Why didn't USA move into Laos to block Ho Chi Minh trail?

[Nerva]

I've watched a number of documentaries on the Vietnam War, and seeing the one from Ken Burns got me thinking again about how the US could have plausibly "won" the war, or if it should have been involved in the first place. My thoughts are:

1) The Domino Theory was correct, despite it being widely ridiculed today. China would not have gone communist without support from the neighboring USSR. North Korea would not exist without the USSR, and the Korean War would not have happened if North Korea was not bordered by communist China and the USSR. The French would not have lost in North Vietnam without the Viet Minh being supplied overland by neighboring China. Laos and Cambodia would not have gone communist without neighboring Vietnam being communist. At various times there were communist insurgencies in Burma, Thailand, Malaya, and the Philippines, and communist political parties in Indonesia and India that sometimes turned violent. By first supporting the French and then fighting the Vietnam War, America stalled the fall of dominoes until 1975, by which time communism had lost its utopian appeal after the Soviets had invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia and dispelled any illusion of it being the choice of the people, its economic flaws were apparent, and the Soviets and Chinese were more likely to fight each other than they were the USA. But if the Americans had not started supporting the French in 1947, the dominoes would have fallen throughout the 50's and 60's, possibly resulting in all of southeast asia and even India being lost. I think the only uncertainty is, was Vietnam the best place for the USA to make a stand, or could it have made a stand better in Thailand and Burma?

2) Bombing the north was foolish, both because it didn't work (Battlefield Vietnam details how China sent engineers to immediately rebuild everything), and because of the optics of killing civilians, and because it inevitably resulted in American POW's that gave the north increasing leverage and weakened public support.

3) The ARVN, backed by American air power, would be more than sufficient to hold off the Viet Cong and to some degree the NVA. Even when faced with the all-out armored Easter Offensive by the NVA, they gave better than they got.

4) The long border with Laos and Cambodia put the south at a major disadvantage when on the defensive against well-supplied forces flowing down the Ho Chi Minh trail.

5) The US Navy effectively stopped the north sending supplies south via water.

6) The USA ceasing air support and financial support of the ARVN doomed the south.

7) The American strategy of attrition was foolish because it was guaranteed to lose public support.

In my opinion, the only chance of success in Vietnam was for Johnson to deploy American ground forces along the DMZ and along Route 9 in Laos -- a total distance of 200 miles. Hold that line and kill anything that tried to cross it. That, combined with the Navy choking off supplies by sea, would keep the NVA out of the south and the ARVN would destroy the unsupplied Viet Cong shortly after, without American ground forces being sent to take hills with no strategic value or patrol rice paddies. At that point, once you get the ARVN strong enough, you could phase-out or greatly reduce the American presence on Route 9, much like the situation in Korea.

That seems obvious, and I know Westmoreland wanted to go into Laos on Route 9. What baffles me is why Johnson would send airmen to get shot down bombing the north and send infantry to step on mines while on patrol or die taking hills of no strategic value, instead of going into Laos, where Route 9 had real strategic value. Obviously there would be international uproar, but it would also be obvious the only reason the Americans were even there is because the NVA already were.

 

[Kgw]

1) Domino theory has never worked. Every time it was invoked, it was false "If we lose Germania, we'll lose the Galia!", said the Romans. "If we lose Flanders, we'll lose Burgundy-Franche Comté!", 17th century Spain. "If we lose Afghanistan, we'll lose India!",19th century Great Britain. In the end, you escalate things making the situation even worse. Ho Chi Minh would've been pleased to become President of Free Vietnam with US' support in 1945. He wasn't really interested in expanding Communism outside Vietnam. Local communist insurgencies were easily crushed were not related to Vietnam, asides from rhetorics. Heck, unified Vietnam fought against Commnunist China and Khemer Rouge in Camboya, not the Philippines or any other "Western country.

 

[Cavalry]

In my opinion, the only chance of success in Vietnam was for Johnson to deploy American ground forces along the DMZ and along Route 9 in Laos -- a total distance of 200 miles. Hold that line and kill anything that tried to cross it. That, combined with the Navy choking off supplies by sea, would keep the NVA out of the south and the ARVN would destroy the unsupplied Viet Cong shortly after, without American ground forces being sent to take hills with no strategic value or patrol rice paddies. At that point, once you get the ARVN strong enough, you could phase-out or greatly reduce the American presence on Route 9, much like the situation in Korea.

