World War 1 (or great war as my Grandad says)

[w_mullender]

Originally posted by Allenby
I happen to think Blackadder is very funny too, but it shouldn't be used to summarise a side's strategy. The reason why a 'sit and wait' strategy would not have been any use was because the British Army (which I refer to in particular) would not have learnt any new skills by defending - the war was won by taking the offensive, and so whilst the British Army suffered losses while attacking, particularly in 1915 and 1916, it went on a valuable learning curve which crafted a citizen force into an army worthy of defeating the Germans.

The problem is how you can measure a learning curve, apparently the only people who needed one were the generals. I wouldnt say that the attacks were particularly useful for the infantry in that respect.

The lessons learnt from from these colonial campaigns were very misleading - the deadlock of trench warfare was only going to be broken by taking the attack - this would involve developing the army into a weapons system that encompasses air power, concentration of artillery, tanks, and advanced infantry tactics working in cooperation. This was made possible by going onto the offensive and learning from any mistakes made, and seeing where parts of the weapons system could be improved. By sitting and waiting, on the defensive, the British Army would not have been able to have pulled off the victory of 1918.

I still fail to see how the attacks of the previous years contribute that much. The main problem I have with the generals is that, although they learned from their mistakes, the mistakes were very very costly. It is also very difficult to see what exactly all the attacks accomplished in educating the generals and why a "sit and wait" would have been much worse in that respect. In short if you need around three years to become a decent general, you shouldnt have been one in those three years.

The Americans contributed one army to the offensive in 1918. Had the war stretched into 1919, they would have taken the lead in the Entente, and as the main fighting force on the Western Front. As of 1918, the main fighting effort was being made by the British Army, and the victory on the Western Front in that year was primarily a British victory. Having said that, the growth of the AEF had an adverse psychological effect on Germany.

As for the blockade and Germany's internal troubles, it cannot be conclusively said that these two factors were the immediate cause for Germany looking for parley in 1918, but they certainly formed part of a combination that made it obvious to Germany that victory was not possible. It is my argument that the German Army's defeat on the Western Front was foremost in causing Germany to seek peace, with the blockade and underlying internal troubles as being secondary, longer term factors.

My argument isnt that the brits didnt win, my argument is that without the blockade, americans and german troubles there would have been none. Mind you also that the germans only surrendered because the americans came and that they saw Wilson as a very reasonable negotiation partner, unlike the brits and french. They didnt expect anything like Versailles.

 

[w_mullender]

Originally posted by Allenby
I happen to think Blackadder is very funny too, but it shouldn't be used to summarise a side's strategy.

Why not? It exactly describes the tactics used and due to its humour shows how ridiculous they were.

And after all it even if it is a serious and interesting subject it is still a fun forum.

 

[Allenby]

The problem is how you can measure a learning curve, apparently the only people who needed one were the generals. I wouldnt say that the attacks were particularly useful for the infantry in that respect.

The 'lurning curve' does not just apply to generals in command, but to everyone in the army all the way down to the infantryman pressing home the attack. In 1915, the British Army was lagely made of territorials and the first Kitchener recruits, who had no experience in battle. In order that they could be moulded into a war winning army, it was necessary that they should go into battle and learn how to fight a modern war. Not only did the generals manage, between 1915-18, to cast aside old, accepted ideas of warfare, but had successfully managed to adapt ideas of modern warfare. The Generals would have come into the First World War with Napoleonic ideas, but went through the war and ended the war having learnt ideas about warfare that would not have been amiss in 1940. The infantry to which you refer, also learnt as well - it would be strange to think that the generals could have learnt a great deal from warfare by 1918, but the soldiers who physically carried out the attacks would not have learnt from what they were doing. The battle of the Somme can rightly be seen as the battle in which the British Army came of age as a fighting force, while its soldiers got to grips with the new weapons that were being adapted for war. During the battle, and afterwards, the infantry would prove to be ever more proficient in the appliance of cover and fire tactics, use of bombs and grenades as well as the Lewis Gun. The victory of 1918 could not have been won without the army having experienced the fighting that it did in 1917 and 1918.

