"why is italy so weak"
I'm sure Hitler also asked himself that question.
I'm sure Hitler also asked himself that question.
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why is italy so weak
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My understanding is as follows:
1-Really poor equipment for ground troops. Italian industry was much more limited than most other "major powers". Italy did develop some very good aircraft and their ships were also technically good, but ground forces equipment was where they decided to try to save money/resources/production capacity. Example is the riveted tanks that Italian industry produced for the Italian army. Italy could have bought some german tanks (or French tanks for that matter), but the idea of not producing their own went against the fascist doctrine and self image that Il Duce was trying to maintain.
2- Leadership and training. Leadership was spotty due to political appointees getting high level positions. And much of the ground forces troops were basically militia in quality (of training/etc), not just the CCNN, but the regular Italian army also. Note that many of the troops that had been released from service to go home and farm were immediately recalled for service in the Italian-Greek campaign.
3. Italian troop morale-pretty low, mostly because of the troops being jerked around, and getting crappy equipment and support in the field.
4. Logistics- pretty crappy. Italy was not able to supply the forces it placed in Libya against the British Western Desert Force. Given that they were mostly infantry divisions against a mobile (mostly armored) force, there was very little chance of the Italians winning in a stand up fight. Italy didn't want to spend the resources to supply the units in combat because it would have forced the Italian navy to commit to keeping the supply line (sealanes) open, and the navy was a big investment compared to the infantry divisions in Libya. So....given the options of "go big or go home", Italy tried to do something in the middle, which required DAK to stand up and prolong the campaign (but suffered the same ultimate fate).
Bottom line, economically, industrially, and from a military training stance, Italy was just not ready to fight a stand up fight against the allies. Maybe 5 years down the road after someone slapped the stupid out of Mussolini, maybe....then again....maybe not.
1-Really poor equipment for ground troops. Italian industry was much more limited than most other "major powers". Italy did develop some very good aircraft and their ships were also technically good, but ground forces equipment was where they decided to try to save money/resources/production capacity. Example is the riveted tanks that Italian industry produced for the Italian army. Italy could have bought some german tanks (or French tanks for that matter), but the idea of not producing their own went against the fascist doctrine and self image that Il Duce was trying to maintain.
2- Leadership and training. Leadership was spotty due to political appointees getting high level positions. And much of the ground forces troops were basically militia in quality (of training/etc), not just the CCNN, but the regular Italian army also. Note that many of the troops that had been released from service to go home and farm were immediately recalled for service in the Italian-Greek campaign.
3. Italian troop morale-pretty low, mostly because of the troops being jerked around, and getting crappy equipment and support in the field.
4. Logistics- pretty crappy. Italy was not able to supply the forces it placed in Libya against the British Western Desert Force. Given that they were mostly infantry divisions against a mobile (mostly armored) force, there was very little chance of the Italians winning in a stand up fight. Italy didn't want to spend the resources to supply the units in combat because it would have forced the Italian navy to commit to keeping the supply line (sealanes) open, and the navy was a big investment compared to the infantry divisions in Libya. So....given the options of "go big or go home", Italy tried to do something in the middle, which required DAK to stand up and prolong the campaign (but suffered the same ultimate fate).
Bottom line, economically, industrially, and from a military training stance, Italy was just not ready to fight a stand up fight against the allies. Maybe 5 years down the road after someone slapped the stupid out of Mussolini, maybe....then again....maybe not.
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I don´t think it was that simple, Italy wasn´t as developed as Germany and had smaller population. They couldn´t keep parity in all equipment, it really is about internal limits that would exist always. And buying stuff from abroad is not the way you develop your own industry. Germany barely had panzers for its army and was a close call in which they won in France fast (but what if... it sold tanks abroad? Which ones? The modern Panzer III? Would be bad idea...), and lost in Russia.
