Why do some people consider the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki unjustified?

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Being me, I have to add Burma to that list. While it was a sideshow on the operational level; strategically it tied up substantial numbers of some of the best Japanese forces. Furthermore, it was the major land campaign which the allies fought against Japan and the defeats suffered in 1944 were by far the most substantial Japan had suffered to that point. It was far more important than the Phillipines (that Nimitz wanted to avoid if I remember rightly?).

It has been painted as a sideshow, partly because it was and partly in an attempt to downplay the role of Britain in the defeat of Japan. But, that major defeat was a blow to Japan and in particular, to the prestige of the Japanese Army.

Not to mention involving a bridge on the River Kwai.

You are correct; Nimitz knew we did not need to retake the Phillippines. All he needed was a central plain big enough to land heavy bombers allowing him to control a radius of a thousand miles in any direction, that was his criteria. The Phillipines were all about MacArthur and his pride, and shows how much cache he had with the war department that he could ordain his own independent crusade. Costly, unnecessary.

But Taffy Three still is the greatest naval story since Horatio Nelson broke Line of Battle and penetrated the lines of the enemy fleet.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Not to mention involving a bridge on the River Kwai.

You are correct; Nimitz knew we did not need to retake the Phillippines. All he needed was a central plain big enough to land heavy bombers allowing him to control a radius of a thousand miles in any direction, that was his criteria. The Phillipines were all about MacArthur and his pride, and shows how much cache he had with the war department that he could ordain his own independent crusade. Costly, unnecessary.

But Taffy Three still is the greatest naval story since Horatio Nelson broke Line of Battle and penetrated the lines of the enemy fleet.

I was always partial to Cape Matapan, but I suppose the 'greatest' is a rather subjective claim and one which also invokes pride.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

I was always partial to Cape Matapan, but I suppose the 'greatest' is a rather subjective claim and one which also invokes pride.

British capital ships against Italian anything is hardly a victory. Argentina probably had a better navy.

US destroyers mounting 5" ring guns fighting off the Yamato - that is something else altogether.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

British capital ships against Italian anything is hardly a victory. Argentina probably had a better navy.

US destroyers mounting 5" ring guns fighting off the Yamato - that is something else altogether.

The Italian navy was actually quite decent.

Also that US destroyer didnt fight off the Yamato, it was sunk by the Yamato at Leyte.
You have very likely Hiei in mind which was engaged by US destroyers at Guadalcanal. Those came so close that she couldnt hit them with her guns and they strafed her bridge.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

You are correct; Nimitz knew we did not need to retake the Phillippines.

No, Nimitz just didnt want to operate his carriers in enclosed waters first and foremost.Especially near Japanese airfileds Thats why he was also against taking the route through the lower DEI.
You are right about Dugout Doug and his Phillipines tho.

 

[Imgran]

The Italian navy was actually quite decent.

Also that US destroyer didnt fight off the Yamato, it was sunk by the Yamato at Leyte.
You have very likely Hiei in mind which was engaged by US destroyers at Guadalcanal. Those came so close that she couldnt hit them with her guns and they strafed her bridge.

Yamato scored 0 kills at Leyte IIRC. It was the Kongo that sunk the Samuel B Roberts and one of the cruisers that sunk the Johnston

Yamato actually broke away from the fighting before the main Center Force did, the Japanese had just lost Musashi and the bombers were thick around Center Force, I think the Japanese admiral was conscious of what losing both Musashi and Yamato in the same engagement would mean for the remnants of his service's dignity.

At any rate, "fought off" is a pretty apt description of what Taffy Three (with air wing assistance from Taffy One, Taffy Two, and ground based air wings) accomplished against Yamato. They posed a serious enough threat that Yamato had to retreat, mostly because the threat of attack from the air which had doomed Musashi. As a result, Japan withdrew Yamato prematurely.

Really it was the aircraft that did most of the heavy lifting at Leyte. If Japan had been able to muster any serious number of fighter escorts that battle would have gone differently, but they had squandered their best pilots at Midway, squandered their replacements at the Phillipine Sea, and were now ridiculously behind the Americans in experienced aircrews as well as pilots, and there was no time and no resources and no breathing room to make up the gap.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

He said 5 inch guns. So fighting off was within that frame and Yamato wasnt "fought off" at Leyte with 5 inch guns. Sure she had to maneuver and was then badly positioned because of torpedos but NOT 5 inch guns. Hence my reference to Guadalcanal.

She also scored hits on Gambier bay and a destroyer but sources vary which one.
Also it was most likely Yamato which sunk Gambier bay, there are even photos with Yamato being at point blank range.