I still fail to see how the attacks of the previous years contribute that much. The main problem I have with the generals is that, although they learned from their mistakes, the mistakes were very very costly. It is also very difficult to see what exactly all the attacks accomplished in educating the generals and why a "sit and wait" would have been much worse in that respect. In short if you need around three years to become a decent general, you shouldnt have been one in those three years.

The attacks of 1916-17 allowed the war to be won in 1918 by wearing down the German Army - the Somme was as one officer put it - 'the muddy grave of the German army', and an event to be held in comparison to what First Ypres was to the 'Old Contemptibles' of the British Regular Army. The cumulative result of attacking the Germans through 1916 and 1917 was the ability to knock them out in 1918, after having sapped the Germany Army's will to fight on all levels - from the Kaiser and the Generals right down to the front line German infantryman. The reason why the generals' mistakes (mainly from 1915 and the first day of the Somme) were costly, was the nature of the war itself ensured that any mistakes made whatsoever would result in heavy loss of life - even the most successful attacks would result in heavy casualties - they were in a sense, inavoidable. It is difficult to think that the British Army, being the main combatant for the Allied side on the Western Front from 1917-18 would not sustain casualties while fighting. A 'sit and wait' policy would not be practical because it was the same tactic employed by the Germans - they seldom made set-piece attacks - and lost the war. Had the Germans not adopted a policy of static on the Western Front, but chose to try and knock out their main enemies (on the Western Front) by taking the offensive, then they could well have won the war by virtue of the fact that it was just as costly to defend in a set-piece attack as it was to attack. If a general of the First World War can be condemned for attacking, he can be equally condemned for sitting in static defence. For the British generals to have only taken three years to change pre-concieved ideas of warfare, adapt and adopt new ideas and allow the army under their command to win a great victory with those ideas, was a great achievement - worse commanders would have taken longer, and it is difficult to see such a turnaround being achieved in a shorter amount of time. The attritional nature of the war meant that the war would last as long as it did, making sure that there would not be any quick and sudden victories. The likes of Alexander, Marlborough and Napoleon would have had a hard time winning the war on the western front had they taken command of the army in 1915 - and they wouldn't necessarily win it in 1916 and 1917 either. The Allies suffered heavier casualties per day in 1944-5 than they did during the First World War, yet Montgomery, Crerar, Dempsey, O'Connor, Horrocks etc are not seen as dim-witted butchers as their First World War counterparts. Had the campaigns in Normandy taken longer than they did, then the casualties would have exceeded those of the First World War, however, the fluid nature of warfare and the presence of a proper exploitation arm in the form of the modern tank ensured that advances were rapid (if bloody), whereas the lack of an adequate exploitation arm in the First World War forced the infantry to do the hard work, thus causing advances to be limited.

My argument isnt that the brits didnt win, my argument is that without the blockade, americans and german troubles there would have been none. Mind you also that the germans only surrendered because the americans came and that they saw Wilson as a very reasonable negotiation partner, unlike the brits and french. They didnt expect anything like Versailles.

The Germans would have been beaten without the blockade anyway, because by 1919 the country itself would have been under the occupation of the Allied forces - the blockade served to strangle the country internally and create domestic trouble - the 1st AEF army wasn't necessarily the force which tipped the balance in favour of the Allies either - the Anglo-French forces in 1918 were probably strong enough to win the war without the AEF. So the Germans didn't surrender because they thought they could get a fair deal from Wilson, but primarily because the German Army had lost on the Western Front. Mind you, there's a lot of 'ifs' and 'buts' there.

Thank you

 

[unmerged(10750)]

Originally posted by AlexanderG
No, the plan was flawed. Even if nothing was done the plan the Germans would have found that they would still be forced to turn before Paris. How did Schliefien deal with this ? He penicled in an extra 250,000 man at the moment of expected contact with the French but did not explain how the men got there.

