Why didn't/couldn't France invade down the Rhine valley in 1939?

[keynes2.0]

By standards of early 20th century it is very harsh. Even by today's standards it could be harsh if you don't have other reliable security quarantees.

Germany received a net transfer of funds in the Versailles treaty. Let me repeat this. The Versailles treaty was an economic SUBSIDY for Germany. I do not mean that Germany paid less then it's very substantial savings in military spending. I mean that Germany paid less gold then it was given gold. Germany got money (primarily from the American government). Germany also paid money (primarily to Belgium) but the amount paid was less then the amount received. The result was a net flow of money INTO the coffers of the German government which was used to subsidize the deficits that they ran every year even before the first mark in reparations was paid.

It's a classic example of autogenisis in history. Everyone knows that the Versailles treaty was a huge economic burden because that's what they hear everywhere. It's everywhere because everyone knows it. The truth of the matter, that Germany never paid, is overlooked because people are too busy discussing the alternative reality. How did the inflation that was caused by the reparations relate to Hitler? Once you are discussing that, it's hard to go back a step and point out that the reparations didn't cause inflation. It's a sick irony that in a period where countless acts of callous inhumanity happened, we forget about the actual victims in order to preserve a fantasy story in which some of the worst aggressors are actually victims.

In the defense of some of the early writers of this thesis, such as Keynes, there were legitimate economic concerns so Germany did need an advocate in the aftermath of the war. However these advocates won, completely and comprehensively. As a result Versailles contained face saving text about punishing Germany but was in truth a subsidy. It's the writers who came decades later who should be censured for creating this myth.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

I see.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Germany received a net transfer of funds in the Versailles treaty. Let me repeat this. The Versailles treaty was an economic SUBSIDY for Germany. I do not mean that Germany paid less then it's very substantial savings in military spending. I mean that Germany paid less gold then it was given gold. Germany got money (primarily from the American government). Germany also paid money (primarily to Belgium) but the amount paid was less then the amount received. The result was a net flow of money INTO the coffers of the German government which was used to subsidize the deficits that they ran every year even before the first mark in reparations was paid.

It's a classic example of autogenisis in history. Everyone knows that the Versailles treaty was a huge economic burden because that's what they hear everywhere. It's everywhere because everyone knows it. The truth of the matter, that Germany never paid, is overlooked because people are too busy discussing the alternative reality. How did the inflation that was caused by the reparations relate to Hitler? Once you are discussing that, it's hard to go back a step and point out that the reparations didn't cause inflation. It's a sick irony that in a period where countless acts of callous inhumanity happened, we forget about the actual victims in order to preserve a fantasy story in which some of the worst aggressors are actually victims.

In the defense of some of the early writers of this thesis, such as Keynes, there were legitimate economic concerns so Germany did need an advocate in the aftermath of the war. However these advocates won, completely and comprehensively. As a result Versailles contained face saving text about punishing Germany but was in truth a subsidy. It's the writers who came decades later who should be censured for creating this myth.

I, for one, would actually like to hear the rationale behind this argument. Can you please remove the hyperbole, and explain it like I'm a simpleton using hard facts and figures?

Thanks.

 

[Avernite]

France entered the war because Russia entered the war, to have not done so would have extinguished French international credibility and forced Russia to back down or be defeated, thereby shifting the balance of power in Europe. Russia, for her part, was also against a wall; she had been humiliated multiple times over the last decade, and could not afford to back down again, particularly when the power under threat was supposed to be under her oversight. This was particularly true in the perspective of Russian decision makers, many of whom were bound by a strict code of honour which made it unthinkable to abandon Serbia to her fate. About the most one can say about Russian responsibility is that Russia refused to back down from the fight; she could have walked away, in shame, but her failure to do so is not the equivalent of guilt.

Somehow I don't think you want to be making this argument, because exactly this argument is what the Germany-supporters use.

"Germany entered the war because Russia entered the crisis, to not have done so would have extinguished German international credibility and forced Austria to back down or be defeated, thereby shifting the balance of power in Europe. Austria, for her part, was also against a wall; she had been weakened multiple times over the last decade, and could not afford to back down, particularly when the power under threat was supposed to be under her oversight (Serbia had been an Austrian puppet after all). This was particularly true in the perspective of Austrian decision makers."

