Why didn't/couldn't France invade down the Rhine valley in 1939?

[Klausewitz]

I completely agree. Did you strain yourself jumping to that conclusion?

Unfortunatly I did not.
I am 90%+ sure that you did not intend the cónclusion I advanced, but if you reread your argument, you might see why I could come to that idea.
So, what did you mean?
Since we all in this thread seem to have some troubles with the English language and reading comprehension, maybe a careful and simple rephrasing might enlighten us to your insights.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Unfortunatly I did not.
I am 90%+ sure that you did not intend the cónclusion I advanced, but if you reread your argument, you might see why I could come to that idea.
So, what did you mean?
Since we all in this thread seem to have some troubles with the English language and reading comprehension, maybe a careful and simple rephrasing might enlighten us to your insights.

Clever reply.

I'll ping you when it's posted.

Give me a day or two, Happy New Year.

 

[Ruwaard]

(...)

And Germany wouldn't have complained about Alsace-Lorraine when France got it back?
Also, reparations were a political necessity for France- the war in the west had mostly been fought in N. France, and thus, the area was decimated by war.

They did amongst other things, I only mentioned that, the French, of all people, didn't seem to realize, that the opposing side had very similar feelings.

As for the reparations, you can go back as far as the Napoleonic wars, the treaty of Tilsit (1807), where France forced Prussia into paying very high reparations and the loss of almost half of their territories. The treaty of Frankfurt (1871), which ended the Franco-Prussian war, France didn't only lose Alsace-Lorraine, but the reparations it had to pay, mirrored those asked of Prussia in the treaty of Tilsit. The treaty of Versailles was a swing in the other direction. Yes, reparations and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig and the German colonies were unavoidable, but the treaty went much further than that. It was not like that Entente and allies actually managed to defeat the German army on German soil, that would have seriously undermined the whole 'we were stabbed in the back'-myth, and would have made the harsher bits of Versailles, easier to swallow. Now, in hindsight, though at the time, there already were doubts, we can conclude Versailles was an unbalanced treaty.

I remember reading, that the German negotiators became concerned, after travelling through northern France. They probably realized France would want a large amount reparations, and they would have the ungrateful job to sell it back home. Whereas they actually were relatively hopeful, when they had left Germany.

 

[Denkt]

From what I have read, the French politicans was trying their best to avoid a new war. They feared a new war so much they did not even use the word war.

I guess they never did attack because they hoped Germany would not attack France and if they did they assumed I guess it would be similar to world war I.

 

[Arilou]

They did amongst other things, I only mentioned that, the French, of all people, didn't seem to realize, that the opposing side had very similar feelings.

As for the reparations, you can go back as far as the Napoleonic wars, the treaty of Tilsit (1807), where France forced Prussia into paying very high reparations and the loss of almost half of their territories. The treaty of Frankfurt (1871), which ended the Franco-Prussian war, France didn't only lose Alsace-Lorraine, but the reparations it had to pay, mirrored those asked of Prussia in the treaty of Tilsit. The treaty of Versailles was a swing in the other direction. Yes, reparations and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig and the German colonies were unavoidable, but the treaty went much further than that. It was not like that Entente and allies actually managed to defeat the German army on German soil, that would have seriously undermined the whole 'we were stabbed in the back'-myth, and would have made the harsher bits of Versailles, easier to swallow. Now, in hindsight, though at the time, there already were doubts, we can conclude Versailles was an unbalanced treaty.

I remember reading, that the German negotiators became concerned, after travelling through northern France. They probably realized France would want a large amount reparations, and they would have the ungrateful job to sell it back home. Whereas they actually were relatively hopeful, when they had left Germany.

Versailles wasn't really unbalanced. The german army was done. They had decisively lost the war.

Given the context and the damage, it was actually a remarkably lenient peace. (which was arguably the problem, the war in some ways left Germany in a relatively stronger position, since they were no longer surrounded by fellow great powers but by smaller countries)

 

[Easy-Kill]

There are a number of strong reasons for this.

Firstly, France had not been preparing for a war in the same way Germany had done on the 1936-1940 period. Germany had constructed the munitions and munitions building economy at the expense of the civilian economy. By 1940, Germany was expending approximately 20% of its GDP on military production, that is North Korea levels of crazy. Most specifically this was felt in the steel and coal shortages, and resulted in the downturn of construction of residential dwellings and consumer goods factories. This was to the total detriment of the civilian sector.

Secondly, this huge expansion was well appreciated. The best strategy for the allies was to maintain a defensive posture, allowing the British Blockade to have its intended effect. Had Germany not plundered france, her economy would have been in quite a dire position by mid 1941. France doesn't need to attack - both the UK and French economies are growing while the German economy is stagnating.

