why is Japan's industry so weak?

[Gotomtom]

I guess I have little to add to what everyone has stated. Let me rephrase my own post then so maybe you understand it a little better:

in 1941 and even in 42 the USSR had the utter bulk(meaning not everything) of its industry on RAILS, I am very sure using a industrial machine half disassembled inside a rail wagon does NOT work.

As such the USSR production within the time frame of 41 and 42 was abysmal (by USSR standard). There for the meager little aid that they did get from the USA was most needed. It does not mean that in terms of production they relied on the USA because the USSR couldn't produce anything themselves, it simply means they had a bad year, after which they recovered and started a production line that could be match by very few nations (essentially the USA only).

They continued to receive lend lease after 42, but these quantities where not very significant compared to the USSR's own production.

People seem to forget that the USSR was about to collapse and get annexed in 41 and 42, and you seem to forget that its industry was NOT operational during these critical 2 years. At such a low in the war any tank from anyone would have been a huge gift. So long as it helped them survive just long enough to get their own production back up.

So yes the USSR produced far more then it got in lend-lease (over the course of the entire war), I am not debating that issue, I am merely stating that what they got in 41 and 42 was at such a critical moment that it actually mattered. Many soviet tank divisions where half Russian half English in tanks (obviously crew being all Russian), yes even the UK gave a lend-lease to Russia, mostly in old obsolete tanks. Obviously the matter of half British tank divisions counts for the early day's in 41 - 42, after that their own tanks(which where superior anyway) where rolling off the assembly lines in huge numbers.

 

[Loke]

I guess I have little to add to what everyone has stated. Let me rephrase my own post then so maybe you understand it a little better:

in 1941 and even in 42 the USSR had the utter bulk(meaning not everything) of its industry on RAILS, I am very sure using a industrial machine half disassembled inside a rail wagon does NOT work.

As such the USSR production within the time frame of 41 and 42 was abysmal (by USSR standard). There for the meager little aid that they did get from the USA was most needed. It does not mean that in terms of production they relied on the USA because the USSR couldn't produce anything themselves, it simply means they had a bad year, after which they recovered and started a production line that could be match by very few nations (essentially the USA only).

They continued to receive lend lease after 42, but these quantities where not very significant compared to the USSR's own production.

People seem to forget that the USSR was about to collapse and get annexed in 41 and 42, and you seem to forget that its industry was NOT operational during these critical 2 years. At such a low in the war any tank from anyone would have been a huge gift. So long as it helped them survive just long enough to get their own production back up.

So yes the USSR produced far more then it got in lend-lease (over the course of the entire war), I am not debating that issue, I am merely stating that what they got in 41 and 42 was at such a critical moment that it actually mattered. Many soviet tank divisions where half Russian half English in tanks (obviously crew being all Russian), yes even the UK gave a lend-lease to Russia, mostly in old obsolete tanks. Obviously the matter of half British tank divisions counts for the early day's in 41 - 42, after that their own tanks(which where superior anyway) where rolling off the assembly lines in huge numbers.

I agree with you, without the external help, the allied LL to Russia, we do not know what would have happened.

Just to pick a few - in theirs "Slaget om Kursk" - 2004 (ISBN 91-7001-091-9) Frankson and Zetterling states on page 104:

- Up til june 30, 1943 the UK and Canada alone had delivered 3300 tanks to the Russian army(the Germans produced about 7000 tanks in 1942 and Germany had other places than Russia to place tanks) so the tanks LL to Russia matters.

- During the war the US delivered 450 000 brand new trucks and it can be compared with the Russian own production of 265 000 trucks. (Most of these Russian made trucks were also licensedproducts of older American trucks...)

 

[amalric de g.]

Now, let us see the war time spending of the USSR-
The GDP of the USSR was approx. $400 Billion in 1940, now granted in 1941 and 1942 this figure would have considerably gone down, still the USSR had over $300 Billion per year on an average in war-time, thus LL works out to 3% of GDP of one year and divided into 4 years of War, it is less than 1% of GDP.

This is from Wiki:
"A total of $50.1 billion (equivalent to $659 billion today) worth of supplies were shipped, or 17% of the total war expenditures of the U.S."

