza of Hungary, thought that annexing Serbia would be a really bad idea. On the other hand, Conrad had been arguing for a military annexation of Serbia for the last ten years. The Hungarians, in general, resisted the inclusion of more Slavs in the empire because it would dilute their own power. For exactly that reason, other politicians - including Archduke Franz Ferdinand himself - were in favour of annexing more Slav territories...
It was generally believed at the time that A-H's ultimate aim in the Balkans was to occupy Salonika, along with the strip of territory leading down to it (including Serbia and Macedonia) - although this might be done by puppeting the relevant countries rather than direct annexation.
It was generally believed at the time that A-H's ultimate aim in the Balkans was to occupy Salonika, along with the strip of territory leading down to it (including Serbia and Macedonia) - although this might be done by puppeting the relevant countries rather than direct annexation.
http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914m/zabern.html
GENTLEMEN: According to the results of the official inquiry, the events in Zabern took place as follows First I should like to say that when I finish my talk the Minister of War will speak to you.
During a training hour, Lieutenant von Forstner was instructing a recruit on how he should handle himself in the event that he was attacked. In view of the many and sad occurrences of recent years, the Lieutenant was in the right to make this the subject of his instruction. On this occasion he said that in a certain eventuality there would be a money premium, which was made higher by a noncommissioned officer present. Putting up a money premium was, of course, improper.
During his instruction, the Lieutenant called the man who was supposed to attack the recruit a 'screwball' [Wackes] . At the same time the Lieutenant warned him about enlisting in the Foreign Legion. That was his good right. However, he did use a thoroughly improper expression when he spoke about service in the Foreign Legion.... In his instruction hour the Lieutenant on three occasions referred to Alsatians as 'screwballs.' . . .
Neither I nor the Minister of War want to excuse anything or keep anything secret. But what was behind these early events? Improper behavior of a young officer in the military barracks. Unpleasant but certainly not of world-shaking import.... The Alsatian people felt themselves to be insulted by use of the term 'screwball.' It has been said that there was a willful public affront to the people. That is not true, considering the circumstances as I have related them.
The use of the word 'screwball' is now forbidden in military areas, and in agreement with the Minister of War, I can now say that the word will not be used again by our troops to describe the Alsatians.
The Alsatian deputies have been very sensitive about my use of the term 'screwball.' But I believe I am not imposing too much upon the gentlemen when I suggest that the Alsatians should not be more sensitive than other branches of our people....
Gentlemen: Even though these events have been so unhappy, I believe that we should not cling to the past, but instead look to the future. Above all it is essential that the situation at Zabern, where the excitement originally arose, be brought back to normal. We must see to it that incidents of this kind do not recur....
GENTLEMEN: According to the results of the official inquiry, the events in Zabern took place as follows First I should like to say that when I finish my talk the Minister of War will speak to you.
During a training hour, Lieutenant von Forstner was instructing a recruit on how he should handle himself in the event that he was attacked. In view of the many and sad occurrences of recent years, the Lieutenant was in the right to make this the subject of his instruction. On this occasion he said that in a certain eventuality there would be a money premium, which was made higher by a noncommissioned officer present. Putting up a money premium was, of course, improper.
During his instruction, the Lieutenant called the man who was supposed to attack the recruit a 'screwball' [Wackes] . At the same time the Lieutenant warned him about enlisting in the Foreign Legion. That was his good right. However, he did use a thoroughly improper expression when he spoke about service in the Foreign Legion.... In his instruction hour the Lieutenant on three occasions referred to Alsatians as 'screwballs.' . . .
Neither I nor the Minister of War want to excuse anything or keep anything secret. But what was behind these early events? Improper behavior of a young officer in the military barracks. Unpleasant but certainly not of world-shaking import.... The Alsatian people felt themselves to be insulted by use of the term 'screwball.' It has been said that there was a willful public affront to the people. That is not true, considering the circumstances as I have related them.
The use of the word 'screwball' is now forbidden in military areas, and in agreement with the Minister of War, I can now say that the word will not be used again by our troops to describe the Alsatians.
The Alsatian deputies have been very sensitive about my use of the term 'screwball.' But I believe I am not imposing too much upon the gentlemen when I suggest that the Alsatians should not be more sensitive than other branches of our people....