Another perspective - would it make sense for, somehow, a government that went more democratic or socialist to invest as much in arms as Italy did? How much of its GDP it invest in the army? IIRS was less than Germany, which had peace time expenses that were impossible to mantain after 1938 (as Adam Tooze´s book shows - I may look into it later and see if talks about the level of italian expense)
About relations between Germany and Italy I don´t think selling arms is a good idea - what they could and should do more is theather cooperation, and that includes Germany not losing the Luftwaffe over England.
Couple of points.
The number of divisions was the first-cut international yardstick by which the power of national armies was measured. 45 divisions > 30 divisions. Obscure the simple arithmetic by throwing into the TOE a legion of a couple of ill-prepared blackshirt battalions and occasional odds and ends and now Il Duce can plausibly boast of 45 triangular divisions. With the Czechs and Poles each claiming around 40 divisions, it's easy to see why 30 divisions were simply not enough.
Ideally, the blackshirts would be brought up to standard in due course.
I don't have the page cite handy (posted it in an earlier thread) but, in "Mussolini's Italy: Life Under the Dictatorship, 1915-1945", Bosworth desscribes the comfortably lackadaisical and inefficient military industrial and logistical system (summarized pithily in the post above as "crappy"). He cites a German evaluation that the Italian war effort ran at around a quarter of what it should have been by by German standards. A fundamental difference seemed to be that the Germans took national socialism and the war effort very seriously while most Italians could sustain only nominal enthusiasm for the fascist cause. One an assume that in a player's hands Italy should be able to do much better.
The number of divisions was the first-cut international yardstick by which the power of national armies was measured. 45 divisions > 30 divisions. Obscure the simple arithmetic by throwing into the TOE a legion of a couple of ill-prepared blackshirt battalions and occasional odds and ends and now Il Duce can plausibly boast of 45 triangular divisions. With the Czechs and Poles each claiming around 40 divisions, it's easy to see why 30 divisions were simply not enough.
Ideally, the blackshirts would be brought up to standard in due course.
I don't have the page cite handy (posted it in an earlier thread) but, in "Mussolini's Italy: Life Under the Dictatorship, 1915-1945", Bosworth desscribes the comfortably lackadaisical and inefficient military industrial and logistical system (summarized pithily in the post above as "crappy"). He cites a German evaluation that the Italian war effort ran at around a quarter of what it should have been by by German standards. A fundamental difference seemed to be that the Germans took national socialism and the war effort very seriously while most Italians could sustain only nominal enthusiasm for the fascist cause. One an assume that in a player's hands Italy should be able to do much better.
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yes a good analisys,
fascist cause rides a wave of rebellion and change that instead did not happen.
Fascist system was more corrupted and inefficient than all previous governments.
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Jmland points out the major causes, but it's not as simple as he assumes.
1-Really poor equipment for ground troops. This encompasses small arms, artillery, tanks, and virtually everything else. Italian industry was still not up to the standards of the UK, France, the US, or Germany, but the basic gear was still fairly good in comparison with most of the rest of the world. Italian artillery and anti-tank weaponry were mostly well below par, as were the automatic weapons. The trucks were at least reasonably durable. As pointed out, buying tanks from an ally who didn't even have enough for their own use is problematical. Italy was already purchasing aircraft engines from Germany, because most of its own were notoriously underpowered (they added a third engine to the nose of the Savoia Marchetti Sparvierro, because it could barely get off the ground with two - it was originally intended as a heavy fighter, but was repurposed as a bomber). The airframes, on the other hand, were actually pretty good in several cases.
2-Leadership was an issue at all levels. The officer corps was treated as an elite group, and did not associate with the "lesser" ranks, meaning that there was poor communication between the officers and the enlisted men, and plenty of contempt for the officers. Officer training was woefully inadequate. That growing contempt turned to outright resentment when supplies ran short, and the officers dined in splendor while the men starved. Training for the enlisted men varied from poor to good, with most being toward the low end, but a few key divisions received very good training, and had correspondingly higher morale.
3-See 2.