Last but not least Japan has not squandered away their best pilots at Midway. Japan lost their best pilots in several battles. Coral Sea, Midway, Dutch Harbor (representign the many small but attritional engagements), Santa Cruz. The Japanese pilot losses at Midway been high and irreplacable but not desecive. They lost almosts as many at Coral sea and more at Santa Cruz.



It was after the Japanese victory at Santa Cruz when their pre war avitation wing was spent. Thats why despite finaly defeating the US pre war carriers and establishing carrier supremacy for a short time they couldnt exploit their (only) strategic victory there.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Yamato scored 0 kills at Leyte IIRC. It was the Kongo that sunk the Samuel B Roberts and one of the cruisers that sunk the Johnston

Yamato actually broke away from the fighting before the main Center Force did, the Japanese had just lost Musashi and the bombers were thick around Center Force, I think the Japanese admiral was conscious of what losing both Musashi and Yamato in the same engagement would mean for the remnants of his service's dignity.

At any rate, "fought off" is a pretty apt description of what Taffy Three (with air wing assistance from Taffy One, Taffy Two, and ground based air wings) accomplished against Yamato. They posed a serious enough threat that Yamato had to retreat, mostly because the threat of attack from the air which had doomed Musashi. As a result, Japan withdrew Yamato prematurely.

Really it was the aircraft that did most of the heavy lifting at Leyte. If Japan had been able to muster any serious number of fighter escorts that battle would have gone differently, but they had squandered their best pilots at Midway, squandered their replacements at the Phillipine Sea, and were now ridiculously behind the Americans in experienced aircrews as well as pilots, and there was no time and no resources and no breathing room to make up the gap.

Yes, you are following my point.

My German friend is being too German literal.

The purpose behind the Japanese deception was to pull the US carriers out of striking range using empty, worthless, CVs. The Yamato task force was aimed at the transports and was to kill the invasion force.

The destroyer screens, backed by the Jeep carriers, 'fought off' the Yamato's task force. The transports were untouched.

 

[Director]

Nimitz and the Navy wanted to bypass the Philippines and base the next stage on Taiwan, but didn't feel strongly about it - a base was a base. MacArthur thought it would be bad press to bypass the Philippines and strongly advocated to take them back. As the Navy had effectively destroyed the Japanese merchant shipping, taking Taiwan wouldn't stop Japanese merchant shipping any better than the subs had. Roosevelt chose to let the Army and Navy both have their way from Guadalcanal on, with the Navy advancing across the central Pacific to Okinawa and the Army moving up the New Guinea chain to the Philippines.

My father served in the Philippines, and he never had a single good word to say about MacArthur, except one: if the US hadn't taken back the Philippines, untold thousands of civilians would have died of starvation, mistreatment and disease.

The invasion of Kyushu was supposed to be the final blow that would drive the Japanese to surrender, with the invasion of the Tokyo plain being planned but hopefully was not required. My father often said that US photo reconnaissance was superb - he thought we knew where every enemy was. Evidence compiled after the war shows he (and everyone else in the Army) was wrong - the Japanese had moved twice as many troops and equipment into Kyushu as they thought. Given the examples of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, I believe the US could have secured Kyushu, but the kamikazes and fortified positions would have exacted a very heavy casualty toll. If the Okinawa pattern held, casualties for civilians would be staggering. And the psychological effects on US troops, many already traumatized by previous operations, would be grueling.

As the Kyushu invasion date drew near, the Navy abandoned its support, the Army Air Force was adamantly opposed and only MacArthur remained convinced it could and should be done. The alternative was continued blockade and bombing, letting starvation and disease (and a fuel-less winter) decimate the Japanese until someone broke.

I don't think the A-bomb convinced the Japanese to quit, but I do think it was a significant part of the process. I'm convinced that Truman made the right choice. First, the Japanese started it. Second, given their record in China they had no right to complain. Third, it saved a lot of lives - possibly including my father's and therefore mine. And fourth, a Japanese surrender saved thousands - possibly millions - of civilians from death.

 

[thedarkendstar]

So all this discussion about the Soviets leads me to one question to decide this question of was the bomb better than the other option. The question is if the Soviets had not invaded would the bombs have caused Japan to surrender? If so they probably massively sped up the process of unconditional surrender if not then it was probably a small but serious factor in the decision.

So the first one it does ensure more lives are saved due to the blockade needing to stay to force a longer to force them to surrender and the fighting and China would be forced to continue on longer which could lead to a different outcome of the Chinese civil war whether that's good or not however is a debate by itself.

