why is Japan's industry so weak?

[amalric de g.]

I read it 3 times and still can't find a single word mentioning anything about the railsystem. And there were alot deeper problems with German logistics then different gauge... Organization, Planning, Partisans. Not all these can be fixed by throwing more industry and time at the problem.

Remember that time is working against Germany here. Each extra time Germany gets to build 1 tank or 1 airplanes the allies can use to build 5 tanks and 10 airplanes. And in some sense they already built them if they are not doing lend lease all that effort puts preassure into North Africa, Italy and Normandy instead against Germany. It's not like it just disappears.

No lend lease:
100% of the shells fired in the battle of Moscow
100% telephones and cables in the battle of Mostow
100% radios, they had in the battle of Moscow when they defeated the Germans
100% of the air fuel they had in the battle of Moscow
100% trucks they had in the battle of Moscow
100% train waggons & locs they had supporting the battle of Moscow
100% of the boots the whole Red Army was not bare footed during the battle of Moscow ( please provide me a source of this ).
100% airplane engines that the Soviet used in the battle of Moscow. About 1000 airplanes available which was 2x what the Germans had. ( also please provide me a source that Soviet were not able to build their own airplane engines )


Are you trying to look bad on purpose?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikulin_AM-38
"Number built 36,163"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Klimov_M-105
"About 129,000 M-105 and its variants were built."


I never wrote the could go on the offensive. But they apparently could after the Germans tried to attack Moscow and they counter-attacked? Soviet can build pretty much that stuff themself, it just means they get a 2:1 or 3:1 advantage in tanks over Germany instead of the 5:1 advantage they enjoyed historically, and that they need to wait a bit longer before being able to go on the offensive.

You started the rail and german logistics quest in your last post, not I. Did we talk about the whole Allies and the SU or only the SU?

We only talked about the SU and lend lease or not?

I know that in the end germany had no chance to win the war, thats madness to beliefe that they could do that.

You don´t or you just pretend to not understand the difference of a offensive with largely infantrie and artillerie and mobile warfare, conducted by germany and later the Red Army after the tiny help from the Lend Lease.

Why did you think the Red Army coudn´t throw the germans out of Russia in 1941/1942?

And about the boots, ask some old polish men, as the Red Army marched into Poland in 1939, the first thing they stole was the boots of the men.

From the book "betrayed Revolution":
Voroschilov and Tuchatschewski miss no oportunity to tell the heads of the war industrie, that the delivered goods aren´t of the expected quality..... the boots are more worse than the delivered MGs.

Or why did you think Stalin ordered boots? The US didn´t send nilly willy what they like, Stalin and his government made lists with what they needed.

Sorry i didn´t meant that the SU didn´t build an engine, thats a fact that they build airplane engines, but a engine didn´t life for ever. The Su build 165.000 engines and 136.800 airplanes.
As a comparisson UK and Germany build 2:1 engines : planes, you see the difference?

Poor educational level of armored troops:
The massive and extremely rapid enlargement of the Panzer force in the 1930s (the Soviet Union built 1934-1939 at least 20,000 tanks, Germany at the same time about 2,000) were very limited training capacity for each tank crew available. As military maneuvers expensive and trainers were scarce for Panzerwaffe that Soviet tank crews were trained only insufficiently. Often they were not able to shoot from the movement and the common tactical approach with other tanks and the air forces.Logistical problems Since the Soviet Union focused their upgrade programs in the 1930s on the development of anti-tank weapon, the development of logistics has been neglected: Lacked trucks for the rapid supply of armored and motorized artillery with gasoline, ammunition and spare parts so that these were often not operational or remained lying entirely. Also there were in the Soviet Union for the amount of armor used far too little trained mechanics, so that the available material was maintained deficient even before the war and later at war damaged tanks rarely satisfactory could be restored.

