why is Japan's industry so weak?

[Kovax]

Did you ever look at real Japanese equipment from that era? The amount of materials that went into them were downright stingy compared to Western European standards. Picture a truck with one headlight, because two was redundant, and a paper composite back to the cab because that saved metal and weight. Their standard service rifle design had been upgraded from just over .22 caliber to heavier and more expensive rounds of around .25 caliber, compared to the roughly .30 caliber used by most western nations, and ammunition was often in short supply. How about a light infantry fieldpiece with only about as much metal in the thin-walled barrel as most light mortars? There were medium field pieces, but true "heavy" artillery was extremely rare. Everything was underbuilt because (A) metal was still relatively scarce even with access to Manchuria, and (B) carrying anything heavier over the horrendous terrain without decent roads and with limited rail access practically demanded lighter equipment.

Japan did an amazing job of utilizing what little industry and resources it had, but it was not an industrial powerhouse by any stretch of the imagination until well after WWII. Both their technical knowledge and industrial base were steadily growing, particularly for producing ships and aircraft, but they were still fighting on a shoestring budget in comparison to the west. Giving them the industry to produce massive amounts of artillery, tanks, and other equipment, rather than large amounts of highly motivated and decently trained "light infantry", and STILL field a competitive navy and air force, would be extremely unrealistic.

 

[phantomrider]

Japan historically lacked heavy industry, also remember a lot of its ships where build by the UK. The lack of heavy industry is related to the lack of natural resources, which in turn is the entire reason for being imperialistic. Many cannons for instance where bought from Germany.

Point is Japan has a huge army with many soldiers, but not a very strong industry, it should be able to produce the small arms and support weapons, and a few heavy weapons like tanks and large artillery. However again Japan relied on numbers and smaller weapons. and of course air force. Industry wise it probably should be one of the weakest majors. Also remember that Japan will be going up against Asian armies for a good portion of the game who will have barely any industry, this is where Japanese power will truly shine, against "western" great powers, Japan never truly stood a chance, both due to their doctrine and due to their industry lacking in capacity.

Aside from the historical aspect, if there is any hoi3 in this I would expect an industrial efficiency, allowing axis nations to start with high efficiency due to laws would give them valuable early game boosts, simulating the industrial build up that the democracies, and USSR had to go through.

Point of clarification -- The Japanese navy totally destroyed the US navy and the Royal Navy in the battles of 1941-42. The US Navy had amazing good fortune (plus really good intel) at Midway that allowed it to regain the initiative in the Pacific eventually. It was not until 1943 that the production capabilities of the US started to overwhelm the Japanese and exploit Japanese weakness. On land, the Japanese totally destroyed US and Philipine forces despite the fact that MacArhur had about 3 years to get ready for an invasion and the Commonwealth forces on the Malay penisula/Sinapore in 1941-42 as well. In the air there airplanes and aircrew (naval or land support) were superior to anything the Brits or the US had at the start of the war as well. About the only "power" that the Japanese were truly inferior to in terms of military might at the start of WWII (through 1942) were the Soviets-- and there it was a question of needing to fight a war (or a border incident or 2) with an army that was more suited to different terrain (and a lack of experience with armor and more set piece battles).
It is true however, that they did not have the industrial potential to replace their losses materially or also qualitatively (their air crew replacement training could not continually replace their losses in terms of quality/experience in particular) and finally they lacked the scientific depth to improve the quality of their weapons as the western powers could and did as the war progressed. (The Zero was a great plane, particularly when going up against P-40s and Brewster Buffalos but not against P-51 Mustangs and Corsairs.)

 

[shri]

Figures from Paul Kennedy's magnum OPUS:-

The Nominal National Products of the major powers in 1938, in 1990 Dollars:

(1) United States: 84.7 billion
(2) Germany: 46.0 billion*
(3) UK: 27.51 billion
(4) USSR: 23.02 billion
(5) France: 16.18 billion
(6) Italy: 8.68 billion
(7) Japan: 7.49 billion

The per capita figures:

(1) United States: 649
(2) Germany: 590
(3) UK: 579
(4) USSR: 138
(5) France: 385
(6) Italy: 200
(7) Japan: 104

*Note that Germany's figures includes Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia, as they were annexed into the country in 1938.