I personally think that peace could have been achieved without the bombs even if Japan would refuse a total surrender I'm sure with how bad things were it would at the end of the day give up most if not all its colonial holdings. Honestly, one of the few holdings they may have held onto IMO is French Indo China when I hear about Japanese. Because it was a previous colonial Territory and was given to the Japanese to at the time the legitimate French government while France would want it back if the US didn't want unconditional surrender I think its possible Japan could have taken it. Not to mention the French government at the time could hardly garrison it and keep it under control as we saw just a few years later.

 

[Katsuki126]

What you fail to account for is no one had ever seen, or could comprehend, what had happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The cities simply ceased to exist. This took time for the government to comprehend. And while they were willing to continue the fight the Emperor, who arguably never wanted this war, ended it.

I didn't quite understand what you meant here. The fact that the town stopped all communications and were flattened was not so surprising for the Japanese as several others towns suffered the same fate (including Tokyo). Whether the Emperor wanted the war or not is something we might never know, his confidants are too loyal to him and sticked to the official story and I doubt written documents about the opinions of the emperor exist (but I still have hope).

The question is if the Soviets had not invaded would the bombs have caused Japan to surrender

It breaks down like that :
A) Why did the Emperor wanted peace ?
B) Why did the military (which did not wanted peace and attacked the Imperial Palace to prevent the diffusion of the Emperor decision to surrender) lost its power and influence ?

The answer to B) is the destruction of the IJN, the inability of the Army to defeat the Chinese and the utter destruction, in less than a week of the Kwantung Army.
For A) there is two possibility :
1) The Emperor was always a pacifist
2) The suffering of his people brought him to see unconditional surrender as unavoidable.

The Emperor was pretty disconnected of his people until the bombings of Tokyo when he saw the town burning, the canals boiling. He then, against the desire of his advisers and the government, visited the town and hospitals around Tokyo. At this point, it was clear that he wanted this lost war to end.

Either way, the Atomic bombs are irrelevant.

 

[thedarkendstar]

I didn't quite understand what you meant here. The fact that the town stopped all communications and were flattened was not so surprising for the Japanese as several others towns suffered the same fate (including Tokyo). Whether the Emperor wanted the war or not is something we might never know, his confidants are too loyal to him and sticked to the official story and I doubt written documents about the opinions of the emperor exist (but I still have hope).



It breaks down like that :
A) Why did the Emperor wanted peace ?
B) Why did the military (which did not wanted peace and attacked the Imperial Palace to prevent the diffusion of the Emperor decision to surrender) lost its power and influence ?

The answer to B) is the destruction of the IJN, the inability of the Army to defeat the Chinese and the utter destruction, in less than a week of the Kwantung Army.
For A) there is two possibility :
1) The Emperor was always a pacifist
2) The suffering of his people brought him to see unconditional surrender as unavoidable.

The Emperor was pretty disconnected of his people until the bombings of Tokyo when he saw the town burning, the canals boiling. He then, against the desire of his advisers and the government, visited the town and hospitals around Tokyo. At this point, it was clear that he wanted this lost war to end.

Either way, the Atomic bombs are irrelevant.

I wouldnt say irrelvent but more like again speeding up the process because now for all they know America has alot of these bombs carried by a simgle bomber that can level a city so while the result is the same as the firebombings the idea that a single bomber dropping a single bomb could come close to matching that it a decent tool to speed up the process.

 

[bz249]

I wouldnt say irrelvent but more like again speeding up the process because now for all they know America has alot of these bombs carried by a simgle bomber that can level a city so while the result is the same as the firebombings the idea that a single bomber dropping a single bomb could come close to matching that it a decent tool to speed up the process.

Since the Japanese air defense network was all but non-existent at that point it made not much difference. June 1945 there are carrier planes and even battleship bombardments of the main islands. This is quite telling on the abilities of the air force.

 

[thedarkendstar]

Since the Japanese air defense network was all but non-existent at that point it made not much difference. June 1945 there are carrier planes and even battleship bombardments of the main islands. This is quite telling on the abilities of the air force.

Again while true the idea of a single bomber without any warning could Annihilate a city and they have done it twice in a matter of days. While its possible that it doesn't change how much damage the US could inflict on Japan compared to normal bombing it does make the idea of making the Americans have to beat us Gone they can now drop a single bomb by a single bomber with minimal material lost to the US no massive bomber fleets are needed no massive takeoffs.

