Why is poland stronger then it really was

[Orthank]

Look if you count the polish people's army then I guess you are including all partisans which were melted in the army after the liberation. Then again you should count all troops that the FF incorporated in 44-45... A way or another, the "4th army" claim seems still irrelevant to me, except maybe during the Blitz, where the Free polish were (oh my god!!!) the "second" army in the "Allies" ...

I don't know what partisants do u mean, for sure not AK (Country's Army) perhaps AL (People's Amry), but i ment Polish Peopele's Amry(LWP Ludowe Wojsko Polskie) 1st and 2nd Army under SU command and equipped by SU equipment - but there were polish soldiers.

Let's compare French forces in 41 how many French were fighting in 41/42 together with Allies? Well French soldier were fighting of course pretty well but not in Indochina vs. Japan but in Syria and Madagaskar vs. Allies, also in North Africa sinking US ships during operation Torch :rofl: .

 

[Prokonsul Piotrus]

As for Russian claims on Poland, you may want to read up about the Polish-Soviet War. Russians - or rather Soviets - had of course claimed much of Polish territories, but not because of any significant Russian population, simply because they conquered those territories, lost in the IWW and now wanted them back. Nothing strange here - few govs dont like 'empire idea', Bolsheviks were no diffrent (and the case can be made for Poles as well). For the most part, the Poles and Russians in 1919-1920 struggled about a territories inhabited mostly by Ukrainians and Bielorussians (which actually opens some of the most interesting 'what if's I know, especially about the Miedzymoze Federation. For the same reasons Soviet claimed the Baltic States, Finland, the territories in the Balkans...the policy which was not different from Germany claiming the territories nearby, with known results

As for the debate about Poland being the 4th Ally, we don't seem to have enough data to easily compare Polish forces to French, but it seems rather obvious to me that Polish importance was highest in the begining of the war (1939-1941), especially when the only other Allies were France and Britain - at that time Poland was at least third, and during the time between fall of France and Operation Barbarossa, Poland might have even been considered the second most important ally of Britain (the case of Polish skilled fighters in the Battle of Britan comes to mind, btw anybody got numbers for French pilots in BoB?). At that time Polish gov in exile was quite cherished by Britain.

After Op. Barbarossa and Japand declaring on US and thus US joining the Allies, Polish importance rocketed down and kept on falling. Which is understandable, but also goes to show the realpolitik: in the begining, Poles where needed, so they had all those nice pacts and promises. Near the end, they were not needed anymore, so they got traded away in the game of diplomacy.

As for Western Allies pressure capability on Soviets, lets not forget the A-bomb (remember that Stalin did not know how many of those Amercicans had - or didn't have, as was the case). Stalin did fear it immensly. But Western Allies (Churchill+Roosevet) were obviously responsible first to their own citizens, and to their allies second. They had 2 choices in 45:
a) to call Stalin bluff, threaten him with A bomb and war, demand the Red Army retreat form Poland and other 'liberated countries' (like Czechoslovakia) and risk a long and bloody war with SU, when most of their citizens were celebrating the end of the war and their ocuntries were at the moment safe from any agressors (remember, Stalin did not threaten WA with war)
b) do what they did in reality - show that they believe Stalin when he promised free and fair elections in the liberated countries and enjoy the end of the war (mind you, if R or C believed Stalin then they *were* fools). But it was the best course of action for their citizens (and remember that R and C represented the thingy called 'democracy'...honestly, who would want to die for Danzig again and who would want to go home after long ~5 years?). Case closed, thank you.
While I wish they had chosen a), I understand while they chose b). In the end...who said it that war is only an extension of the politics? Poland lost the political game, EOT.

About French/British capacity to wage an offensive war on the Germans in 39 - this is a nice speculation, and they might had some chance, but let's forget the speculation here. The important fact is that they didn't do it, WHILE they had signed pacts with Poland promising that they would (the agreements stated that in the event of war the other allies were to fully mobilize and carry out a "ground intervention within two weeks" in support of the ally being attacked). Further, they could told Poland in September - or before - that such attack on their part would be delayed or even impossible, thus allowing Poland to change its deployment plans. They didn't. On 12 September, the Anglo-French Supreme War Council gathered for the first time at Abbeville in France. It was decided that all offensive actions were to be halted immediately. By then the French divisions have advanced approximately eight kilometres into Germany on a 24 kilometres long strip of the frontier in the Saarland area. Maurice Gamelin ordered his troops to stop not closer than 1 kilometre from the German positions along the Siegfried Line. Poland was not notified of this decision. Instead, Gamelin informed marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły that half of his divisions are in contact with the enemy, and that French advances have forced the Wehrmacht to withdraw at least 6 divisions from Poland. The following day the commander of the French Military Mission to Poland informed the Polish chief of staff, general Julian Stachiewicz, that the planned major offensive on the western front had to be postponed from 17 September to 20 September. At the same time, French divisions were ordered to retreat to their barracks along the Maginot Line. The terms like 'lie' or 'deceive' come to mind, don't they? Simlarly, Poland was not informed of the Molotov-Ribbentrop secret agreement to divide Poland, which was known to Allied intelligence. The Soviet attack made Polish plans for the defence of the Romanian Bridgehead obsolete and was the final straw that spelled defeat for the Poles. If the Allies passed the information to the Poles, or perhaps took the case themselves to Uncle Joe, perhaps some things might have turned up differently - but they didn't. So the facts is that the French and British not only did not attack Germany - which is understandable for reasons brought on the forums already - but they did not passed vital intelligence and strategegic information to Poles, which I honestly fail to understand.

Finally, an interesting thing about the Polish September Campaign that contributed to the fall of Poland yet was not mentioned in our discussion (yes, I read it all ). Polish pre-war propaganda stated that any German invasion would be easily repelled. Polish defeats in the September campaign came as a shock to many civilians, who unprepared for such news and with no training for such an event, paniced and retreated east, spreading chaos, lowering troops morale and making road transportation for Polish troops very difficult. The propaganda had also some negative consequences on Polish troops themselves, whose communication disrupted by German mobilie units operating in the rear and civilians blocking roads was further thrown in chaos by the bizarre reports from Polish radio stations and newspapers, which often reported imaginary victories and other military operations (although the reports on French offesnive and giant British air raids could have well been provided by French and British themselves, given the facts I presented before). This lead to many cases of Polish troops being encirled or taking a stand against overwhelming odds, when they thought they were actually counterattacking, stopping Germans from breaking out of the encirlement or would receive reinforcements from other victorious areas soon.