So your maths are plain wrong, thats obvious. $11.3 billion went to the Soviet Union, thats nearly half of their total GDP of one year (1938), thats a substantial help for the SU and not pennys.

 

[Red_warning]

Sure, if the SU had a GDP of $400 Billion in 1940 than they had a greater GDP than the rest of the world. The worlds GDP was in 1938 $240 Billion.

The Nominal National Products of the major powers in 1938, in current dollars:

(1) United States: 84.7 billion
(2) Germany: 46.0 billion*
(3) UK: 27.51 billion
(4) USSR: 23.02 billion
(5) France: 16.18 billion
(6) Italy: 8.68 billion
(7) Japan: 7.49 billion

*Note that Germany's figures includes Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia, as they were annexed into the country in 1938.

Estimated GDP's of other Western European countries:

Denmark: 1.9 billion (assumed per capita income of British/German level, 500 dollars)
Sweden: 3.15 billion (assumed per capita income of British/German level, 500 dollars)
Switzerland: 2.94 billion (assumed per capita income of 700 dollars)
Netherlands: 4.35 billion (assumed per capita income of British/German level, 200 dollars)
Belgium: 4.2 billion (assumed per capita income of British/German level, 200 dollars)
Norway: 1.16 billion (assumed per capita income of French level, 200 dollars)
Finland: 1.48 billion (assumed per capita income of French level, 200 dollars)
Greece: 1.42 billion (assumed per capita income of Italian level, 200 dollars)
Spain: 2.53 billion (assumed per capita income of Bulgarian level, 100 dollars)
Portugal: 0.76 billion (assumed per capita income of Bulgarian level, 100 dollars)

total estimated GDP: 23.89 billion

Western Europe:
23.89 billion (estimated) + 98.37 billion (known) = 122.26 billion

So, in 1938, the World Distribution of GDP was:

Europe: 155.4 billion
--- Western Europe: 122.26 billion
--- Eastern Europe: 10.09 billion
--- Soviet Union: 23.02 billion

United States: 84.7 billion

Japan: 7.49 billion

total: 240.59 billion

So several small north European states had larger GDP than Spain, each one of them, and roughly half of Japan? That's pretty mind blowing.

 

[Vonboe]

I'm no economics professor, can someone explain to me how Japanese GDP in the 40's is calculated when there were no exchange rate between US dollars and Japanese yen, and the production cost/expensive was totally different. for example the average cost of an Zero type 21 ( A6M2b ) was about 156,787¥ /=1,256$ ( with todays exchange rate ) and with 30's exchange rate 314$ . While a US P-40 Warhawk cost $44,892 to produce in 1944.
( p.s I'm being sincere )

 

[Loke]

So several small north European states had larger GDP than Spain, each one of them, and roughly half of Japan? That's pretty mind blowing.

Hmmm... could the Spanish civil war be an issue here...
Todays Spain has an economy about a little more than twice the size of Sweden. Polands economy is still a bit smaller than Swedens.

1938 a Nordic Union would have had an economy about the size of Japan just below Italy. Smaller population in the Nordic Union but quite modern and effiecent society.

Today a Nordic Union would be about the size of Italy or Russias economy but compared per capita alot more effective.

 

[Alpha2518]

I'm no economics professor, can someone explain to me how Japanese GDP in the 40's is calculated when there were no exchange rate between US dollars and Japanese yen, and the production cost/expensive was totally different. for example the average cost of an Zero type 21 ( A6M2b ) was about 156,787¥ /=1,256$ ( with todays exchange rate ) and with 30's exchange rate 314$ . While a US P-40 Warhawk cost $44,892 to produce in 1944.
( p.s I'm being sincere )

Probably by working backwards from when the exchange was first established in order to get those numbers when the exchange didn't exist.

 

[Murmeldjuret]

GDP is sort of irrelevant in a total war economy. A market economy always gets more GDP than a total war economy or a planned economy because it is easier to count. It also makes it hard to take into account the great depression which was causing havoc for GDP in the west, but not in USSR/Japan making the GDP=Industry largely moot as a comparison between them. An empty but functional factory = 0 GDP, but lots of industry after a few months.