They did try. 1st with US Marine at Khe Sanh 1968, a move on this direction but still on Vietnam border. Second time with ARVN troops in 1971 ( Operation Lam Son 719 ) with US fire support.

The problem is the North Vietnam will not need to go 1500 miles to avoid choke point to attack US troop as they did in history. They can just attack US troop in Laos with terrain favored to them (forest, mountain that reduce effect of heavy firepower)

Also Khe Sanh proved something. The US could not silence NVA artillery bombard on their base and were encircled most of the time. That was with the best troop and unlimited air support. If they have multiple bases like that with lesser troop and air support splitted between bases, a disaster can happen!

 

[Fanstar1]

They did try. 1st with US Marine at Khe Sanh 1968, a move on this direction but still on Vietnam border. Second time with ARVN troops in 1971 ( Operation Lam Son 719 ) with US fire support.

The problem is the North Vietnam will not need to go 1500 miles to avoid choke point to attack US troop as they did in history. They can just attack US troop in Laos with terrain favored to them (forest, mountain that reduce effect of heavy firepower)

Also Khe Sanh proved something. The US could not silence NVA artillery bombard on their base and were encircled most of the time. That was with the best troop and unlimited air support. If they have multiple bases like that with lesser troop and air support splitted between bases, a disaster can happen!

khe sanh was a tactical US victory, but US withdrew after battle

 

[Fanstar1]

1) Domino theory has never worked. Every time it was invoked, it was false "If we lose Germania, we'll lose the Galia!", said the Romans. "If we lose Flanders, we'll lose Burgundy-Franche Comté!", 17th century Spain. "If we lose Afghanistan, we'll lose India!",19th century Great Britain. In the end, you escalate things making the situation even worse. Ho Chi Minh would've been pleased to become President of Free Vietnam with US' support in 1945. He wasn't really interested in expanding Communism outside Vietnam. Local communist insurgencies were easily crushed were not related to Vietnam, asides from rhetorics. Heck, unified Vietnam fought against Commnunist China and Khemer Rouge in Camboya, not the Philippines or any other "Western country.

because Khmer regime invaded Vietnam first in 1979, also Khmer were allied to china and Vietnam to soviets after Vietnam war.

 

[DoomBunny]

They did try. 1st with US Marine at Khe Sanh 1968, a move on this direction but still on Vietnam border. Second time with ARVN troops in 1971 ( Operation Lam Son 719 ) with US fire support.

The problem is the North Vietnam will not need to go 1500 miles to avoid choke point to attack US troop as they did in history. They can just attack US troop in Laos with terrain favored to them (forest, mountain that reduce effect of heavy firepower)

Also Khe Sanh proved something. The US could not silence NVA artillery bombard on their base and were encircled most of the time. That was with the best troop and unlimited air support. If they have multiple bases like that with lesser troop and air support splitted between bases, a disaster can happen!

The likelihood of an American Dien Bien Phu was very low. The French only managed that defeat through some spectacularly bad decision making and planning (holding the valley floor but not the surrounding heights, no effective counter-battery, air reliant logistical chain completely inadequate for task, lack of air support). Even then, the French gave a good showing and inflicted horrendous casualties on the Vietnamese forces. Against the Americans, even the NVA simply didn't stand a chance in a pitched fight, they had everything the French had lacked in the way of firepower and logistical support.

 

[viale]

The almost immediate invasion of Vietnam by China in the aftermath of their kicking of US butts should put the idea of a unified communist conspiracy to rest. Besides Vietnam. The Chinese-Russian relationship, and the Tito-Stalin split also provide examples to the stupidity of that theory.

 

[Nerva]

Did you read my OP? I made a point of saying that the situation had changed in 1975 -- by that point China and the USSR not only disagreed on ideology, they had even fought a border skirmish and the Russians were trying to entice Taiwan into helping them overthrow Maoist China. China attacked Soviet-allied Vietnam to punish them for invading Sino-allied Cambodia -- it was an extension of the Sino-Soviet split.

1) Domino theory has never worked. Every time it was invoked, it was false "If we lose Germania, we'll lose the Galia!", said the Romans. "If we lose Flanders, we'll lose Burgundy-Franche Comté!", 17th century Spain. "If we lose Afghanistan, we'll lose India!",19th century Great Britain. In the end, you escalate things making the situation even worse. Ho Chi Minh would've been pleased to become President of Free Vietnam with US' support in 1945. He wasn't really interested in expanding Communism outside Vietnam. Local communist insurgencies were easily crushed were not related to Vietnam, asides from rhetorics. Heck, unified Vietnam fought against Commnunist China and Khemer Rouge in Camboya, not the Philippines or any other "Western country.