 

[Halibutt]

But Western Allies (Churchill+Roosevet) were obviously responsible first to their own citizens, and to their allies second. They had 2 choices in 45:
a) to call Stalin bluff, threaten him with A bomb and war, demand the Red Army retreat form Poland and other 'liberated countries' (like Czechoslovakia) and risk a long and bloody war with SU, when most of their citizens were celebrating the end of the war and their ocuntries were at the moment safe from any agressors (remember, Stalin did not threaten WA with war)
b) do what they did in reality - show that they believe Stalin when he promised free and fair elections in the liberated countries and enjoy the end of the war (mind you, if R or C believed Stalin then they *were* fools). But it was the best course of action for their citizens (and remember that R and C represented the thingy called 'democracy'...honestly, who would want to die for Danzig again and who would want to go home after long ~5 years?). Case closed, thank you.

IMHO in 1945 both the UK and the US of A had still a "c" option, although it was not as obvious (?) as it was between 1941 and 1944. The option was to follow their own statements from the Atlantic Charter and listen to the pleas of the Polish government. For instance they could send foreign observers to the "elections" and instead of being happy that the case was closed by forged elections, they could simply protest every time the USSR broke its promises. Between 1945 and 1947 there was still a place for an allied military mission to Poland, observing the situation and reporting it to the allies. There was still a place for negotiating some sort of a compromise. Poland would most surely not regain 100% independence, and especially after all the infamous promises and agreements the allies made in 1943 and 1944, but still some sort of a compromise solution could be reached that would spare thousands of Poles the fate of Soviet slaves and victims of their policies. I'm not sure what would be the outcome of such talks since the Allies would have to show some guts which they most surely lacked, but perhaps some sort of "finlandisation" could be achieved. Or at least a similar status to that achieved by Czechoslovakia.

Other thing is that the Allies could back down later and Poland could've been annexed to the Soviet zone of influence a few years later, just like Czechoslovakia was.

Finally, an interesting thing about the Polish September Campaign that contributed to the fall of Poland yet was not mentioned in our discussion (yes, I read it all ). Polish pre-war propaganda stated that any German invasion would be easily repelled. Polish defeats in the September campaign came as a shock to many civilians, who unprepared for such news and with no training for such an event, paniced and retreated east, spreading chaos, lowering troops morale and making road transportation for Polish troops very difficult.

You're right, but I wouldn't overestimate the meaning of peacetime propaganda. The civilians would block the roads anyway, since the Germans conducted terror bombing raids from the very first days of the campaign. The number of people whose towns were destroyed by "Ze Germans" was enough to block the roads anyway. Not to mention the average number of reffugees produced by any war, regardless of its duration or origin.

This lead to many cases of Polish troops being encirled or taking a stand against overwhelming odds, when they thought they were actually counterattacking, stopping Germans from breaking out of the encirlement or would receive reinforcements from other victorious areas soon.

I have yet to see some source that would mention such situations.
Cheers

 

[StephenT]

About French/British capacity to wage an offensive war on the Germans in 39 - this is a nice speculation, and they might had some chance, but let's forget the speculation here. The important fact is that they didn't do it, WHILE they had signed pacts with Poland promising that they would (the agreements stated that in the event of war the other allies were to fully mobilize and carry out a "ground intervention within two weeks" in support of the ally being attacked).

When was this commitment made? The actual agreement signed made no mention of it: it simply contained a promise to "give all the support and assistance in our power" - which sounds good, but is rather lacking in details...

If the Polish government seriously thought that Britain and France would mount an all-out offensive into Germany as soon as war broke out, and made their military plans on that assumption, then all I can say is their Chief of Military Intelligence - not to mention the entire General Staff - would have been guilty of gross professional incompetence. A simple count of number of divisions and number of aircraft in service on each side would have told them that.

The terms like 'lie' or 'deceive' come to mind, don't they?

Actually, the idea that a French diplomat in Warsaw would be ignorant of a decision taken the day before by a general in France sounds entirely plausible, in light of the shambles that was French command and control in 1939-40.

If the Allies passed the information to the Poles, or perhaps took the case themselves to Uncle Joe, perhaps some things might have turned up differently - but they didn't.

The Allies had just spent the last six months trying, with increasing desperation, to persuade Stalin to sign an allience with them. When he turned around and announced he'd decided to ally with Hitler instead, reversing practically everything he'd ever said regarding foreign policy, it's not surprising there was some reluctance to "put the case to Uncle Joe".

 

[unmerged(2833)]

When was this commitment made? The actual agreement signed made no mention of it: it simply contained a promise to "give all the support and assistance in our power" - which sounds good, but is rather lacking in details...

If the Polish government seriously thought that Britain and France would mount an all-out offensive into Germany as soon as war broke out, and made their military plans on that assumption, then all I can say is their Chief of Military Intelligence - not to mention the entire General Staff - would have been guilty of gross professional incompetence. A simple count of number of divisions and number of aircraft in service on each side would have told them that.

We had rather lenghty discussion a year or two ago about this subject, on history forums, between Shrieke000 and Halibutt, IIRC. I guess he can find it for you, the outcome of it was that it was indeed promised, by French. But Halibutt can tell you more.

 

[Halibutt]

When was this commitment made? The actual agreement signed made no mention of it: it simply contained a promise to "give all the support and assistance in our power" - which sounds good, but is rather lacking in details...

Yup, some time ago I dug up both the Polish and French versions of the military alliance. The most important part was that two weeks after the start of hostilities (it was not certain what should be the starting point: the attack on one of the signataries or the DoW by the other) the other will attack "with majority of its forces" (avec le gros des ses force, if memory serves me right, my French is a bit rusty).

In this light the Inter-Allied Supreme War Council meeting in Abbeville on September 12th was a clear act of treachery - or at least a violation of the treaties signed by the French.