They might not have been forced to turn before Paris had they had the extra men that were fighting uselessly in Alsace-Lorraine and being ferried back and forth between East Prussia and the Western Front.

If the Germans had not weakened the right flank in order to send extra troops to the Eastern Front that were neither needed nor wanted by the commanders there, they might have been successful at the Marne and not needed to turn.

I don't know that an unmodified Schlieffen plan would have worked. But the plan that was ultimately followed was immeasurably worse, and almost succeeded anyway.

 

[Grosshaus]

Originally posted by Allenby
In order that they could be moulded into a war winning army, it was necessary that they should go into battle and learn how to fight a modern war. Not only did the generals manage, between 1915-18, to cast aside old, accepted ideas of warfare, but had successfully managed to adapt ideas of modern warfare.

I'm not all that well informed about WW1, but when comparing to WW2 a general then was a bad one if it took him 3 years to learn "the new way". Germans had the blitz quite well figured out before France with only few months of active fighting and only reasonable casualties.

What if American generals in the Pacific had spent the first 3 years flooding infantry to well-guarded enemy islands with no naval/air support?

Of course it was different with WW1 when the enemy neither adopted a more innovative tactical stance, but still I can't think of Western front generals as competent.

 

[Allenby]

Originally posted by Grosshaus
I'm not all that well informed about WW1, but when comparing to WW2 a general then was a bad one if it took him 3 years to learn "the new way". Germans had the blitz quite well figured out before France with only few months of active fighting and only reasonable casualties.

What if American generals in the Pacific had spent the first 3 years flooding infantry to well-guarded enemy islands with no naval/air support?

Of course it was different with WW1 when the enemy neither adopted a more innovative tactical stance, but still I can't think of Western front generals as competent.

The generals of the Second World War had greater means of fighting quicker, more rapid battles.

You make a valid point about the German commanders - in some respect, their tactics derive from those used by the British in 1918. In 1940, fast and powerful tanks were available which took the advantage back to the 'cavalry' arm and air power had come of age. Therefore, advances were rapid because the means of movement were available, and distance can be therefore judged as a yardstick for success. On the other hand, the First World War is notable for the lack of mobility of its armies in comparison with its Second World War counterparts, which meant that decisive victories and rapid advances were difficult to achieve, and thus success cannot be fairly judged in distance, but grimly, in casualties inflicted upon the enemy.

 

[w_mullender]

Originally posted by Allenby
The 'lurning curve' does not just apply to generals in command, but to everyone in the army all the way down to the infantryman pressing home the attack. In 1915, the British Army was lagely made of territorials and the first Kitchener recruits, who had no experience in battle. In order that they could be moulded into a war winning army, it was necessary that they should go into battle and learn how to fight a modern war. Not only did the generals manage, between 1915-18, to cast aside old, accepted ideas of warfare, but had successfully managed to adapt ideas of modern warfare. The Generals would have come into the First World War with Napoleonic ideas, but went through the war and ended the war having learnt ideas about warfare that would not have been amiss in 1940. The infantry to which you refer, also learnt as well - it would be strange to think that the generals could have learnt a great deal from warfare by 1918, but the soldiers who physically carried out the attacks would not have learnt from what they were doing. The battle of the Somme can rightly be seen as the battle in which the British Army came of age as a fighting force, while its soldiers got to grips with the new weapons that were being adapted for war. During the battle, and afterwards, the infantry would prove to be ever more proficient in the appliance of cover and fire tactics, use of bombs and grenades as well as the Lewis Gun. The victory of 1918 could not have been won without the army having experienced the fighting that it did in 1917 and 1918.