Underdeveloped light industry
The Soviet Union was not able to build an appropriate number of light industrie to the needs of the Red Army in the phase of major industrialization. This was particularly fatal for the procurement of a sufficient number of radio devices and high-quality optical sights for armored forces and the air force.

losses comparison tanks
timeline losses ratio Germany : SU
6/41-2/42 1:5,0
3/42-5/42 1:6,6
6/42-10/42 1:7,9
11/42-3/43 1:1,3
4/43-8/43 1:5,7
9/43-11/43 1:2,5
12/43-6/44 1:1,4
7/44 1:4,0
8/44 1:2,0
9/44 1:1,0
10/44-12/44 1:1,3
1/45-5/45 1:3,5

tanks germany eastfront SU incl. far east
1/45 4.881 16.200 minus 5,218 tanks from UK and 7000 tanks from the US are = 3982 mhhh????!!!!!!!

Thats my last post about this matter.

 

[amalric de g.]

You guys can all down vote my posts all you want. They are accurate, truthful and based on reality. December 1941 was the closest Germany was ever going to be to winning based on their expectations. They failed. Why would ANYONE believe that if Germany at its peak compared to the USSR couldn't win in 1941, it would win in 1942 or 1943 while the scales of power were turning inevitably towards the USSR? From December 1941, Germany is ONLY getting weaker and the USSR is ONLY getting stronger. Germany was never going to be closer to victory.

If the USSR didn't collapse in 1941 before lend lease played a role, it was not going to collapse a year later with the USSR that much stronger and Germany that much weaker. Lend lease or otherwise.

The problem here, is that people can't divorce narrative from reality. It's important to the national pride of a lot of people if we inflate our role in defeating Germany.

My grandfather on my mothers side fought in WW2 for Canada. My grandfather and like 6 of his brothers fought for the USA in WW2, some in Europe and some in the Pacific. I'm very proud of what they did, what they risked, and what they accomplished. I don't however think we need to continue to portray some sort of false narrative that the USA saved the world from the clutches of defeat at the last minute. That is, what the lend lease debate is about. It is an argument that is steeped in nationalism, and cold war propaganda.

Most of that cold war propaganda was written by German commanders that had real biases and hatred for the USSR, and had vested interests in selling their version of the war. A lot of it is also just not knowing what happened because they only had 1 side of the story.

However, there was a very real, and very pervasive effort in the late 40's 50's 60's 70's and early 80's to outright dismiss the Soviet contribution, and to paint a picture that our efforts were what allowed the USSR to survive, Lend Lease is an example. As I perused this thread, and I saw people quoting numbers I couldn't help but shake my head. Lot of the numbers represent manipulation. Others are put without context. The Trucks and Locomotives are especially egregious. The USSR produced hundreds of thousands of trucks. They also had 10's of thousands of locomotives. The old 2000 locomotive figure sounds impressive, until you consider that, off the top of my head, the USSR had 28000 locomotives in its fleet. Giving numbers without context is what arguing about Lend Lease is all about. It's a continuation of American exceptionalism, that is actually still alive and well among some circles of people in the USA to this day. Ironicially, over 62% of all lend lease arrived in 1944 and 1945. Context.

We should be proud of what we did. We shouldn't try to steal valor to puff ourselves up.

About your trucks build in the UDSSR, 175.000 were build during the war, not one truck more and not one truck had 4X4. Most of the army prewar trucks were destroyed in 1941.

About the train waggons and locs, i didn´t have exact numbers of the losses, but it´s fair to estimate that most of them are operating in the western SU, Germany had from 1941 until half of 1943 air superiority, how many train waggons and locs survived?

The exact number of Russian locs incl. passenger locs and heavy duty locs is 14910 locs build during 1890 and 1945 including the 2000 LL locs. So 12910 locs were build or bought by Russia.

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_russischer_und_sowjetischer_Triebfahrzeuge

I didn´t find the source anymore with the 1941 - 1942 Lend lease but it was not a tiny number.

"According to research by a team of Soviet historians, the Soviet Union lost a staggering 20,500 tanks from June 22 to December 31, 1941. At the end of November 1941, only 670 Soviet tanks were available to defend Moscow—that is, in the recently formed Kalinin, Western, and Southwestern Fronts. Only 205 of these tanks were heavy or medium types, and most of their strength was concentrated in the Western Front, with the Kalinin Front having only two tank battalions (67 tanks) and the Southwestern Front two tank brigades (30 tanks).