On the other hand the obligations signed by the Brits were much less specific and the only serious obligations was to retaliate against the Germans should they start attacking civillian targets in Poland. Needless to say, there were no such actions by the RAF in 1939 either. But the most interesting thing here is that the Polish c-i-c opposed a plan of an air raid on Berlin. AFAIR on September 11th one of the Polish PZL.37B flew a recce mission from the area of Lublin to Berlin and back - completely unopposed. The pilots reported no AA fire over the German capital and it's probable that the AA defence simply believed in German propaganda that stated that Poles do not have any bombers. If it wasn't for Rydz-Śmigły's principles, Goering would have to change his name to Mueller much sooner
Cheers

 

[Prokonsul Piotrus]

If the Polish government seriously thought that Britain and France would mount an all-out offensive into Germany as soon as war broke out, and made their military plans on that assumption, then all I can say is their Chief of Military Intelligence - not to mention the entire General Staff - would have been guilty of gross professional incompetence. A simple count of number of divisions and number of aircraft in service on each side would have told them that.

As Halibutt replied to other points, I'll just add that (IIRC) Polish intelligence/foreign policy strongly discourage 'spying' on its own Allies (i.e. UK/France). As far as simple numbers are concerned, The Allies had the numbers - what they didn't have was the will and strategy to use it offensively, as we have discussed previously in our thread (their plan was a IWW-trench/atttrition warfare, after all). And if Polish politicians believed the treaties they signed would be fullfilled...well, honestly, can you blame them much for that? What I simply don't understand is why F/B didn't tell Poland the truth, so Poland defence would be constructed around long term defence in the south (Romanian Bridgehead plan variant) with little dependence on quick relief action from the Western front.

 

[unmerged(26744)]

Yup, but there's a difference between French volunteers and Poles from Silesia or Greater Poland who had no other option: either to sign the volksliste or perish in concentration camps or - if they were lucky - "only" get expelled to General Gouvernment with a luggage of less than 10 kilograms.

Yes, there is. And I note that there weren't 200k French volunteers, but 20% of that number. The others were "volunteer" WORKERS (e.g. building trenches, doing laundry work in Kriegsmarine bases, etc). Or didn't Germany use Polish workers, too ?

Mostly because there was no government to propose such a status to - but this is a classical what if scenario: what if there were some notable Poles who would like to cooperate...

Again, it all depends on what you call "cooperate". The Germans simply weren't prepared to offer the Vichy France deal to the Poles, for ideological reasons. "Notable Poles" were less enclined than the French to cooperate in the first place (mostly because they didn't think that the conquest of Poland meant Allied defeat, while the Vichy French did) but the main difference was that the Germans simply didn't try to set up a puppet.

How many troops did the allied French forces have between 1940 and 1945?

In 1940, a handful: call it 20k or so. By 1943, about 300k. By the end of the war, the number was up to about 500k frontline troops and an additional million LOC troops largely awaiting US equipment or guarding the Atlantic pockets.

My point wasn't to try and make the French / Poles / Chinese / Rumanians / etc. score points over each other, for the record I think that in the 1940-45 period Poland resisted more as a % of its resources than any of these other contenders. I was just trying to make sense of this "4th ally" claim which so many countries made (see the book "third axis, fourth ally" about the WWII Rumanians).

So, basically, there was no difference. A screening force would perhaps fall in 1 day, then the Germans would get what they want in 3 days and the war would be over before even the Allies joined in...

A screening force means that fighting goes on and this is a real invasion, not a "liberation" as claimed for Austria, so the Allies get a chance to join. The historical deployment didn't improve the odds that the Allies might support Poland but lowered the odds of Poland successfully resisting. I'm well-aware of the reason why the Poles picked that deployment, I just don't agree with them. Just as I'm well-aware of the reasons why Gamelin sent his only strategic reserve to Holland, but don't agree with them.

(regarding consolidating armored brigades) I understand your proposal, but I doubt it would change much to use the only mobile troops we had as strategic reserve instead of tactical reserve. Such an organisation would be badly needed if Poland prepared for a quick counter-offensive and drive to the rear of the Germans. However, in a purely-defence war such a unit would be able to close less gaps than all of the Bdes separately.

It could attempt to close less gaps, but would be more successful at closing those gaps that it attempted to close. My understanding is that the Polish cavalry brigades weren't generally all that successful in closing gaps, however bravely they fought.

Well... yes... Caen is a special case. And 1944 is not 1939, note that in 1944 there was a totally different situation, with tanks capable of fighting other tanks (in 1939 it happened very, very rarely).

Again, tanks were perfectly adequate to stop other tanks prior to 1944. Try Gembloux, Crusader, 1st Alamein, Kursk...

So there would be a difference between no experience gained and... no experience gained... (about Polish industry) Cite your sources please.

There was a little experience gained, historically, from the French military observer reports. So the difference would be between not enough experience gained and no experience gained, not between nothing and nothing. My source for Polish industry, as I already mentioned, is Zaloga's book on the Polish campaign.

Well, the 40mm s were badly needed in 1939 and so were the wz.36 AT guns. Not to mention the additional 100 fighters...

Yes, but then so were other things that the Poles had to import. Again, these exports largely paid for themselves by lowering the per unit cost.

The Allies never asked him to sign any treaties regarding Central Europe - despite constant pressure from the exiled governments. On the contrary, Churchill forced Stalin to sign a document in which the future of Greece and Yugoslavia was decided - and guess what? Stalin obeyed it.

You must be joking... what kept Stalin out of Greece wasn't the treaty with Churchill but US military intervention and the fact that Tito broke away from the USSR which closed down the sanctuaries that communist Greek guerrillas were enjoying in Yugoslav territory.

And you may want to look up the terms of the "agreement" regarding other countries... like "50-50" ending up meaning "communist".

Well, as a matter of fact Stalin did sign such a promise - there was the Sikorski-Mayski agreement in 1941, in which the Soviet Union declared all pacts with the Nazi Germany null and void. The problems begun when Stalin proposed his own interpretation of the SU western border and the Allies agreed with his vision instead of simply stating that the Nazi-Soviet border of 1939 will not be the basis for a future border delimitation. This was a violation of international law and this allowed Stalin to disobey the treaty he signed in 1941.

Yes, that's just my point. Stalin signed a treaty in which he repudiated the parts of his pact with Germany that he no longer wished to adhere to, but the Allies couldn't force him to sign a treaty committing to restoring the 1939 border with Poland.