And I can give counter-examples. USSR crushed Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Solidarity in 1981, all on the theory that if one satellite is allowed to leave the Warsaw Pact or adopt democratic reforms, it will lead to the fall of the entire Eastern Bloc. Then Gorbachev announced the "Sinatra Doctrine" and let Poland hold free elections in June of 1989 -- before the year was out, the Ceauşescus were summarily executed, and two years later the USSR ceased to exist.

I don't take an absolutist view on all domino theories always being right or wrong. My own assertion was that the communist domino theory was correct in 1945, was still correct in 1955, was questionable in 1965, was doubtful by 1975, and was defunct by 1985. So I don't think Eisenhower was a fool when he used the theory as justification for taking action in Vietnam -- like I said, Vietnam was only in play because China was next door, and China only fell because the USSR was next door, and Cambodia and Laos would not have fallen if Vietnam were not next door -- it's not even a theory, it was a fact in those cases. The question for debate is how quickly the dominos would have fallen if the USA had done nothing to intervene in Vietnam.

Lê Duẩn was the most powerful man in North Vietnam after 1960, and he was far more aggressive than Ho Chi Minh when it came to actively supporting the Viet Cong, sending the NVA south, and exporting communism to Laos and Cambodia. So even if Ho Chi Minh was a really nice guy who didn't give a shit about global communism, he was not in charge for the time period we're discussing. And besides, "he's not really a communist" was what they said about Castro until it was too late.

They did try. 1st with US Marine at Khe Sanh 1968, a move on this direction but still on Vietnam border. Second time with ARVN troops in 1971 ( Operation Lam Son 719 ) with US fire support.

The problem is the North Vietnam will not need to go 1500 miles to avoid choke point to attack US troop as they did in history. They can just attack US troop in Laos with terrain favored to them (forest, mountain that reduce effect of heavy firepower)

Also Khe Sanh proved something. The US could not silence NVA artillery bombard on their base and were encircled most of the time. That was with the best troop and unlimited air support. If they have multiple bases like that with lesser troop and air support splitted between bases, a disaster can happen!

Yes, as I indicated, Westmoreland wanted to go into Laos on Route 9, and the whole purpose of Khe Sanh was to provide a launching point for such an operation -- and it was ultimately abandoned precisely because Westmoreland did not get his way and was shown the door after Tet. The NVA never really tried to take Khe Sanh, because they knew it wouldn't work -- the siege of Khe Sanh was simply a diversion for Tet intended to pull American forces away from the cities to defend their most remote outpost -- and Westmoreland fell for it completely, by the way.

The half-assed 1971 ARVN offensive on Route 9 is really not comparable to what I was suggesting -- it was never intended to be anything more than a PR stunt, and it had very little planning and poor leadership. That's why I suggested the USA go into Laos, not ARVN. The ARVN performed well in some battles and lost others. The US military never lost a battle in Vietnam, but they lost the public's support, which was every bit as important. So my analysis of how the US could have "won" the war was in terms of finding a solution that involved both strategic victory and something the public would stay supportive of.

In 1965 the public still overwhelmingly supported the war. I think if they'd gone into Laos, the NVA could try all the Khe Sanh's they wanted, but it would only result in extreme casualties for them, no victories, and more importantly their strategic failure would doom the Viet Cong to extermination at the hands of just the ARVN backed by US air power. There would be next to no American POW's being held captive. With those facts on the ground and the North in a weaker bargaining position than North Korea was (who had two million Chinese troops fighting for them on the front), the American public would never support any negotiated settlement that left South Vietnam any worse off strategically than the situation was in South Korea, and we would have a North/South Korea kind of outcome.

 

[newtlord]

Whether domino theory is valid in general is a question I would not be able to answer. In this particular case, it should be observed that, after Vietnam went communist, there was not a general fall of non-communist regimes in the region. Cambodia went over (and promptly started quarelling with communist Vietnam) but the rest of south-east Asia held solid. As collapsing chains of dominoes go, this wasn't much of a collapsing chain of dominoes.

The US military never lost a battle in Vietnam, but they lost the public's support, which was every bit as important.