Given the disruption to Soviet production and Red Army losses, the Soviet Union was understandably eager to put British armor into action as soon as possible. According to Biriukov’s service diary, the first 20 British tanks arrived at the Soviet tank training school in Kazan on October 28, 1941, at which point a further 120 tanks were unloaded at the port of Archangel in northern Russia. Courses on the British tanks for Soviet crews started during November as the first tanks, with British assistance, were being assembled from their in-transit states and undergoing testing by Soviet specialists.

The tanks reached the front lines with extraordinary speed. Extrapolating from available statistics, researchers estimate that British-supplied tanks made up 30 to 40 percent of the entire heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941, and certainly made up a significant proportion of tanks available as reinforcements at this critical point in the fighting. By the end of 1941 Britain had delivered 466 tanks out of the 750 promised.

The British Military Mission to Moscow noted that by December 9, about ninety British tanks had already been in action with Soviet forces. The first of these units to have seen action seems to have been the 138th Independent Tank Battalion (with twenty-one British tanks), which was involved in stemming the advance of German units in the region of the Volga Reservoir to the north of Moscow in late November. In fact the British intercepted German communications indicating that German forces had first come in contact with British tanks on the Eastern front on November 26, 1941.

The exploits of the British-equipped 136th Independent Tank Battalion are perhaps the most widely noted in the archives. It was part of a scratch operational group of the Western Front consisting of the 18th Rifle Brigade, two ski battalions, the 5th and 20th Tank Brigades, and the 140th Independent Tank Battalion. The 136th Independent Tank Battalion was combined with the latter to produce a tank group of only twenty-one tanks, which was to operate with the two ski battalions against German forces advancing to the west of Moscow in early December. Other largely British-equipped tank units in action with the Western Front from early December were the 131st Independent Tank Brigade, which fought to the east of Tula, south of Moscow, and 146th Tank Brigade, in the region of Kriukovo to the immediate west of the Soviet capital."

Thats from the magazine WWII

I think LL was essential for the SU, case closed.

 

[egslim]

You guys can all down vote my posts all you want. They are accurate, truthful and based on reality. December 1941 was the closest Germany was ever going to be to winning based on their expectations. They failed. Why would ANYONE believe that if Germany at its peak compared to the USSR couldn't win in 1941, it would win in 1942 or 1943 while the scales of power were turning inevitably towards the USSR? From December 1941, Germany is ONLY getting weaker and the USSR is ONLY getting stronger. Germany was never going to be closer to victory.

If the USSR didn't collapse in 1941 before lend lease played a role, it was not going to collapse a year later with the USSR that much stronger and Germany that much weaker. Lend lease or otherwise.

[...]

Most of that cold war propaganda was written by German commanders that had real biases and hatred for the USSR, and had vested interests in selling their version of the war. A lot of it is also just not knowing what happened because they only had 1 side of the story.

However, there was a very real, and very pervasive effort in the late 40's 50's 60's 70's and early 80's to outright dismiss the Soviet contribution, and to paint a picture that our efforts were what allowed the USSR to survive, Lend Lease is an example. As I perused this thread, and I saw people quoting numbers I couldn't help but shake my head. Lot of the numbers represent manipulation. Others are put without context. The Trucks and Locomotives are especially egregious. The USSR produced hundreds of thousands of trucks. They also had 10's of thousands of locomotives. The old 2000 locomotive figure sounds impressive, until you consider that, off the top of my head, the USSR had 28000 locomotives in its fleet. Giving numbers without context is what arguing about Lend Lease is all about. It's a continuation of American exceptionalism, that is actually still alive and well among some circles of people in the USA to this day. Ironicially, over 62% of all lend lease arrived in 1944 and 1945. Context.

Bullseye!

 

[egslim]

Extrapolating from available statistics, researchers estimate that British-supplied tanks made up 30 to 40 percent of the entire heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941, and certainly made up a significant proportion of tanks available as reinforcements at this critical point in the fighting. By the end of 1941 Britain had delivered 466 tanks out of the 750 promised.