Japan built the impressive navy they did on the very limited industry they had because they devoted their total war industry to building that navy. It was smaller than both UK/US but larger than the naval powers of France/Italy, which shows how much disparity there was in industrial capacity.

Despite early successes against the largely overestimated defensibly positions in SE Asia and Pearl Harbor, once the US sent dedicated naval forces to the region, the Japanese clearly did not enjoy the tactical advantage. Coral Sea was indecisive but the US improved their tactics for the following Midway battle which proved decisive and effectively ended the Japanese empire simply because IJN had a numerical disadvantage to the navy the US had at that time, not counting the huge difference in production. Japan never really stood a chance against winning a war against the US, they just hoped the US would be non-comittal to a war, and that bombing=demoralization. WW2 proved neither was true.

The most interesting numbers are imo in steel of varying grades, as well as engine components of varying grades. You could not build airplanes/transports/tanks/trucks/warships without them.
Japan has domestic iron (earth is mostly iron) but it is of poor quality (hence the long time/skill to make samurai swords). They needed to import iron that could cheaply be turned to military grade steel for ships. This makes judging production in steel=industrial capacity a bit imprecise. If we use engine production as a difference, the US enjoyed some 50+:1 disparity (dont remember exact). By the end of the war the US Navy fielded more warships than IJN airplanes.

 

[mursolini]

People seem to forget that the USSR was about to collapse and get annexed in 41 and 42, and you seem to forget that its industry was NOT operational during these critical 2 years. At such a low in the war any tank from anyone would have been a huge gift. So long as it helped them survive just long enough to get their own production back up.

So yes the USSR produced far more then it got in lend-lease (over the course of the entire war), I am not debating that issue, I am merely stating that what they got in 41 and 42 was at such a critical moment that it actually mattered. Many soviet tank divisions where half Russian half English in tanks (obviously crew being all Russian), yes even the UK gave a lend-lease to Russia, mostly in old obsolete tanks. Obviously the matter of half British tank divisions counts for the early day's in 41 - 42, after that their own tanks(which where superior anyway) where rolling off the assembly lines in huge numbers.

That is quite wishful thinking actually. The bulk of Soviet industry being behind Ural at that point, while territories close to front line already were striped from recruit able people, USSR really wouldn`t lose much fighting capacity even IF Germany would capture Moskow, and Leningrad. USSR would still be vastly superior production wise, and seeing how Germany is still at war with USA and UK, there was no reason for SU to surrender, they remembered their WW1 history all too well.

As for "industry being non-operational", go look at 1941 production figures, they were increasing compared to 1940 level anyway. In 1941, SU still totally outproduced Germany in most arms, especially armor and planes and artillery. And by early 1942, industry transfer was mostly complete, with new plants coming online. The simple fact is, SU had roughly half of it`s industry in places where Germans never ever made it to, in 1940 already. Only around 40-50% of Soviet industry was ever moved.

 

[Loke]

That is quite wishful thinking actually. The bulk of Soviet industry being behind Ural at that point, while territories close to front line already were striped from recruit able people, USSR really wouldn`t lose much fighting capacity even IF Germany would capture Moskow, and Leningrad. USSR would still be vastly superior production wise, and seeing how Germany is still at war with USA and UK, there was no reason for SU to surrender, they remembered their WW1 history all too well.

As for "industry being non-operational", go look at 1941 production figures, they were increasing compared to 1940 level anyway. In 1941, SU still totally outproduced Germany in most arms, especially armor and planes and artillery. And by early 1942, industry transfer was mostly complete, with new plants coming online. The simple fact is, SU had roughly half of it`s industry in places where Germans never ever made it to, in 1940 already. Only around 40-50% of Soviet industry was ever moved.