I am not saying that all levels of the military didnt learn anythin, I am saying that the ones who needed it most were the generals. You say that after the Somme the Brits "came of age". Well with the 3rd battle of Ypres almost the same tactics were used, with about the same level of succes. Imo the succeses in 1918 were more due to better material (improved tank, improved communication equipment and airplanes), which hadnt been present before, plus of course that the Germans werent able to bring in their men from the east. And dont forget the constant supply of fresh troops.
What bothers me most about these battles is that there was no real change in tactics after it became apparent that they werent working. The generals (and not only the allied) were to obsessed with a "decisive breakthrough" that they simply couldnt think of any other tactic then a frontal assault.

The attacks of 1916-17 allowed the war to be won in 1918 by wearing down the German Army - the Somme was as one officer put it - 'the muddy grave of the German army', and an event to be held in comparison to what First Ypres was to the 'Old Contemptibles' of the British Regular Army. The cumulative result of attacking the Germans through 1916 and 1917 was the ability to knock them out in 1918, after having sapped the Germany Army's will to fight on all levels - from the Kaiser and the Generals right down to the front line German infantryman. The reason why the generals' mistakes (mainly from 1915 and the first day of the Somme) were costly, was the nature of the war itself ensured that any mistakes made whatsoever would result in heavy loss of life - even the most successful attacks would result in heavy casualties - they were in a sense, inavoidable. It is difficult to think that the British Army, being the main combatant for the Allied side on the Western Front from 1917-18 would not sustain casualties while fighting. A 'sit and wait' policy would not be practical because it was the same tactic employed by the Germans - they seldom made set-piece attacks - and lost the war. Had the Germans not adopted a policy of static on the Western Front, but chose to try and knock out their main enemies (on the Western Front) by taking the offensive, then they could well have won the war by virtue of the fact that it was just as costly to defend in a set-piece attack as it was to attack. If a general of the First World War can be condemned for attacking, he can be equally condemned for sitting in static defence. For the British generals to have only taken three years to change pre-concieved ideas of warfare, adapt and adopt new ideas and allow the army under their command to win a great victory with those ideas, was a great achievement - worse commanders would have taken longer, and it is difficult to see such a turnaround being achieved in a shorter amount of time. The attritional nature of the war meant that the war would last as long as it did, making sure that there would not be any quick and sudden victories. The likes of Alexander, Marlborough and Napoleon would have had a hard time winning the war on the western front had they taken command of the army in 1915 - and they wouldn't necessarily win it in 1916 and 1917 either. The Allies suffered heavier casualties per day in 1944-5 than they did during the First World War, yet Montgomery, Crerar, Dempsey, O'Connor, Horrocks etc are not seen as dim-witted butchers as their First World War counterparts. Had the campaigns in Normandy taken longer than they did, then the casualties would have exceeded those of the First World War, however, the fluid nature of warfare and the presence of a proper exploitation arm in the form of the modern tank ensured that advances were rapid (if bloody), whereas the lack of an adequate exploitation arm in the First World War forced the infantry to do the hard work, thus causing advances to be limited.

You're forgetting that the allies did the most of the attacking and that the germans were still capable of attacking after the Somme with some succes (though as almost universal in WW1 they had to fall back again). I also believe that our forum-database aka Hannibal in a recent thread completely discredited the comparison between 44 and WW1 you make. Another difference being that it didnt take them 4 years to achieve a "decisive breakthrough". I am not saying that WW1 was possibly one of the most difficult wars for a general, my argument is that the generals used the same tactics over and over and were only succesfull in the end due to the circumstances I named earlier (innovation, americans, blockade, domestic unrest in Germany and the failure of the germans to get their troops on the western front). It is a bit like saying that the roman generals facing Pyrrhus were good as with every battle they lost their strategic position became better.
A more "Alexander/Napoleon-like" general most probably wouldnt have achieved succes sooner, but I do think that their casualties would have been much lower.

The Germans would have been beaten without the blockade anyway, because by 1919 the country itself would have been under the occupation of the Allied forces - the blockade served to strangle the country internally and create domestic trouble - the 1st AEF army wasn't necessarily the force which tipped the balance in favour of the Allies either - the Anglo-French forces in 1918 were probably strong enough to win the war without the AEF. So the Germans didn't surrender because they thought they could get a fair deal from Wilson, but primarily because the German Army had lost on the Western Front. Mind you, there's a lot of 'ifs' and 'buts' there.