I am no professional researcher, but the simple expedient of googling "u s military defeats in Vietnam" produces pages countering this apparently common claim by cataloging engagements in the war where U.S. units were defeated. Indeed, it would be something of a miracle if, in the course of a decade of heavy fighting, there were never an occasion where even a vastly inferior force was able to bring together enough local superiority (and luck) to pull off a temporary victory.

 

[keynes2.0]

1) Domino theory has never worked. Every time it was invoked, it was false "If we lose Germania, we'll lose the Galia!", said the Romans.

Yes, when the Germans crossed the Rhine around 400 AD, the Romans didn't lose Galliarum. Instead they lost Brittain, Spain, Africa, Septimania and half of Galliarum.

 

[Calad]

1) The Domino Theory was correct, despite it being widely ridiculed today. China would not have gone communist without support from the neighboring USSR. North Korea would not exist without the USSR, and the Korean War would not have happened if North Korea was not bordered by communist China and the USSR. The French would not have lost in North Vietnam without the Viet Minh being supplied overland by neighboring China. Laos and Cambodia would not have gone communist without neighboring Vietnam being communist. At various times there were communist insurgencies in Burma, Thailand, Malaya, and the Philippines, and communist political parties in Indonesia and India that sometimes turned violent. By first supporting the French and then fighting the Vietnam War, America stalled the fall of dominoes until 1975, by which time communism had lost its utopian appeal after the Soviets had invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia and dispelled any illusion of it being the choice of the people, its economic flaws were apparent, and the Soviets and Chinese were more likely to fight each other than they were the USA. But if the Americans had not started supporting the French in 1947, the dominoes would have fallen throughout the 50's and 60's, possibly resulting in all of southeast asia and even India being lost. I think the only uncertainty is, was Vietnam the best place for the USA to make a stand, or could it have made a stand better in Thailand and Burma?

Domino theory is ridiculed because it is ridicilous: "if one nation falls rest will follow, like dominos". So if I push you, will you also cause fall of others? If one car stops moving, will every other car also stop moving? If one kid likes chocolate, will everybody else like chocolate?

Now somehow this makes sense when it comes to nations, not on anything else.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Domino Theory is directly tied to Containment Theory.

Containment Theory, as originally postulated, stated a diplomatic and economic perimeter should be established and military action eschewed in containing communism. In isolation, Soviet Communism would crumble and fall as the house of cards it ultimately proved to be.

Containment Theory was adopted by the Legislative-Military-Industrial Complex as a Military Containment Option, because this cabal is fed by weapon sales. If one nation falls, all nations will fall; so, more weapons!

Vietnam was an attractive option for a long, prolonged war of guerrilla insurgency. The Golden Triangle provided a never ending cash supply for CIA, Bell Helicopters made a frigging fortune, and the weapons merchants were all happy.

The American People? Not so much. How many Americans needed to die before the Vietnamese are allowed to choose their own government for themselves?

Imagine, just imagine, if ALL that cash poured into the dirt of the jungle was invested into the schools and infrastructure of the United States during the Civil Rights Era?

 

[Klausewitz]

khe sanh was a tactical US victory, but US withdrew after battle

That is an interesting fact though, isn't it?
The US fought for Khe Sanh for three month, lost over 200 dead, over one thousand wounded and who knows how many million dollars down the drain and then, as soon as they have declared victory, they desert the base and the area remains in the hands of the VC ever after.
If you win a victory, why leave?
I see two options:
1. Khe Sanh was seen as a failed experiment that was terminated with as little loss of faith as possible.
2. The USA was unsure whether they would be able to hold Khe Sanh again and chose to abandoned it to avoid an 'American Bien-Dien-Phu'.

 

[Fanstar1]

That is an interesting fact though, isn't it?
The US fought for Khe Sanh for three month, lost over 200 dead, over one thousand wounded and who knows how many million dollars down the drain and then, as soon as they have declared victory, they desert the base and the area remains in the hands of the VC ever after.
If you win a victory, why leave?
I see two options:
1. Khe Sanh was seen as a failed experiment that was terminated with as little loss of faith as possible.
2. The USA was unsure whether they would be able to hold Khe Sanh again and chose to abandoned it to avoid an 'American Bien-Dien-Phu'.

khe sanh was besieged for months by NVA and was near DMZ, US was also preoccupied with TET offensive (tet was tactical disaster for viet cong, but strategic victory ultimately)

 

[Fanstar1]

Domino Theory is directly tied to Containment Theory.

