Ugh, ok, Panthers vs Shermans it is.
That's an interesting quote indeed you have there. If it's correct, and only the Battle of the Bulge "revealed the deficiencies in the M4 Shermans and tank destroyers on the U.S. side", does that mean that the Allies had had no problems defeating German armour between the Normandy landings and the Bulge battle? I decided to follow up the citations on that and they link to the Wiki's article on the Shermen and a study "THE EVOLUTION AND DEMISE OF U.S. TANK DESTROYER DOCTRINE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR". The Sherman article only says:
while the study concluded the BotB section with:
It seems a fairly big stretch on wiki writer's part to distill this into the battle "revealing the deficiencies in the M4 Shermans and tank destroyers on the U.S. side."
I have a BotB quote for you too though, it's from a review of the book Panther vs Sherman: Battle of the Bulge 1944 (Duel), the reviewer is historian R. A Forczyk(check the "About me" section if you like):
I'm also going to link another interesting article from WoT's Tank expert, The_Chieftain:
http://forum.worldoftanks.com/index.php?/topic/91572-us-guns-german-armor-pt-2/
It's pretty long, but rather interesting. However, a quick quote:
Also, from earlier in the same article, about the Allied victories in France preceding the BotB, just to highlight how useful it is to have a medium tank that can actually drive places instead of having to be shuttled about on trains:
It's an interesting mirror to how the much more mobile Germans utterly disrupted the Allied armies in France in 1940 when they had the mobile force and the French could not react fast enough.
This isn't quite as relevant, but while I was on the WoT forum's history sperging section I found one of the poster had interview a PzIV gunner who fought in Normandy and it's another interesting read. Here's the section asking about tanks:
http://forum.worldoftanks.com/index.php?/topic/306856-interview-with-a-pziv-gunner-pt3-canadians/
Again, what use has a tank if it can't survive in a tank to tank battle? Thats a logical flaw imo. A flaw wich many tankers payed with their lives in reality.
Am intersting quote maybe:
The heavy U.S. tank losses in the Battle of the Bulge against a concentrated German tank force composed of some 400 Panther tanks,[35] as well as Tiger II tanks and other German armored fighting vehicles, revealed the deficiencies in the M4 Shermans and tank destroyers on the U.S. side. The British forces armour was somewhat better equipped to deal with such a force, having adapted some Shermans to carry a more powerful 17 Pounder gun.[36][37] On 22 December 1944, while the battle still raged, the brand new T26E3 tanks were ordered to be deployed to Europe. The unexpected German tank attack had settled the question once and for all as to whether the T26 was needed. Twenty were sent in the first shipment arriving at the port of Antwerp in January
There is much more of that here and in other places http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M26_Pershing
E.g. read here for more: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanks_in_the_United_States
So US started with tanks on the same lvl as germans PzI/PzII but developed quite quick up to the M4(Sherman). And also just after starting prodcution of M4 the T-20 was designed. That lead later to the M-26. So US could have had more devastating tanks with ease much earlier. Intersting read about the M-26 in the above wiki:
That's an interesting quote indeed you have there. If it's correct, and only the Battle of the Bulge "revealed the deficiencies in the M4 Shermans and tank destroyers on the U.S. side", does that mean that the Allies had had no problems defeating German armour between the Normandy landings and the Bulge battle? I decided to follow up the citations on that and they link to the Wiki's article on the Shermen and a study "THE EVOLUTION AND DEMISE OF U.S. TANK DESTROYER DOCTRINE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR". The Sherman article only says:
which only indicates a "clamor"Following the clamor for better armor and firepower after the losses of the Battle of the Bulge
while the study concluded the BotB section with:
Conclusion
Throughout Europe the tank destroyers proved time and time again their
versatility on the battlefield. Although not always as lethal as they should have been, in
light of heavier and heavier German tanks, their mobility and ability to strike targets with
direct and indirect fire made them a valuable asset. By the end of the World War II both
the towed and self-propelled tank destroyers proved their worth on the battlefield. As
Hugh M. Cole cites in the Center of Military History’s official account of the actions of
tank destroyers in the Ardennes, “Tank destroyers are clearly traceable in the Ardennes
fighting as over and over again influencing the course of battle.” Although none of the
tank destroyers rose to the initial level of expectations of the Tank Destroyer Branch,
each platform had performed well, based on the users’ knowledge of the weapons system
and the situation in which it was employed.
It seems a fairly big stretch on wiki writer's part to distill this into the battle "revealing the deficiencies in the M4 Shermans and tank destroyers on the U.S. side."