Thank you

That is indeed a lot of ifs and buts. Imo without the blockade the domestic front and the army wouldnt have been demoralised. It is a lot easier to keep morale up when you have enough supplies.
I also dont think the realistic germans did believe in the 14 points, but I do think it was a very convenient cop-out for Hindenburg.

 

[StephenT]

Originally posted by w_mullender
What bothers me most about these battles is that there was no real change in tactics after it became apparent that they werent working. The generals (and not only the allied) were to obsessed with a "decisive breakthrough" that they simply couldnt think of any other tactic then a frontal assault.

Sorry, but that's quite simply untrue. There were many, many developments and improvements in tactics over the course of WW1. It's just that the popular 'Blackadder' view of history takes no notice of them. For example:

Fire and movement tactics
Bite and hold tactics
Introduction of light machine guns, and a doctrine to use them.
Introduction of hand grenades, ditto.
Infiltration doctrine.
Artillery shells being fused to explode immediately on contact with the ground, to cut barbed wire (introduced in 1917. If they'd been available the previous year, the results of the Somme would have been very different)
Echelon machine gun fire
Indirect machine gun fire
The box barrage
The lifting barrage
The creeping barrage
The hurricane barrage
The hurricane barrage with added gas shells
Mining

...and many more. However, you are right on one thing: when the front line presents an unbroken line of trenches and barbed wire from Switzerland to the sea, it's quite difficult to come up with any form of tactics that doesn't involve a 'frontal assault' of some form or other...

A more "Alexander/Napoleon-like" general most probably wouldnt have achieved succes sooner, but I do think that their casualties would have been much lower.

But whenever Napoléon faced an entrenched enemy of roughly equal strength to him (as at Borodino or Waterloo) he suffered appalling casualty levels. I suspect that had he been around in 1914 instead of 1814, his reputation wouldn't be nearly as good as it is today...

 

[w_mullender]

Originally posted by StephenT
Sorry, but that's quite simply untrue. There were many, many developments and improvements in tactics over the course of WW1. It's just that the popular 'Blackadder' view of history takes no notice of them. For example:

Fire and movement tactics
Bite and hold tactics
Introduction of light machine guns, and a doctrine to use them.
Introduction of hand grenades, ditto.
Infiltration doctrine.
Artillery shells being fused to explode immediately on contact with the ground, to cut barbed wire (introduced in 1917. If they'd been available the previous year, the results of the Somme would have been very different)
Echelon machine gun fire
Indirect machine gun fire
The box barrage
The lifting barrage
The creeping barrage
The hurricane barrage
The hurricane barrage with added gas shells
Mining

Well the 3rd battle of Ypres wasnt much of a success with most of these available. My argument is that there wasnt a basic change in the tactics involved (that is not to say there werent changes) and that in the end it was only succesfull because technology improved (as well as other things like morale drop of the germans).

...and many more. However, you are right on one thing: when the front line presents an unbroken line of trenches and barbed wire from Switzerland to the sea, it's quite difficult to come up with any form of tactics that doesn't involve a 'frontal assault' of some form or other...

Well WW1 western front is an oddie in military terms. The main problem is that it is difficult to see how else to win the war without a breakthrough somewhere or lengtening the war considerably. Imo lengthening the war would have been less costly, especially in human terms. Especially when you consider that the "decisive breakthrough" only took place in 1918 after 4 years of frontal assaults by both sides with either no success of very limited success.
Imo without the outside factors neither side could have achieved anything.

But whenever Napoléon faced an entrenched enemy of roughly equal strength to him (as at Borodino or Waterloo) he suffered appalling casualty levels. I suspect that had he been around in 1914 instead of 1814, his reputation wouldn't be nearly as good as it is today...