While I'm sure it wouldn't be as quick as in real life I think even if The Soviets didn't invade Manchuria and destroy the Kwantung Army. The bombs would be the straw that breaks the camels back if not at least speed up the process of the blockade

So while I agree that the Japanese would have surrendered regardless of the Bombs I think the bombs may have helped speed up that decision a decent bit. And if the army wasn't destroyed I think the bombs would have caused a similar effect as the destruction of the army in Manchuria just not as fast as if both happened.

 

[bz249]

Again while true the idea of a single bomber without any warning could Annihilate a city and they have done it twice in a matter of days. While its possible that it doesn't change how much damage the US could inflict on Japan compared to normal bombing it does make the idea of making the Americans have to beat us Gone they can now drop a single bomb by a single bomber with minimal material lost to the US no massive bomber fleets are needed no massive takeoffs.

While I'm sure it wouldn't be as quick as in real life I think even if The Soviets didn't invade Manchuria and destroy the Kwantung Army. The bombs would be the straw that breaks the camels back if not at least speed up the process of the blockade

So while I agree that the Japanese would have surrendered regardless of the Bombs I think the bombs may have helped speed up that decision a decent bit. And if the army wasn't destroyed I think the bombs would have caused a similar effect as the destruction of the army in Manchuria just not as fast as if both happened.

IMHO... the greatest effect is the fact the Soviet Union is a belligrent and not a neutral, thus the chance of negotiation was reduced to zero. The second thing is the fact that Army suffered a humiliating defeat, thereby showing how worthless their last bargaining chip (we can cause heavy damage to you if you intend to fight) is. Because that was their last and only bet: IF the Americans land the army defending the Home Islands would cause unprecedented casulties. As compared to that the Kvantung Army collapsed like a house of cards.

The atomic bombs might added a further weight to the balance by showing how utterly outclassed they are... but it was already clear at the Tokyo firebombs and the naval bombardment of Kamaishi.

 

[Imgran]

Yes, you are following my point.

My German friend is being too German literal.

The purpose behind the Japanese deception was to pull the US carriers out of striking range using empty, worthless, CVs. The Yamato task force was aimed at the transports and was to kill the invasion force.

The destroyer screens, backed by the Jeep carriers, 'fought off' the Yamato's task force. The transports were untouched.

This is accurate, although I think that your German friend's Germanness literal nature isn't helped by the fact that the lion's share of the credit should be going to the jeep carriers and air wing reinforcements from other nearby task forces, while you seem to be giving it all to the screening ships.

The destroyers and destroyer escorts did successfully maintain a threat in being, prevent the cat from getting in among the pigeons, and minimized damage to the carriers by forcing the Japanese task force to engage them at range. In that they were extremely successful and deserved all the honors they received.

Since I'm a little bit German myself through my grandmother, I'll stipulate that if the original comment said "held them off," rather than 'fought them off," this controversy would probably not have happened, because that's exactly what Taffy Three did, and they did it brilliantly.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

This is accurate, although I think that your German friend's Germanness literal nature isn't helped by the fact that the lion's share of the credit goes to the jeep carriers and air wing reinforcements from other nearby task forces

No one is denying the air cover, I have mentioned it repeatedly. But the carriers aren't the ones that had to stand up to heavy naval rifle fire.

 

[Imgran]

IMHO... the greatest effect is the fact the Soviet Union is a belligrent and not a neutral, thus the chance of negotiation was reduced to zero. The second thing is the fact that Army suffered a humiliating defeat, thereby showing how worthless their last bargaining chip (we can cause heavy damage to you if you intend to fight) is. Because that was their last and only bet: IF the Americans land the army defending the Home Islands would cause unprecedented casulties. As compared to that the Kvantung Army collapsed like a house of cards.

The atomic bombs might added a further weight to the balance by showing how utterly outclassed they are... but it was already clear at the Tokyo firebombs and the naval bombardment of Kamaishi.

You're correct in the sense that Japan was already pretty close to surrender, it had effectively already lost the war, and was only dragging its heels about unconditional surrender.

i honestly think that the loss of Manchukuo is a red herring, Manchukuo is something they would like to have kept but at that point it was defending the home islands, not their colonial holdings, that was paramount to the Japanese. Which, again, is why, if they did drop the nuclear bombs, it had to be done over the home islands

Until Japan had actually surrendered, it was the duty of the US military to throw everything it could at the Japanese in order to induce their surrender. It doesn't matter if they would have surrendered anyway when the US couldn't possibly have known that. Until they actually did surrender, the war is not over, and the normal rules of war apply -- do everything you think you have to to bring the war to an end.

