Why Verdun?

[StephenT]

Look at a railway map of France in 1914. The main railway line from German-occupied Metz going directly to Paris crosses the River Meuse at Verdun. That's why it was strategically vital. That's why the French turned it into the most heavily-fortified city in France during the years after 1880. As Boblof says, it was also the northern end of a whole chain of fortresses stretching down to the Swiss border.

It was also the pivot for the Schlieffen Plan. The German offensive went through Belgium and Luxembourg north of Verdun in order to avoid those fortifications, and then swung around in an arc towards the River Marne. The French front line in September 1914 was basically a right angle, with Verdun at its vertex. That's why Verdun ended up as a salient, in addition to its heavily-fortified nature making it difficult to capture.

It had some sentimental value as well, with it being the site where Charlemagne's grandsons divided his empire and thus founded the country that would become France, as well as its status of being the last French fortress to surrender to the Prussians in 1870. But honestly, I think its strategic value came first.

 

[StephenT]

On the other side, for the kind of battle that Falkenhayn apparently wanted Verdun was a good choice. It was near major rail lines controlled by the Germans, and thus supply (especially artillery shells) and reinforcement was not a problem, while on the contrary Verdun had very poor rail connections on the French side.

Just to clarify this. In 1914 Verdun had excellent rail connections on the French side. However by 1916 German advances had cut off all four main railway lines leaving Verdun, to north, south, east and west; leaving only a narrow-gauge track and a single road to supply the salient.

 

[Semper Victor]

Just to clarify this. In 1914 Verdun had excellent rail connections on the French side. However by 1916 German advances had cut off all four main railway lines leaving Verdun, to north, south, east and west; leaving only a narrow-gauge track and a single road to supply the salient.

Yes, exactly. And the narrow-gauge line became quickly unusable because of German heavy artillery fire. During the battle, the French could only send supplies and reinforcements into the Verdun battlefield by means of that single road, the "Voie Sacrée" as the French propaganda nicknamed it. It was also constantly shelled by German guns, and the French had to deploy several regiments of colonial troops (North Africans and Indochinese) to keep repairing it constantly. It was also the first instance in a modern war in which a large army engaged in battle was supplied exclusively by trucks, around 6,000 ones that the French army deployed there (horses were useless under the constant German bombardment).

 

[krieger11b]

Yes, exactly. And the narrow-gauge line became quickly unusable because of German heavy artillery fire. During the battle, the French could only send supplies and reinforcements into the Verdun battlefield by means of that single road, the "Voie Sacrée" as the French propaganda nicknamed it. It was also constantly shelled by German guns, and the French had to deploy several regiments of colonial troops (North Africans and Indochinese) to keep repairing it constantly. It was also the first instance in a modern war in which a large army engaged in battle was supplied exclusively by trucks, around 6,000 ones that the French army deployed there (horses were useless under the constant German bombardment).

I would think driving underpowered trucks from the 1910's and their non treaded tires would be next to useless if the area was badly covered by holes from artillery shells. How close would the trucks get to the trenches? I can see them being more useful for artillery which was further from the shelling. Still though, the engines of the day had such pathetic horsepower I would think the capacity would be 1 ton at most and at a very slow speed.

 

[Imgran]

I would think driving underpowered trucks from the 1910's and their non treaded tires would be next to useless if the area was badly covered by holes from artillery shells. How close would the trucks get to the trenches? I can see them being more useful for artillery which was further from the shelling. Still though, the engines of the day had such pathetic horsepower I would think the capacity would be 1 ton at most and at a very slow speed.

About half a step removed from covered wagons

 

[Semper Victor]

I would think driving underpowered trucks from the 1910's and their non treaded tires would be next to useless if the area was badly covered by holes from artillery shells. How close would the trucks get to the trenches? I can see them being more useful for artillery which was further from the shelling. Still though, the engines of the day had such pathetic horsepower I would think the capacity would be 1 ton at most and at a very slow speed.

I don't know if horse wagons would've been able to sustain the infernal rythm. In the thickest part of the battle, each week the road saw a traffic of 50,000 tons of matériel and 90,000 troops in and out of Verdun (due to Pétain's policy of rotating the troops). Plus the length of the route was 75 km, in a hilly region. If one stood by the road, a truck would pass by every 15 seconds, constantly. Day and night. At the height of the battle, the logistical service of Verdun had a truck pool of between 6,000 and 8,000 units, from a wide array of manufacturers, both French and foreign (with many American trucks). At the main logistical base of Bar-le-Duc (where the Voie Sacrée began) the French built a wide array of reair facilities, for repariring trucks and even produce spare parts and repair worn-out tyres, all in a matter of weeks.

