Why do some people consider the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki unjustified?

[Spartanlemur]

You misunderstand me. By ”doomed in that respect” I meant that Japan by 1945 could no longer hope to be a military rival of the US. The Soviets could and were for the next 44 years.

Alone, no, but it only need tip the balance against hegemonic power. Many little countries can be a check on one large country, because they can act as one larger body should the need arise.

And anyway, my specific point was just an example of how a conservative opposition to nuking or invasion might be made. It's not an egoistic philosophy, so you could also argue against invasion out of a desire to let Japan preserve its dignity.

I return to my original argument which is that a conditional peace treaty was an alternative to invasion or using atomic bombs.

 

[Imgran]

You're perhaps unwittingly trying to engage in a pointless semantic argument which will waste your time and mine. My meaning is clear, and consideration of the origins and meaning of the term "invasion" is not necessary.

Then why use the word? This is your word choice we're talking about, not mine. Since the language you're using includes an presumed assertion that the disputed lands are in fact Japanese (including former European colonial holdings, Manchukuo and the Philippines), I think the rhetorical distinction is nontrivial.

 

[Spartanlemur]

Then why use the word? This is your word choice we're talking about, not mine. Since the language you're using includes an presumed assertion that the disputed lands are in fact Japanese (including former European colonial holdings, Manchukuo and the Philippines), I think the rhetorical distinction is nontrivial.

To be clear, I think my definition is right, and this something you disagree with. That's why I say you're entering into a semantic argument (if I agreed that I was wrong, there would be no argument to be had).

I am refusing to engage, because such an argument is a waste of time, and takes this thread away from its topic. I made very clear the idea I was referring to, and I will say no more on this matter.

 

[Imgran]

Alone, no, but it only need tip the balance against hegemonic power. Many little countries can be a check on one large country, because they can act as one larger body should the need arise.

There were no antihegemonic partners in Asia at that time. Japan was not strong enough to protect itself against the USSR, much less project power of its own against any but the weakest, least developed threats, and her vulnerability to blockade would not easily be forgotten.

If anything, a Japan that survived the war as an ostensible Japanese Empire would become an arm of US foreign policy just like the real Japan did, and for the same reasons. Japan was dependent on the US for resources before the war, and a militaristic Japanese empire would not have changed in that regard. Particularly as the US offered protection against Soviet aggression and the Japanese remained invested in the Asian mainland where they would need the protection of a more powerful ally, the result would be increased American power projection into Asia, not a check on US power.

Imagine a Japanese empire dependent on the United States and the role she might play in the Cold War. If anything, they would be a check on Chinese revolutionary Communism that left that whole region in flux for several generations. and substantially weaken the Communist position in Asia.

 

[Spartanlemur]

There were no antihegemonic partners in Asia at that time. Japan was not strong enough to protect itself against the USSR, much less project power of its own against any but the weakest, least developed threats, and her vulnerability to blockade would not easily be forgotten.

If anything, a Japan that survived the war as an ostensible Japanese Empire would become an arm of US foreign policy just like the real Japan did, and for the same reasons. Japan was dependent on the US for resources before the war, and a militaristic Japanese empire would not have changed in that regard. Particularly as the US offered protection against Soviet aggression and the Japanese remained invested in the Asian mainland where they would need the protection of a more powerful ally, the result would be increased American power projection into Asia, not a check on US power.

Imagine a Japanese empire dependent on the United States and the role she might play in the Cold War. If anything, they would be a check on Chinese revolutionary Communism that left that whole region in flux for several generations. and substantially weaken the Communist position in Asia.

If what you say is true, then you could even make the argument for a conditional peace without dropping any nukes from the liberal position which seeks hegemonic power.

 

[Geriander]

Alone, no, but it only need tip the balance against hegemonic power. Many little countries can be a check on one large country, because they can act as one larger body should the need arise.

And anyway, my specific point was just an example of how a conservative opposition to nuking or invasion might be made. It's not an egoistic philosophy, so you could also argue against invasion out of a desire to let Japan preserve its dignity.

I return to my original argument which is that a conditional peace treaty was an alternative to invasion or using atomic bombs.

But by what metric would it be a good alternative?

Good for the US? Hardly since it would put them in a worse strategic position during the Cold War. Letting it be known that any atrocity could be commited against the US and its allies without punishment would also create a bad precedent.