 

[olm]

Germany received a net transfer of funds in the Versailles treaty. Let me repeat this. The Versailles treaty was an economic SUBSIDY for Germany. I do not mean that Germany paid less then it's very substantial savings in military spending. I mean that Germany paid less gold then it was given gold. Germany got money (primarily from the American government). Germany also paid money (primarily to Belgium) but the amount paid was less then the amount received. The result was a net flow of money INTO the coffers of the German government which was used to subsidize the deficits that they ran every year even before the first mark in reparations was paid.

It's a classic example of autogenisis in history. Everyone knows that the Versailles treaty was a huge economic burden because that's what they hear everywhere. It's everywhere because everyone knows it. The truth of the matter, that Germany never paid, is overlooked because people are too busy discussing the alternative reality. How did the inflation that was caused by the reparations relate to Hitler? Once you are discussing that, it's hard to go back a step and point out that the reparations didn't cause inflation. It's a sick irony that in a period where countless acts of callous inhumanity happened, we forget about the actual victims in order to preserve a fantasy story in which some of the worst aggressors are actually victims.

In the defense of some of the early writers of this thesis, such as Keynes, there were legitimate economic concerns so Germany did need an advocate in the aftermath of the war. However these advocates won, completely and comprehensively. As a result Versailles contained face saving text about punishing Germany but was in truth a subsidy. It's the writers who came decades later who should be censured for creating this myth.

I as somewhat puzzled why this post was written as reply to mine, as I actually never have claimed in this thread that specific reparation sums were too large or too small (I don't have firm opinion on that). Post you quoted was about whether permanent strict restrictions on military is a harsh requirement or not by standards of that time.

 

[keynes2.0]

I, for one, would actually like to hear the rationale behind this argument. Can you please remove the hyperbole, and explain it like I'm a simpleton using hard facts and figures?

Thanks.

Honestly, just go to wikipedia for this one: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I_reparations#Amount_paid_by_Germany

The precise figure Germany paid is a matter of dispute.[87] The German Government estimated it had paid the equivalent of 67.8 billion gold marks in reparations. The German figure included—other than gold or goods in kind—the scuttling of the interned German fleet at Scapa Flow, state property lost in lands ceded to other countries, and the loss of colonial territories.[88] The Reparation Commission and the Bank for International Settlements state that 20.598 billion gold marks was paid by Germany in reparations, of which 7.595 billion was paid before the implementation of the London Schedule of Payments.[89] Niall Ferguson provides a slightly lower figure. He estimates that Germany paid no more than 19 billion gold marks.[90] Ferguson further estimates that this sum amounted to 2.4 per cent of Germany's national income between 1919 and 1932. Stephen Schuker, in his definitive econometric study (1988, pp. 106–19), concedes that Germany transferred 16.8 billion marks over the whole period, but points out that this sum was vastly offset by the devaluation of Allied paper-mark deposits up to 1923, and by loans that Germany subsequently repudiated after 1924. The net capital transfer into Germany amounted to 17.75 billion marks, or 2.1% of Germany's entire national income over the period 1919–1931. In effect, therefore, America paid reparations to Germany—four times more, in price-adjusted terms, than the U.S. furnished to West Germany under the post-1948 Marshall Plan.[90][91][92] According to Gerhard Weinberg, reparations were paid, towns were rebuilt, orchards replanted, mines reopened and pensions paid. However, the burden of repairs was shifted away from the German economy and onto the damaged economies of the war's victors.[93]

I as somewhat puzzled why this post was written as reply to mine, as I actually never have claimed in this thread that specific reparation sums were too large or too small (I don't have firm opinion on that). Post you quoted was about whether permanent strict restrictions on military is a harsh requirement or not by standards of that time.

Ok, my b.

 

[DoomBunny]

Somehow I don't think you want to be making this argument, because exactly this argument is what the Germany-supporters use.

"Germany entered the war because Russia entered the crisis, to not have done so would have extinguished German international credibility and forced Austria to back down or be defeated, thereby shifting the balance of power in Europe. Austria, for her part, was also against a wall; she had been weakened multiple times over the last decade, and could not afford to back down, particularly when the power under threat was supposed to be under her oversight (Serbia had been an Austrian puppet after all). This was particularly true in the perspective of Austrian decision makers."