Japan has a per capita income 1/2 of Italy and 1/4 of France but do consider, this is all nominal GDP and not GDP based on PPP, if you take into account lower standard of living, higher motivation, more morale, die hard spirit and several other intangibles into account then the Japanese figures do not seem too bad.
Wartime expenditures by Japan actually outstripped Italy but stopped short of France.

Now, Japan shouldn't be able to field a "TIGER" division of tanks but they should be able to field 6 CVs by 1939 and probably 9 by 1941 (if you forego the Yamato class BBs).
You also should be able to field a very good fighter, good tactical bombers, naval bombers and torpedo planes though strategic bombers should be outside of your "SCOPE".
As for Infantry, considering the terrible infrastructure in most of China, Indo-China and Burma; the Japanese infantry which were primarily supported by high quality mortars than Heavy Artillery should actually have an advantage in terms of - less consumption of supplies and faster movement.

On the other hand, a Japanese division should be absolutely on the disadvantage fighting in Europe. For all their deficiencies cited, the Japanese were very good in the "TERRAIN" that they fought and wanted to fight in- China, Korea, Manchuria, South East Asia, Phillipines, Islands in the Pacific, Burma etc.

 

[Denkt]

As said before the starting industry is very low compared to your max potential. In the Wednesday stream both UK and Germany have increased their industry massively. Japan can also get industry from early conquest.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

Again though this is in too little quantities compared to other majors.

That I can roughly agree with, though Italy was just as if not more shortchanged than Japan. And obviously we only got a glimpse of French wartime industry's performance during the war.

To give you an example the USSR had tons of heavy industry, they still had to rely on US and UK tanks and equipment. Having to buy equipment does not mean they couldn't build any themselves. It simply means what they where producing wasn't enough. In the case of Japan, again I have to stress they didn't need to rely on heavy industry because no one around them could match them... except the USA.

The reason I took issue is that Japan was not importing foreign heavy weapons in any meaningful quantities between '20s through '40s. Often such foreign contacts were for purposes of technological transfer, pattern already seen with Kongo. From early date there was conscious effort to achieve self-sufficiency in design and production of military equipment.

What they did actually need (at least earlier on in '20s and such) to import were specialized components, particularily in new technology. More obviously they also imported raw materials, like scrap steel from US.

on a last note, specify artillery. Because I do believe I mention they where capable of producing their own (forgive me if i did not), they just tended to stick to smaller arty, 1 because their industry was better suited for it and 2, more importantly the terrain across Asia was more suited, lots of mountains and jungle areas, along with lesser infrastructure would mean heavy guns would be a bother and not very useful.

I'd suspect the relative lack of motor vehicles was another limiting factor for heavy artillery, particularily as Japanese emphasized speed. Big guns tend to need tractors unless you are content with using them as siege pieces.

As already written, Korea and Manchuria puppets meant the Japanese were nearly self sufficient in Coal, Iron Ore, Steel, but sorely lacked Oil and Rubber (the reason for grabbing South East Asia). Also pre-War JAPAN needs to have very good starting relations with the USA so that it can buy Oil from USA.

They also lacked bauxite, Palau being essentially only source in Japanese Empire. In fact, Japanese demand for it was significant reason why bauxite mines started up in SEA, most significantly Bintan. Another area of shortage was in alloy metals, but the game's resource system lacks detail to depict that entirely (if at all). For example chromium would almost undoubtedly represent various alloy elements commonly used in high strength steel, so a specific shortage of nickel would be less important in the game.

 

[dave_r_gilbert]

In the early to mid thirties Japanese industry was heavily geared to supporting the armed forces, with very little slack, and not much civilian industry.
At the same time UK and especially US industry were geared to civilian needs, with a great deal of slack.
So although Japan was building a good number of navy vessels in 35 they couldn't match the tempo when the UK started building in earnest in 37-38, and the US outbuilt everybody else combined from 42 onwards.
Korea and Manchuria were decent sources of raw materials for Japan's industry needs in the 30's, with some glaring holes. Oil, Rubber, and Tin.
So long as they could get those by trade, the war in China could be supported.
In fact they were in a vicious circle. Manchurian resources were needed to support the war in China, and the war in China was needed to get access to Manchurian resources.
When the USA embargoed oil the clock started ticking.
Either go to war to get direct access while stocks lasted, or stop the war in China.