Gentlemen: Even though these events have been so unhappy, I believe that we should not cling to the past, but instead look to the future. Above all it is essential that the situation at Zabern, where the excitement originally arose, be brought back to normal. We must see to it that incidents of this kind do not recur....
Yakman said:
I have no idea what this Zabern affair is, or what this article refers to.
zabern is a city in alsacace. after bringing them into the newfounded german reich in 1871 they where complaining about disrespect from other germans, culminating in the mentioned facts. way interesting in our schools they never tell what really happened. its just referred to as zabern affaire and being a sign of mistreatment of alsatians. wastly overdone as i see.
I read that France had a lot of market shares in the Ottoman empire (called "capitulations" iirc) to protect, declaring war on the Turks perhaps wasn't the best thing to do to protect those investments. On the other hand Paris also had a foot in Lebanon since the late 1800'ies. In 1914, as that front wasn't opened yet what were Paris' objectives in the region?
Vulture said:
After the war, in which the Netherlands took no part (in fact, many Belgian refugees found shelter here), the Belgians pushed the Allies for parts of Dutch Limburg and Zeeuws Vlaanderen!
That's the thanks we got... Luckily, the Allies didn't agree to these demands (fearing, maybe, the Dutch would be driven in the arms of the Germans). The 'moraal van dit verhaal': the Belgians weren't much better!
There is a little more to the Zabern affair than what was quoted above.
Basically, the lieutenant was showing his men how to use their bayonets to stab people who attacked them. He then added, "if you do this to one of the screwballs (meaning, the local civilians), I'll pay you 10 marks."
This was reported in the newspapers, causing much outrage. A protest march was organised in Zabern, with the permission of the police. However, the commander of the military garrison took offence, and called out his troops to suppress the demonstration and arrest the ringleader.
This was an illegal and unconstitutional act - the Army had no right to interfere over the heads of the civilian authorities. However, no effective action was taken against the military - just a slap on the wrist. To add insult to injury, the Kaiser awarded a medal to the commander who ordered the troops to be sent in.
The main importance for German history is to show how in the Kaiserreich, the Army still saw itself as effectively above the law.
Basically, the lieutenant was showing his men how to use their bayonets to stab people who attacked them. He then added, "if you do this to one of the screwballs (meaning, the local civilians), I'll pay you 10 marks."
This was reported in the newspapers, causing much outrage. A protest march was organised in Zabern, with the permission of the police. However, the commander of the military garrison took offence, and called out his troops to suppress the demonstration and arrest the ringleader.
This was an illegal and unconstitutional act - the Army had no right to interfere over the heads of the civilian authorities. However, no effective action was taken against the military - just a slap on the wrist. To add insult to injury, the Kaiser awarded a medal to the commander who ordered the troops to be sent in.
The main importance for German history is to show how in the Kaiserreich, the Army still saw itself as effectively above the law.
You're being over-simplistic if you say that Germany, as an entity, had clear war aims throughout the war.
It started out with no war aims at all... I think most historians agree that the German war aims in August 1914 could only be very broadly defined as to thwart the Russians, keep Austria-Hungary intact and fully sovereign and kick the French in the teeth. Keep in mind that the German public thought that war had been forced on them by the Entente, prior to 1914 Germany was a "saturated" country in Europe. The public as well as the intellectuals and the elites had no territorial ambitions when the war started, unlike France or Serbia.
The war frenzy in September, before the Marne battle, triggered a war aims discussion and in the course of that discussion, many people argued that Germany should punish the French as harshly as possible. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg published his September-Programme in September (well duh ) 1914 and proposed the annexation of parts of Belgium as well as parts of France - a strip of land in the Vosges, the coast between Boulogne and Dunkerque and some other bits and pieces. It was more of a proposal than a plan, though, and Bethmann-Hollweg didn't make any of his proposals "official" policy. The right wing parties in the Reichstag had also been clamoring for annexations, and the MPs Erzberger and Claß had their proposals printed as pamphlets and distributed.
There were no official war aims at any point, though, and as the war progressed control over government policy fell more and more to the military anyways. The Social Democrats in the Reichstag maintained their position - that there should be no annexations - throughout the war.
Since any peace treaty would eventually have to be ratified by the Reichstag, the debates were not just hollow chattering but had importance.