"Wishful thinking", now that was a peculiar way to put it... Although fact still stands, if it wasnt for allied LL I dont think Russia would have made it.
No, not all Russian industry had relocated and geared up....
Lets take another example - "Slaget om Kursk" - 2004 (ISBN 91-7001-091-9) Frankson and Zetterling states on page 105:

The possibility for the Russian army to conduct mobile operations had been absymal without all trucks(409 500) given to them by the allies. Another interesting thing is how the Russian production of locomotiv/trains disapeared, it vanished. During the years 1942 to 1945 only 92 were produced in Russia but on the other hand they got close to 2000 through LL from the allies....
1941 Russia produced 30000 goods wagons, through the years 1942-45 only 1087 got built in Russia... That would have been a problem if not the Allies had LL 10000 goods wagons during those years.
Lets mention the railroadproduction it dropped with 90% during the war, it was great that the allies could compensate the Russians railroadproduction losses with more than 90% railroad.

It is not to exagerate when saying that the Russian ability to move its armies, personel, supply and conduct modern warfare was dependant of support from LL from USA/UK/Canada.

More than 1/3 of all explosives used by Russia during WWII came from the USA and thats quite alot... losing 33% firepower.
Half of Russias aluminium came from the USA, UK, Canada, what would have happened to the Russian airforce without it.

All these factories that used to produce this heavy equipment like train, railroads, trucks, wagons etc what did they do.... ? Thats the same type of factories that CAN produce tanks.
And the Russians produced 24 000 tanks in 1942 but not telling the whole story how they could do that is not fair, isit...

 

[Alex_brunius]

I think we can conclude that the Lend lease helped Soviet bring the fight back to Germany quicker, and with less loss of life, but probably didn't matter alot for the end outcome if Soviet would survive or not ( since they defeated the Germans outside Moscow without it, and since it was the winter at Stalingrad that broke the Germans back, not the LL equipment or trucks ).

Now this thread was once about why Japans industry was so weak...

 

[Axe99]

Keep in mind all those figures are nominal as well - even purchasing power parity comparisons have plenty of potential pitfalls when assessing how much $1 is worth in actual goods and services in a paritcular economy, but nominal comparisions of figures from the 1930s and 1940s should be taken with truckloads of salt.

On topic, Japan's GDP was almost definitely under-stated nominally, not unlike how China's was for many years using nominal comparisons.

 

[Alex_brunius]

On topic, Japan's GDP was almost definitely under-stated nominally, not unlike how China's was for many years using nominal comparisons.

Indeed. To get a more practical estimate on how the Industry compared one can for example look at how many airplanes each nation produced, because air-power mattered equally much everywhere, both on land and at sea.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_aircraft_production

The numbers in the table above need to be adjusted a bit because Italy dropped out half way through ( so their IC need to be higher then ratio suggests ), and USA since they built a bigger number of expensive 4 engine strategic bombers ( so their IC needs to be higher then ratio suggests ).

Another thing that is striking is how late Germany and Japan mobilized all their Industry. UK pulls ahead of both (despite lower peak number ) on total because they geared up faster and reached high numbers already in 1941 & 42, unlike Germany & Japan that had prepared for short wars and peaked only in 44 after they realized they were in this for the long run.

 

[Czert]

Japan historically lacked heavy industry, also remember a lot of its ships where build by the UK. The lack of heavy industry is related to the lack of natural resources, which in turn is the entire reason for being imperialistic. Many cannons for instance where bought from Germany.

Point is Japan has a huge army with many soldiers, but not a very strong industry, it should be able to produce the small arms and support weapons, and a few heavy weapons like tanks and large artillery. However again Japan relied on numbers and smaller weapons. and of course air force. Industry wise it probably should be one of the weakest majors. Also remember that Japan will be going up against Asian armies for a good portion of the game who will have barely any industry, this is where Japanese power will truly shine, against "western" great powers, Japan never truly stood a chance, both due to their doctrine and due to their industry lacking in capacity.

Aside from the historical aspect, if there is any hoi3 in this I would expect an industrial efficiency, allowing axis nations to start with high efficiency due to laws would give them valuable early game boosts, simulating the industrial build up that the democracies, and USSR had to go through.

well, tak uk made ships is true for pre-WWI ships, after it japan relied on own ship building capacities. truth, jaan industry was not very advanced one, but it was big in size, after all japs builded waaaay more ships and planes than spaghetis, and even thier tank force was bigger one, not counting waay biger infantry army. japan lacked mainly technology to make good engines, tanks..etc. not raw industry power.
reasosn for expansion was to secure RESOURCES for industry, not industry itself.