Good for Japan? Aside from it remaining a military dictatorship, it may be. Why this would carry more weight than what would be good for the people of Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan remains another matter.

 

[thedarkendstar]

Your argument for the probity of America's actions is the traditional argument for Liberalism, going back to Locke. It has had many critics over the years (including socialists, conservatives, reactionaries, and communists), so I won't engage in any criticism here, for it is enough to say that significant criticism exists.

You confirm my point, which is that the invasion of Japan was driven by American desire to assert dominance (whether it already existed, or is new, is as irrelevant as whether a law exists in actuality before a police officer comes to arrest someone for breaking it or not).

It should be remembered that Japan only became a concern in the Yalta conference at the behest of America.

So I'll clearly state America's possibilities:

- Invade Japan (many casualties, American domination)
- Nuke Japan (fewer casualties, American domination)
- Secure peace with Japan (no casualties, but also no American domination!)

The people who say that nuking Japan was the merciful option do not acknowledge the existence of the third option, because they are often militant liberals who refuse to accept any prospect of Liberalism not being enforced on a worldwide basis. The same people who are the most enthusiastic supporters of modern foreign invasions against those who break the laws of Liberalism, which is a universalist philosophy.

While True without total Japanese surrender would they have received the massive financial aid they received from the US to rebuild the nation eir is also the possibility without these funds Japan would actually a poorer place today.

 

[Geriander]

While True without total Japanese surrender would they have received the massive financial aid they received from the US to rebuild the nation eir is also the possibility without these funds Japan would actually a poorer place today.

Not having to pay for their own defense during the Cold War also helped. The record of military dictatorships when it comes to creating prosperity is also quite mixed.

 

[Yakman]

There were no antihegemonic partners in Asia at that time. Japan was not strong enough to protect itself against the USSR, much less project power of its own against any but the weakest, least developed threats, and her vulnerability to blockade would not easily be forgotten.

Ridiculous. Japan could have seized the Russian Far East, and held it, had it so chosen. they lost A battle, on the periphery of their power projection.

That they didn't only goes to Tokyo knowing that the true prizes lay to the south.

 

[Geriander]

Ridiculous. Japan could have seized the Russian Far East, and held it, had it so chosen. they lost A battle, on the periphery of their power projection.

That they didn't only goes to Tokyo knowing that the true prizes lay to the south.

This discussion has been pretty much limited to 1945. By then the Japanese army collapsed under the Soviet advance with little resistance. The USSR of 1945 would have little difficulty in pushing Japanese troops out of mainland Asia.

 

[Arilou]

The third option leaves Japan in localized domination. This is downright cruel to any peoples left under their boot. It also assumes that the intact Japanese government will precariously balance itself between eventual reassertion of its military over east Asia and collapse due to failure, in some hypothetical middle position where they contentedly play nice in their rump empire with the scraps of colonial vassals they are left with and don't start fights anymore.

This is a very silly thing to expect as an outcome.

Japan was not invaded, did not have its eastern regions raped and displaced, was not partitioned, did not have a wall through tokyo... instead enjoying a half century as a world leading economy. The people of Japan (not even getting to Korea etc) are better off than had we foolishly left their warmongering leaders in place.

To be honest, even with a white peace in '45 Japan probably wouldn't be able to hang on to it's possessions for long, not while still being at war with the USSR, China, etc.

Heck, if while it would probably take a while, the british still had a navy while the Japanese didn't. It would require a massive reorientation, but it would probably end with Japan starved into submission anyway, and with more dead as the japanese pockets are isolated and picked off.

So the end result of an american-led white peace is likely to be A) A massive drop in american credibility and ability to influence the world B) A corresponding increase in Soviet influence. And C) The same end result: Hundreds of thousands, if not millions of additional dead.

Why pre-Manchukuo? Was the US particularly vocal about the Mukden incident?

Kinda? The US (like most of the world) never recognized Manchukuo or the japanese possesion of the territory. As far as everyone except the fascists and the Soviets (post-nonagression pact, obviously no longer applicable after the soviet DOW) it was illegally occupied chinese land.

As far as well... Pretty much everyone was concerned, Japan keeping Manchuria was a non-starter.

EDIT: And of course, it was a non-starter simply from a US perspective. The US public would not stand for what would (righfully) be spun as a japanese victory after the japanese had attacked the without provocation. Especially when there were two, for the americans, relatively cheap options (IE: Starvation or nukes) availible.