Containment Theory, as originally postulated, stated a diplomatic and economic perimeter should be established and military action eschewed in containing communism. In isolation, Soviet Communism would crumble and fall as the house of cards it ultimately proved to be.

Containment Theory was adopted by the Legislative-Military-Industrial Complex as a Military Containment Option, because this cabal is fed by weapon sales. If one nation falls, all nations will fall; so, more weapons!

Vietnam was an attractive option for a long, prolonged war of guerrilla insurgency. The Golden Triangle provided a never ending cash supply for CIA, Bell Helicopters made a frigging fortune, and the weapons merchants were all happy.

The American People? Not so much. How many Americans needed to die before the Vietnamese are allowed to choose their own government for themselves?

Imagine, just imagine, if ALL that cash poured into the dirt of the jungle was invested into the schools and infrastructure of the United States during the Civil Rights Era?

laos and Cambodia fell around same time as south Vietnam in 1975, so they weren't totally wrong ( domino theory was still mostly bullshit). US should have forced south Vietnam to democraticize rather than be an authoritarian state also.

 

[Cavalry]

khe sanh was besieged for months by NVA and was near DMZ, US was also preoccupied with TET offensive (tet was tactical disaster for viet cong, but strategic victory ultimately)

TET (the 1st offensive in January) is good success for them, they achieved surprise and capture some whole cities . It was second and third offensive in May and August 1968 that was not as good, but still give US heavy casualties and made Westmoreland lost his Commander in Chief!

 

[LordTempest]

Domino theory has never worked.

O rly?

How many independent states existed in South America in 1808? Zero.
How many independent states existed in South America in 1828? Ten or eleven, depending on definition.

How many communists states existed in Eastern Europe in 1982? Eight or Nine, depending on definition.
How many existed in 1992? Zero.

Now, In the immortal words of our resident Danish cyborg: Why is that?

Even if you look at Asia, you'll see that the Domino Theory has merit. In the 1940's through to the 1960's, Asian countries with strong Chinese populations (Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia) suffered from prolonged Communist insurgencies. With the exception of Indonesia (which IIRC had the largest non-ruling Communist Party in the world outside of France and Italy at one point) these insurgencies were mostly due to agitation from CCP-affiliated members of the local Chinese community. The CCP backed communist insurgencies all over South-East Asia, even though only two of these ever actually succeeded in taking power and only one of these could be considered explicitly Maoist. (The KMT likewise backed counter-insurgencies in Malaysia, Singapore and Burma.) Would these insurgencies have existed without the existence of the PRC? Hell no!

The fact that some pro-US governments were able to successfully contain Communism does not discredit the theory that the presence of x states either actively or passively promoting their ideology abroad in any given region increases the odds of either more states or more people within those states adopting a similar ideology.

Domino theory is ridiculed because it is ridicilous: "if one nation falls rest will follow, like dominos". So if I push you, will you also cause fall of others? If one car stops moving, will every other car also stop moving? If one kid likes chocolate, will everybody else like chocolate?

Now somehow this makes sense when it comes to nations, not on anything else.

If one car suddenly stops moving on a busy road, and another car crashes into it, then another and another you very quickly have what is called a pile-up. If a group of kids who have never seen molten chocolate before are offered what appears to them to be either mud or excrement, then they won't dare try it. If one particularly brave kid however can be convinced to step up and try it, he can explain to his peers that this mud stuff is actually a rather sweet and delicious desert instead, and convince more of his fellows to try some.

This is pretty elementary stuff. Herd immunity, the bandwagon effect, etc. are all very real phenomena provided that the right conditions are present.

 

[Calad]

If one car suddenly stops moving on a busy road, and another car crashes into it, then another and another you very quickly have what is called a pile-up. If a group of kids who have never seen molten chocolate before are offered what appears to them to be either mud or excrement, then they won't dare try it. If one particularly brave kid however can be convinced to step up and try it, he can explain to his peers that this mud stuff is actually a rather sweet and delicious desert instead, and convince more of his fellows to try some.

This is pretty elementary stuff. Herd immunity, the bandwagon effect, etc. are all very real phenomena provided that the right conditions are present.

I guess you dont see flaw of your thinking: nations are not herds. Both Laos and Cambodia became Communist because of failed Vietnam war which US extended into other countries. This is why Thailand is not Communist which your model simply cant explain.