The British Military Mission to Moscow noted that by December 9, about ninety British tanks had already been in action with Soviet forces.

The German offensive ended December 5, so the key number here is "90" - in other words, a drop in the ocean. As Invader_Canuck pointed out, there's a significant time difference between delivering a tank of unknown model, and actually using it to fight.

According to wikipedia, Stalin transferred 1700 tanks from Siberia and the Far East. Those were available as soon as they rolled off the train.

http://ww2-weapons.com/lend-lease-tanks-and-aircrafts/
At the beginning of 1943, there were 1,023 Lend-Lease tanks in Russian units although 6,179 had been received since 1941.
This shows the Lend-Lease tanks were not very efficient to use - only 1/6 remained in service after (on average) 6 months. Probably due to the lack of spares and knowledge how to repair a foreign design.

 

[shri]

Eduard Wagner the Quartermaster General of the Wehrmacht in 1941 reported on 27 November 1941 that
"We are at the end of our resources in both personnel and material. We are about to be confronted with the dangers of deep winter."
Shows long before the British Tanks were on the Front (9th Dec as reported), the Germans had admitted defeat and started preparation of a "Strategically Defensive Posture".

To put it bluntly- the Battle of Moscow and the chance to crush the USSR was gone. Never again would the Germans have the strength to attack on a broad front ever. And all of this was done without a drop of LL by the USSR alone.
LL only mattered in the great offensives of the USSR in 1943 and 44 onward and by then the war was already decided. It only accelerated the fall started in the "battle of Moscow".

 

[SchwarzKatze]

Enough with the derailing please. Maybe a mod could split the posts into another thread if you're all eager to continue.

 

[Loke]

Enough with the derailing please. Maybe a mod could split the posts into another thread if you're all eager to continue.

Agreed, Im guilty aswell. Back on Japans industry

 

[franc001sher]

The history of the Japanese industry was very short at the game era and it was just as short as that of the Chinese industry nowadays. Imagine what the "made in China" means. That was just what "made in Japan" meant before and during the WWII.

 

[Gotomtom]

I shall respect the call to re-rail this post.

For the source as I wasn't just randomly saying things, I based it off of:
Absolute war, Soviet Russia in the second world war
Chris Belamy
9780330510042

mainly that book. It goes in depth into the behind the scene secret agents, spies, (mi6, nkvd etc.), economy, production, loses and so on, it does make use of (newly) released Soviet and Russian sources and documents, as well as German, British and American.

For the China and Japan theater I have read the following interesting books people might be interested it:
Japans Imperial Army, its rise and fall, 1853-1945
Edward J. Drea
9780700616633
Deals mostly with the evolution of the Japanese army, but includes mobilization tables and expenditure of income on the Military, also talks about the turmoils within the army, and between army and navy, the infighting over tradition vs. modernization etc.

The Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-Shek and the struggle for modern China.
Jay Taylor
9780674060494
Mostly about China obviously, includes allot of politics, espcially between the KMT, the CCP the USSR and the USA, but pretty much all from the Chiang's points of view. Less useful for the Japanese industry, but does show, far better then the imperial army book, how the Japanese managed to fight with often inferior weapons.

Those 2 combined make for a pretty powerful combination as you find out what the Japanese army was doing, and then look at how this impacted China from the Chinese perspective. I have read more on the subject of the far east during WW2 but these 2 books are by far my main source of reference at this point. Atleast it is not wikipedia knowledge

 

[Invader_Canuck]

About your trucks build in the UDSSR, 175.000 were build during the war, not one truck more and not one truck had 4X4. Most of the army prewar trucks were destroyed in 1941.

About the train waggons and locs, i didn´t have exact numbers of the losses, but it´s fair to estimate that most of them are operating in the western SU, Germany had from 1941 until half of 1943 air superiority, how many train waggons and locs survived?

The exact number of Russian locs incl. passenger locs and heavy duty locs is 14910 locs build during 1890 and 1945 including the 2000 LL locs. So 12910 locs were build or bought by Russia.