 

[amalric de g.]

I'm no economics professor, can someone explain to me how Japanese GDP in the 40's is calculated when there were no exchange rate between US dollars and Japanese yen, and the production cost/expensive was totally different. for example the average cost of an Zero type 21 ( A6M2b ) was about 156,787¥ /=1,256$ ( with todays exchange rate ) and with 30's exchange rate 314$ . While a US P-40 Warhawk cost $44,892 to produce in 1944.
( p.s I'm being sincere )

Good question, i think it´s not easy to get exact numbers, but i´m no expert on this matter. I think all comparissons are lacking on one or two points, you can´t really compare apples and oranges. So even the experts rely on estimates.

I think we can conclude that the Lend lease helped Soviet bring the fight back to Germany quicker, and with less loss of life, but probably didn't matter alot for the end outcome if Soviet would survive or not ( since they defeated the Germans outside Moscow without it, and since it was the winter at Stalingrad that broke the Germans back, not the LL equipment or trucks ).

Now this thread was once about why Japans industry was so weak...

The end of 1941 was the Soviet Union shortly before the economic collapse. The main industrial and agricultural centers of the country. The "bread basket" Ukraine and large parts of the center of heavy industry, the Donets Basin, which equaled the Ruhr in Germany in importance, were occupied. Although a large part of industrial plants was evacuated end of 1941 to the east and so beyond the reach of the armed forces, but it was not until the first half of 1942, up behind the Ural rebuilt in the vast expanses of land plants had the resulting drop in production offset , The food supply for 65 million people of the 130 million people in the remaining areas fell out. The supply of iron ore, coal and steel fell by 75% and the supply of essential war materials, such as aluminum, manganese or copper by more than two thirds. From erstwhile resource wealth remained only wood, oil and lead.

Most of the supply came but not in the form of weapons, but in the form of food, raw materials, machinery and industrial equipment.
15417000 pair of boots
4.062 million tons of food
2.54 million tons of steel
728,000 tons of non-ferrous metal
764,000 tons of chemicals
2.42 million tonnes of petrochemicals
77,900 SUV Willys MB ( "Jeep")
151,000 light commercial vehicles
200,000 Studebaker US6 trucks
1.5 million kilometers telephone cable
35,000 radio stations
380,000 field telephones
43% of all tires
56% of all rail
1/3 of explosives
1900 Locomotives (own production 932 locomotives)

A special feature was that the Americans delivered 90% of the total high-octane aviation gasoline Allied and 58% of the total high-octane fuel of the Soviet Union. Without this fuel efficient aircraft were not to operate.

Thats the important stuff. Without the 1.5 million kilometers telephone cabel and the 380.000 field telephones, the Red Army couldn´t conduct their combined large offensives from 1943 onwards.
Without the rare materials and steel the SU economy would collapse.

British LL for the SU

• 4,020 ambulances and trucks
• 323 machinery trucks
• 2,560 Universal Carriers
• 1,721 motorcycles
• £1.15bn worth of aircraft engines
• 600 radar and sonar sets
• 15 million pairs of boots

All data for 1943 (the peak of WW2 and before bombing reduced germany's production):

Steel:

US - 80.6 million tons
Germany - 34.5 million tons (42.8% of the US)
Britain - 13.1 million tons
USSR - 8.5 million tons
Japan - ~5 million

Pig Iron:

US - 55.8 million tons
Germany - 27.8 million tons (49.82% of US)
Britain - 7.3 million tons
USSR - 5.6 million tons

Coal:

US - 586.2 million tons
Germany - 554.6 million tons (94.6% of US)
Britain - 202.1 million tons
USSR - 93.1 million tons

Energy:

US - 558.75 million TOE
Germany - 347.01 million tons TOE (62.1% of US)
Britain - 133.7 million tons TOE
USSR - 74.98 million tons TOE

Compare the SU with germany, without LL germany would outproduce the SU thats a simple fact.