4-Logistics in North Africa assumed that Italy would be able to supply its forces across the Mediterranean. The UK put a stop to that, or pretty close to it. The amount of supplies interdicted was fairly high, and Italy couldn't replace the convoys as fast as the RN destroyed them. Italy and Germany resorted to slipping small craft across, and traveling the most dangerous stretches only at night, but the shipping volume was totally inadequate. Rommel only prolonged the inevitable, because there was no way that Italy could supply the additional forces, while the UK was able to bring more and more to bear against the beleaguered Italians and Africa Corps.
1-Really poor equipment for ground troops. This encompasses small arms, artillery, tanks, and virtually everything else. Italian industry was still not up to the standards of the UK, France, the US, or Germany, but the basic gear was still fairly good in comparison with most of the rest of the world. Italian artillery and anti-tank weaponry were mostly well below par, as were the automatic weapons. The trucks were at least reasonably durable. As pointed out, buying tanks from an ally who didn't even have enough for their own use is problematical. Italy was already purchasing aircraft engines from Germany, because most of its own were notoriously underpowered (they added a third engine to the nose of the Savoia Marchetti Sparvierro, because it could barely get off the ground with two - it was originally intended as a heavy fighter, but was repurposed as a bomber). The airframes, on the other hand, were actually pretty good in several cases.
2-Leadership was an issue at all levels. The officer corps was treated as an elite group, and did not associate with the "lesser" ranks, meaning that there was poor communication between the officers and the enlisted men, and plenty of contempt for the officers. Officer training was woefully inadequate. That growing contempt turned to outright resentment when supplies ran short, and the officers dined in splendor while the men starved. Training for the enlisted men varied from poor to good, with most being toward the low end, but a few key divisions received very good training, and had correspondingly higher morale.
3-See 2.
4-Logistics in North Africa assumed that Italy would be able to supply its forces across the Mediterranean. The UK put a stop to that, or pretty close to it. The amount of supplies interdicted was fairly high, and Italy couldn't replace the convoys as fast as the RN destroyed them. Italy and Germany resorted to slipping small craft across, and traveling the most dangerous stretches only at night, but the shipping volume was totally inadequate. Rommel only prolonged the inevitable, because there was no way that Italy could supply the additional forces, while the UK was able to bring more and more to bear against the beleaguered Italians and Africa Corps.
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And why it shouldn´t br able to... do worse or equal?
A strategy game is about choices over limited resources. I don´t know what you are trying to say, if Italy could build 6 battleships with the same historical army and airforce size (or bigger...) then why the hell England couldn´t either? Why England couldn´t be more interventionist and at the very least start mobilizing industry more to have bigger army by 1940?
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>then why the hell England couldn´t either?
Its not a case of couldn't more a case of wouldn't, reflecting the UK's obsession with its navy rather than its army, for what should be quite obvious reasons. It was established British policy than outside of wartime, the British army would be ~12 regular divisions and other commitments, at least in the home sphere, would be met through territorial army units. Makes for military parades that are a lot less impressive no doubt, but results in a little less strain on the taxpayer. That number had been established policy for a number of years (even prior to WWI), prompting Bismark's famous comment that if the British army ever made an aggressive landing on the German Baltic coastline, Germany would send the Berlin police to arrest them
It just isn't that common for a democracy to do a big interventionist build up while at peace (regardless of who is in office). Democracies tend to have to balance the opinion of the generally pre-war dovish electorate vs the opinion of the Hawks in government, hence the prevalence of subtle and understated efforts to rearm in peace (The Shadow scheme on the British National Foci tree in HOI4 being a good example).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_shadow_factories
Its not a case of couldn't more a case of wouldn't, reflecting the UK's obsession with its navy rather than its army, for what should be quite obvious reasons. It was established British policy than outside of wartime, the British army would be ~12 regular divisions and other commitments, at least in the home sphere, would be met through territorial army units. Makes for military parades that are a lot less impressive no doubt, but results in a little less strain on the taxpayer. That number had been established policy for a number of years (even prior to WWI), prompting Bismark's famous comment that if the British army ever made an aggressive landing on the German Baltic coastline, Germany would send the Berlin police to arrest them
It just isn't that common for a democracy to do a big interventionist build up while at peace (regardless of who is in office). Democracies tend to have to balance the opinion of the generally pre-war dovish electorate vs the opinion of the Hawks in government, hence the prevalence of subtle and understated efforts to rearm in peace (The Shadow scheme on the British National Foci tree in HOI4 being a good example).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_shadow_factories
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Mussolini's Italy came up with "italian strike" idea. You show up to work, but follow every rule and regulation to the letter, doing very little actual work.