Also whole Vietnam war was absolutely unnecessary: Vietnamese national characteristic is build similar way like Canada's: what they are not. Vietnam has opposed Chinese dominion more than 600 years. US could have easily allowed unified Vietnam and then used nationalism against Chinese. Voila and whole domino theory became obsolete! After Vietnam war China and Vietnam had a short border war just to show how unified Communist nations truly were. So again if Communist countries could not tolerate each other what again was the point of domino theory?

 

[LordTempest]

I guess you dont see flaw of your thinking

No, I guess you don't.

The Domino Theory is not a post facto defence of the US war in Vietnam. It is a broader philosophical argument to do with principles of IR, cause and effect and human psychology. You can't just say: "Ha! See? Thailand never became Communist! The domino theory is total rubbish!" when for almost 20 years Thailand fought a Communist insurgency which was backed by other Communist parties in the region. This threat was contained because the insurgency was eventually starved of support from abroad, something that would have been more difficult to do if Thailand were surrounded by socialist republics in Malaysia, Burma, etc. and more easier to do if the nations who supported this insurgency (China, Vietnam, etc.) were not Communist.

This is what the domino theory is actually about. It's not cargo cult logic: nations in an ideological struggle often support similar, like-minded groups in other nations because it is in their own self-interest to do so. Support can be active, (ie. funding commie rebels in Thailand) active-passive (letting Soviet arms travel from Russia to Vietnam through your borders) or passive (becoming an economic superpower, minding your own business and inspiring other nations to copy your model.)

Voila and whole domino theory became obsolete!

No.

How many communists states existed in Eastern Europe in 1982? Eight or Nine, depending on definition.
How many existed in 1992? Zero.

After Vietnam war China and Vietnam had a short border war just to show how unified Communist nations truly were. So again if Communist countries could not tolerate each other what again was the point of domino theory?

And why do you think Deng Xiaoping invaded Vietnam? Because Vietnam was a Soviet proxy picking on China's only real ally in the region: Cambodia. In other words, the PRC invaded Vietnam out of fear that the Vietnamese annexation of Cambodia would lead to further Soviet influence in South-East Asia. If Cambodia fell, other Communist parties in the region might shift their allegiance from Beijing to Moscow. This is not an argument against the domino theory: this is the domino theory!

 

[Calad]

No, I guess you don't.

The Domino Theory is not a post facto defence of the US war in Vietnam. It is a broader philosophical argument to do with principles of IR, cause and effect and human psychology. You can't just say: "Ha! See? Thailand never became Communist! The domino theory is total rubbish!" when for almost 20 years Thailand fought a Communist insurgency which was backed by other Communist parties in the region. This threat was contained because the insurgency was eventually starved of support from abroad, something that would have been more difficult to do if Thailand were surrounded by socialist republics in Malaysia, Burma, etc. and more easier to do if the nations who supported this insurgency (China, Vietnam, etc.) were not Communist.

This is what the domino theory is actually about. It's not cargo cult logic: nations in an ideological struggle often support similar, like-minded groups in other nations because it is in their own self-interest to do so. Support can be active, (ie. funding commie rebels in Thailand) active-passive (letting Soviet arms travel from Russia to Vietnam through your borders) or passive (becoming an economic superpower, minding your own business and inspiring other nations to copy your model.)

I highlighted part for you where you seems to support isolation or Berlin wall in Asia. Maybe you should be a bit more organized how you explain yourself.

I guess domino theory makes sense if you ignore completely local history, traditions, nations and politics. To me it seems to be an easy way to to propagate to public why your nation have to wage war in some remote jungle. Also it seems to be offering to an incompetent government a simple solutions on complex issue.

And why do you think Deng Xiaoping invaded Vietnam? Because Vietnam was a Soviet proxy picking on China's only real ally in the region: Cambodia. In other words, the PRC invaded Vietnam out of fear that the Vietnamese annexation of Cambodia would lead to further Soviet influence in South-East Asia. If Cambodia fell, other Communist parties in the region might shift their allegiance from Beijing to Moscow. This is not an argument against the domino theory: this is the domino theory!

This only makes domino theory to look like even more ridiculous. There is not and never were an unified force to take over whole region which completely cripples your main point. Again, a simple explanation to simple people. US actually lost, and there was no domino effect, which again cripples this logic.