Early Japanese successes are only realistically possible if the UK is simultaneously fighting Germany and Italy, the US is tactically surprised, and a large slice of luck is thrown in.
The UK assessment was that any 2 of Germany, Italy, and Japan could be handled by the Royal Navy, but all of them together was a step too far.
At Midway the Japanese luck ran out.

By late 41 the UK was outbuilding Japan in just about everything, but nearly all of it went to the war with Germany & Italy, or lendlease to the Soviet Union.
USA was just getting into its stride.

Given that Japan was devoid of strategic resources, and with limited industrial depth, its amazing they got as far as they did.
And also a sign of national desperation.

 

[Gotomtom]

One thing Japan could do better then most would be colonial exploitation probably (for game purposes at least). If in hoi4 there could be a mechanic that allows Japan to get more potential out of Korea and Manchuria then say Britain or Netherlands can get out of India and the Dutch-Indies(calling it that for historical purposes in a historical discussion). It wouldn't be strange either as these regions are way closer to Japan then the European colonies are to Europe. Also Japan did actively and for a long time invest in these area's. They should get some resource and local supply and production bonus here, in my opinion. Again this is an idea for in game and does not necessarily have to be perfectly historical, as long as it roughly estimates it.

 

[Gotomtom]

Point of clarification -- The Japanese navy totally destroyed the US navy and the Royal Navy in the battles of 1941-42. The US Navy had amazing good fortune (plus really good intel) at Midway that allowed it to regain the initiative in the Pacific eventually. It was not until 1943 that the production capabilities of the US started to overwhelm the Japanese and exploit Japanese weakness. On land, the Japanese totally destroyed US and Philipine forces despite the fact that MacArhur had about 3 years to get ready for an invasion and the Commonwealth forces on the Malay penisula/Sinapore in 1941-42 as well. In the air there airplanes and aircrew (naval or land support) were superior to anything the Brits or the US had at the start of the war as well. About the only "power" that the Japanese were truly inferior to in terms of military might at the start of WWII (through 1942) were the Soviets-- and there it was a question of needing to fight a war (or a border incident or 2) with an army that was more suited to different terrain (and a lack of experience with armor and more set piece battles).
It is true however, that they did not have the industrial potential to replace their losses materially or also qualitatively (their air crew replacement training could not continually replace their losses in terms of quality/experience in particular) and finally they lacked the scientific depth to improve the quality of their weapons as the western powers could and did as the war progressed. (The Zero was a great plane, particularly when going up against P-40s and Brewster Buffalos but not against P-51 Mustangs and Corsairs.)

The Japanese navy dealt a heavy blow to the US navy which bought them time, but it was hardly the devastating strike which Yamamoto envisioned. Not getting the carriers essentially means that the entire pearl harbor attack was a strategic defeat for Japan, despite it being a tactical success beyond measure. As for Midway, along with many other battles taking place at the same time, luck had little to do with it. It was pretty much the superior intelligence of the Americans and sheer negligence and arrogance of the Japanese that caused them to lose. After all why would the Japanese navy even need intel, they are after all superior to the American navy, are they not? (rhetorical and sarcasm)

Long story short, though the Japanese had some amazing successes against the allied navies they hardly "totally destroyed" them, as they fairly quickly made a come back. Had the USA truly been totally destroyed then it would have been such a blow to allied morale and taken a very long time to rebuild the pacific fleet that Japan might well have been able to pull off their plans of digging in as far as Hawaii. This might have even given the Japanese a chance at harassing American homeland ports to diminish their rebuilding capacity.