Please note the "-thingies I used, I was referring to their status in history. But to go OT slightly: At Waterloo Napoleon had to do something as otherwise Wellington would have combined with the Prussians. Still if Napoleon had faced Haig and Hindenburg at Waterloo his odds would have gone up considerably

If you wanna compare the WW1 generals with military geniuses (or who are considered as such) the best option might be the siege generals like Maurice and Frederick of Nassau and Vauban, who with a siege only risked their men when they were certain of victory. Though the difference with a siege is is that in WW1 there was constant resupplying of men and material.

 

[Grosshaus]

Originally posted by StephenT
...and many more. However, you are right on one thing: when the front line presents an unbroken line of trenches and barbed wire from Switzerland to the sea, it's quite difficult to come up with any form of tactics that doesn't involve a 'frontal assault' of some form or other...

One could have focused on other fronts then. Both sides could have focused more on Balkans, Middle-East and Ukraine. Naturally this wasn't a decision made by front generals, they had no choice but to try to accomplish as much as possible in their sector.

 

[Allenby]

Originally posted by w_mullender
Well the 3rd battle of Ypres wasnt much of a success with most of these available. My argument is that there wasnt a basic change in the tactics involved (that is not to say there werent changes) and that in the end it was only succesfull because technology improved (as well as other things like morale drop of the germans).

But the Third Battle of Ypres was a success in a sense - the attrition inflicted upon the German Army nearly caused it to withdraw from Flanders. It served as a further battering that allowed for Germany to be defeated in 1918. In any case, Third Ypres had to be fought to take pressure off the French army - by then, in a state of mutiny.

Originally posted by w_mullender

Please note the "-thingies I used, I was referring to their status in history. But to go OT slightly: At Waterloo Napoleon had to do something as otherwise Wellington would have combined with the Prussians. Still if Napoleon had faced Haig and Hindenburg at Waterloo his odds would have gone up considerably

But by using a comparison you automatically assume that one general has qualities and abilities that are similar to the person that is being referred to - in this case Napoleon. And I don't see how Napoleon's chances would have gone up if Haig and Hindenburg, bizzarely were in command of the Anglo-Prussian army at Waterloo instead of Wellington and Blucher. The tactics they employed would have been adopted by any sensible general given the situation.

Originally posted by Grosshaus
One could have focused on other fronts then. Both sides could have focused more on Balkans, Middle-East and Ukraine. Naturally this wasn't a decision made by front generals, they had no choice but to try to accomplish as much as possible in their sector.

The argument of the 'Easterners' during the war. Problematically, Germany was not a block propped up by the Austrian and Turkish pillars, but in fact, the Austrian and Turkish blocks were supported by the German pillar. Attacking Germany's allies would have done little to have defeated Germany herself - she had to be personally beaten, in the main theatre of war - the Western Front. Besides, attempts at outflanking the enemy via the Dardanelles and Salonika both failed.

 

[unmerged(15208)]

Originally posted by w_mullender
Well the 3rd battle of Ypres wasnt much of a success with most of these available. My argument is that there wasnt a basic change in the tactics involved (that is not to say there werent changes) and that in the end it was only succesfull because technology improved (as well as other things like morale drop of the germans).

At the platoon level tactics in use by Third Ypres were not immensly different to those employed right up to the era of mass deployment of assault rifles in the 60s/70s. This was centered around fire and movement covered by intergeral support weapons, especially light machine guns, supported by rifle grenades and morters. Its difficult to see how the British army could have gone much further at this level.

Errors were made at the operational and political level, but when they had good weather the British assaults were normally quite successful- at least by WW1 standards!

 

[Keynes]

Haig may not have been a bad general but he was bad *British* general. The British way of war up to that point and at all time everywhere was to limit the exposure of the Army to mass casualties and leverage the British advantages of sea power and access to resources. Ultimately that would win the war - German troop morale collapsed once soldiers realized Ludendorf's March gamble failed and they faced a inevitably losing struggle against the logistically superior Allies. But Haig was under political pressure to "hurry the job" and caved. While Britain was content to fight Louis XIV or Napoleon for two decades each, Haig had to push to knock out the Germans right away.