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_russischer_und_sowjetischer_Triebfahrzeuge

I didn´t find the source anymore with the 1941 - 1942 Lend lease but it was not a tiny number.

"According to research by a team of Soviet historians, the Soviet Union lost a staggering 20,500 tanks from June 22 to December 31, 1941. At the end of November 1941, only 670 Soviet tanks were available to defend Moscow—that is, in the recently formed Kalinin, Western, and Southwestern Fronts. Only 205 of these tanks were heavy or medium types, and most of their strength was concentrated in the Western Front, with the Kalinin Front having only two tank battalions (67 tanks) and the Southwestern Front two tank brigades (30 tanks).

Given the disruption to Soviet production and Red Army losses, the Soviet Union was understandably eager to put British armor into action as soon as possible. According to Biriukov’s service diary, the first 20 British tanks arrived at the Soviet tank training school in Kazan on October 28, 1941, at which point a further 120 tanks were unloaded at the port of Archangel in northern Russia. Courses on the British tanks for Soviet crews started during November as the first tanks, with British assistance, were being assembled from their in-transit states and undergoing testing by Soviet specialists.

The tanks reached the front lines with extraordinary speed. Extrapolating from available statistics, researchers estimate that British-supplied tanks made up 30 to 40 percent of the entire heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941, and certainly made up a significant proportion of tanks available as reinforcements at this critical point in the fighting. By the end of 1941 Britain had delivered 466 tanks out of the 750 promised.

The British Military Mission to Moscow noted that by December 9, about ninety British tanks had already been in action with Soviet forces. The first of these units to have seen action seems to have been the 138th Independent Tank Battalion (with twenty-one British tanks), which was involved in stemming the advance of German units in the region of the Volga Reservoir to the north of Moscow in late November. In fact the British intercepted German communications indicating that German forces had first come in contact with British tanks on the Eastern front on November 26, 1941.

The exploits of the British-equipped 136th Independent Tank Battalion are perhaps the most widely noted in the archives. It was part of a scratch operational group of the Western Front consisting of the 18th Rifle Brigade, two ski battalions, the 5th and 20th Tank Brigades, and the 140th Independent Tank Battalion. The 136th Independent Tank Battalion was combined with the latter to produce a tank group of only twenty-one tanks, which was to operate with the two ski battalions against German forces advancing to the west of Moscow in early December. Other largely British-equipped tank units in action with the Western Front from early December were the 131st Independent Tank Brigade, which fought to the east of Tula, south of Moscow, and 146th Tank Brigade, in the region of Kriukovo to the immediate west of the Soviet capital."

Thats from the magazine WWII

I think LL was essential for the SU, case closed.

I believe you are literally citing sources I have produced on these forums and coming to the wrong conclusion. Most of these un-sourced comments you used are things I have posted on these forums repeatedly, WITH the source information.

You are then talking about Alexander Hill, whose numbers are completely wrong. (EDIT) I will update this post when I cut/paste a wall of text refuting Alexander Hill.

Sources

At the end of November 1941, only 670 Soviet tanks were available to defend Moscow—that is, in the recently formed Kalinin, Western, and Southwestern Fronts. Only 205 of these tanks were heavy or medium types, and most of their strength was concentrated in the Western Front, with the Kalinin Front having only two tank battalions (67 tanks) and the Southwestern Front two tank brigades (30 tanks). - P.A. Rotmistrov, Vremia i tanki (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972) p. 107-118

On October 28th, British Valentine tanks arrived at a tank training school in Kazan and 120 more tanks were unloaded at Archangel- Biriukov, Tanki-frontu! Zapiski sovetskogo generala (Rusich, 2005) p. 16, 47

At the conclusion of 1941 the British had delivered 466 tanks, 259 Valentines, and 145 Matildas, the remainder were the Tetrarch - Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie konvoi, p. 49, 52

The British Military Mission in Moscow reported that by 9 December approximately 90 tanks had been in action. - Secret Cipher Telegram, From: 30 Military Mission, To: The War Office, Reed 11/12/41, WO 193/580

The total number of British tanks in service with Soviet formations at 46 tanks on 20 December. Kolomiets, M. Moshchanskiy, I. Tanki Lend-Liza [Lend Lease Tanks], (Eksprint, 2000, Moscow) p. 17

Moshchanskiy and Kolomiets indicate that during the Battle for Moscow, no more than 2% of the total numbers of armored vehicles were of British make. Same source.