 

[Scutatus]

Point of clarification -- The Japanese navy totally destroyed the US navy and the Royal Navy in the battles of 1941-42. The US Navy had amazing good fortune (plus really good intel) at Midway that allowed it to regain the initiative in the Pacific eventually. It was not until 1943 that the production capabilities of the US started to overwhelm the Japanese and exploit Japanese weakness. On land, the Japanese totally destroyed US and Philipine forces despite the fact that MacArhur had about 3 years to get ready for an invasion and the Commonwealth forces on the Malay penisula/Sinapore in 1941-42 as well. In the air there airplanes and aircrew (naval or land support) were superior to anything the Brits or the US had at the start of the war as well. About the only "power" that the Japanese were truly inferior to in terms of military might at the start of WWII (through 1942) were the Soviets-- and there it was a question of needing to fight a war (or a border incident or 2) with an army that was more suited to different terrain (and a lack of experience with armor and more set piece battles).
It is true however, that they did not have the industrial potential to replace their losses materially or also qualitatively (their air crew replacement training could not continually replace their losses in terms of quality/experience in particular) and finally they lacked the scientific depth to improve the quality of their weapons as the western powers could and did as the war progressed. (The Zero was a great plane, particularly when going up against P-40s and Brewster Buffalos but not against P-51 Mustangs and Corsairs.)

The Far east was not a priority front to the UK, most of it's military strength - and that of the empire and commonwealth - were needed far more desperately nearer to home. As a consequence the contingents of Army, Navy and Air Force assigned to the Far East were minimal, sometimes barely more than a sacrificial token.Even the vast Indian army was not as much an asset as it's strength might suggest, as most of that was actually needed to keep a very troubled sub continent pacified. Compared to it's size the Indian army could contribute - or spare - comparatively little. So all in all, the forces in say, Singapore or Burma, tended to be dumped with obsolescent equipment and were woefully underprepared due to lack of support and resources from home (sure they had all the time, but with Westminster not giving funds, supplies, equipment or manpower there was only so much that could be done).There were plans - good plans - for the defence of the territories, but almost every time they were not given the manpower or permissions they needed to implement them properly. The compromises forced on the local commanders were of course inadequate. I rather suspect a similar story can be told for the US defenders of the Phillipines.

So in the Far East there were inadequately sized badly equipped garrisons, lacking logistical support, with poor preparation, about as far from the homeland as one can get (which made reinforcement a time consuming logistical nightmare) up against a Japanese military, well prepared, with good planning, that could concentrate localised superiority at relative ease due to it's homeland being just next door.

Which is all to say, just because Japan walked over British (and US) garrisons and destroyed the local tiny Royal Navy contingents (NOT the whole Royal Navy!!!) in 1941/42, it is not necessarily a true judge of Japanese "greatness". When the Far East stopped being a "side show" and the US and UK focused on Japan properly, it became a very different story.

 

[Cowsnipe]

Good question, i think it´s not easy to get exact numbers, but i´m no expert on this matter. I think all comparissons are lacking on one or two points, you can´t really compare apples and oranges. So even the experts rely on estimates.



The end of 1941 was the Soviet Union shortly before the economic collapse. The main industrial and agricultural centers of the country. The "bread basket" Ukraine and large parts of the center of heavy industry, the Donets Basin, which equaled the Ruhr in Germany in importance, were occupied. Although a large part of industrial plants was evacuated end of 1941 to the east and so beyond the reach of the armed forces, but it was not until the first half of 1942, up behind the Ural rebuilt in the vast expanses of land plants had the resulting drop in production offset , The food supply for 65 million people of the 130 million people in the remaining areas fell out. The supply of iron ore, coal and steel fell by 75% and the supply of essential war materials, such as aluminum, manganese or copper by more than two thirds. From erstwhile resource wealth remained only wood, oil and lead.

Most of the supply came but not in the form of weapons, but in the form of food, raw materials, machinery and industrial equipment.
15417000 pair of boots
4.062 million tons of food
2.54 million tons of steel
728,000 tons of non-ferrous metal
764,000 tons of chemicals
2.42 million tonnes of petrochemicals
77,900 SUV Willys MB ( "Jeep")
151,000 light commercial vehicles
200,000 Studebaker US6 trucks
1.5 million kilometers telephone cable
35,000 radio stations
380,000 field telephones
43% of all tires
56% of all rail
1/3 of explosives
1900 Locomotives (own production 932 locomotives)

A special feature was that the Americans delivered 90% of the total high-octane aviation gasoline Allied and 58% of the total high-octane fuel of the Soviet Union. Without this fuel efficient aircraft were not to operate.