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I agree with the other 3 points but not with this...
UK, France, US, and Germany had absolutely not the same industrial standards among them.
France was not better prepared than Italy.
Italy had much bigger front than France and subdivided in 3 totally separated theatres.
Every front was just surrounded by enemies than more complicate to defend (as u just point out), with all the consequences that this implies.
France had only 1 front in homeland, and he could concentrate all force there.
Nevertheless Italy had fight for 4 years, and France capitulated in 15 days....45 days considering operations also in Belgium and Netherlands.
By superficial considerations about Italy we should conclude than Italians soldiers fight 300 times better than French soldiers?
If Italy was weak than what was France?
About tanks, Italy produced very few and has purchased even less.
It was not due to an technology inability of industry, but for belief of the military and political leaders that these were not needed.
"Eight million bayonets", there was still a conviction the army's strength was only based on numbers and not on the level of technology and integration between the forces.
Not all italian artillery were below par, Ansaldo 149/40 mod. 35 field artillery have similar performance in comparison of german one, and better of some allied artillery.
Ansaldo 90/53 AA artillery was superior to 88 Flak in every aspects. Germans took it and continued to use it in exchange of 88mm Flak.
Anti-tank weaponry in much cases were not produced neither designed.
You can not compare equipments that does not exist. With the exception of the Swiss made AT rifle Solothurn (which soon became useless for increase of tank armor) italian infantry havent any AT weapon. The reason here was the same of the point above, the convinction of military and political leaders that these were not needed.
Italian tanks was riveted and crappy not more than French and Japanese tanks, but nobody guess japan was weak cause their tanks was crappy.
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The Crappy Japanese tanks were compensated by a First-Class Naval Fleet, which was till 1942 the No:1 or No:2 in the World and backed by a relatively strong air-force.
Also, the average Japanese infantry-man was ready to die for the Emperor with a zeal unmatched by any other nation. This did result in a lot of wastage but also gave the Japanese divisions immense morale, the "Italian type mass surrenders" did not happen to the Japanese.
Again, the "Terrain and Geography" of the Japanese war was mainly- Jungles, Hills, Islands etc which required good Air-Sea power backed by strong infantry, tanks were not very good in that terrain unlike in North Africa where the Tanks reigned supreme. After the steppes of Southern Russia, the North African theatre was perhaps the BEST tank country and missing this concept hurt Italy badly.
a POD-
In late 1937/early 1938, maybe an event or decision can happen for the Italians- our forces are CRA*, let us reform, you end up firing half of the General staff and lose all your "stored" military experience and Lose 1 Political Power per day for 2 years (for the Fascists accepting defeat was worse than death) but the Italians gain a "9 battalion division set-up" and also some access to German Techs like- PzIII, Stuka and some Artillery and Anti-Tank guns (if Germany is at 150+ relations and Anti-Commintern pact is signed) and this results also in the "Italians being unable to unilaterally declare war once they join AXIS- stopping the Greek and other adventures" but Italy has better quality supports and weapons systems and thus manages to do better, but Italy basically becomes something like Hungary or Romania.. just another cog in the wheel.
OR
You say- We are great, gain some 100 Political Power and continue on the path of destruction.
P.S: Italian General Staff was superbly corrupt, Eg: Ugo Cavellero was a director in FIAT (pre-war) and accepted shoddy quality material despite knowing of it.
Pietro Badoglio was the Staff Officer in Cadorna's staff and dreamt many of those "useless Isonzo Offensives in WW1" yet he continued enjoying the support of the Govt.
So on and so forth..
Also, the average Japanese infantry-man was ready to die for the Emperor with a zeal unmatched by any other nation. This did result in a lot of wastage but also gave the Japanese divisions immense morale, the "Italian type mass surrenders" did not happen to the Japanese.