I also believe that there's a very strong case to be made that the new weapon was a strong inducement to surrender. With a massive carpet bombing the planes can be spotted from a fair distance, and the noise is nearly deafening. This gives you time to get people into shelters, etc. It gives you time to scramble whatever air defense you have left. But most importantly, it just gives you time. Time to do something.

A lone bomber is harder to spot. Almost impossible without radar actually. Compared to a carpet bombing campaign the nuclear weapons just seem to explode out of nowhere. No warning. No idea it's about to happen. No ability to prevent, warn, shelter, nothing. There is a whole world of difference between "little you can do," and "NOTHING you can do." The people of Japan went from barely able to protect themselves to completely unable to protect themselves. That's a small but very fundamental difference.

The fact that the military had lost all ability to mount a defense of Japan, combined with the existential threat of the new weapons, would have been a powerful inducement for the Emperor to step in and ensure that there was still a Japan at the end of things. It drove a nation numb to carpet bombings and prepared to sell their lives dearly, straight to the negotiating table because suddenly the US didn't even have to land troops to completely destroy them. "You will die without ever seeing the face of your killer." No honor, no pride, no courage, just ash and hopelessness. Time to end this.

 

[bz249]

You're correct in the sense that Japan was already pretty close to surrender, it had effectively already lost the war, and was only dragging its heels about unconditional surrender.

i honestly think that the loss of Manchukuo is a red herring, Manchukuo is something they would like to have kept but at that point it was defending the home islands, not their colonial holdings, that was paramount to the Japanese. Which, again, is why, if they did drop the nuclear bombs, it had to be done over the home islands

Until Japan had actually surrendered, it was the duty of the US military to throw everything it could at the Japanese in order to induce their surrender. It doesn't matter if they would have surrendered anyway when the US couldn't possibly have known that. Until they actually did surrender, the war is not over, and the normal rules of war apply -- do everything you think you have to to bring the war to an end.

I also believe that there's a very strong case to be made that the new weapon was a strong inducement to surrender. With a massive carpet bombing the planes can be spotted from a fair distance, and the noise is nearly deafening. This gives you time to get people into shelters, etc. It gives you time to scramble whatever air defense you have left. But most importantly, it just gives you time. Time to do something.

A lone bomber is harder to spot. Almost impossible without radar actually. Compared to a carpet bombing campaign the nuclear weapons just seem to explode out of nowhere. No warning. No idea it's about to happen. No ability to prevent, warn, shelter, nothing. There is a whole world of difference between "little you can do," and "NOTHING you can do." The people of Japan went from barely able to protect themselves to completely unable to protect themselves. That's a small but very fundamental difference.

The fact that the military had lost all ability to mount a defense of Japan, combined with the existential threat of the new weapons, would have been a powerful inducement for the Emperor to step in and ensure that there was still a Japan at the end of things. It drove a nation numb to carpet bombings and prepared to sell their lives dearly, straight to the negotiating table because suddenly the US didn't even have to land troops to completely destroy them. "You will die without ever seeing the face of your killer." No honor, no pride, no courage, just ash and hopelessness. Time to end this.

The point with Manchokuo is not that it would have mattered, but it had shown that their army is unable to mount an effective defense against the Allies (the key issue is however that there were no neutral power anymore to mediate for the peace).
The battleship raids of the Home Islands is an interesting case, because it was done in order to get the Japanese Air Force in the air to be destroyed in combat. Yet the Japanese Air Force was kept back in reserve to repel the invasion. That's quite a dire situation. They were hoping for a lucky punch after 11 rounds of brutal beating. Then came the twin A-Bomb attack and the collapse of the Kvantung Army in a matter of days if not hours.

Whether the ineptness of their field armies or the A-bomb was more important factor is up to discussion. But 10th of August it was clear that the lucky punch is not going to happen, even if the Allies chose to land on the Home Islands.

 

[Geriander]

You're correct in the sense that Japan was already pretty close to surrender, it had effectively already lost the war, and was only dragging its heels about unconditional surrender.

i honestly think that the loss of Manchukuo is a red herring, Manchukuo is something they would like to have kept but at that point it was defending the home islands, not their colonial holdings, that was paramount to the Japanese. Which, again, is why, if they did drop the nuclear bombs, it had to be done over the home islands
.

The Soviet invasion did pose a threat to the home islands as well. Most Japanese forces and defences were directed to the south and east in anticipation of an US invasion.The Soviets were able to perform an amphibious assult on Korea so, in the event of a US invasion of Japan, they could very well have joined in. Having one of the home islands end up as a communist republic after the war was probably a nightmare for the Japanese government.