Was Allied help to the USSR, or rather its extent as obvious in July 1941? I don't think so. But still, if not in 1941, then how about 1942, when large part of the Soviet war machine was US and UK-made?

Allied help to the USSR in July 1941 consisting of Hopkings meeting Stalin on 28 July. The first Allied convoys (7 ships) left 21 August. Looking at US deliveries only, 180 tanks, 150 aircraft and 8,300 other vehicles were sent in 1941. For 1942 the figures are 3,000 tanks, 2,500 aircraft and 79,000 other
vehicles shipped. In 1943 another 920 tanks, 5,150 aircraft and
144,400 other vehicles were shipped. Through 30 June 1945 an
additional 2,900 tanks, 6,650 aircraft and 188,700 other vehicles were
shipped.

"Large part" is a considerable exageration. Lend-lease was between 5% and 10% of the Soviet war effort (depending on estimates), and the bulk of the shipments arrived in the second half of the war, after the Allies knew they were going to win.

And why exactly a powerful state (mainly through its alliances, but still) should accept such a dictate agree to cede 50% of its territory - for nothing?

I'm not saying that the Poles were not having a raw deal, I'm saying that they were not having to get a better one. They didn't realize it. But again, it doesn't necessarily matter as it's doubtful whether Stalin would have allowed an independent Polish government to remain after 1948.

Indeed, Stalin wanted to grab Warsaw as fast as possible, but this was before the Warsaw Uprising started. Afterwards the Soviets were halted.

The Soviets initially wanted to grab Warsaw, and called for the uprising. Simultaneously, the AK tried to auto-liberate and both help the Soviets and beat them to the liberation of Warsaw. The problem was that the Germans concentrated a strong armored corps which mauled the Soviet vanguard (8th Guard tank corps in particular), while the Poles didn't manage to link up - again, the Germans had more to do with this than the Poles themselves.

Second stage: Stalin believes something like "oh well, I'm not going to get Warsaw but the uprising will soon petter out anyway". That was his second mistake, as the Poles fought on until October, making the Soviets look bad. The Red Army tried again to reach Warsaw, but with no greater success.

At that stage, Stalin could either pass for a well-meaning person whose army had been stopped by the Germans short of helping the Poles, or for a cold-hearted murderer at the head of an invincible army. Not surprisingly, he preferred the latter image as more likely to keep people in line, so he didn't object to letting it be known that the Red Army could have liberated Warsaw if it had really wanted. But that's a myth. Stalin certainly didn't mind dead Poles (and he turned down offers of Allied cooperation which would have helped the Polish insurgents, although not altered the final outcome), but he had genuinely tried to capture Warsaw and failed.

After all, it's not as if Stalin needed the Germans to murder his AK "allies": the Red Army had proved perfectly adequate to "dispose" of them when Polish towns had been liberated in joint operations prior to Warsaw.

Yup, sad but true. I always wondered why both Churchill and Rosevelt (especially the latter) both started playing Stalin's game. I'm afraid it was simply stupidity, nothing more...

Try to picture the Red Army either making a deal with the Germans, or simply stopping in its tracks for a few months, say in early 1944. What do you figure that the cost in additional US/UK casualties would be ? THAT was the reason why Roosevelt & Churchill largely played along with Stalin.

Also, why would the Germans agree for such a truce and why would they withdraw their troops from the east even if such a truce was signed? Perhaps Hitler was a moron, but not that of a moron as to believe in Stalins declarations... especially as bizarre...

Hitler used 100% of his new production and the bulk of the newly-raised reserves from the Replacement Army to bolster the West Front in the Fall of 1944, at a time when the Soviets were on the Vistula. He redeployed 2 SS armored corps from the east which fought on D-Day in 1944. He used his strategic reserves in the Ardennes rather than to stop the impending Vistula-Oder Soviet offensive.

Hitler wanted to win the war AGAINST ALL HIS ENEMIES, not just the Soviets. He was trying to replace his losses and hold all fronts. If the Soviets don't attrite the Ostheer and he can "hold" the front with less units, then the additional troops plus all the replacements and the new production, are going to go West instead of being split 50/50. Check out the number of German troops killed by the Soviets in 1944-45, and imagine the additional Allied effort to kill those same troops.

 

[unmerged(26744)]

I wonder what are you basing the assumption that industry investments pay back after 5 years. Hearts of Iron?

No, just the fact that this spending on defense industry was deduced from the military budget, with much of the spending on actual weapons being pushed back to 1940-42.

 

[unmerged(26744)]

What I simply don't understand is why F/B didn't tell Poland the truth, so Poland defence would be constructed around long term defence in the south (Romanian Bridgehead plan variant) with little dependence on quick relief action from the Western front.

Britain didn't tell the Poles anything, because everyone knew that the British had no army so the Poles didn't even bother asking.

France promised the Poles to do something for different reasons, basically the Poles pleaded with the French political leadership which thought it wouldn't do to weasel out of prior military commitments and tell the Poles that they would be on their own, but the government didn't really know about the military situation. Gamelin, who did know about the military situation, had no intention of helping the Poles and of launching a serious offensive.

There's no denying that the Poles were explicitely lied to, and that the French (mostly, with the British to a lesser degree) deceived them. What I disagree with are the claims that 1/ the French actually had an opportunity to achieve decisive results in the west while Germany was bashing Poland, and 2/ the new claim that the Polish deployment was linked to the French commitment. It wasn't. In fact, the French wanted the Poles to defend in depth behind the Vistula.

But the bottom line is that each country looks after its own: France was perfectly willing to let Poland die while it was conducting its own mobilization unhindered. Britain was perfectly willing to go to war with 2 divisions, relying on others to take the brunt of the casualties. The USA was perfectly willing to "fight" Nazi Germany by selling weapons to the Allies, meanwhile making quite a bit of money on the side. Italy was perfectly willing to play jackal and pick the best bits, except that Benito miscalculated.

Nations don't behave nicely with each other. Live with it.

 

[Cavalry]

As for Russian claims on Poland, you may want to read up about the Polish-Soviet War. Russians - or rather Soviets - had of course claimed much of Polish territories, but not because of any significant Russian population, simply because they conquered those territories, lost in the IWW and now wanted them back... .