The Matilda and Valentine were capable of traversing through 35 and 40cm of snow respectively while the T-34 and KV-1 could operate in up to 70cm of snow leading to the recommendation that these tanks be held back until conditions were more favorable. -
Soobrazheniia ABTU Zapadnogo fronta v Operativnii otdel Genshtaba KA po ABTU, sostavlennie na osnove opita boevikh deistvii tankovikh chastei, 19 ianvaria 1942 g., in Glavnoe avtobronetankovoe upravlenie. Liudi, sobitiia, fakti i dokumentakh—1940–1942 gg. (Moscow: GABTU, 2005), p. 168
By mid December the typical training period was just 15 days for tank crews on these weapons. N. Biriukov, Tanki – frontu! Zapiski sovetskogo generala (Smolensk: Rusich, 2005) p. 47, 53, 69

By the end of 1942 "almost half of foreign tanks broke down at disembarkation points or in transit due to inappropriate use and maintenance. A significant portion, getting to the point of contact with the enemy, did not remain in combat for technical reasons." M. Suprun Lend-liz i severnie konvoi 1941–1945 (Moscow: Andreevskii flag, 1997), p. 52

Alexander Hill, the source the wikipedia article you used to come up with your figure of medium and heavy tanks, grossly exaggerated the number of tanks in operation. Moreover, he classifies them. Matildas and Valentines are not medium and heavy tanks, they are light and medium.

Lastly, to correct your first paragraph. You don't understand the Soviet method of tabulating losses. Any vehicle damaged that required battle damage repairs, were counted as "lost". This is also part of how the USSR bolstered their tank production numbers. Vehicles "lost" then "repaired" were counted as a new production.

This is where the myth that German armor ran around with 10-1 kill death ratios comes from. Germans only counted losses of lost tanks. Russians counted any vehicle damaged but recovered also as lost, even when it could be put back into service in a week or so.

 

[Zaku]

You are then talking about Alexander Hill, whose numbers are completely wrong. (EDIT) I will update this post when I cut/paste a wall of text refuting Alexander Hill.

Don't. If you want an internet arguement contest do it in private. Please stop derailing the topic.

 

[aqvamare]

http://forum.axishistory.com/index.php?sid=8d402a83cf03910cc46bb2633de545bc

off topic please in this forum

 

[Sun_Wu]

Please stop derailing the thread

Did you ever look at real Japanese equipment from that era? The amount of materials that went into them were downright stingy compared to Western European standards. Picture a truck with one headlight, because two was redundant, and a paper composite back to the cab because that saved metal and weight. Their standard service rifle design had been upgraded from just over .22 caliber to heavier and more expensive rounds of around .25 caliber, compared to the roughly .30 caliber used by most western nations, and ammunition was often in short supply. How about a light infantry fieldpiece with only about as much metal in the thin-walled barrel as most light mortars? There were medium field pieces, but true "heavy" artillery was extremely rare. Everything was underbuilt because (A) metal was still relatively scarce even with access to Manchuria, and (B) carrying anything heavier over the horrendous terrain without decent roads and with limited rail access practically demanded lighter equipment.

Japan did an amazing job of utilizing what little industry and resources it had, but it was not an industrial powerhouse by any stretch of the imagination until well after WWII. Both their technical knowledge and industrial base were steadily growing, particularly for producing ships and aircraft, but they were still fighting on a shoestring budget in comparison to the west. Giving them the industry to produce massive amounts of artillery, tanks, and other equipment, rather than large amounts of highly motivated and decently trained "light infantry", and STILL field a competitive navy and air force, would be extremely unrealistic.

