Moltke "transferred" 4.5 corps to the Eastern Front? As far as I can discover, the entire German Army on the Eastern Front comprised 4.5 corps... (I, XVII, XX and I Res Corps plus the 3 Reserve Division and 1 Cavalry Division).
That's not an awful lot to stand against the 10 corps of the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies plus the 3 corps of the Warsaw-based GHQ Reserve. 3-1 odds...
As for the Schlieffen Plan itself, I've read somewhere that the French road net simply wasn't capable of taking any more troops (plus all their horse-drawn supply wagons, of course). Sending more troops onto the right wing would simply have produced endless traffic jams, not actually increased the German combat power at the sharp end.
The British BEF was already ashore long before the Germans got anywhere near the Channel Ports, as they discovered at Mons.
Besides, the ports were fortified - they couldn't have been taken on the march without detaching forces for a siege.
While marching through the Netherlands might have been a benefit for the Germans in August 1914, it actually turned out to be a blessing for them that they didn't. Immense quantities of food and supplies were smuggled to Germany through the British blockade because they were first shipped to Holland, then across the land border.
Regarding Britain, the impression I get from reading the diplomatic correspondence is that the UK government was thoroughly alarmed by German aggression and in strong sympathy with France even before it became evident that the German war plan called for an attack in the West. Whether that sympathy would extend as far as a declaration of war on Germany is another question, of course. However, Asquith's Cabinet had already taken the decision that they would close the English Channel to German warships before the news of the ultimatum to Belgium arrived - even though they knew that this would mean war if the German fleet tried to force its way through.
That's not an awful lot to stand against the 10 corps of the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies plus the 3 corps of the Warsaw-based GHQ Reserve. 3-1 odds...
As for the Schlieffen Plan itself, I've read somewhere that the French road net simply wasn't capable of taking any more troops (plus all their horse-drawn supply wagons, of course). Sending more troops onto the right wing would simply have produced endless traffic jams, not actually increased the German combat power at the sharp end.
The British BEF was already ashore long before the Germans got anywhere near the Channel Ports, as they discovered at Mons.
While marching through the Netherlands might have been a benefit for the Germans in August 1914, it actually turned out to be a blessing for them that they didn't. Immense quantities of food and supplies were smuggled to Germany through the British blockade because they were first shipped to Holland, then across the land border.
Regarding Britain, the impression I get from reading the diplomatic correspondence is that the UK government was thoroughly alarmed by German aggression and in strong sympathy with France even before it became evident that the German war plan called for an attack in the West. Whether that sympathy would extend as far as a declaration of war on Germany is another question, of course. However, Asquith's Cabinet had already taken the decision that they would close the English Channel to German warships before the news of the ultimatum to Belgium arrived - even though they knew that this would mean war if the German fleet tried to force its way through.