France simply didn't have the manpower necessary to conduct large scale offensive operations. Their strategy was to defeat the German army in the field, not to occupy Germany. Similarly, Germany was almost at maximum mobilisation for the battle against France, and had been stockpiling munitions for 6 months prior to the invasion in May 1940. The intention of the French was to wait for the Schleiffen plan 2.0 and then use its mobile forces to engage and defeat the German armies in Belgium, not to encircle and avoid, not to break through and occupy ... But to engage and defeat.

We see the success of Germany through the failures of France, without appreciating that most of the German General officer corps wished to undertake a re-fight of ww1. It was only a select few who proposed the idea of the Sickle Cut and there were many things that went right allowing it to succeed. It is entirely possible that a similar French attack would have failed spectacularly, wasting a significant portion of France's offensive capability and its main advantages (big defensive wall and highly effective Blockade).

Fortunately for Germany, they had a few officers who could see the merits in an operational gamble to fix a strategic problem. France however, did not have that strategic problem.

 

[Klausewitz]

Versailles wasn't really unbalanced. The german army was done. They had decisively lost the war.

That is the point it was not and the war was not.
Both were just a question of time, but as of 11/11/1918 the army was intact, the Eastern Front had been (decisivly) won and the Western Front was still on French and Belgian territory.
To add insult to injury the Germans in control were accutly aware that not the French or British had beaten them (and the French and British knew that too) but the Americans, which was why the Armistice was made based on the 14 points.
And no, it was no lenient peace. It was a peace harsh enough to inflict lasting damage but not harsh enough to render Germany incapable of doing something about the harm..
But we are in 1939 now, not 1919...

 

[Count Blue]

If you want to know which Power it worships, just look at the victims left behind on the altar.

Dont get me wrong but there are so many various victims on that "altar".
I cant make out who would be behind that, apart from calling it general "evil itself".

 

[TheLoneGunman]

Keep the discussion civil and on-topic please.

 

[Fanstar1]

That is the point it was not and the war was not.
Both were just a question of time, but as of 11/11/1918 the army was intact, the Eastern Front had been (decisivly) won and the Western Front was still on French and Belgian territory.
To add insult to injury the Germans in control were accutly aware that not the French or British had beaten them (and the French and British knew that too) but the Americans, which was why the Armistice was made based on the 14 points.
And no, it was no lenient peace. It was a peace harsh enough to inflict lasting damage but not harsh enough to render Germany incapable of doing something about the harm..
But we are in 1939 now, not 1919...

The german army was in complete retreat across the western front, and all of Germany's allies had surrendered. It wasn't all rosy in reality

 

[Fanstar1]

That is the point it was not and the war was not.
Both were just a question of time, but as of 11/11/1918 the army was intact, the Eastern Front had been (decisivly) won and the Western Front was still on French and Belgian territory.
To add insult to injury the Germans in control were accutly aware that not the French or British had beaten them (and the French and British knew that too) but the Americans, which was why the Armistice was made based on the 14 points.
And no, it was no lenient peace. It was a peace harsh enough to inflict lasting damage but not harsh enough to render Germany incapable of doing something about the harm..
But we are in 1939 now, not 1919...

the americans stopped the spring and july offensives, sure, but they only were part of meuse-argonne offensive during the allied counteroffensives of autumn 1918.

 

[Klausewitz]

@Fanstar1 I'd love to get into it... in another topic...

 

[Minodrin]

National Socialism is a religion...

I think you are making an interesting point, but I think it's the other way around. Nazism was not a religion, but an ideology, and organized religions are not just faith and spirituality, they are ideologies too - they have ideas about how the world should be run, what is good and what is an/the evil that should be defeated.

As for France, maybe they were just fighting the last war when the war broke out, and once they should have noticed that this wasn't the last war (after Poland fell), it was too late to change course.

 

[Director]

France simply didn't have the manpower necessary to conduct large scale offensive operations. Their strategy was to defeat the German army in the field, not to occupy Germany.

The French experience of WW1 was one of massive casualties in fruitless offensives, massive casualties in grim defense (as at Verdun), mutinies and final progress in 1918 through use of meticulously-planned, firepower-intensive small offensives that ran for short gains, then switched to a different place. As Germany approached economic collapse and the bottom of the manpower pool, these centrally-planned, tank-plane-artillery intensive, careful short rushes were very effective.

The French Army extrapolated from 1918 and concluded that moving forward into Belgium to protect its industrial heartland, digging in and drawing the enemy onto a prepared defense was the best way to overcome Germany's greater numbers and material preparation. Given the lessons of the Great War, the French solution - building the Maginot Line to hold a long stretch with minimal manpower, massing the army behind a river line in Belgium, and pulverizing the enemy with massed artillery and machine-gun fire, seemed reasonable. (After 1914-1917 there was a strong element of 'Let them try it and see how they like it.') The single key piece here is that France could not, and would not, incur WW1-style casualties by making offensive moves, both because the manpower pool was shallow and because the Army and the public might well revolt if they did.