As it so happens I recently did a bunch of research into the WW2 time period from a Japanese and Chinese perspective (by reading books), many Japanese admirals where very much aware of the imperial navies shortcomings when compared to the USA,m let alone all the allies combined. As such they knew they where going to gamble, they gambled wrong and paid the price.

 

[phantomrider]

The Japanese navy dealt a heavy blow to the US navy which bought them time, but it was hardly the devastating strike which Yamamoto envisioned. Not getting the carriers essentially means that the entire pearl harbor attack was a strategic defeat for Japan, despite it being a tactical success beyond measure. As for Midway, along with many other battles taking place at the same time, luck had little to do with it. It was pretty much the superior intelligence of the Americans and sheer negligence and arrogance of the Japanese that caused them to lose. After all why would the Japanese navy even need intel, they are after all superior to the American navy, are they not? (rhetorical and sarcasm)

Long story short, though the Japanese had some amazing successes against the allied navies they hardly "totally destroyed" them, as they fairly quickly made a come back. Had the USA truly been totally destroyed then it would have been such a blow to allied morale and taken a very long time to rebuild the pacific fleet that Japan might well have been able to pull off their plans of digging in as far as Hawaii. This might have even given the Japanese a chance at harassing American homeland ports to diminish their rebuilding capacity.

As it so happens I recently did a bunch of research into the WW2 time period from a Japanese and Chinese perspective (by reading books), many Japanese admirals where very much aware of the imperial navies shortcomings when compared to the USA,m let alone all the allies combined. As such they knew they where going to gamble, they gambled wrong and paid the price.

One could just say the Japanese were unlucky twice -- once when the US carriers were not at Pearl Harbor with the rest of the Pacific fleet and twice at Midway when the US carrier dive bomber squadrons missed the Japanese carriers on the outbound run but found them when they were returning to base (their carriers) at a time when the Japanese combat air patrol had been "softened" and pulled out of position by an excellently but totally unplanned coordinated assault by US torpedo bombers. In the rest of 1942 the US got a couple of "draws" at best and started to make much larger deposits to the bottom of "iron bottom sound" than the Japanese until late 1943 when the Japanese started to catch up. The allied combined fleet in Indonesia was almost totally sunk, the Brits lost all their capital ships (Wales and Repulse) in the defence of Singapore and also had heavy losses when a small Japanese carrier force raided the Indian Ocean and (the Brits) didn't really put much of anything into the Pacific for a long time. (Maybe annihilation was too strong in the original post). Yes the Japanese navy in particular "knew" that the war with the US was a very dangerous gamble for them but they weren't the decision makers in terms of the choice of war or peace with the US (and the rest of the allies). Even if the Japanese had won the naval battle at Midway and taken Midway I am not sure they had the logistics to get to Hawaii and stay there. They certainly didn't have the logistics to support going further east with their navy even if the got Hawaii.

I also agree that the Japanese were in many cases quite "arrogant". On the other hand they did not have a monopoly on that trait. Despite superior intelligence and early radar detection of the attack force at Pearl Harbor the US military was caught totally by surprise-- possibly/probably because they didn't think the Japanese (in particular) would or could do something like what they did. Even worse the attack on the Phillipines which came well after the attack on Pearl Harbor the command in the Phillipines was equally surprised as the forces at Pearl. Finally, Gen MacArthur's whole defense of the Phillipines plan was dependent on being rescued by the US Navy and he retreated into a "fortress" area that he had 3 years to prepare but it didn't have food stores, ammunition stores or living facilities to support his forces in jungle terrain (Bataan peninsula). (Again the belief that the Japanese just aren't capable of threatening a "real" western or European led force).

 

[Gotomtom]

Although it might have seen like luck from a Japanese point of view the USA was very well aware that an attack was very likely. As you said little did they expect to be hit in Pearl. As for the believe that the Japanese could not threaten a real western force... this is pretty much true HOWEVER, the allies made 2 very big judgement errors here, 1st there where no real western forces in Asia, as they where colonial force with light equipment and standard or even lesser European tactics. Where the Japanese did truly shine was in jungle warfare, something the Europeans simply completely forgot about.