Prior to the victories over the Russians in winter 14/15 there had been little discussion over war aims in the east - this changed when the tide began to turn, and especially after the victories in Poland in 1915. The annexionists pushed for sweeping annexations in the east, and the goals that were proposed by their leading personalities varied between political dominance over puppet states, direct rule over conquered peoples and even large-scale ethnic cleansing so as to create more space for the German race. (Sounds familiar?) In any case, the military destroyed all possibilities for a separate peace with the Czarist government with the farce they called "Kingdom of Poland", which is especially revealing because Ludendorff (the man who called the shots in the east) didn't even consult with the civilian government but made policy all on his own. Goes to show how little influence the civilians had at that point.
The role that was to be given to Austria-Hungary also changed during the war. After 1915/16 many saw the Austrians as "too weak" to keep order in eastern Europe so they pushed for direct German domination over the Balkan nations.
Later on, in 1917 and 1918, the Social Democrats and their demands for a "peace without annexations" found more and more support both among the common folk as well as among the liberal parties in the Reichstag. In 1916 a permanent commission had been set up by the majority parties Zentrum (=catholic lower and middle class), National Liberals (=rightist middle and upper class), Progressive Popular Party (=liberal middle class) and Social Democrats (=leftist lower class) called the "war aims commission". They debated throughout the war and in July 1917 the delegates of Zentrum, SPD and the Progressives issued a petition stating that "forced annexations and the economic rape of defeated countries" were against the principles of peace, understanding between the nations and reconciliation, which the Reichstag upheld. One of the driving motivations behind the change in mind of many who had previously argued for annexations was the revolution in Russia, which, in the eyes of the left and the liberals, had removed one of the main reasons for their support of the war, namely the Czarist regime. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg signed the petition, too, although he had no part in the drafting. The rightist parties (National Liberals and others) argued harshly against the resolution and the general staff cared very little about what the Reichstag thought and said. Matthias Erzberger, a Zentrum delegate who had published one of the far-reaching annexionist pamphlets in 1914, was in 1917 one of the main forces behind the peace resolution. (He also signed the armistice in November 1918, and was assassinated by a radical nationalist in 1921)
You can't discuss German war aims without discussing German domestic politics in the war. The two are inseparably linked.
It started out with no war aims at all... I think most historians agree that the German war aims in August 1914 could only be very broadly defined as to thwart the Russians, keep Austria-Hungary intact and fully sovereign and kick the French in the teeth. Keep in mind that the German public thought that war had been forced on them by the Entente, prior to 1914 Germany was a "saturated" country in Europe. The public as well as the intellectuals and the elites had no territorial ambitions when the war started, unlike France or Serbia.
The war frenzy in September, before the Marne battle, triggered a war aims discussion and in the course of that discussion, many people argued that Germany should punish the French as harshly as possible. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg published his September-Programme in September (well duh
) 1914 and proposed the annexation of parts of Belgium as well as parts of France - a strip of land in the Vosges, the coast between Boulogne and Dunkerque and some other bits and pieces. It was more of a proposal than a plan, though, and Bethmann-Hollweg didn't make any of his proposals "official" policy. The right wing parties in the Reichstag had also been clamoring for annexations, and the MPs Erzberger and Claß had their proposals printed as pamphlets and distributed. There were no official war aims at any point, though, and as the war progressed control over government policy fell more and more to the military anyways. The Social Democrats in the Reichstag maintained their position - that there should be no annexations - throughout the war.
Since any peace treaty would eventually have to be ratified by the Reichstag, the debates were not just hollow chattering but had importance.
Prior to the victories over the Russians in winter 14/15 there had been little discussion over war aims in the east - this changed when the tide began to turn, and especially after the victories in Poland in 1915. The annexionists pushed for sweeping annexations in the east, and the goals that were proposed by their leading personalities varied between political dominance over puppet states, direct rule over conquered peoples and even large-scale ethnic cleansing so as to create more space for the German race. (Sounds familiar?) In any case, the military destroyed all possibilities for a separate peace with the Czarist government with the farce they called "Kingdom of Poland", which is especially revealing because Ludendorff (the man who called the shots in the east) didn't even consult with the civilian government but made policy all on his own. Goes to show how little influence the civilians had at that point.