No, the point here is entirely different.

The Russian situation was a genuine one. Russia had indeed been humiliated multiple times in the last decade (in 1904-5, in 1908, and in 1912-3, amongst other long-term provocations from Austria-Hungary including practice mobilizations and thinly veiled threats), and felt she was honour bound to defend Serbia, particularly given that, to Russian knowledge (which in hindsight was proved largely accurate), the Serbian government was not complicit in the situation. In other words, Russia was faced by someone picking a fight and had the choice between running away in shame or accepting the challenge and taking the first punch.

Meanwhile, the Austro-Hungarian and German situations were much different. When the Archduke was assassinated, these powers embarked upon a pre-meditated attempt to coerce Serbia into submission. The situation was not seen as one of being 'up against the all', rather it was a deliberate attempt to exploit the situation for expansionist purposes; Austria-Hungary had been looking for such an opportunity for a while. One can bring the idea of lost honour and past humiliations into it, but the argument does not fit in the same way it does for Russia. One can also consider the diplomatic perspective; Germany could not abandon Austria-Hungary or she would be diplomatically isolated, but this does not equate to needing to prod Austria-Hungary towards war; Russian advice to Serbia was to be as diplomatic as possible, a sharp contrast. Even leaving aside the points outlined above about what people were actually thinking (as opposed to the amateur conjecture so often the staple of historical discussions like these), there really aren't the facts there to support this conclusion. Russia was quite clearly on the ropes in the decade running up to the First World War; Germany was not, and whilst Austria-Hungary was not in great shape, its immediate past was more successful than Russia's, and as noted its goal was not consolidation but rather expansion. Even ignoring this, we again come back to the sticking point of German and Austro-Hungarian behaviour, which was designed to either win a diplomatic victory by reducing Serbia to a puppet, or provoke a confrontation; there are easier ways to save face.

To go back to the fight analogy, Austria-Hungary and Germany got a drink spilled on them, and rather then ascertain whether it was an accident, or simply ask for a dry cleaning bill, they made unreasonable demands and punched the dude.

(As an aside, the date of Russian mobilization has often been used to throw things off and make Russia seem more aggressive than she was. Russia was indeed the first of the great powers to mobilize in Summer 1914, but this did not equate to her being the first power to make an act of aggression; Austria-Hungary provoked this mobilization by declaring war on and attacking Serbia, Russia was clearly acting defensively.)

 

[Avernite]

No, the point here is entirely different.

The Russian situation was a genuine one. Russia had indeed been humiliated multiple times in the last decade (in 1904-5, in 1908, and in 1912-3, amongst other long-term provocations from Austria-Hungary including practice mobilizations and thinly veiled threats), and felt she was honour bound to defend Serbia, particularly given that, to Russian knowledge (which in hindsight was proved largely accurate), the Serbian government was not complicit in the situation. In other words, Russia was faced by someone picking a fight and had the choice between running away in shame or accepting the challenge and taking the first punch.

Meanwhile, the Austro-Hungarian and German situations were much different. When the Archduke was assassinated, these powers embarked upon a pre-meditated attempt to coerce Serbia into submission. The situation was not seen as one of being 'up against the all', rather it was a deliberate attempt to exploit the situation for expansionist purposes; Austria-Hungary had been looking for such an opportunity for a while. One can bring the idea of lost honour and past humiliations into it, but the argument does not fit in the same way it does for Russia. One can also consider the diplomatic perspective; Germany could not abandon Austria-Hungary or she would be diplomatically isolated, but this does not equate to needing to prod Austria-Hungary towards war; Russian advice to Serbia was to be as diplomatic as possible, a sharp contrast. Even leaving aside the points outlined above about what people were actually thinking (as opposed to the amateur conjecture so often the staple of historical discussions like these), there really aren't the facts there to support this conclusion. Russia was quite clearly on the ropes in the decade running up to the First World War; Germany was not, and whilst Austria-Hungary was not in great shape, its immediate past was more successful than Russia's, and as noted its goal was not consolidation but rather expansion. Even ignoring this, we again come back to the sticking point of German and Austro-Hungarian behaviour, which was designed to either win a diplomatic victory by reducing Serbia to a puppet, or provoke a confrontation; there are easier ways to save face.