An attack on the Philippines was expected, the loss of so many ships at Pearl Harbor certainly did the defenses of the pacific no good. However the carriers at pearl harbor where not out of port by luck, they where out because an attack was expected, as such they where doing some recon rather then sitting duck in a port. Luck is rarely involved in war, if you dig into the intelligence you can find out there are many details to individual battles.

As for the midway battle, again luck was barely a part of it, a huge amount of scouting and planning went into that offensive, during the entire battle Japan was pretty much doing exactly what the American wanted. To name one absolutely ridiculous part of the planning gone into Midway, the US intelligence had not yet fully cracked the Japanese code, but they suspected an attack on midway. To make sure they know the Japanese code name for Midway they made it send out a request for "fresh water", not long after the intercepted a Japanese transmission with the code name is out of fresh water supplies.

I have to 100% agree with your statement that arrogance was not a Japanese specific trait, Especially Stillwell(USA general) and many British officers had a fair amount of it and thought very highly of themselves even though they where horrible at fighting war.

In any case I think we should steer this discussion back towards the IC of Japan, which was the original idea of this thread.

Can we form a decent conclusion yet on Japans industrial might? I think many of us have already put forward a good rundown of what they did build. I do have some manpower and mobilization tables but sadly no industrial or production tables. Other then that they diverted a good portion of their production towards aircraft manufacture towards the middle of the war. This prevented them from building many tanks, which probably didn't hurt Japan much except if they got into a war with the USSR, which they didn't until they had already completely lost anyway.

 

[Oerdin]

Historically, Japan did have a relatively small industrial base compared to the other great powers. They just didn't have that many tanls and planes and their navy took decades to build up. Their army was mostly infantry and they had a hard time replacing any equipment they lost.

 

[Vonboe]

Historically, Japan did have a relatively small industrial base compared to the other great powers. They just didn't have that many tanls and planes and their navy took decades to build up. Their army was mostly infantry and they had a hard time replacing any equipment they lost.

True, but that wasn't because of lack of weapon/heavy industry but suveer insufficiency of raw materials.
You don't start melting down 1 yen coins because you don't have enought arms manufacturer, but because you need more copper ...

 

[Sir Garnet]

I commend to your attention the relatively recently published and very detailed Rikugun: Guide to Japanese Ground Forces 1937-1945, with Vol 1.: Tactical Organization of Imperial Japanese Army & Navy Ground Forces" with copious detail on policy, deployments, tactics, paper and actual orders of battle down to equipment counts, deployments, training etc. and Vol 2 on equipment from small arms to tanks and guns. Lots of facts and details ideal for wargame design purposes. Also quite a few factual surprises.

For example, and relevant to this thread, I was astonished by how complacent the Japanese were about conscription and thin ground force levels in general and especially in the Pacific during the first two years of the Pacific War, a time when Britain and the US (the despised "soft" democracies) were putting enormous efforts forth to fully mobilize their strength.

The game design question is to what extent the player should be limited by the realities of actual historical developments vs. being free to pursue courses of action that we think possible and desirable in hindsight but were justifiably not taken. (This is not just about Japan - Italy is even more an underperformer in mustering its military potential.) The army was necessarily starved for industrial support given the needs of the naval and air forces, technical arms with much greater industrial demands.

Should players have the flexibility of HOI3 in optimizing their research, building, and political options freely?
I see the HOI4 focus structure engine as a means of containing orderly choices among alternative histories without being able to turn everything upside down from Jan 1 1936 on to optimize IC and force buildups for 1939. That deranges the game for those who expect a relatively historical flow of events.

While the Navy had to think strategically, the Army's operations seem mostly driven by an aggressive spirit and opportunism as successive targets fell more easily than expected. Their southern offensives were conducted with forces in numbers comparable to their opponents and with skimpy material resources, relying in improvisation as well as the doctrinal superior fighting spirit and ferocity of Japanese infantry. Arrogant confidence or not, they achieved a lot on the cheap.

It's important to understands that the Japanese army of WW2 was far from being a modern WW2-style army in design, equipment or support. It was more of a shoestring operation, an army of the 1920s with selective upgrades (including some good infantry support equipment) but limited by its resources and its needs in the planned theatres of war. Since it worked out for years, one may forgive some convenient complacency.