 

[Imgran]

Ridiculous. Japan could have seized the Russian Far East, and held it, had it so chosen. they lost A battle, on the periphery of their power projection.

That they didn't only goes to Tokyo knowing that the true prizes lay to the south.

The battle of Khalkhin Gol demonstrated that the Soviets could put a more dangerous army in the field in the 30s than the Japanese could... at a time when Japan was fully mobilized for war and the Soviets were not, and during a period where Soviet arms was as weak as they ever would be.

As time progressed, the plight of Japan in mainland Asia would only grow weaker. It would be a matter of time before Stalin and Mao, or the US and Chiang, would ally to drive them off the continent, depending on how they set up their foreign policy after the war. Either way, there's no way they're keeping any mainland Asian holdings after the war, they simply didn't have the manpower to fight both China plus their backing superpower at the same time.

In the end, Imperial Japan would have had two choices -- protect itself against the USA by allying with the Soviets, or protecting itself against the Soviets by allying with the USA. Considering that the Soviets had very little way to protect them against US naval aggression combined with how vulnerable Japan proved to the US Navy, I suspect they'd choose the latter, and become an extension of US Cold War diplomacy in the East.

 

[Katsuki126]

Then why didn't they? Again. It's not as if the US didn't keep pressuring them. The fact is, the Japanese did not surrender after the invasion of Manchuria. They did not surrender despite warnings from the US government. They did not surrender after the first atomic bomb even. And even after the second bomb they still faced an attempted coup.

The Japanese had ample opportunity to surrender. They didn't. Was the atomic bombs the deciding factor? Hard to say, but it was, at least, a reasonable decision based on available information.

Uh...
The Japanese did surrender with the invasion of Manchuria which began the 9th of August and ended where is now the border between North and South Korea on the 15th...

On the 6th and 9th of August came the two nuclear bombing, one would expect Japan to surrender on the 10th or the 11th, fearing another nuke in the days to come. But Japan surrendered only on the 15th. A whole week later. The Emperor prepared his speech on the 14th, not the 9th or the 10th (and he knew about the massive scale destruction of Japan since his tour of Tokyo after the aforementioned bombing).

One have to realize that the military seized power in Japan, prompted the war, and the Army and the Navy were competing for power. After being bogged down in China, the Army lost its leadership, allowing the Navy to control the government, forcing the "southern expansion" and war with the United States. It went badly, and only one force remained untouched in Japan : The one-million-men strong Kwantung Army.

Despite the terrible state of Japan in 1945, officers and generals still wanted to pursue a war they thought winnable. Then the soviet, exactly three month after the German surrender (as Staline promised) invaded Manchuria and destroyed in a single week the Kwantung Army.

The Army lost its prestige, and its credibility, the officers were demoralized. The Emperor, as Meiji did 70 years before, used this at his advantage, he took back the power and made peace.

What drove the Emperor to peace is unknown, and will probably never be known, his confidants always defended the official story claiming that he has always been a pacifist.
However I will advocate that if, and that is a big if, the Emperor became a staunch advocate of peace because of the suffering of his people, the nuclear bombing were not the main factor, seeing his subject being burned alive in Tokyo might have been enough.

I hope it was clear enough, I thought it deserved to be explained that it was not the nuke that forced Japan to surrender. Most people tend to only have the same information as the Americans in 45'. Now that we have the full picture, we should temper our judgement. (and just so it's clear, if I was Truman or any high official in the American army, with the information and expectations they had, I would have supported the use of a nuclear bomb. I'm not blaming America here, simply saying that with hindsight, it was not necessary)


There is in this thread a lot of rational thinking about the use of nuke, if the nuke were not used there would have been xxx millions dead and so on. This has nothing to do with the reason that made those events happened or their justifications. In a modern war, the complex interactions between the different branches of the Armed Forces, as well as the government and the various individuals remain important. It is not just America as a single entity versus Japan as a single entity.

Last but not least, for @Fire_Unionist , some people think that the nuclear bombings are unjustified because the usual justifications is : "it did end the war", when nowadays, we realize that it didn't. The main justification fall hence it is considered by some unjustified (though plenty of people will bring forward other justifications that might or might not be relevant).

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

What I can add to this is the US servicemen preparing to invade the Home Islands, who had bled mightily over yards of dirt at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, REJOICED those two bombs were dropped. Casualties in a final battle would have been horrendous on both sides, and they knew it.