Unfortunately, the German Army was more flexible, decentralized and - by the dire necessity of having their plans captured - forced to charge their mobile forces through terrain that the high commands of both sides considered risky and unsuitable for offensive movement. Von Manstein's daring plan was rejected by his superiors and only was accepted after he took it over their heads to Hitler.) And, in fairness, while the French model was unable to cope with small-unit infiltration and the rapid pace of movement around their southern flank, had Germany made the 'broad-front' push through Belgium as originally-planned, the French could have held up much better.

So the short version is that the French built their operational and tactical models around a defensive plan based on firepower, and depended on centralized, corps-and-army level planning of defense and counter-offensive operations. They were not going to launch an offensive while they thought they could lure the Germans onto a prepared killing field and thus maximize enemy casualties and limit their own. This is the reason for the 'Phoney War', and the reason the French were not going to be baited into any offensive moves in 1939-40.

 

[fredinno]

They did amongst other things, I only mentioned that, the French, of all people, didn't seem to realize, that the opposing side had very similar feelings.

As for the reparations, you can go back as far as the Napoleonic wars, the treaty of Tilsit (1807), where France forced Prussia into paying very high reparations and the loss of almost half of their territories. The treaty of Frankfurt (1871), which ended the Franco-Prussian war, France didn't only lose Alsace-Lorraine, but the reparations it had to pay, mirrored those asked of Prussia in the treaty of Tilsit. The treaty of Versailles was a swing in the other direction. Yes, reparations and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig and the German colonies were unavoidable, but the treaty went much further than that. It was not like that Entente and allies actually managed to defeat the German army on German soil, that would have seriously undermined the whole 'we were stabbed in the back'-myth, and would have made the harsher bits of Versailles, easier to swallow. Now, in hindsight, though at the time, there already were doubts, we can conclude Versailles was an unbalanced treaty.

I remember reading, that the German negotiators became concerned, after travelling through northern France. They probably realized France would want a large amount reparations, and they would have the ungrateful job to sell it back home. Whereas they actually were relatively hopeful, when they had left Germany.

The only thing more that Germany lost that you didn't mention was a bit of land to Belgium, and West Prussia and Pozen to Poland.

Why is giving Schleswig to the Danes any better than giving Belgium a bit of the Rhineland (that was handed over to Prussia after the Napoleonic Wars, mind you).

 

[Ruwaard]

The only thing more that Germany lost that you didn't mention was a bit of land to Belgium, and West Prussia and Pozen to Poland.

Why is giving Schleswig to the Danes any better than giving Belgium a bit of the Rhineland (that was handed over to Prussia after the Napoleonic Wars, mind you).

It’s not and it is, both Alsace-Lorraine and Schleswig were in a way settling old scores. Posen/Poznan and West Prussia were too in a way, though the situation of Poland was a bit more different. The Belgian East Cantons (Eupen-Malmedy etc.) was most directly in the purely territorial compensation category. I guess the loss of West Prussia, which disconnected East Prussia from the rest of Germany stung the most though.

 

[Fanstar1]

It’s not and it is, both Alsace-Lorraine and Schleswig were in a way settling old scores. Posen/Poznan and West Prussia were too in a way, though the situation of Poland was a bit more different. The Belgian East Cantons (Eupen-Malmedy etc.) was most directly in the purely territorial compensation category. I guess the loss of West Prussia, which disconnected East Prussia from the rest of Germany stung the most though.

Much of the territory lost was ethnically german too, especially west Prussia

 

[fredinno]

Much of the territory lost was ethnically german too, especially west Prussia

Not really. Pozan and West Prussia had near-equal amounts of Poles and Germans, though regional variances existed.

 

[fredinno]

It’s not and it is, both Alsace-Lorraine and Schleswig were in a way settling old scores. Posen/Poznan and West Prussia were too in a way, though the situation of Poland was a bit more different. The Belgian East Cantons (Eupen-Malmedy etc.) was most directly in the purely territorial compensation category. I guess the loss of West Prussia, which disconnected East Prussia from the rest of Germany stung the most though.

Schleswig was not setting old scores. The area was a puppet of Denmark, not actual Danish Territory. Plus, they didn't really have a serious vendetta against the Germans for the land.

And Poland without W. Prussia is effectively a German dependency.

Only the Saarland was really 'unjust', and that was given back to Germany anyways.

 

[The-Doc]

It’s not and it is, both Alsace-Lorraine and Schleswig were in a way settling old scores. Posen/Poznan and West Prussia were too in a way, though the situation of Poland was a bit more different. The Belgian East Cantons (Eupen-Malmedy etc.) was most directly in the purely territorial compensation category. I guess the loss of West Prussia, which disconnected East Prussia from the rest of Germany stung the most though.

Vous n'aurez pas l'Alsace et la Lorraine.