Thats the important stuff. Without the 1.5 million kilometers telephone cabel and the 380.000 field telephones, the Red Army couldn´t conduct their combined large offensives from 1943 onwards.
Without the rare materials and steel the SU economy would collapse.

British LL for the SU

• 4,020 ambulances and trucks
• 323 machinery trucks
• 2,560 Universal Carriers
• 1,721 motorcycles
• £1.15bn worth of aircraft engines
• 600 radar and sonar sets
• 15 million pairs of boots

All data for 1943 (the peak of WW2 and before bombing reduced germany's production):

Steel:

US - 80.6 million tons
Germany - 34.5 million tons (42.8% of the US)
Britain - 13.1 million tons
USSR - 8.5 million tons
Japan - ~5 million

Pig Iron:

US - 55.8 million tons
Germany - 27.8 million tons (49.82% of US)
Britain - 7.3 million tons
USSR - 5.6 million tons

Coal:

US - 586.2 million tons
Germany - 554.6 million tons (94.6% of US)
Britain - 202.1 million tons
USSR - 93.1 million tons

Energy:

US - 558.75 million TOE
Germany - 347.01 million tons TOE (62.1% of US)
Britain - 133.7 million tons TOE
USSR - 74.98 million tons TOE

Compare the SU with germany, without LL germany would outproduce the SU thats a simple fact.

I really hope lend lease gets transported on the map and can be interacted with.

 

[Alex_brunius]

Thats the important stuff.

Sure, much important stuff, and almost all of it either arrived or could not be used until after the German advances already had been halted at Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad by Soviets themself.

Lend Lease didn't save Soviet, It ensured Soviet could advance faster.

Compare the SU with germany, without LL germany would outproduce the SU thats a simple fact.

And what does that matter? Without more fuel and without supply-lines the German military can not supply a single extra tank as deep into Soviet as Moscow or Stalingrad anyways... So none of that "out-production" can effectively be used until Soviet pushes the border back closer to Germany.

A German tank without fuel, critical spares or ammo when the Soviet counter-attack quickly becomes either a tank blown up by their own crew, or a Soviet tank

 

[phantomrider]

The Far east was not a priority front to the UK, most of it's military strength - and that of the empire and commonwealth - were needed far more desperately nearer to home. As a consequence the contingents of Army, Navy and Air Force assigned to the Far East were minimal, sometimes barely more than a sacrificial token.Even the vast Indian army was not as much an asset as it's strength might suggest, as most of that was actually needed to keep a very troubled sub continent pacified. Compared to it's size the Indian army could contribute - or spare - comparatively little. So all in all, the forces in say, Singapore or Burma, tended to be dumped with obsolescent equipment and were woefully underprepared due to lack of support and resources from home (sure they had all the time, but with Westminster not giving funds, supplies, equipment or manpower there was only so much that could be done).There were plans - good plans - for the defence of the territories, but almost every time they were not given the manpower or permissions they needed to implement them properly. The compromises forced on the local commanders were of course inadequate. I rather suspect a similar story can be told for the US defenders of the Phillipines.

So in the Far East there were inadequately sized badly equipped garrisons, lacking logistical support, with poor preparation, about as far from the homeland as one can get (which made reinforcement a time consuming logistical nightmare) up against a Japanese military, well prepared, with good planning, that could concentrate localised superiority at relative ease due to it's homeland being just next door.

Which is all to say, just because Japan walked over British (and US) garrisons and destroyed the local tiny Royal Navy contingents (NOT the whole Royal Navy!!!) in 1941/42, it is not necessarily a true judge of Japanese "greatness". When the Far East stopped being a "side show" and the US and UK focused on Japan properly, it became a very different story.