"The Japanese would rely on speed, surprise and highly aggressive infantry tactics to sweep away enemy forces in the Far East.” Motorization was very limited and ill-used - when trucks replaced horses in the Guards, 5th, and 48th divisions, they ended up sitting in the Dutch East Indies for the rest of the war. (Vol 1 p33) “ A great variety of armored vehicles were developed, but in limited numbers and industrial methods inefficient compared with those of the US. The formation in mid-1942 of a Mechanized Army of the 1st and 2nd armored divisions using obsolete equipment in limited numbers but lacking C3 and tactical capabilities is more evidence of interest in exploring successful German methods than development of any effective capability for the Kwantung Army, which was the Army's de facto strategic reserve to draw down for needs elsewhere.

If the Japanese could have engaged early on in a larger military industrial build-up in support of the army rather than more for the navy (a big "if"), in the circumstances that would probably have manifested in higher quality and stocks of infantry equipment, logistical support and radio communications, since the need would remain light infantry for the southern theatres. Development of anti-tank equipment, more artillery support, and motorization for the Kwantung Army in the Manchurian theatre would also be reasonable, depending on the evaluation of the Soviet threat.

 

[Amur_Tiger]

Japan was an Industrial power in the WW2 era and bigger than Italy but smaller than France, so ideally it should be at-least 1/2 factories more than Italy and 2/3 less than France but have more production efficiency and more manpower and better laws and bonus so that it can utilise its limited factory base better than France and be actually able to punch at the level of the UK (which it historically did).
Maybe the "Persona of the Emperor" or some such "Research decision" or starting Bonus can apply giving Japan better usability of its existing factory base.
As already written, Korea and Manchuria puppets meant the Japanese were nearly self sufficient in Coal, Iron Ore, Steel, but sorely lacked Oil and Rubber (the reason for grabbing South East Asia). Also pre-War JAPAN needs to have very good starting relations with the USA so that it can buy Oil from USA.

While Japan certainly accomplished a fair bit with it's production in no way did they 'punch at the level of the UK'. The 1937 build plan the UK started was never matched by Japan. Also compare the 1942 design light fleet carrier builds to the Unryu class, the UK lays down more then twice as many in 1942 and nearly twice as many in 1943 in those two years the UK laid down 16 1942 design light fleet carriers in two years compared to 8 Unryu class.

When the UK put it's mind to it they easily outstripped Japan in naval production, the real question was whether the UK was putting it's mind to it and how much of that naval production would be put to use against Japan, given the position of the UK on the map this doesn't tend to be a huge amount. Though it might be an interesting test of sorts for the UK to pursue a Britannia Rules The Waves play where the UK puts an early focus into enough Naval supremacy to lock down the European Axis and effectively fight Japan.

 

[Red_warning]

I don't know about quantity but Japan was still pretty far behind the west in the 40s when it came down to pure technical know-how.

 

[Axe99]

While Japan certainly accomplished a fair bit with it's production in no way did they 'punch at the level of the UK'. The 1937 build plan the UK started was never matched by Japan. Also compare the 1942 design light fleet carrier builds to the Unryu class, the UK lays down more then twice as many in 1942 and nearly twice as many in 1943 in those two years the UK laid down 16 1942 design light fleet carriers in two years compared to 8 Unryu class.

When the UK put it's mind to it they easily outstripped Japan in naval production, the real question was whether the UK was putting it's mind to it and how much of that naval production would be put to use against Japan, given the position of the UK on the map this doesn't tend to be a huge amount. Though it might be an interesting test of sorts for the UK to pursue a Britannia Rules The Waves play where the UK puts an early focus into enough Naval supremacy to lock down the European Axis and effectively fight Japan.

Aye - even if we only count the vessels counted in HoI4*, the UK built 74 per cent more tonnage (rough estimate, but whether it's 50 or 80, it's clearly a heap more than Japan) of warships, while also building thousands more AFVs and aircraft, substantial numbers of merchant ships and providing far better logistical support to the units it did build.