I found that some Ukrainian don't like the Pole very much. It is not the Russian claims on Poland anymore. It is the independent of Ukraine. It is the land of Bielorussia and Ukraina, and they are part of Soviet Union. Nothing for Russia, just a chance to die for their Ukraina friend! At least Ukraina is equal with Russia in the Union, but it may just end up as a vassal in a Greater Poland!

While some talk about Polish-Ukraina alliance, I found some said somewhere the new Poland just want to re-establishe the Greater Poland! And it is not very good for Ukraina!

 

[unmerged(38830)]

All the above-mentioned factors played in, but the most important in my opinion was the fact that the polish army not only was deployed close to the front, but also along the ENTIRE border to Germany, notably the land corridor to the Baltic sea, a huge miscalculation as this meant sure encirclement and destruction of a vast portion of the quite capable army up north. It is not at all impossible that UK and France migth have acted differently from what they did if the poles had traded space for time and preserved their forces, although SU stabbing them in the back was a terrible misfortune.

Would the western allies have dared help Poland directly if it meant alienating the Soviets further? One can only speculate...but to return to the original question, I´ll join the chorus and say no, the Polish Army is not to powerful in game.

 

[Halibutt]

France promised the Poles to do something for different reasons, basically the Poles pleaded with the French political leadership which thought it wouldn't do to weasel out of prior military commitments and tell the Poles that they would be on their own, but the government didn't really know about the military situation. Gamelin, who did know about the military situation, had no intention of helping the Poles and of launching a serious offensive.

Beeep - wrong answer. It was Gamelin himself who signed the treaty.

1/ the French actually had an opportunity to achieve decisive results in the west while Germany was bashing Poland,

This is disputable. Once I believed that the Germans would have no chance to defend Rhineland against a French assault. Now I'm not so sure about it, but again, I see no proofs of either opinion.

2/ the new claim that the Polish deployment was linked to the French commitment. It wasn't. In fact, the French wanted the Poles to defend in depth behind the Vistula.

So what for was the Polish HQ trying to gain time?
Cheers

 

[Halibutt]

This is not really true. The first bombing of London occured on August 23-24 when German bombers accidentally dropped bombs into the city. The first purposeful raid against civilians was committed by the RAF on August 25-26. The RAF raid was an extremely small bomber attack that was specifically aimed at reprisal for the German bombs that had fallen in London.

Sorry to quote GW Bush in such a honourable society, but... you forgot Poland. The Polish-British agreement had lots of declarations, and only one of them could be fulfilled by the Brits: retaliation against the Germans should they start attacking civilian targets in Poland. The Krauts started on September 1st, on the very first hours of the war. And what did the Brits do? Nothing.

No, just the fact that this spending on defense industry was deduced from the military budget, with much of the spending on actual weapons being pushed back to 1940-42.

If you mean the Central Industrial Region (COP in Polish), then much of it was actually financed by private investors. Also, it is the first time I hear that it was built by the Polish Army. Could you elaborate?

Yes, there is. And I note that there weren't 200k French volunteers, but 20% of that number. The others were "volunteer" WORKERS (e.g. building trenches, doing laundry work in Kriegsmarine bases, etc). Or didn't Germany use Polish workers, too?

There is a difference between Slave workers and volunteer workers, paid for their service to the German war machine. I thought it is rather obvious, but apparently I was wrong.

Again, it all depends on what you call "cooperate". The Germans simply weren't prepared to offer the Vichy France deal to the Poles, for ideological reasons. "Notable Poles" were less enclined than the French to cooperate in the first place (mostly because they didn't think that the conquest of Poland meant Allied defeat, while the Vichy French did) but the main difference was that the Germans simply didn't try to set up a puppet.

The matter needs further studies, but there is evidence that at least one Polish politician was proposed to head some sort of a Polish government after 1939 - Kazimierz Bartel. Check the wiki article on him for a short biographical note on him.

My point wasn't to try and make the French / Poles / Chinese / Rumanians / etc. score points over each other, for the record I think that in the 1940-45 period Poland resisted more as a % of its resources than any of these other contenders. I was just trying to make sense of this "4th ally" claim which so many countries made (see the book "third axis, fourth ally" about the WWII Rumanians).

Sure, agree with that. On the other hand, it's the first time I hear about the Romanian claim to be the 4th ally, though I must admit that I don't know much about the Romanian forces fighting against the Germans and Hungarians in WWII.

A screening force means that fighting goes on and this is a real invasion, not a "liberation" as claimed for Austria, so the Allies get a chance to join. The historical deployment didn't improve the odds that the Allies might support Poland but lowered the odds of Poland successfully resisting. I'm well-aware of the reason why the Poles picked that deployment, I just don't agree with them. Just as I'm well-aware of the reasons why Gamelin sent his only strategic reserve to Holland, but don't agree with them.

Knowing what I know 60 years afterwards I also disagree with the Polish plan. However, the screening force would have to be big enough not to give an impression that it was but a police force and some local bands (as the German propaganda would most probably call those units). So, it would have to be big enough and would actually weaken the Polish defence, since it would be split in two from the very first hours of the war: large part of the forces screening the border, without much chance to withdraw since behind them is a huge gap, and then the rest dislocated some 300 kilometres behind. This makes the whole plan of shortening the front line problematic, to say the least. What is the sense of it if you don't have enough divisions to defend the new line?

Again, tanks were perfectly adequate to stop other tanks prior to 1944. Try Gembloux, Crusader, 1st Alamein, Kursk...

But not in 1939 or 1940. There were tanks that could do that, but actual tank to tank combat was a very rare case, usually it was tank-AT or tank-infantry combat. Even in France in 1940 the case was the same.

And you may want to look up the terms of the "agreement" regarding other countries... like "50-50" ending up meaning "communist".

Yup, but this was a matter of the Yalta talks. I can't remember any agreements on the future of Greece in Yalta.

Yes, that's just my point. Stalin signed a treaty in which he repudiated the parts of his pact with Germany that he no longer wished to adhere to, but the Allies couldn't force him to sign a treaty committing to restoring the 1939 border with Poland.

Nope. He did sign such treaty - the problem was that he later changed his mind - and the Allies backed him up. All they had to do is not to back him up, they didn't need to force him to anything.