Overall, I think Blackadder hits closer to the mark then the revisionist. Creeping barrages as a great innovation? Please. "Fire and movement tactics" - hell skirmishers had been doing that since the age of Gustavus Adolphus. Strategy came down to attrition calculations, and tactics came down to "learning by dying." Those that were strong and had a knack for solidering survived and maybe learned some things; the rest died quick. No surprise infantry tactics improved over time, but not due so much from top down innovation of doctrine and training then from some crude form of survival of fittest in the ranks.

Originally posted by Anthony EJW
Errors were made at the operational and political level, but when they had good weather the British assaults were normally quite successful- at least by WW1 standards!

Yes and when the battlefield turned into a muddy quagmire because of the weather, the geniuses at HQ kept pushing right ahead, resulting in terrible casualties for no gain.

 

[StephenT]

Originally posted by Keynes
Haig may not have been a bad general but he was bad *British* general. The British way of war up to that point and at all time everywhere was to limit the exposure of the Army to mass casualties and leverage the British advantages of sea power and access to resources.

Which, admittedly, is a great strategy if you have powerful allies to do the actual fighting. If your allies, on the other hand, are torn by mutiny and revolution and nearing collapse, a long, slow blockade is pretty useless.

After all, it wasn't really the British Army and Navy which defeated Napoleon - he was doing fine until he went and lost his half-a-million strong army in Russia. British money paid for Russian, Austrian and Prussian troops to defeat France...
(A simplification, I know, but not IMO an oversimplification)

Creeping barrages as a great innovation? Please.

Why not? For that matter, the very concept of indirect fire was an innovation of WW1.

No surprise infantry tactics improved over time, but not due so much from top down innovation of doctrine and training then from some crude form of survival of fittest in the ranks..

Actually, due to both. The surviving troops evolved better tactics, which were then picked up by High Command, written into the training and doctrine manuals and passed back out to the rest of the troops. Fairly standard practice in any modern army, really, and contrary to popular opinion most generals in WW1 weren't exactly stupid.

 

[Keynes]

Originally posted by StephenT
Which, admittedly, is a great strategy if you have powerful allies to do the actual fighting.

Which by April 1917, they had.

Fact is, if the leaders and people of the UK knew in Aug. 1914 what the war would cost in terms of casualties, they never would would have entered.

For that matter, the very concept of indirect fire was an innovation of WW1.

Indirect fire was used in the ACW and the Franco-Prussian War; many artillery pieces were designed for dual use. Firing artillery at unseen targets was uncommon due to limited range but was pioneered in the Civil War and became increasingly frequent as that war continued. I kind of like Sgt. Humphrey's refreshing commentary on the significance of this innovation: "I claim no credit for the 'invention'; the thing is so obvious. In fact, if I invented it, I did not do it at Fayetteville, but in my day-dreams when I was about 8 years old."

Of course airplanes and tanks saw their first siginificant wartime use in WWI, but not in ways that were decisive or reflecting of great credit on the creativity of the High Command. The most creative military strategy in the War were two things that backfired rather badly: the Gallipoli landings and the German employment of submarines.

 

[StephenT]

Originally posted by Keynes
Which by April 1917, they had.[

Not really. April 1917 was significant for all sorts of reasons (financial, morale-related, even naval) but not in terms of troops to do the actual fighting. Even a year later on 21 March 1918 (the date the great German offensive started) there were 106 French, 61 British and just 4 American divisions on the Western Front. US troops would have been vital had the war lasted into 1919, but it didn't.

Fact is, if the leaders and people of the UK knew in Aug. 1914 what the war would cost in terms of casualties, they never would would have entered.[

No argument here. Mind you, I suspect the same could be said for all the combatants.

 

[Allenby]

Originally posted by Keynes
The most creative military strategy in the War were two things that backfired rather badly: the Gallipoli landings and the German employment of submarines.