* If we count all fighting ships, it's more than a hundred per cent advantage - ie, for every ton of ship Japan produced, the UK produced two.

 

[Oerdin]

While Japan certainly accomplished a fair bit with it's production in no way did they 'punch at the level of the UK'. The 1937 build plan the UK started was never matched by Japan. Also compare the 1942 design light fleet carrier builds to the Unryu class, the UK lays down more then twice as many in 1942 and nearly twice as many in 1943 in those two years the UK laid down 16 1942 design light fleet carriers in two years compared to 8 Unryu class.

When the UK put it's mind to it they easily outstripped Japan in naval production, the real question was whether the UK was putting it's mind to it and how much of that naval production would be put to use against Japan, given the position of the UK on the map this doesn't tend to be a huge amount. Though it might be an interesting test of sorts for the UK to pursue a Britannia Rules The Waves play where the UK puts an early focus into enough Naval supremacy to lock down the European Axis and effectively fight Japan.

The UK and the US always had much more capacity to build things than Japan though Japan always maxed out its number of ships launched under the naval construction treaty while the UK and US frequently left part of their quotas unused due to domestic political and economic factors during the run up to the war.

So Japan had a large initial stock of ships but those could not be easily replaced as the war went on. Where as the allies kept increasing production, often dramatically, all through the war.

 

[Oerdin]

Aye - even if we only count the vessels counted in HoI4*, the UK built 74 per cent more tonnage (rough estimate, but whether it's 50 or 80, it's clearly a heap more than Japan) of warships, while also building thousands more AFVs and aircraft, substantial numbers of merchant ships and providing far better logistical support to the units it did build.

* If we count all fighting ships, it's more than a hundred per cent advantage - ie, for every ton of ship Japan produced, the UK produced two.

Churchill's history of WW2 really stresses that it was ultimately a war of production and numbers and he breaks down the numbers in each catagory quite well. Japan really was a dwarf industrial power trying to make up for its material deficiencies via aggressive tactics and a large manpower base.

 

[griffor]

i would imagine by the start of the war you could be at britan area of game start industrial capacity possibly even trading extra resources to allies would be usefull in building up faster if the www is anything to go by

 

[Loke]

Figures from Paul Kennedy's magnum OPUS:-

The Nominal National Products of the major powers in 1938, in 1990 Dollars:

(1) United States: 84.7 billion
(2) Germany: 46.0 billion*
(3) UK: 27.51 billion
(4) USSR: 23.02 billion
(5) France: 16.18 billion
(6) Italy: 8.68 billion
(7) Japan: 7.49 billion

The per capita figures:

(1) United States: 649
(2) Germany: 590
(3) UK: 579
(4) USSR: 138
(5) France: 385
(6) Italy: 200
(7) Japan: 104

*Note that Germany's figures includes Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia, as they were annexed into the country in 1938.

Japan has a per capita income 1/2 of Italy and 1/4 of France but do consider, this is all nominal GDP and not GDP based on PPP, if you take into account lower standard of living, higher motivation, more morale, die hard spirit and several other intangibles into account then the Japanese figures do not seem too bad.
Wartime expenditures by Japan actually outstripped Italy but stopped short of France.

Now, Japan shouldn't be able to field a "TIGER" division of tanks but they should be able to field 6 CVs by 1939 and probably 9 by 1941 (if you forego the Yamato class BBs).
You also should be able to field a very good fighter, good tactical bombers, naval bombers and torpedo planes though strategic bombers should be outside of your "SCOPE".
As for Infantry, considering the terrible infrastructure in most of China, Indo-China and Burma; the Japanese infantry which were primarily supported by high quality mortars than Heavy Artillery should actually have an advantage in terms of - less consumption of supplies and faster movement.

On the other hand, a Japanese division should be absolutely on the disadvantage fighting in Europe. For all their deficiencies cited, the Japanese were very good in the "TERRAIN" that they fought and wanted to fight in- China, Korea, Manchuria, South East Asia, Phillipines, Islands in the Pacific, Burma etc.

Interesting!

Canada?, just below Italy? How about Australia?