To go back to the fight analogy, Austria-Hungary and Germany got a drink spilled on them, and rather then ascertain whether it was an accident, or simply ask for a dry cleaning bill, they made unreasonable demands and punched the dude.

(As an aside, the date of Russian mobilization has often been used to throw things off and make Russia seem more aggressive than she was. Russia was indeed the first of the great powers to mobilize in Summer 1914, but this did not equate to her being the first power to make an act of aggression; Austria-Hungary provoked this mobilization by declaring war on and attacking Serbia, Russia was clearly acting defensively.)

But you're making a completely different argument now, so... I guess you agree with me despite the initial no?

Your first argument was 'France and Russia felt the need to join this war', which is just as true for Austria and Germany; your new argument is that France and Russia had a much more reasonable argument for feeling the need to join this war than Germany and Austria did - because their actions were defensive rather than 'preemptively defensive' as the German/Austrian position was.

 

[DoomBunny]

But you're making a completely different argument now, so... I guess you agree with me despite the initial no?

Your first argument was 'France and Russia felt the need to join this war', which is just as true for Austria and Germany; your new argument is that France and Russia had a much more reasonable argument for feeling the need to join this war than Germany and Austria did - because their actions were defensive rather than 'preemptively defensive' as the German/Austrian position was.

No, this isn't the case.

France had to join the war because if she did not, Russia would surely be defeated. Russia had to join the war because if she did not, Serbia would be crushed.

Austria chose to provoke a war because she wanted to push into the Balkans. Germany chose to support her because (depending on who one asks, both historiographically and contemporaneously) provoking a war was either necessary, or because the risks were outweighed by the chance to force a diplomatic victory.

What you had in France and Russia was a genuinely defensive posture.

 

[Easy-Kill]

No, this isn't the case.

France had to join the war because if she did not, Russia would surely be defeated. Russia had to join the war because if she did not, Serbia would be crushed.

Austria chose to provoke a war because she wanted to push into the Balkans. Germany chose to support her because (depending on who one asks, both historiographically and contemporaneously) provoking a war was either necessary, or because the risks were outweighed by the chance to force a diplomatic victory.

What you had in France and Russia was a genuinely defensive posture.

I am quite interested in this topic. If I understand a lot of the logic of the German supporters, Germany had to go to war because she was on the wrong side of the balance of power. Essentially , she had o fight a war of aggression to prevent being defeated if war were to break out.

However, it is entirely this logic that I find difficult to fully understand. If war is simply politics by violent means, then surely the idea of fighting a war means that you wish to assert your will on another and the only reason you fear a war is when you are concerned that you cannot exert your influence over somebody else?

 

[Eusebio]

I am quite interested in this topic. If I understand a lot of the logic of the German supporters, Germany had to go to war because she was on the wrong side of the balance of power. Essentially , she had o fight a war of aggression to prevent being defeated if war were to break out.

However, it is entirely this logic that I find difficult to fully understand. If war is simply politics by violent means, then surely the idea of fighting a war means that you wish to assert your will on another and the only reason you fear a war is when you are concerned that you cannot exert your influence over somebody else?

Germany was on the wrong side of the balance of power because its policy was to become the dominant power in Europe with overseas colonies and a navy to match. If they had accepted an equal role in the concert of nations the rest of Europe wouldn't have aligned against them, but they thought the destiny of the German people was greater than that.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Germany was on the wrong side of the balance of power because its policy was to become the dominant power in Europe with overseas colonies and a navy to match. If they had accepted an equal role in the concert of nations the rest of Europe wouldn't have aligned against them, but they thought the destiny of the German people was greater than that.

But why shouldn't German have these? Afterall, Britain had it ... why shouldn't Germany?

 

[DoomBunny]

I am quite interested in this topic. If I understand a lot of the logic of the German supporters, Germany had to go to war because she was on the wrong side of the balance of power. Essentially , she had o fight a war of aggression to prevent being defeated if war were to break out.

However, it is entirely this logic that I find difficult to fully understand. If war is simply politics by violent means, then surely the idea of fighting a war means that you wish to assert your will on another and the only reason you fear a war is when you are concerned that you cannot exert your influence over somebody else?