Again, the "Terrain and Geography" of the Japanese war was mainly- Jungles, Hills, Islands etc which required good Air-Sea power backed by strong infantry, tanks were not very good in that terrain unlike in North Africa where the Tanks reigned supreme. After the steppes of Southern Russia, the North African theatre was perhaps the BEST tank country and missing this concept hurt Italy badly.
a POD-
In late 1937/early 1938, maybe an event or decision can happen for the Italians- our forces are CRA*, let us reform, you end up firing half of the General staff and lose all your "stored" military experience and Lose 1 Political Power per day for 2 years (for the Fascists accepting defeat was worse than death) but the Italians gain a "9 battalion division set-up" and also some access to German Techs like- PzIII, Stuka and some Artillery and Anti-Tank guns (if Germany is at 150+ relations and Anti-Commintern pact is signed) and this results also in the "Italians being unable to unilaterally declare war once they join AXIS- stopping the Greek and other adventures" but Italy has better quality supports and weapons systems and thus manages to do better, but Italy basically becomes something like Hungary or Romania.. just another cog in the wheel.
OR
You say- We are great, gain some 100 Political Power and continue on the path of destruction.
P.S: Italian General Staff was superbly corrupt, Eg: Ugo Cavellero was a director in FIAT (pre-war) and accepted shoddy quality material despite knowing of it.
Pietro Badoglio was the Staff Officer in Cadorna's staff and dreamt many of those "useless Isonzo Offensives in WW1" yet he continued enjoying the support of the Govt.
So on and so forth..
Well, that is a really really bad idea. In real life, in history, in late 1937/ early 1938, the entire Italian army was made up of 3 regiments of 3 battalions plus a machine gun battalion and an artillery regiment. They really had triangular divisions, not binary. Giving Italy binary divisions in 1936 is an historical flight of fancy by Paradox. In fact, it was only right about that time (1937-1938) that the Regio Esercito was considering adopting a two regiment divisional structure. So, your proposal is not only unhistorical, but it is the exact opposite of history.
If anything, Italy should start with a nine battalion division like everyone else. Then in 1938, it should get an event -- "We need more divisions". "Our generals have proposed to reduce the number of regiments per divisions from 3 to 2. This will give each division less firepower, but will enable us to field more divisions." Then you could have two options: "Naw, stay the same" or "More is better!" The AI could be coded to usually take the "More is better!" option, which would change the Italian infantry template from 9 battalions to 6 battalions. Then automatically, the game system would change each divisions. The extra manpower and infantry equipment would flow back to stockpile, and Italy would presumable have the resources to outfit a few more divisions. However, you do have a good idea about attaching a cost to the "Naw, stay the same" option in political points or land experience, or conversely an added benefit to the "More is better!" option to better incentivize the player to opt for the historical choice.
I am all for trying to model the particular challenges faced by the Italian army (ahem), but just giving them fewer battalions per division seems to be a ham fisted way to do it. We have not heard anything about officers or officer ratio. I am afraid it is not in the game, but that was a good place to nerf Italy in Hoi3. Italy had plenty of officers, but many were worthless and might as well not have been there. Without that tool you could make them fall behind in doctrine research, and the obvious place to nerf them is in the equipment tech level of the equipment actually used by the divisions. They might be able to research some fine weapons, like the Beretta Modello 38, but their industry should be so over taxed by other needs or underfunded with resources that they can never actually equip their divisions with the good stuff and must make due with the WWI left overs. In fact, the equipment stocks should be so low that you do not want to waste it on attrition with training your troops. So, your troops end up being not only not as well equipped but also not as well trained as the troops of other nations. It should be so hard to build enough tanks to field an armor division that you shouldn't particularly care if the tanks are any good.
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The point of @Kovax was about "Really poor equipment for ground troops."
We didnt comparison about navy, we was talking of tanks and infantry equipments.
Tanks dont navigate on sea, and ships cant invade territory. Than is not possible compensate one each other.