I have a BotB quote for you too though, it's from a review of the book Panther vs Sherman: Battle of the Bulge 1944 (Duel), the reviewer is historian R. A Forczyk(check the "About me" section if you like):
From another review talking about the same book:The real lessons of this book are delivered in the concluding sections on statistics and analysis. Contrary to what readers conditioned to war movies or computer games might expect, the author notes that actual statistical data indicates that most tank vs. tank battles were small, involving only 4-9 tanks on each side. The data also indicates that the defender had a distinct advantage, since they usually got to fire first. Despite its vaunted post-war reputation, the author uses data from 29 engagements involving Shermans and Panthers to conclude that, "the popular myths that Panthers enjoyed a 5-to-1 kill ratio against Shermans or that it took five Shermans to knock out a Panther have no basis at all in the historical records." Further, he states that, "in a head-to-head duel, the Panther Ausf G was clearly superior to the M4A3 (76mm)...[but] tactical considerations were often paramount." Also, "the Sherman offered a better balance of mass and quality than did the Panther." The statistics that the author provides indicate that the Germans committed about 416 Panthers to the Ardennes offensive and lost 180, while the Americans committed about 600 M4A3 tanks and lost about 90. However, these statistics do not break down how many tanks were destroyed by other tanks as opposed to lost to mines, A/T guns or mechanical breakdown. Thus, the Shermans likely inflicted more damage on their opponents, but the actual results of the duel are left a bit murky.
I don't have a source for this, but I have seen it repeatedly and it matches with the above:The surprising conclusion that Steven Zaloga brings out at the end of his book was that the Sherman tank proved to be 3.6 times more effective than the Panther in actual battle: the Sherman crews were much better trained and battle-hardened, while the Panther crews were often inexperienced and lesser trained; despite the qualitative inferiority of the Sherman, U.S. crews knew how to use the Sherman tank's mobility and faster turret to shoot the Panther's sides & rear armor; the Sherman was much more reliable and they were produced in far greater numbers, while the Panther was unreliable and there weren't enough of them to go around. Zaloga's conclusions seemed similar to your conclusions in your book regarding the effectiveness of the T-34 vs. Panther in actual battle.
Robert Forzcyk: ”Overall, US armor destroyed more German tanks than German tanks destroyed US tanks, by a factor of about 3:2.”
I'm also going to link another interesting article from WoT's Tank expert, The_Chieftain:
http://forum.worldoftanks.com/index.php?/topic/91572-us-guns-german-armor-pt-2/
It's pretty long, but rather interesting. However, a quick quote:
In September, 1944, the US Third Army was across the Moselle River in the vicinity of Nancy. The Germans launched a series of armored counterattacks with the intention of restoring their line and crushing the over-extended U.S. spearheads of 4th Armored Division. The 21. Panzer Division and 15. Panzergrenadier Division led the attacks. Third Army stripped troops from uninvolved units to counter this attack on the bridgehead. This left Combat Command A (CCA) of 4th Armored Division isolated near Arracourt and generally under-strength.
Rather than distributing all of the tanks coming in as replacements across many panzer divisions which would still inevitably be under-strength, the Germans had instead siphoned off many of the new tanks to create a number of Panzer Brigades. These were powerful armor-heavy units without the tail of a division – spears that were all blade and little shaft. At 0730 on September 19, 1944, the German 113th Panzer Brigade slammed into Combat Command A.
CCA at this time had only one company of M4 tanks forward, with a company of M10 tank destroyers in reserve. 113th Panzer Brigade hit them with four companies of Panther tanks and a company of assault guns, along with two battalions of panzergrenadiers (armored infantry).
But one of the prices the Germans paid for creating new units, rather than re-building the existing cadres of their panzer divisions, was that the panzer brigades were inexperienced and under-trained. And they were fighting veteran US crews on a battlefield that allowed the US forces room to maneuver.
CCA of the 4th Armored Division was equipped mostly with 75mm-armed M4 tanks. They fought a series of delaying actions from ambush positions which bled the 113th Brigade every step of the way, slowed their advance, and reduced their cohesion. A second company of M4s arrived as re-enforcements. Once the Germans paused to regroup, CCA launched its own attack out of the fog, rolling up the German flank, and all but annihilating 113th Panzer Brigade.
The next day as they surveyed the battlefield the Americans counted forty-three knocked out German AFVs, almost all of them Panthers. German losses were actually greater than that, but they had managed to recover several knocked-out tanks as they withdrew. The two battalions of panzergrendiers had been shattered as well – overrun and scattered, suffering over 500 casualties.