The role that was to be given to Austria-Hungary also changed during the war. After 1915/16 many saw the Austrians as "too weak" to keep order in eastern Europe so they pushed for direct German domination over the Balkan nations.
Later on, in 1917 and 1918, the Social Democrats and their demands for a "peace without annexations" found more and more support both among the common folk as well as among the liberal parties in the Reichstag. In 1916 a permanent commission had been set up by the majority parties Zentrum (=catholic lower and middle class), National Liberals (=rightist middle and upper class), Progressive Popular Party (=liberal middle class) and Social Democrats (=leftist lower class) called the "war aims commission". They debated throughout the war and in July 1917 the delegates of Zentrum, SPD and the Progressives issued a petition stating that "forced annexations and the economic rape of defeated countries" were against the principles of peace, understanding between the nations and reconciliation, which the Reichstag upheld. One of the driving motivations behind the change in mind of many who had previously argued for annexations was the revolution in Russia, which, in the eyes of the left and the liberals, had removed one of the main reasons for their support of the war, namely the Czarist regime. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg signed the petition, too, although he had no part in the drafting. The rightist parties (National Liberals and others) argued harshly against the resolution and the general staff cared very little about what the Reichstag thought and said. Matthias Erzberger, a Zentrum delegate who had published one of the far-reaching annexionist pamphlets in 1914, was in 1917 one of the main forces behind the peace resolution. (He also signed the armistice in November 1918, and was assassinated by a radical nationalist in 1921)
You can't discuss German war aims without discussing German domestic politics in the war. The two are inseparably linked.
Pretty much. What can be characterized about German war aims was that their demands grew harsher as the war dragged on.
Well, the extremist positions grew more extremist as the victories rolled along. But you have to consider as well the growing opposition to the war, which started long before the disasters in summer 1918. It wasn't only the Social Democrats but also large sections of the bourgeoisie and the liberals who demanded not only domestic reform and a parliamentarization of the government but also a peace without annexations. Unfortunately their opinion wasn't heard when the military and the bureaucrats made the peace treaties, even though they had a large part, if not a majority, of the German people behind them. The leader of the German delegation at Brest-Litovsk for example complained that in his negotiations with Trotsky he had to restrain himself from slamming his fist on the table and pointing at the maps showing the military situation to support his demands because the public opinion at home and the Reichstag majority would throw a fit if he acted like a conqueror.Yakman said:
Only after Trotsky left the negotiations and the German army resumed its advance did he get the terms he wanted...
But one must remember that by 1918, the civilian government was completely out of the decision making process. While this DID result in the fall of the Reich, I doubt that the socialists would have been able to toss out the Kaiser and dictate terms in the event of a German victory.
Well, yes. By spring 1918, decision making was firmly in the hands of the OHL (the supreme army command, i.e. von Hindenburg and Ludendorff) and the Reichstag was out of the loop. But the Kaiser had already promised some reform for Prussia and for the Reich in his Easter message 1917, so you might say that the primer for the political change had already been set, even though it took the disasters of summer 1918 to make the military give up its power.Yakman said:
Then again, they hadn't been in charge throughout the whole war - they had become "untouchable" only after Bethmann-Hollweg's forced abdication, the victories of 1916/17 which had boosted their image as well as their influence on the Kaiser and the bureaucracy and the totalization of the war effort (summer/fall 1916) which gave them a large degree of control within the economic planning authorities, as well as outside of the formal channels.
(Interestingly, not only the OHL was strengthened through the total war measures, but also the socialist-dominated unions - those same laws that put military representatives into the economic commissions also created commissions in which union representatives held seats, and the prewar anti-labour laws were rescinded. So this, too, had two sides, and contributed not only to the absolute power of the 3rd OHL but also to the leading role that the social democrats played after the parliamentarization.)
The position of the OHL was never as firm as that of ordinary military dictatorships. They were only so powerful while they were successful... since they had not seized power but rather had had power handed to them, this power could also be taken away from them again.
Yakman said:
Actually: Franz Ferdinand`s sentiments about Serbia was "good-riddance-to bad-rubbish" (simplistic), and he had no wish for it ever again to become a part of AH. When he was shot, however, things changed a bit...
If the Black Hand wanted to create a major incident, they couldn`t have picked a better target. Not even the Emperor himself.
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