Japan didnt fight only on the coast and islands, they invaded millions of square Kms of enermy continental lands, and they didnt it with navy or air force.
For invade a territory, any kind of territory, land units are needed and land unit equipment the same.
Dont seem japanese had so good equipments for ground troops. Sure not better than Italian one.
Moreover some infantry equipment of japanese land forces was italian, as the ordnance rifle Carcano-Arisaka produced in Italy.
Also the other verions Type 38 and 99 produced in Japan on copy of Carcano mod. 38.
Italy had just in 1937/38 triangular division with 9 battalion set-up as every other army.
In 1940 they were binary (but 8 battallion), but the total number of divisions increased of 33%.
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I have read your posts before also and do agree with them... i was referring to the "in-game" possibilities not the HISTORICAL. There is a difference. Paradox has already gone ahead with the crappy 6 battalion divisions and as far as i know, OFFICERS has not been mentioned Explicitly or Implicitly.
Again, i would state that what i am proposing is that the - player can move Italy in a different direction in the game but at a big cost (it should not be free).
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Italian morale was not very low at the start of the war; actually the Italian soldiers were not lacking of guts to fight.
On the other hand what was lacking was equipment (That is a fault of Italian economical backbone, being frail); leadership (A degree of not very competent leaders at the higher levels) and support / C3I (communications with air, navy and army had to go through various steps and they struggled to coordinate their efforts well).
An Italian division should have the same potential of an UK Division. That's the end of the story.
The game allows to tinker with templates. Good. Which means both Italy and Uk can tinker on their template in accord to what the game allows.
The Industrial Output gives each nation a degree of planes, guns, etc per month (or daily, whatever). That is something that will be mirrored. UK probably can equip fully X divisions, when Italy if wanting X divisions will have them with half of the amount of guns for example than their expected order of battle / full complement.
Whichever modifiers the selected leaders for the Army provide.
Other variables dictated by in-game situation (logistic level / supply, etc) which is a variable.
These are the differences the game should account.
Not an artificial "weakening" of a nation just because historically they performed "poorly".
The game should mirror the roots of the problem (ie: Italy not having a grand industry to begin with, Leader traits, etc) - and then let the players work with that.
Same as the Italian Navy - per se was not bad at all in terms of quality of material and personnel. But it was short of coordination with the airforce; and lacked carriers.
If you look at any encounter the Italian Navy had with the Royal Navy where a carrier was not present - you'll see that the encounter was pratically even or at best an Axis victory.
Add in a carrier and you can have a result like Capo Matapan.
On the other hand what was lacking was equipment (That is a fault of Italian economical backbone, being frail); leadership (A degree of not very competent leaders at the higher levels) and support / C3I (communications with air, navy and army had to go through various steps and they struggled to coordinate their efforts well).
An Italian division should have the same potential of an UK Division. That's the end of the story.
The game allows to tinker with templates. Good. Which means both Italy and Uk can tinker on their template in accord to what the game allows.
The Industrial Output gives each nation a degree of planes, guns, etc per month (or daily, whatever). That is something that will be mirrored. UK probably can equip fully X divisions, when Italy if wanting X divisions will have them with half of the amount of guns for example than their expected order of battle / full complement.
Whichever modifiers the selected leaders for the Army provide.
Other variables dictated by in-game situation (logistic level / supply, etc) which is a variable.
These are the differences the game should account.
Not an artificial "weakening" of a nation just because historically they performed "poorly".
The game should mirror the roots of the problem (ie: Italy not having a grand industry to begin with, Leader traits, etc) - and then let the players work with that.
Same as the Italian Navy - per se was not bad at all in terms of quality of material and personnel. But it was short of coordination with the airforce; and lacked carriers.
If you look at any encounter the Italian Navy had with the Royal Navy where a carrier was not present - you'll see that the encounter was pratically even or at best an Axis victory.
Add in a carrier and you can have a result like Capo Matapan.
In this case would be more interesting (and historical) create an event named "Pariani reform" in 1940 that transform every inf division from triengulat to binary.