Allied help to the USSR in July 1941 consisting of Hopkings meeting Stalin on 28 July. The first Allied convoys (7 ships) left 21 August. Looking at US deliveries only, 180 tanks, 150 aircraft and 8,300 other vehicles were sent in 1941. For 1942 the figures are 3,000 tanks, 2,500 aircraft and 79,000 other
vehicles shipped. In 1943 another 920 tanks, 5,150 aircraft and
144,400 other vehicles were shipped. Through 30 June 1945 an
additional 2,900 tanks, 6,650 aircraft and 188,700 other vehicles were
shipped.

"Large part" is a considerable exageration. Lend-lease was between 5% and 10% of the Soviet war effort (depending on estimates), and the bulk of the shipments arrived in the second half of the war, after the Allies knew they were going to win.

Hmmm... thanks for the numbers, apparently we interprete them differently. For me 10% gained at no expence - just as a gift, is a large part.

Try to picture the Red Army either making a deal with the Germans, or simply stopping in its tracks for a few months, say in early 1944. What do you figure that the cost in additional US/UK casualties would be ? THAT was the reason why Roosevelt & Churchill largely played along with Stalin.

I still fail to understand what would Stalin win by signing such an agreement with Germany or by simply stopping his troops. Where would Hitler redirect his forces after he pushed the Allies back to the sea?

Hitler used 100% of his new production and the bulk of the newly-raised reserves from the Replacement Army to bolster the West Front in the Fall of 1944, at a time when the Soviets were on the Vistula. He redeployed 2 SS armored corps from the east which fought on D-Day in 1944. He used his strategic reserves in the Ardennes rather than to stop the impending Vistula-Oder Soviet offensive.

Hitler wanted to win the war AGAINST ALL HIS ENEMIES, not just the Soviets. He was trying to replace his losses and hold all fronts. If the Soviets don't attrite the Ostheer and he can "hold" the front with less units, then the additional troops plus all the replacements and the new production, are going to go West instead of being split 50/50. Check out the number of German troops killed by the Soviets in 1944-45, and imagine the additional Allied effort to kill those same troops.

Bah, I thought we are speaking of early 1944, when the Soviets were still in their own soil, not of autumn-winter.
Cheers

 

[unmerged(38177)]

poland was EASY

Where have been your problem.... in my game, Sept 21 was ANNEX DAY. :rofl:

 

[unmerged(26744)]

Beeep - wrong answer. It was Gamelin himself who signed the treaty.

No, the answer is correct. No new treaty was signed, what Gamelin signed was a military convention, i.e. a clarification of previous treaties if you will. And the reason why he signed was because of negociations at the political level between the Polish delegation and the French government. Essentially, Daladier overpromised as a sop to the desperate pleas of the Poles, just as in 1940 Bullitt (US ambassador in France) led the French premiers to expect more from the US than FDR was willing (or would have been able) to deliver when confronted with desperate French pleas of assistance.

Gamelin didn't ask for the convention himself, although he had no problem with it because he didn't intend to keep his part of the bargain (i.e. launch a serious offensive early on) while considering that it might bolster Polish morale and sustained Polish resistance was useful for France to complete her mobilization unhindered.

This is disputable. Once I believed that the Germans would have no chance to defend Rhineland against a French assault. Now I'm not so sure about it, but again, I see no proofs of either opinion.

Well, the burden of proof lies with those who make the claim. People who claim that France could have successfully invaded Germany in 1939 should support their argument, and so far I haven't seen anything to that effect except for some usually false figures about troop deployments on both sides. I already wrote in a previous post why I was highly dubious that the French, even if they had been led by Napoleon, could have broken through in time to save the Poles in 1939.

So what for was the Polish HQ trying to gain time?

I don't really understand that question. The Poles were trying to gain time for the Allies to intervene because they believed - mistakenly - that the cavalry was coming and they only had to hold on for a little longer. The French wanted the Poles to keep the Germans occupied while they conducted their own mobilization, during which time they (French) would be vulnerable.

The Polish-British agreement had lots of declarations, and only one of them could be fulfilled by the Brits: retaliation against the Germans should they start attacking civilian targets in Poland.

No, just "all support and assistance in [each contracting party's] power". The text is available online

If you mean the Central Industrial Region (COP in Polish), then much of it was actually financed by private investors. Also, it is the first time I hear that it was built by the Polish Army. Could you elaborate?

Afraid I can't, as I'm reluctant to dig up the book to see what the author's sources are. What I wrote - from Zaloga - was that some of the investment came out of the military budget which pushed spending on actual armaments back to 1940-42. In other words, the Poles built the COP not entirely from army funds, and not all of their military budget was devoted to that project, but given that the investment didn't have time to pay off by the time of the war, it was a waste of money and therefore one of the things that could be improved according to the question asked.

There is a difference between Slave workers and volunteer workers, paid for their service to the German war machine. I thought it is rather obvious, but apparently I was wrong.

In that case the main difference is that the Polish economic system had broken down with the Germans not interested in restoring it (rather the opposite in fact) while they considered ruling through "normal" local administrative channels more efficient for Western Europe. In either case, the workers were "paid for their service" with wages barely sufficient to sustain them (if at all, in the case of Poles). Don't confuse them with "true" collaborators, like European businessmen who flocked to the German gates to get rich on German war orders (ultimately paid for by their own countrymen).

The matter needs further studies, but there is evidence that at least one Polish politician was proposed to head some sort of a Polish government after 1939 - Kazimierz Bartel. Check the wiki article on him for a short biographical note on him.

Again, my understanding is that "some sort of Polish government" didn't amount to a nominally independent country like Vichy France was. Since the Poles were not offered the same deal as the French, it's hard to claim that they turned it down. Doesn't make the French look any nobler, of course...

This makes the whole plan of shortening the front line problematic, to say the least. What is the sense of it if you don't have enough divisions to defend the new line?

Defending Poland is going to be problematic no matter what. Deploying in depth was IMO the best option, which doesn't mean it gave Poland a good chance.

But not in 1939 or 1940. There were tanks that could do that, but actual tank to tank combat was a very rare case, usually it was tank-AT or tank-infantry combat. Even in France in 1940 the case was the same.