The French had foreseen the situation, and preparations were under way since the autumn of 1915, where the road was widened up to 7 metres in as many sectors as possible. By 21 February 1916 when the Germans began their attack, a special logistic service with a motor vehicle reserve was already in place, and the French expanded it as the battle evolved. The worse roblem they found was that the road coud not withstand the heavy traffic, especially when the snow melted in March. As the road could not be cut in any circumstances, the French kept several regiments of Territoriaux (colonial troops) whose only task was to dig up the local limestone, turn it into gravel and chuck it incessantly, day and night, into the road under the truck's tyres so that they would act as "compression rolls" and compact the road. The road was thus surrounded left and right by men separated only a few meters once from the other constantly shoveling gravel onto it.

Traffic ordnances were draconian. It was absolutely forbidden to stop on the road, unless in truly extreme circumstances. Plus any immobile vehicle was immediately pushed out of the road in order to avoid bottlenecks. Maximum speed allowed was 25 km/h for vans and 15 km/h for trucks. The road was of double direction, with vehicles passing constantly in both directions. Horses and troops on foot were forbidden from the road. Drivers were subjected to 18-hour workdays for periods of 10 days, non-stop. They had to sleep on board of their trucks.

Also, several squadrons of fighters were kept in the air with the exclusive mission of protecting the road from German air attacks.

 

[Stryk9ine]

Afaik after the Franco-Prussian war where Verdun was the last French fortification to surrender and suddenly found itself to be close to the German-French border and smack in the middle of presumed future German invasion routes toward Paris. The French rather immediately started to beef up the defenses around Verdun, work that didn't end until 1913. By the time of WWI it had as far as I can understand been sold to the people as a principal point of defense for Paris and France overall. Loosing it was thought to have the potential to have demoralized the French people who might not have understood that defending forts rather than holes in the ground was sooooo 1914.

This. PR is a powerful thing.

 

[Imgran]

Molding the national will is more than just PR. The way a nation thinks collectively can be a powerful force, if you can tap into it and get people moving in the right direction you can win wars with it, even if you're not a democratic nation.

 

[George Parr]

Look at a railway map of France in 1914. The main railway line from German-occupied Metz going directly to Paris crosses the River Meuse at Verdun. That's why it was strategically vital. That's why the French turned it into the most heavily-fortified city in France during the years after 1880. As Boblof says, it was also the northern end of a whole chain of fortresses stretching down to the Swiss border.

It was also the pivot for the Schlieffen Plan. The German offensive went through Belgium and Luxembourg north of Verdun in order to avoid those fortifications, and then swung around in an arc towards the River Marne. The French front line in September 1914 was basically a right angle, with Verdun at its vertex. That's why Verdun ended up as a salient, in addition to its heavily-fortified nature making it difficult to capture.

It had some sentimental value as well, with it being the site where Charlemagne's grandsons divided his empire and thus founded the country that would become France, as well as its status of being the last French fortress to surrender to the Prussians in 1870. But honestly, I think its strategic value came first.

Minor nickle: Metz wasn't German-occupied, it belonged to Germany

 

[Imgran]

To the French, it was German occupied, having been taken from them in the Franco-Prussian war.

 

[krieger11b]

I don't know if horse wagons would've been able to sustain the infernal rythm. In the thickest part of the battle, each week the road saw a traffic of 50,000 tons of matériel and 90,000 troops in and out of Verdun (due to Pétain's policy of rotating the troops). Plus the length of the route was 75 km, in a hilly region. If one stood by the road, a truck would pass by every 15 seconds, constantly. Day and night. At the height of the battle, the logistical service of Verdun had a truck pool of between 6,000 and 8,000 units, from a wide array of manufacturers, both French and foreign (with many American trucks). At the main logistical base of Bar-le-Duc (where the Voie Sacrée began) the French built a wide array of reair facilities, for repariring trucks and even produce spare parts and repair worn-out tyres, all in a matter of weeks.