Yes it is clear that the far east was not a priority for either the US or the British. On the other hand both had adequate time to prepare for the defense against an aggressive Japan and neither did. In the Philipines, the US and Filopino forces were led by General MacArthur who is acclaimed to be a first class military mind by many. He had 3 years to prepare for the defense of the Philipines and was totally defeated by Japanese forces that were inferior in numbers to his own. In contrast, General Yamashita, when faced with a similar reverse situation in 1944 (he got taken out of a mothball assignment and sent in to command Japanese forces after the US invaded the Phillipines) did much better. Within three weeks of showing up he reorganized his defense, retreated into inhospitable terrain (with a hostile local population) and stayed there for about 9-10 months tying up an entire US Army that was needed for the invasion of Japan. When the war ended he marched out and went home with about 50+% of his forces intact. General Yamashita (Tiger of Malay) is well known to the Brits as he was the guy who led a force that was inferior to the commonwealth forces in numbers and took Singapore.
On the navy side in 1941-42 the Japanese sank 1 BB (prince of Wales) (1 of 3 RN BB lost during the whole war), 1 BC (Repulse) on of 2 BC lost during the war and 1 CV (Herrmes) (1 of 5 lost) plus 3 of 28 cruisers lost during the war. From 1942 until 1944, the RN simply wasn't in the Pacific (which may have saved them from extensive further losses).

To me a mark of competence or even greatness in a military is 1) beating the "former" best in the field {winning is everything in war}, 2) doing so against the odds (inferior manpower, to some extent technology and equipment and supply) and 3) a poor third when outnumbered, outgunned and out supplied being really really difficult to deal with such that you might get better terms in defeat.
Japan, in 1941-42 certainly met terms 1 and 2 above and the excuse from the US and Brits that "well we really didn't try very hard" doesn't cut it. We {I am US} got crushed and until we actually learned to take the Japanese more seriously than MacArthur did (who also had a similar bad day in Korea when he let 500,000 Chinese volunteers sneak up on him) --we kept getting crushed (it took us 6-12 months after Pearl Harbor) to learn our lesson.

 

[amalric de g.]

Sure, much important stuff, and almost all of it either arrived or could not be used until after the German advances already had been halted at Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad by Soviets themself.

Lend Lease didn't save Soviet, It ensured Soviet could advance faster.



And what does that matter? Without more fuel and without supply-lines the German military can not supply a single extra tank as deep into Soviet as Moscow or Stalingrad anyways... So none of that "out-production" can effectively be used until Soviet pushes the border back closer to Germany.

A German tank without fuel, critical spares or ammo when the Soviet counter-attack quickly becomes either a tank blown up by their own crew, or a Soviet tank

You didn´t read the whole stuff, did you?

First germany rebuild the railsystem, to the european gauge, thats time consuming. If the Red Army is not able to push the Wehrmacht back, every day the gauge is rebuild some miles more, so the supply strain lessens.

Without LL germany didn´t need to put more and more tanks on the Eastfront, the Red Army would exhaust herself in head on offensives, as they couldn´t supply large scale tank pincer offensives.

Without 43% of the tires, 90% of the trucks and Jeeps, 50% high octane plane fuel, train cars and locomotives. The food and 30 million boots, the Red Army coudn´t conduct large offensives. The US send enough food to supply half of the Red Army. Oh and the 1.5 million kilometers cable and telephones were send during 1941 - 1942.
The SU received 1/3 of their total TNT from the US.

No lend lease:
1/3 fewer shells.
No telephones and cable. No combined offensive.
No radios, the SU radios are crap.
1/2 air fuel. Half of the SU airforce without fuel.
90% trucks, no logistics.
10k train waggons 2000 locs, no logistics.
No 30 million boots, the whole Red Army bare footed in winter.
1,15 billion pounds worth, airplane engines from UK, let us estimate one engine costs 5000 pounds, 1,150.000.000X5= 230.000 engines, the SU didn´t build one engine herself.

The SU industrie was not able to produce that stuff all alone.

Please explaine me how in hell could the Red Army go on the offensive without this stuff? As you should remember the winter offensive 1941/42 was halted by the germans. If the SU didn´t got all this things, sooner or later, the Red Army generalship had exhausted their manpower pool and that would be game over.

With LL the Red Army had in 1944 a severe manpower shortage. What did you think would happen without LL?

One last question, without food for half of the Red Army during 1942 - 1945 what happens with a soldier without eating?