The fact the Emperor’s surrender recording had to be safeguarded from interception by the Military dictatorship tells you all you need to know about Japan’s intention to surrender voluntarily without the unleashing of atomic fury.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Uh...
The Japanese did surrender with the invasion of Manchuria which began the 9th of August and ended where is now the border between North and South Korea on the 15th...

On the 6th and 9th of August came the two nuclear bombing, one would expect Japan to surrender on the 10th or the 11th, fearing another nuke in the days to come. But Japan surrendered only on the 15th. A whole week later. The Emperor prepared his speech on the 14th, not the 9th or the 10th (and he knew about the massive scale destruction of Japan since his tour of Tokyo after the aforementioned bombing).

One have to realize that the military seized power in Japan, prompted the war, and the Army and the Navy were competing for power. After being bogged down in China, the Army lost its leadership, allowing the Navy to control the government, forcing the "southern expansion" and war with the United States. It went badly, and only one force remained untouched in Japan : The one-million-men strong Kwantung Army.

Despite the terrible state of Japan in 1945, officers and generals still wanted to pursue a war they thought winnable. Then the soviet, exactly three month after the German surrender (as Staline promised) invaded Manchuria and destroyed in a single week the Kwantung Army.

The Army lost its prestige, and its credibility, the officers were demoralized. The Emperor, as Meiji did 70 years before, used this at his advantage, he took back the power and made peace.

What drove the Emperor to peace is unknown, and will probably never be known, his confidants always defended the official story claiming that he has always been a pacifist.
However I will advocate that if, and that is a big if, the Emperor became a staunch advocate of peace because of the suffering of his people, the nuclear bombing were not the main factor, seeing his subject being burned alive in Tokyo might have been enough.

I hope it was clear enough, I thought it deserved to be explained that it was not the nuke that forced Japan to surrender. Most people tend to only have the same information as the Americans in 45'. Now that we have the full picture, we should temper our judgement. (and just so it's clear, if I was Truman or any high official in the American army, with the information and expectations they had, I would have supported the use of a nuclear bomb. I'm not blaming America here, simply saying that with hindsight, it was not necessary)


There is in this thread a lot of rational thinking about the use of nuke, if the nuke were not used there would have been xxx millions dead and so on. This has nothing to do with the reason that made those events happened or their justifications. In a modern war, the complex interactions between the different branches of the Armed Forces, as well as the government and the various individuals remain important. It is not just America as a single entity versus Japan as a single entity.

Last but not least, for @Fire_Unionist , some people think that the nuclear bombings are unjustified because the usual justifications is : "it did end the war", when nowadays, we realize that it didn't. The main justification fall hence it is considered by some unjustified (though plenty of people will bring forward other justifications that might or might not be relevant).

What you fail to account for is no one had ever seen, or could comprehend, what had happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The cities simply ceased to exist. This took time for the government to comprehend. And while they were willing to continue the fight the Emperor, who arguably never wanted this war, ended it.

 

[Herbert West]

What you fail to account for is no one had ever seen, or could comprehend, what had happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The cities simply ceased to exist. This took time for the government to comprehend. And while they were willing to continue the fight the Emperor, who arguably never wanted this war, ended it.

Again, japanese cities had been erased with alarming regularity. The new thing about atomic bombs was that they could be delivered by a single bomber, therefore de facto undetectable and without warning.

However, it was at very best the first bomb that forced Japan to the table. The japanese ruling council met on the 9th, that is true, but they met because of the Soviet invasion, starting on 0400 hours, not because of the bombing, of which they did not hear until already in session. And even during that session, they were ready to acquiesce with Postdam, with the splitting caveats being occupation and who resides over war criminals.

So both bombs were contributing factors, sure, but they were not, and ought not to be presented as, the triggering factor in Japan surrendering, That honour does belong to the USSR.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

So both bombs were contributing factors, sure, but they were not, and ought not to be presented as, the triggering factor in Japan surrendering, That honour does belong to the USSR.

If this is true, then George Patton crossing the Remagen Bridge caused Germany to collapse.

The defeat of Germany required a massive allied effort; Russian troops, British Intelligence, and American Industry. But, at the end of the day, I hand defeat over Germany to Zhukov.

Japan . . . the United States broke Japan over its knee; that victory belongs to America. Chester Nimitz in particular. Russia never enters into the equation, they were little more than freebooters looking for cheap land. China was the anvil, America the hammer.