The French had foreseen the situation, and preparations were under way since the autumn of 1915, where the road was widened up to 7 metres in as many sectors as possible. By 21 February 1916 when the Germans began their attack, a special logistic service with a motor vehicle reserve was already in place, and the French expanded it as the battle evolved. The worse roblem they found was that the road coud not withstand the heavy traffic, especially when the snow melted in March. As the road could not be cut in any circumstances, the French kept several regiments of Territoriaux (colonial troops) whose only task was to dig up the local limestone, turn it into gravel and chuck it incessantly, day and night, into the road under the truck's tyres so that they would act as "compression rolls" and compact the road. The road was thus surrounded left and right by men separated only a few meters once from the other constantly shoveling gravel onto it.

Traffic ordnances were draconian. It was absolutely forbidden to stop on the road, unless in truly extreme circumstances. Plus any immobile vehicle was immediately pushed out of the road in order to avoid bottlenecks. Maximum speed allowed was 25 km/h for vans and 15 km/h for trucks. The road was of double direction, with vehicles passing constantly in both directions. Horses and troops on foot were forbidden from the road. Drivers were subjected to 18-hour workdays for periods of 10 days, non-stop. They had to sleep on board of their trucks.

Also, several squadrons of fighters were kept in the air with the exclusive mission of protecting the road from German air attacks.

Well in that situation it does make sense with the insane amount of supplies and endless labor to fix the roads. Even with the abysmal low octane fuel of the day and low engine efficiency, feeding/watering that many horses would almost impossible.

If you don't mind elaborating at what point did the truck supplies stop and they started using the small gauge railways they used so often to get supplies extremely close to the actually trenches, or did trucks go that far too?

Also what was the advantage of the trucks over normal gauge railways for getting supplies to the point where small gauge railways were used?

To the French, it was German occupied, having been taken from them in the Franco-Prussian war.

To the Germans it was French occupied since the 18th century. Then gain we can go on forever going over who held what when.

 

[StephenT]

Also what was the advantage of the trucks over normal gauge railways for getting supplies to the point where small gauge railways were used?.

Before the war, Verdun was a railway junction, where the main north-south and east-west lines intersected. The eastward line headed into German territory. The northward line went into the area captured by Germany in 1914 during the initial phase of the Schlieffen Plan. That left the southward and eastward lines. However, both of these were cut by localised German advances in 1915, leaving only the road to Bar-le-Duc and the narrow-gauge railway that ran alongside it as a communications route.

The French did begin construction of a brand-new railway into Verdun through territory they still controlled, but it wasn't finished during the crucial part of the battle.

 

[Semper Victor]

Well in that situation it does make sense with the insane amount of supplies and endless labor to fix the roads. Even with the abysmal low octane fuel of the day and low engine efficiency, feeding/watering that many horses would almost impossible.

If you don't mind elaborating at what point did the truck supplies stop and they started using the small gauge railways they used so often to get supplies extremely close to the actually trenches, or did trucks go that far too?

Also what was the advantage of the trucks over normal gauge railways for getting supplies to the point where small gauge railways were used?.

The situation of Verdun with respect to supplies was a bit special. You can see it in this map:

Of the rail lines that went through Verdun, all except one were cut by the Germans:

• The line that went north along the Meuse crossed the German lines.
• Same for the line that went east.
• The line that went south along the Meuse was cut by the salient of the German lines at Saint Mihiel.
• The line that went west to Paris came so near the German lines that several sections of it went regularly under fire by the German artillery.

That left only 1 usable rail line, the line that went south towards Bar-le-Duc. The problem is that it was a narrow-gauge line with a single track, unable to support the massive traffic needed to fuel the Verdun battlefield. Roughly besides it run a road (route départamentale), the one that would be known as the Voie Sacrée.

The narrow-gauge railway (known as the Meusien or Varinot) was used mainly for evacuating wounded soldiers from the battlefield on the way out, and for moving artillery pieces in the way in.

The distance covered by the Voie Sacrée was 75 km, until the place known as Moulin Brulé. From this place, the last 8 km until Verdun proper were under German artillery fire. The train station at Verdun was of course also unusable, as it was hit by the German artillery already on the first day of the battle, and so the trains had to stop also before entering the fire range of the German guns.

I don't know how the distribution of supplies and ammunition was made along the French front, but I doubt highly that it was made by railways. They would've been horribly vulnerable. Verdun was open to German artillery fire from an arch of almost 270º. The Germans amassed 1,200 guns for the initial attack (2/3 of them heavy or super-heavy guns), widely dispersed along that arch but all of them pointing to the relatively narrow sector of the French front in front of Verdun. The density of the German fire was impressive: 2 million shells just for the opening 6 days of the offensive and 2 million more for the next 12 days (according to Falkenhayn's initial previsions). And at least on the German side, the number of guns did not diminish significantly until July 1916 when the Allies began the Somme ofensive. Even then in the July 9-15 attack, the German artillery fired 60,000 gas shells against French artillery positions and 300,000 more shells only against Fort Souville (including hundreds of 360 mm shells).