But why shouldn't German have these? Afterall, Britain had it ... why shouldn't Germany?

Largely what Eusebio said. As for the reason Germany shouldn't have these, well, people weren't really saying that. The issue was that Germany came late to the game and took things a lot harder than everyone else whenever they lost.

If one considers the German colonial empire, it is not actually that small; Kamerun, Tanganyika, Togo, Namibia, New Guinea and the Pacific Islands, Qingdao. Certainly, this was less than Britain and France, but these nations had come to the colonial game far earlier, and Germany still had more than all the other colonial players. One should also consider that Germany was in the process of building herself an informal empire in the Middle East, on the basis of the Ottoman Empire, and hopefully later expansion into Persia. The way Germany went about building her empire was also part of the issue; German advances in places like Morocco were, diplomatically speaking, sticking their nose into a traditional French sphere of influence, and doing so rather pointedly. In that case, Germany lost out on Morocco but won concessions elsewhere, but still felt as though she was the victim of a conspiracy because she didn't get everything she wanted.

In considering the navy the same pattern is true. Germany ended up with a very large navy (indeed, disproportionately so considering her needs), but still lost out to Britain in the naval arms race. This is often portrayed as Britain having performed some form of grudge-based tit for tat expansion, when really this wasn't the case. For Germany, even a colonial Germany, a large fleet was optional; for Britain a large fleet was necessity, even if one removed the empire from the equation. Things were made all the worse by how pointed Germany's naval armament program was; most of the ships built were short-ranged vessels, designed with the clear intent of challenging the Royal Navy in the North Sea and waters surrounding the British isles. What the Germans saw as an attempt to keep Germany as a second-rate naval power was in fact simple prudence; Britain could not tolerate a German navy more powerful (or even relatively equal) to her own for reasons of simple national security, and so of course Britain won the naval arms race.

I guess what I'm trying to convey here is that Germany was doing very well for herself, but not quite as well as some. In the belief that Germany should be the greatest power around, she sought to increase her power, and thereby came into conflict with everyone, with the result that the paranoia developed. Whilst many in Germany certainly believed the world was out to get them, this was moreso a case of their own expansionist goals coming into conflict with everyone else's and the Germans taking it the wrong way when they lost out. It's also worth noting that Germany wasn't really trying to be diplomatic about things, the Kaiser in particular was a bull in a china shop, somewhat like a 19th/20th century Donald Trump.

Many in Germany certainly perceived themselves as being under threat, but really it seems that a lot of this was unjustified paranoia. In likelihood Germany and France were always going to be enemies, simply owing to geography and their mutual antagonism, but French opinion was more focused on the threat Germany posed to France than the idea that France might take the offensive; this was not unreasonable, Germany had humiliated France in 1870-1, and was superior to France in almost every regard, the exceptions being finance and colonial holdings. Similarly, there was a substantial undercurrent in Russian opinion which was pro-German, on cultural, economic, and strategic grounds; if Germany had been smart, the real solution would have been to turn towards a friendship with Russia, ditch the Austro-Hungarians, and leave France with a choice between doing what Germany wanted and trying to build a defence based on the world's smallest army (Britain) and that of Austria-Hungary, which was in pretty much every sense the inferior of every other great power's save for that of Italy.

 

[Avernite]

No, this isn't the case.

France had to join the war because if she did not, Russia would surely be defeated. Russia had to join the war because if she did not, Serbia would be crushed.

Austria chose to provoke a war because she wanted to push into the Balkans. Germany chose to support her because (depending on who one asks, both historiographically and contemporaneously) provoking a war was either necessary, or because the risks were outweighed by the chance to force a diplomatic victory.

What you had in France and Russia was a genuinely defensive posture.

I don't get why you keep saying no when you do agree with me?

Russia and France were on the defensive, Germany and Austria on the 'preemptively defensive' which has quotes around it for a reason?

Largely what Eusebio said. As for the reason Germany shouldn't have these, well, people weren't really saying that. The issue was that Germany came late to the game and took things a lot harder than everyone else whenever they lost.