If you want to examine any of the land, air, naval, or submarine campaigns required to get to this conclusion; I am at your service.

 

[Herbert West]

If I rephrase it as surrendering (as they intended) or terms close to, and ultimately fully in accordance with Potsdam (as it turned out to be), will you accept?

It was the loss of the Kwantung Army, the prestige loss associated with that for the Army higher ups, and the loss of the USSR as a neutral intermediary that convinced the japanese leadership to seek terms of surrender on, or close to, the terms the Allies wanted, rather than their earlier peace feelers (after countless civilians deaths due to firebombing and destruction of their cities), which were on terms the Japanese wanted.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Well, let's try it this way. The Offensive War against Japan consisted of:

• the systematic and relentless destruction of the Japanese Surface Fleet by the United States Navy
• the seizure of the Phillipines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa as a long-term goal of the Army and Marine's two prong approach across the Pacific, accomplished by the gradual development and deployment of that magnificent logistical train: The Fleet That Stayed.
• Hap Arnold's VLR high-altitude bombing campaign of Japan, starring the B-29, with limited success
• The End Game beginning with Curtis LeMay reorganizing his bombers to operate at low altitude, cracking buildings open with high explosives followed by a carpet of napalm, setting the Japanese Home Islands on fire.
• Nimitz's US submarine blockade, which proved so effective that the poorly organized Japanese merchant marine essentially ceased to exist, making Japan's foreign territories moot.
• The US Marines and Army massing to launch Operation Downfall, the invasion of the Japanese Home Islands; spearheaded by Operations Olympic and Coronet. And they openly feared the Gotterdamerung surprises Japan had waiting for them when they arrived.

At this strategic moment, Stalin orders a land grab, knowing the Japanese Territories would be about as difficult to take as the Baltic States were while Germany was occupied with Frace.

At that moment, Harry S. Truman decides to drop two atomic bombs, Fat Man and Little Boy, on Japan to prove to the world (read that: Stalin) we had them; and to put a punctuation point on the end of the war.

The Emperor of Japan sues for peace, many Japanese are hung for war crimes regarding the sheer brutality with which they thought they could treat the human race.

So, perhaps this is what you meant to say; and if so I agree with you whole heartedly.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Well, let's try it this way. The Offensive War against Japan consisted of:

• the systematic and relentless destruction of the Japanese Surface Fleet by the United States Navy
• the seizure of the Phillipines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa as a long-term goal of the Army and Marine's two prong approach across the Pacific, accomplished by the gradual development and deployment of that magnificent logistical train: The Fleet That Stayed.
• Hap Arnold's VLR high-altitude bombing campaign of Japan, starring the B-29, with limited success
• The End Game beginning with Curtis LeMay reorganizing his bombers to operate at low altitude, cracking buildings open with high explosives followed by a carpet of napalm, setting the Japanese Home Islands on fire.
• Nimitz's US submarine blockade, which proved so effective that the poorly organized Japanese merchant marine essentially ceased to exist, making Japan's foreign territories moot.
• The US Marines and Army massing to launch Operation Downfall, the invasion of the Japanese Home Islands; spearheaded by Operations Olympic and Coronet. And on one was excited about the Gotterdamerung surprises Japan had waiting for them when they arrived.

At this strategic moment, Stalin orders a land grab, knowing the Japanese Territories would be about as difficult to take as the Baltic States were while Germany was occupied with Frace.

At that moment, Harry S. Truman decides to drop two atomic bombs, Fat Man and Little Boy, on Japan to prove to the world (read that: Stalin) we had them; and to put a punctuation point on the end of the war.

The Emperor of Japan sues for peace, many Japanese are hung for war crimes regarding the sheer brutality with which they thought they could treat the human race.

So, perhaps this is what you meant to say; and if so I agree with you whole heartedly.

Being me, I have to add Burma to that list. While it was a sideshow on the operational level; strategically it tied up substantial numbers of some of the best Japanese forces. Furthermore, it was the major land campaign which the allies fought against Japan and the defeats suffered in 1944 were by far the most substantial Japan had suffered to that point. It was far more important than the Phillipines (that Nimitz wanted to avoid if I remember rightly?).

It has been painted as a sideshow, partly because it was and partly in an attempt to downplay the role of Britain in the defeat of Japan. But, that major defeat was a blow to Japan and in particular, to the prestige of the Japanese Army.