French artillery fire was also impressive. Beginning on October 20 the more than 700 French guns of all calibers (including 370 and 400 mm super-heavy guns) fired more than 855,000 shells against Fort Douamont during a 6 day period. The final French attack on December 1916 saw another 6-day bombardment by 827 guns firing more than 1,160,000 shells.

In these conditions, I doubt that permanent railways of any size would be really feasible, on any side.

 

[krieger11b]

Wow that situation with the trains being cut off and only one real road to ferry supplies makes the defense of Verdun that much more impressive.

 

[George Parr]

To the French, it was German occupied, having been taken from them in the Franco-Prussian war.

You wanting something back =/= it being occupied.
Metz was officially territory of Germany, ceeded by France in an official treaty that was recognized by everyone. Something that is officially German cannot be German occupied. An occupation is a temporary status that remains in existence until the matter has been clarified by a treaty. You can end an occupation through military means prior to signing a treaty, but not by doing so after signing a treaty, because in that instance there is no occupation anymore. Of course you can use military means to try and get the lands back later on, but that is something entirely different.

In other words:
Metz between 1870 and 1918 was part of Germany proper, it wasn't German occupied. Every country acknowledged that.
On the other hand, German control of most of France during WW2 was definately an occupation, for while there was a treaty that clarified German control for the time being, it didn't settle what would happen with the lands after the war would be over. As such, there was no clarification.
Just like the ownership of former German territories in the east were not officially settled until Germany officially relinquished its claim in a treaty.

 

[keynes2.0]

He was obviously talking about the famous french revanchism, not the treaty. To the french it was french, to the germans it was german.

 

[StephenT]

He was obviously talking about the famous french revanchism, not the treaty. To the french it was french, to the germans it was german.

Imagine it's 1873 and you're General Séré de Rivières, the military engineer given the task of designing a line of fortresses along the German-French border to ensure that France never faces a defeat like that of 1870 again. The point where the primary railway line between Paris and Metz crosses the Meuse is obviously the key point, where the strongest fortresses need to be sited. Do you think that you, mon Général, are going to think of Metz as 'that traditionally German city that's legally part of Germany" or as "that beloved French city, part of la patrie, cruelly and unjustly occupied by the dirty Boches"?

 

[Semper Victor]

By the way, on 7:15 of a 21st February 100 years ago the German Fifth Army launched Unternehmen Gericht, with a preliminary bombardment of 10 hours by 808 guns, firing 1 million shells over a 30 km front. The battle of Verdun had begun.

 

[Ming]

It seems like Verdun would be a horrible place to make a stand, and that getting the French to commit everything to doing so was correctly playing into German strengths.

So why did the german plan fail?

Was it simply the fact of mission creep? The Germans stayed on the attack too long and bled alongside the French?
German artillery wasn't as productive as anticipated and the French were too resilien to collapse from the casualties inflicted?
Or was it a flawed plan from the beginning and attritional warfare was a deadend in 1916?

 

[DoomBunny]

I'd say more that it was simply a standard outcome for battles on the Western/Italian Front from the onset of trench warfare until the development of new methods. Attritional warfare (of the rather even-sided variety, not the desired slaughterhouse variety) was pretty much the only option for armies in 1915/16 and even in some cases into 1917 (see for example, the Italians).

It took time for offensive methods to develop, and also for there to be a will to learn, understand and apply the principles at a strategic and operational level. That the Canadians were able to achieve such excellent results at Hill 70 was due to a deep-analysis of German thinking, the problems of trench warfare, and how to use both together to achieve a victory. It also included an acceptance that gains would be limited in ground and instead focused on causing disproportionate casualties.

At Verdun, the Germans did not have the same unity of command, nor the same methods. Then again, nobody really did in 1916. The French were about the closest to developing a truly effective offensive art, and whilst that showed itself to be successful in places it was still far from achieving the results of the better 1917 battles and those of 1918. Moreover, once the Germans updated their defensive ideas the French failure to progress in kind led to the Nivelle disaster which stripped the French army of much of its offensive power later in the war.

Put simply, the failure at Verdun should not be viewed as an anomaly, it was the norm for offensive actions, particularly major ones, to become dual-sided meatgrinders until 1918.