Don't forget Japanese soldiers were slight in stature, the average Japanese soldier in WWII was about as tall as the average white woman is now, this means that they simply could not carry as much as Western troops, especially Americans (who were historically a fair bit taller than most countries).

You are absolutely right that heavy equipment would have been grossly inappropriate and a liability in Southeast Asia.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

You are absolutely right that heavy equipment would have been grossly inappropriate and a liability in Southeast Asia.

Historically Japanese brought some super-heavy siege artillery against Hong Kong and Phlippines and would have probably wanted them against Singapore had British not surrendered pre-emptively. Light armour was feature in many of the southern conquests, particularly Malaya where Japanese also had lots (for them) motor vehicles. Later Allies brought tanks in many places to attack Japanese strong points and lack of heavy weaponry for Japan exacerbated their effectiveness. The island stronghold are obvious outlet for heavy weapons as they were static. Etc.

There certainly are situations where heavy weapons were and would have been more of a hindrance than asset, notably flanking maneuvers outside established trails and roads, but I don't think that works as generalization. Japan ingame should want all the heavy weapons it can get, but in domestic production sense it would be a balancing act between navy and well equipped army. Lightly equipped army being best in absolute sense for Japan is bit retroactive.

 

[parkerg12]

So to bring this into a game perspective because one thing japan will always lack is oil. so how does japan gear its industry and its army to overcome this.... oil = tanks = motorized = planes = ships. japan can gain a little oil production through the use of synthetic in game but it is not entirely clear how efficient that will be. where oil will end up being the most important is in the production of carriers and their aircraft. Japan simply does not have the industry to provide there army with any equipment that requires oil or its navy will be left un prepared for war. if it is a historical war tanks and heavy equipment are out of the question... hm sounds pretty much like what happened IRL.

Also to note ships take a while to build and if started and completed when oil if flowing in from the USA there is a good chance japan could complete to production of their navy before the oil gets cut off.

BUT if there is a change in the politics like japan allies china then goes after the soviet union together then things can change drastically. Different wars require different arms

 

[Opanashc]

losses comparison tanks
...

How many tanks were rebuilt by both sides? Germans did not count a tank lost, if they could fix it. Soviets did. Guderian (?) said, that 80% of German tanks knocked out by the enemy, in early war, were fixed. Thus, on average, in 1941 for every tank Germans counted as lost, they had 4 that got knocked out.

 

[mursolini]

How many tanks were rebuilt by both sides? Germans did not count a tank lost, if they could fix it. Soviets did. Guderian (?) said, that 80% of German tanks knocked out by the enemy, in early war, were fixed. Thus, on average, in 1941 for every tank Germans counted as lost, they had 4 that got knocked out.

It doesn`t truly meter. If one would want to actually calculate tank casualties, it would be pretty straight - forward take what is there at the start of time period, add deliveries of new tanks, subtract tanks existing at the end of time period. There, no need to get into accounting BS.

It is hardly shocking to see Soviet tank casualties very high. They had far more tanks to lose, since they had far more in stock and produced much more. The casualty ratio of tanks is not the measure of Soviet tank quality in any way, shape or form.

 

[HumanMarine]

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

Just gonna leave this here.

 

[Loke]

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

Just gonna leave this here.

Interesting, it shows the US superority over Japan in every aspect.

 

[amalric de g.]

I believe you are literally citing sources I have produced on these forums and coming to the wrong conclusion. Most of these un-sourced comments you used are things I have posted on these forums repeatedly, WITH the source information.

You are then talking about Alexander Hill, whose numbers are completely wrong. (EDIT) I will update this post when I cut/paste a wall of text refuting Alexander Hill.