At Hannut and then Gembloux, a German panzer corps was stopped by French tanks. 10th panzer division stopped French armored counterattacks south of Sedan. These are 1940 examples. Yes, most tanks were destroyed by AT guns and not by tanks. That goes for 1939-40 but also for 1944-45. But tanks were also seen as good AT weapons early in the war, not just in 1944-45. And yes, I'm aware of the German doctrine of panzerjägers. Doesn't change my point. The Poles would have been better off consolidating what armor they had, IMO.

Yup, but this was a matter of the Yalta talks. I can't remember any agreements on the future of Greece in Yalta.

Please keep track of your claims. You specifically wrote about Churchill's private deal with Stalin as opposed to Yalta. My point is Stalin reneged on both deals: he failed to provide "freely elected governments" to countries within the Red Army zone as agreed at Yalta, and he didn't pull out of areas "conceded" to Britain with the one exception of Greece where he was forced to (as opposed to withdrawing voluntarily).

Bottom line: the Allied ability to blackmail Stalin is at best undemonstrated by the historical record. And someone mentioned nukes, forgetting that nukes weren't available until August 1945. Nobody in Europe - or the US - was willing to go to war with their former Soviet ally for the sake of Poland in 1945.

Nope. He did sign such treaty - the problem was that he later changed his mind - and the Allies backed him up. All they had to do is not to back him up, they didn't need to force him to anything.

Again, we disagree on what "back him up" means. When Stalin says "the matter is settled, the Soviet Union will accept nothing less", I'm not sure that he needs backup.

Hmmm... thanks for the numbers, apparently we interprete them differently. For me 10% gained at no expence - just as a gift, is a large part.

You wrote that "a large part of the Soviet war machine was US or UK-made". Estimates range between 5% and 10% (that figure being the higher estimates, recent scholarship says the Soviets may well have been right with their 5% figure: see Harrison's "Accounting for war"). Most of the lend-lease was delivered in 1944-45. So by 1941-42, the Soviet war effort was overwhelmingly locally-produced.

I still fail to understand what would Stalin win by signing such an agreement with Germany or by simply stopping his troops. Where would Hitler redirect his forces after he pushed the Allies back to the sea?

Stalin would get a free stab at a relatively undefended German front while German troops got close to the shore (if ever). What he would gain would be less German troops facing him (read: less Soviet casualties, easier advances).

Bah, I thought we are speaking of early 1944, when the Soviets were still in their own soil, not of autumn-winter.

No difference. In early 1944, the Germans were still willing to deploy to counter what they considered the greatest threat: see redeployments to Italy, or the bulk of the Luftwaffe being withdrawn from Russia. At that time, the Soviets were still confident that they could push back the Germans, except it would be costly.

You asked why Germany would redeploy away from Russia, the answer was "Germany keeping the communists at arm's length in priority is a myth prior to April 1945". It is supported by the historical troop & reinforcement deployments.

 

[Halibutt]

No, the answer is correct. No new treaty was signed, what Gamelin signed was a military convention, i.e. a clarification of previous treaties if you will. And the reason why he signed was because of negotiations at the political level between the Polish delegation and the French government. Essentially, Daladier overpromised as a sop to the desperate pleas of the Poles, just as in 1940 Bullitt (US ambassador in France) led the French premiers to expect more from the US than FDR was willing (or would have been able) to deliver when confronted with desperate French pleas of assistance.

Gamelin didn't ask for the convention himself, although he had no problem with it because he didn't intend to keep his part of the bargain (i.e. launch a serious offensive early on) while considering that it might bolster Polish morale and sustained Polish resistance was useful for France to complete her mobilization unhindered.

Bah, at last someone who has actually read the text. Thanks God you're here We're both right on this one, it was what I call a mental shortcut on my side, some sort of "you know what I mean, no need to explain it".

Well, the burden of proof lies with those who make the claim. People who claim that France could have successfully invaded Germany in 1939 should support their argument, and so far I haven't seen anything to that effect except for some usually false figures about troop deployments on both sides. I already wrote in a previous post why I was highly dubious that the French, even if they had been led by Napoleon, could have broken through in time to save the Poles in 1939.

Again, we could discuss the chances for such a break-through ad nauseam. Someone has already mentioned "the longest Polish thread" here - the one on the possibilities of French assault. We've spent some half a year discussing this topic and nobody ever reached the truth... So, let's leave it as it is, such a dispute is a fantasy scenario anyway.

No, just "all support and assistance in [each contracting party's] power". The text is available on-line

Again, good to have you here. I was poking not at the treaty itself (published in the British Blue Book), but at the agreement signed after General Ironside's mission to Warsaw ended (available in the Polish White Book and mentioned in the French Yellow Book, ask your local book seller...if you want him get a stroke ). Ironside promised Poland even more, including the transfer of several RAF squadrons to the Polish soil as an expeditionary corps...

Afraid I can't, as I'm reluctant to dig up the book to see what the author's sources are. What I wrote - from Zaloga - was that some of the investment came out of the military budget which pushed spending on actual armaments back to 1940-42. In other words, the Poles built the COP not entirely from army funds, and not all of their military budget was devoted to that project, but given that the investment didn't have time to pay off by the time of the war, it was a waste of money and therefore one of the things that could be improved according to the question asked.

Might be then, I'm not sure, I'll ask my pals who ate their teeth (as we say here) studying the history of COP.

In that case the main difference is that the Polish economic system had broken down with the Germans not interested in restoring it (rather the opposite in fact) while they considered ruling through "normal" local administrative channels more efficient for Western Europe. In either case, the workers were "paid for their service" with wages barely sufficient to sustain them (if at all, in the case of Poles). Don't confuse them with "true" collaborators, like European businessmen who flocked to the German gates to get rich on German war orders (ultimately paid for by their own countrymen).

For me there still is a difference between people caught in the streets of Warsaw or Kielce and sent to Germany as slaves and people who went to the local Arbeitsamt and volunteered for work in Germany.

Again, my understanding is that "some sort of Polish government" didn't amount to a nominally independent country like Vichy France was. Since the Poles were not offered the same deal as the French, it's hard to claim that they turned it down. Doesn't make the French look any nobler, of course...

It's hard to speculate what would be the powers of such a government since none was ever formed...