And what price did the Americans pay for this victory? Six soldiers had been killed, thirteen soldiers wounded. Three M10s and five M4 tanks had been knocked out.
CCA 4th Armored Division did not win with overwhelming airpower or artillery support. Fog kept the airplanes home and made it almost impossible to bring down heavy fire concentrations on the Germans. The battle was almost exclusively a match between the armored forces. Nor did the Americans win due to overwhelming numbers. Overall they were outnumbered in both tanks and infantry. They won because they out-maneuvered their enemy, and concentrated forces for the decisive punch.
Also, from earlier in the same article, about the Allied victories in France preceding the BotB, just to highlight how useful it is to have a medium tank that can actually drive places instead of having to be shuttled about on trains:
The confines of the boccage had been overcome. Once the US Army had achieved freedom of maneuver it moved so quickly, overcoming or by-passing German positions so rapidly that the Germans could not organize a defense. Ever since a cadre of US Army officers had observed and studied the German campaign across France in 1940, the doctrines, plans, training, and weapons had been developed for this. It was all working. The paper specifications may have said that the Germans should be able to stop the American tanks, but it seems that nobody told the crews of the M4s this.
In the US Army the armoured divisions, and even the infantry divisions, had a level of mobility that no other army could match (although by this time the British came very close). The US Army was not bound to the rail infrastructure. That was a good thing, as the allied air forces had spent months pulverizing the rail lines and marshalling facilities across Europe, and particularly across France. The US Army had enough trucks in ETO to move entire divisions by road (though not every division at once). The artillery was motorized, unless it was self-propelled (which was even better). And the supply echelons were motorized. Everything that was not a motor vehicle moved as cargo in a motor vehicle. Once on the move, no other nation could react to the American speed.
It's an interesting mirror to how the much more mobile Germans utterly disrupted the Allied armies in France in 1940 when they had the mobile force and the French could not react fast enough.
This isn't quite as relevant, but while I was on the WoT forum's history sperging section I found one of the poster had interview a PzIV gunner who fought in Normandy and it's another interesting read. Here's the section asking about tanks:
http://forum.worldoftanks.com/index.php?/topic/306856-interview-with-a-pziv-gunner-pt3-canadians/
What was your opinion of your unit’s performance?
We were too inexperienced and eager and we let that get the better of us. We attacked in set ambushes, frontal assaults, or badly co-ordinated thrusts. I think too many of us believed in our own superiority or the superiority of our tanks without thinking about how to use it effectively.
Do you believe that the Germans tanks were superior?
Initially yes. When it came to roughly even fights in the beginning we generally came out better than the Allies those first couple of days. But the Canadians and British learned fast and replaced their loses fast. Our tanks were great in some ways but poor in others, the Allies Sherman was all round decent and that began to tell as the battles became more and more of a bar brawl.
Any specific opinion of the Pz.IV?
I loved it. Good armour and all round combat performance if used properly, but it took some getting use to. The skirts were always getting caught in the brush or something, you really had to make sure you took care of the mechanics, and many had driving or turret quirks.
Quirks?
Well I know a few drivers complained about how the tank could jerk or lurch about unexpectedly when trying to make fine or slow adjustments. Can remember a few running into things or getting stuck because of this. I know my tank had a bit of an issue rotating the turret smoothly mechanically, it could jump a bit and there wasn’t enough fine control. I always used the manual traverse to fine tune my aiming rather than the switch. I know Siegel’s tank had the same problem.
What about the Panther?
It was a beautiful tanks but temperamental like a beautiful women <laughs>. Good armour in the front, an incredible gun, and beautiful cross county. But like a woman who gets by on looks it had personality problems. Poor gunnery control, poor side armour, required a lot of engine work to prevent fires, and it had to be driven carefully. In the opening part of a battle it was deadly, but as the battle turned into more of brawl it wasn’t so good. The Allies also tended to shoot them first. I was happier with my Pz.IV.
How about the Sherman?
Like I said it seemed to be a nice balanced tank like the Pz.IV. It didn’t excel at anything, but it deemed seem to have any glaring faults either. Gun wasn’t great, but it wasn’t bad. Armour wasn’t great, but it wasn’t bad. Driving cross-country wasn’t great, but again wasn’t bad. Actually with driving I’d say it was one area it’d was good at since they could be driven everywhere while we had to use special transport. I had a chance to look around inside one at the War Museum decades ago and I liked the layout inside more than I liked my tank’s, everything seemed better thought out for the crew.
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