If one considers the German colonial empire, it is not actually that small; Kamerun, Tanganyika, Togo, Namibia, New Guinea and the Pacific Islands, Qingdao. Certainly, this was less than Britain and France, but these nations had come to the colonial game far earlier, and Germany still had more than all the other colonial players. One should also consider that Germany was in the process of building herself an informal empire in the Middle East, on the basis of the Ottoman Empire, and hopefully later expansion into Persia. The way Germany went about building her empire was also part of the issue; German advances in places like Morocco were, diplomatically speaking, sticking their nose into a traditional French sphere of influence, and doing so rather pointedly. In that case, Germany lost out on Morocco but won concessions elsewhere, but still felt as though she was the victim of a conspiracy because she didn't get everything she wanted.

This part I agree with, though I would say I understand why Germany took things harder. Germany was the only one who had a capability of challenging the British 'world order' of the 19th century, so where others got what they wanted or were smacked down so quickly as to never really want something, Germany could push on when initial signs were negative.

I am reminded of the cold war game 'Balance of Power': if you fold on step one of the crisis you never lose much, but when you've hung your prestige on winning and then fold anyway, it hurts much more.

In considering the navy the same pattern is true. Germany ended up with a very large navy (indeed, disproportionately so considering her needs), but still lost out to Britain in the naval arms race. This is often portrayed as Britain having performed some form of grudge-based tit for tat expansion, when really this wasn't the case. For Germany, even a colonial Germany, a large fleet was optional; for Britain a large fleet was necessity, even if one removed the empire from the equation. Things were made all the worse by how pointed Germany's naval armament program was; most of the ships built were short-ranged vessels, designed with the clear intent of challenging the Royal Navy in the North Sea and waters surrounding the British isles. What the Germans saw as an attempt to keep Germany as a second-rate naval power was in fact simple prudence; Britain could not tolerate a German navy more powerful (or even relatively equal) to her own for reasons of simple national security, and so of course Britain won the naval arms race.

Here I disagree. I don't think Germany had a disproportionate navy in any shape or form. It was able to match the Russo-French fleet handily, which of course it needed (because otherwise they might blockade the North Sea - and I hardly think the Russo-French alliance was ever pro-German). The Russo-French in 1914 had built+building 19 dreadnoughts, the Germans 20, the Austrians 6. Given geographical concerns, this means Germany should always win, which is where you want the navy to be: able to handily beat the obvious enemies.

Of course, it was also as a result big enough to give Britain pause should it ever want to beat on Germany, but that's the downside of a multipolar world. I know, Britain doesn't want to have naval competitors, but that doesn't make it a case of Germany being in the wrong.
The big problem is that Germany didn't handle its needs in a very diplomatic fashion - but to translate that into 'Germany doesn't even need a navy that big' is wrong.

I guess what I'm trying to convey here is that Germany was doing very well for herself, but not quite as well as some. In the belief that Germany should be the greatest power around, she sought to increase her power, and thereby came into conflict with everyone, with the result that the paranoia developed. Whilst many in Germany certainly believed the world was out to get them, this was moreso a case of their own expansionist goals coming into conflict with everyone else's and the Germans taking it the wrong way when they lost out. It's also worth noting that Germany wasn't really trying to be diplomatic about things, the Kaiser in particular was a bull in a china shop, somewhat like a 19th/20th century Donald Trump.

Many in Germany certainly perceived themselves as being under threat, but really it seems that a lot of this was unjustified paranoia. In likelihood Germany and France were always going to be enemies, simply owing to geography and their mutual antagonism, but French opinion was more focused on the threat Germany posed to France than the idea that France might take the offensive; this was not unreasonable, Germany had humiliated France in 1870-1, and was superior to France in almost every regard, the exceptions being finance and colonial holdings. Similarly, there was a substantial undercurrent in Russian opinion which was pro-German, on cultural, economic, and strategic grounds; if Germany had been smart, the real solution would have been to turn towards a friendship with Russia, ditch the Austro-Hungarians, and leave France with a choice between doing what Germany wanted and trying to build a defence based on the world's smallest army (Britain) and that of Austria-Hungary, which was in pretty much every sense the inferior of every other great power's save for that of Italy.