Two creative strategies that featured in a war that didn't allow for much creativity, however.

Even so, the Dardanelles campaign, if successful, would have knocked Turkey out of the war, but whether it would have gone any further to defeat Germany remains questionable - the experience of the Salonika campaign demonstrates that campaigning in the Balkans was not easy, and that if Germany were to be defeated, it would have to be done in the main theatre of operations - the Western Front.

 

[phelbas]

Originally posted by Allenby
Two creative strategies that featured in a war that didn't allow for much creativity, however.

Even so, the Dardanelles campaign, if successful, would have knocked Turkey out of the war, but whether it would have gone any further to defeat Germany remains questionable - the experience of the Salonika campaign demonstrates that campaigning in the Balkans was not easy, and that if Germany were to be defeated, it would have to be done in the main theatre of operations - the Western Front.

But knocking Turkey out of the war would have allowed supplies to Russia, which may have kept her in the war a little longer. It's all if's and but's

 

[Dark Knight]

Originally posted by Allenby

Even so, the Dardanelles campaign, if successful, would have knocked Turkey out of the war, but whether it would have gone any further to defeat Germany remains questionable - the experience of the Salonika campaign demonstrates that campaigning in the Balkans was not easy, and that if Germany were to be defeated, it would have to be done in the main theatre of operations - the Western Front.

A successful Dardanelles campaign might have brought Greece into the war immediately and kept Bulgaria from entering, which in turn would have allowed Serbia to hold out much longer if not indefinitely (supported by foreign troops), and could have likewise caused Romania to join earlier. The result would have been much greater pressure on Austria-Hungary, which would then have required much more support from Germany to keep from collapsing under the weight of ongoing fronts with Russia, Romania, Serbia, and Italy.

 

[ptan54]

Stats about Schlieffen Plan:

Before the war started Moltke jr transferred 4.5 corps to the eastern front, 180,000 men, from the right wing.

Between 1905 and 1914, 9 more corps became available. 8 went to the left wing, 1 went to the right wing. Schlieffen would probably have done the exact opposite, ie 7 more corps on the right, thats 280,000 men (assuming 40,000 = 1 corps?)

When the French became bogged down in their attempt at Plan 17, Moltke jr decided to dispatch 2-3 corps from the Sixth army to "Pursue Direction Epinal", thats 100,000 ish men lost to the right wing again.

Then we have the 2 corps sent to East Prussia that never made it there in time, 80,000 men lost.

Tally up the figures and you get 640,000 more men for the right wing.....much better chance of success, albeit still a gamble.

Take into account also the original plan called for bypassing Liege, since the German armies would move in a wider arc, faciliated by passing through Dutch Maastricht. They would have taken the Channel Ports en route to Paris, meaning very difficult British landings.

As for the suggestion of scrapping the plan altogether, earlier war plans had indeed envisioned defence in the west and offence in the east. Moltke sr. and Waldersee had considered France to be a fortress, incapable of easy breaching, so the focus should have been on the east.

As for the notion that Britain would have declared war on Germany despite a defensive war on the west and nonviolation of Belgian neutrality, I would say wrong. The mood in Asquith's cabinet was very anti war until the Germans were marching through Belgium, threatening the channel ports.

24th July 1914, Asquith wrote "Happily there seems to be no reason why we should be anything more than spectators [in the coming war]". The notion of Germans just across the Channel changed all that. It was highly unlikely that the British army would be fighting a French war of aggression in Alsace Lorraine; the British were prepared to defend their ally, not march with them into senseless offensives on German forts.

And if you want to go back further, the Bismarckian system's continuation would not have seen Germany diplomatically isolated (Austria and co. dont count as significant) by 1914. The Iron Chancellor did not instigate any war after 1871, and was satisfied with the German Empire he had helped to create. Only the mentally ill(?) Wilhelm II decided to go for the idiotic Tirpitz Plan and the "place in the Sun". A Friedrich III ruled Germany would probably not go to war with Britain.