Defending Poland is going to be problematic no matter what. Deploying in depth was IMO the best option, which doesn't mean it gave Poland a good chance.

Agreed. This could be seen the lesser of two evils, but was it really so - I'm afraid we'll never find out.

At Hannut and then Gembloux, a German panzer corps was stopped by French tanks. 10th panzer division stopped French armored counter-attacks south of Sedan. These are 1940 examples. Yes, most tanks were destroyed by AT guns and not by tanks. That goes for 1939-40 but also for 1944-45. But tanks were also seen as good AT weapons early in the war, not just in 1944-45. And yes, I'm aware of the German doctrine of panzerjägers. Doesn't change my point.

Again, no disagreement here, I was merely nitpicking, which you saw as an argument to discuss with. No need to, I agree

Again, we disagree on what "back him up" means. When Stalin says "the matter is settled, the Soviet Union will accept nothing less", I'm not sure that he needs backup.

When Stalin signs the agreement with Poland declaring all pacts with the Nazis null and void - it's ok, the Allies accept it. But then Stalin changed his mind and started to probe the Poles and the Allies on how much are they willing to give away. The Poles were not willing to give away anything, so he simply backed down. But the Allies were willing to give away everything, all Poland included, so he proceeded with his pressure until he received the declarations of Churchill and Roosevelt. It's hard to speculate what would be the outcome should the Allies stick to their alliances and pacts and simply say "you've signed an agreement, now it's your turn to fulfil it". Instead they said "You want Poland - it's yours".

You wrote that "a large part of the Soviet war machine was US or UK-made". Estimates range between 5% and 10% (that figure being the higher estimates, recent scholarship says the Soviets may well have been right with their 5% figure: see Harrison's "Accounting for war"). Most of the lend-lease was delivered in 1944-45. So by 1941-42, the Soviet war effort was overwhelmingly locally-produced.

Are you suggesting that in 1941 and 1942 Stalin did not need the Allied supplies he got?

Stalin would get a free stab at a relatively undefended German front while German troops got close to the shore (if ever). What he would gain would be less German troops facing him (read: less Soviet casualties, easier advances).

and

You asked why Germany would redeploy away from Russia, the answer was "Germany keeping the communists at arm's length in priority is a myth prior to April 1945". It is supported by the historical troop & reinforcement deployments.

Again, I'm afraid we won't agree on this one. For me Hitler was a poor strategist and was a psychopath, but not an idiot or a moron. I doubt he would leave his back undefended if the Soviets simply stopped. The two could sign such an agreement in 1939 or even in 1941, but in 1944 it was impossible. Neither Hitler nor Stalin would believe in such an agreement - and a simple break in hostilities would not change much (I mean a break that is similar to those that happened after each offensive, both German and Soviet).

No difference. In early 1944, the Germans were still willing to deploy to counter what they considered the greatest threat: see redeployments to Italy, or the bulk of the Luftwaffe being withdrawn from Russia. At that time, the Soviets were still confident that they could push back the Germans, except it would be costly.

Of course, the greatest threat was a two-front war and they did try to counter it. However, I still fail to understand why would Hitler allow Stalin to reach Berlin in one, major offensive just to repel the western allies. Because such a redirect of significant forces from the eastern front would mean exactly that.
Cheers

 

[unmerged(20827)]

Ironside promised Poland even more, including the transfer of several RAF squadrons to the Polish soil as an expeditionary corps...

Just my two cents in this very very intersting discussion to clarify this point, source "The Polish Air Force At War - The Official History - 1939-1943 Vol 1" by Jerzy B. Cynk

"...Intensive talks between the Polish and French defence chiefs, conducted in Paris in May 1939, pressured the French into signing a provisional bilateral agreement.This obliged France to provide Poland with five bomber squadrons
..."

the airfields for these bomber squadrons from France actually had been prepared - in vain as we all know but it's obvious the trust in the agrrements was high.

P.S. Halibutt, this book is a very complete account of the Polish airforce also in the interwar period, weren't you preparing a 1919-20 war mod? I could dig up the Air forces OOBs, I have also a lot of pics of the first polish aircrafts.

 

[llama_thumper]

wow, a 1919-1920 mod would be great! have always waited for that.
but maybe it would be better to encode that in the 1914 mod? the post ww1 period was very interesting, would be great to see it in HoI2....

----
and full of kopas w dupas

 

[Amadeus]

Very interesting and informative threads..

Very interesting and informative threads.... but quite long to read in a one go.
I just wish to give a small contribution of me too.

Also, i'm pretty sure the only country to "draw sabres" in WWII was a Romanian charge against the soviets late war.

Not really, there were some 16 confirmed cavalry charges in 1939 in Poland, with sabres and all. The interesting thing is that most of them were a success.

You both forget the italian Savoia Cavalleria Rgt. charge at Isbuscenskij near the Don river on the 23 or 24 August 1942, the 2nd Squadrone charge "draw sabres" the soviet lines while the 4th Squadrone at foot engage them frontally, then again the 2nd and 3rd Squadrone charge routing them.
Estimated force engaged: 650 italian horseman against 2000 soviet rifleman !

For me there still is a difference between people caught in the streets of Warsaw or Kielce and sent to Germany as slaves and people who went to the local Arbeitsamt and volunteered for work in Germany.

I'm sorry you are wrong there, of course there was some volunteers (very few indeed) but the most of french workers have not choise at all but to work for german (and sabote as much as they could).
Have you ever heard about the "Service du Travail Obligatoire" and about "la relève" ?
In June 1942 germans ask Vichy for 350000 workers and promit that for each 3 "volunteers" (sic!) 1 french POW would be liberated (there was still a lot of french POW captured in june-july 1940). This projet was a failure !
Then at 11 November 1942 german forces enter Vichy territories for "protecting" them against Allied menace ! They almost immediatly ask for all french workers which don't already works for the german's war economy to be put in a train and send working in Germany. This measure was intended for all men between 16-60 years and all women without child between 18-45 years !
Finally Vichy governement on 16 February 1943 make a law which institute the STO (Service du Travail Obligatoire) for all young man of 20-22 to be forced to work in Germany (i.e. deportated) easy to say they were not happy at all and many of them joined the "Maquis" instead !