Eh, I think you will see that your second paragraph is entirely due to the first. From the premise that Germany deserves to be the greatest power just as much as anyone else (i.e. Britain and as later alternative, Russia/USA), it follows that Germany gets to be under threat if that threat is only to it being the greatest power around rather than to its direct borders (which, as you explain, could have been preserved just fine by ditching its almost-lapdog Austria and hanging with Russia instead). The only powers that joined WW1 under unavoidable threat to direct borders were Serbia and Belgium, all the others could have dodged out and preserved their borders as independent states - and only Russia might have had a direct threat to its form of government from dodging out despite no threat to its borders if it did.

 

[olm]

Here I disagree. I don't think Germany had a disproportionate navy in any shape or form. It was able to match the Russo-French fleet handily, which of course it needed (because otherwise they might blockade the North Sea - and I hardly think the Russo-French alliance was ever pro-German). The Russo-French in 1914 had built+building 19 dreadnoughts, the Germans 20, the Austrians 6. Given geographical concerns, this means Germany should always win, which is where you want the navy to be: able to handily beat the obvious enemies.

You sure about those dreadnought numbers?
http://www.naval-history.net/WW1NavalDreadnoughts.htm
Gives: 24-4-4 (Germany-France-Russia) for 1914.

 

[Avernite]

You sure about those dreadnought numbers?
http://www.naval-history.net/WW1NavalDreadnoughts.htm
Gives: 24-4-4 (Germany-France-Russia) for 1914.

https://warandsecurity.com/2014/08/04/the-naval-balance-of-power-in-1914/

Gives 15+5-4+8-0+7. Yours seems to include battlecruisers in the total tally, in which Germany leads the non-British Europeans by far.

 

[Arilou]

Germany was the only one who had a capability of challenging the British 'world order' of the 19th century

Not even close, as can be seen by the power that actually DID supercede the british: The United States.

I do think german internal politics matter to some extent too, it was not just a matter of the Kaiser being a bad diplomat, but rather also how the ruling german elite saw and presented itself. That kind of bullish nationalism was on the rise everywhere, but the particularly german mixture of democracy and authoritarianism made it particularly volatile. (not to mention that different interests in Germany were often pushing it in different directions, and because of the way things worked that meant antagonizing a whole lot of different people)

Germany didn't just try to expand it's influence (which was pretty normal) but it tried to expand it's influence in every possible direction at the same time. (Both suppresisng France, aiding Austria-Hungary and their informal client in the OE against Russia AND challenging the british at the same time)

 

[thedarkendstar]

Imagine if the man who committed the assassination had lived and seen the disaster he brought to the world not once but twice.

 

[DoomBunny]

I don't get why you keep saying no when you do agree with me?

Russia and France were on the defensive, Germany and Austria on the 'preemptively defensive' which has quotes around it for a reason?

I'm not sure we really are. Germany and Austria weren't really 'preemptively defensive' as much as openly looking for expansion.

Here I disagree. I don't think Germany had a disproportionate navy in any shape or form. It was able to match the Russo-French fleet handily, which of course it needed (because otherwise they might blockade the North Sea - and I hardly think the Russo-French alliance was ever pro-German). The Russo-French in 1914 had built+building 19 dreadnoughts, the Germans 20, the Austrians 6. Given geographical concerns, this means Germany should always win, which is where you want the navy to be: able to handily beat the obvious enemies.

Of course, it was also as a result big enough to give Britain pause should it ever want to beat on Germany, but that's the downside of a multipolar world. I know, Britain doesn't want to have naval competitors, but that doesn't make it a case of Germany being in the wrong.
The big problem is that Germany didn't handle its needs in a very diplomatic fashion - but to translate that into 'Germany doesn't even need a navy that big' is wrong.

Few points here:

1) Germany pulled back from a full naval arms race with Britain before 1914, precisely because the British made it clear that Germany would never win; the UK had more money and was prepared to spend more of it on the fleet than Germany was. The figures are therefore somewhat misleading as the peak crisis had passed.

2) Direct comparison to the French and Russian fleets is somewhat disingenuous; France's fleet was split between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic/Channel, whilst Russia's fleet was split between the Baltic and the Black Sea (the latter section locked in place by the Ottomans).

3) As above, one should include Battlecruisers in the total, they were capital ships in their own right, particularly when considered on paper.