Sources

At the end of November 1941, only 670 Soviet tanks were available to defend Moscow—that is, in the recently formed Kalinin, Western, and Southwestern Fronts. Only 205 of these tanks were heavy or medium types, and most of their strength was concentrated in the Western Front, with the Kalinin Front having only two tank battalions (67 tanks) and the Southwestern Front two tank brigades (30 tanks). - P.A. Rotmistrov, Vremia i tanki (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972) p. 107-118

On October 28th, British Valentine tanks arrived at a tank training school in Kazan and 120 more tanks were unloaded at Archangel- Biriukov, Tanki-frontu! Zapiski sovetskogo generala (Rusich, 2005) p. 16, 47

At the conclusion of 1941 the British had delivered 466 tanks, 259 Valentines, and 145 Matildas, the remainder were the Tetrarch - Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie konvoi, p. 49, 52

The British Military Mission in Moscow reported that by 9 December approximately 90 tanks had been in action. - Secret Cipher Telegram, From: 30 Military Mission, To: The War Office, Reed 11/12/41, WO 193/580

The total number of British tanks in service with Soviet formations at 46 tanks on 20 December. Kolomiets, M. Moshchanskiy, I. Tanki Lend-Liza [Lend Lease Tanks], (Eksprint, 2000, Moscow) p. 17

Moshchanskiy and Kolomiets indicate that during the Battle for Moscow, no more than 2% of the total numbers of armored vehicles were of British make. Same source.

The Matilda and Valentine were capable of traversing through 35 and 40cm of snow respectively while the T-34 and KV-1 could operate in up to 70cm of snow leading to the recommendation that these tanks be held back until conditions were more favorable. -
Soobrazheniia ABTU Zapadnogo fronta v Operativnii otdel Genshtaba KA po ABTU, sostavlennie na osnove opita boevikh deistvii tankovikh chastei, 19 ianvaria 1942 g., in Glavnoe avtobronetankovoe upravlenie. Liudi, sobitiia, fakti i dokumentakh—1940–1942 gg. (Moscow: GABTU, 2005), p. 168
By mid December the typical training period was just 15 days for tank crews on these weapons. N. Biriukov, Tanki – frontu! Zapiski sovetskogo generala (Smolensk: Rusich, 2005) p. 47, 53, 69

By the end of 1942 "almost half of foreign tanks broke down at disembarkation points or in transit due to inappropriate use and maintenance. A significant portion, getting to the point of contact with the enemy, did not remain in combat for technical reasons." M. Suprun Lend-liz i severnie konvoi 1941–1945 (Moscow: Andreevskii flag, 1997), p. 52

Alexander Hill, the source the wikipedia article you used to come up with your figure of medium and heavy tanks, grossly exaggerated the number of tanks in operation. Moreover, he classifies them. Matildas and Valentines are not medium and heavy tanks, they are light and medium.

Lastly, to correct your first paragraph. You don't understand the Soviet method of tabulating losses. Any vehicle damaged that required battle damage repairs, were counted as "lost". This is also part of how the USSR bolstered their tank production numbers. Vehicles "lost" then "repaired" were counted as a new production.

This is where the myth that German armor ran around with 10-1 kill death ratios comes from. Germans only counted losses of lost tanks. Russians counted any vehicle damaged but recovered also as lost, even when it could be put back into service in a week or so.

I knew very well, the SU counting method.

Did you know that the germans only counted enemy tanks as destroyed who burned out. Thats the reason why germans shoot several grenades into enemy tanks until they burned. If the tank don´t catch fire it was not counted.

How many tanks were rebuilt by both sides? Germans did not count a tank lost, if they could fix it. Soviets did. Guderian (?) said, that 80% of German tanks knocked out by the enemy, in early war, were fixed. Thus, on average, in 1941 for every tank Germans counted as lost, they had 4 that got knocked out.

Thats true.

But in the end it didn´t matter, who counted so and the other side counted different. Germany lost nearly all tanks in the end.
The question is:
The SU started with over 20.000 tanks in 1941, from 1941 until 1945 in total the SU build arpoximately 100.000 tanks, including the repaired tanks.

The SU officials claimed 78.000 tanks destroyed, how many are so badly damaged, that a repair is not possible, how many could be repaired, maybe even to or three times?

In 1945 the Red Army had 16.000 tanks on both fronts left. So how many tanks were really destroyed?

Don´t get me wrong on this, i didn´t try to make a contest who is the smartest person out of this. I´m only interested, it´s not easy to find a reliable source, if you can´t read russian.