4) Really, the size and nature of the German building program points to a desire to challenge the Royal Navy. France and Russia's battle line's were significant in comparison only when ships in construction are considered; even then, Germany comes out with a significant edge over their totals, without allowing for its ability to focus its fleet and control interior lines. There was little danger of joint Franco-Russian naval action, nor of the concentration of one powers fleet against Germany; realistically all Germany needed to counter this threat was a moderate navy, perhaps even just enough to ensure that no blockade could be established. However, the decision to build such a large fleet was clearly a direct challenge, both in terms of grand strategy and simple prestige, to the Royal Navy and British hegemony.

Germany wasn't necessarily wrong, but the thing is that by pursuing the course it did, Germany could not have done anything but provoke a confrontation with Britain; the point is that for Germany to then claim that she was hard done by and being denied her due was to miss the fact that Britain could never allow Germany 'her due' in the first place, or jeopardize national security.

Eh, I think you will see that your second paragraph is entirely due to the first. From the premise that Germany deserves to be the greatest power just as much as anyone else (i.e. Britain and as later alternative, Russia/USA), it follows that Germany gets to be under threat if that threat is only to it being the greatest power around rather than to its direct borders (which, as you explain, could have been preserved just fine by ditching its almost-lapdog Austria and hanging with Russia instead). The only powers that joined WW1 under unavoidable threat to direct borders were Serbia and Belgium, all the others could have dodged out and preserved their borders as independent states - and only Russia might have had a direct threat to its form of government from dodging out despite no threat to its borders if it did.

Certainly there is an element of fear in German thinking that suggests that Germany's borders are threatened, mainly by the idea that France is hell bent on revenge and will stop at nothing to bring about the success of its conspiracies to that effect (i.e., allying Russia). More distantly, I believe there was some level of paranoia regarding Russia as well, with Russian designs on the straits, Anatolia, and Iran directly clashing with Germany's desire to build a Middle Eastern empire for herself (though as you say, this was avoidable if Germany had not been so forward). Really though, I think it is just paranoia, as outlined above; genuine nonetheless, with many believing they were under threat, but still paranoia.

 

[olm]

https://warandsecurity.com/2014/08/04/the-naval-balance-of-power-in-1914/

Gives 15+5-4+8-0+7. Yours seems to include battlecruisers in the total tally, in which Germany leads the non-British Europeans by far.

I guess they can be counted on numerous different ways. I did a bit of most simple original search taking from wikipedia all "Laid down" years for all dreadnoughts and battlecruisers in 1907-1913 period, resulting this:
Germany:
1907: Nassau, Westfalen, Rheinland, Posen, Von der Tann (BC) 4+1
1908: Helgoland, Ostfriesland, Thüringen, Moltke (BC) 3+1
1909: Oldenburg, Kaiser, Goeben (BC) 2+1
1910: Friedrich der Grosse, Kaiserin, Prinzregent Luitpold, König Albert 4
1911: König, Grosser Kurfüst, Markgraf, Kronprinz, Seydlitz (BC) 4+1
1912: Derfflinger (BC), Lützow (BC) +2
1913: Bayern, Baden, Hindenburg (BC) 2+1
Russia:
1909: Gangut, Petropavlovsk, Sevastopol, Poltava 4
1911: Imperatritsa Mariya, Imperatritsa Ekaterina Velikaya, Imperator Aleksandr III 3
1912: Izmail (BC), Borodino (BC), Kinburn (BC), Navarin (BC) +4
France:
1910: Courbet, Jean Bart 2
1911: France, Paris 2
1912: Bretagne, Lorraine, Provence 3
1913: Normandie, Flandre, Gascogne, Languedoc 4

Comparison (BB+BC):
1907: Germany 4+1 = 4+1 vs 0
1908: Germany 3+1 = 7+2 vs 0
1909: Germany 2+1 vs Russia 4 = 9+3 vs 4
1910: Germany 4 vs France 2 = 13+3 vs 6
1911: Germany 4+1 vs Russia 3, France 2 = 17+3 vs 11
1912: Germany +2 vs Russia +4, France 3 = 17+5 vs 14+4
1913: Germany 2+1 vs France 4 = 19+6 vs 18+4

In conclusion we can see that then it comes down to laid down ships Germany pushed aggressively ahead in 1907-1908 period, 1909-1911 France+Russia started matching their pace, and 1912-1913 Germany started slowing down in comparison.