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It's really not a lot. It's two simple points:
1) Blitzkreig bad at taking cities
2) The invasion of France was lucky and could have gone badly if the French had made a more timely response
2a) The invasion lacked logistical staying power
I don't really know if the first one is true or significant but I would say the second is on the level. And I usually dont bother with that fellow so it's reasonable enough to win over a hostile audience in myself.
1) Blitzkreig bad at taking cities
2) The invasion of France was lucky and could have gone badly if the French had made a more timely response
2a) The invasion lacked logistical staying power
I don't really know if the first one is true or significant but I would say the second is on the level. And I usually dont bother with that fellow so it's reasonable enough to win over a hostile audience in myself.
The original Sichelschnitt was luck.
Mostly though because no subordinate French commander decided to disobey orders to take decisive action.
Though i would argue that under the doctrine of bataille conduite actually France was not able to react faster because they were neither psychologically nor doctrinal able to react faster. Actually they DID not want to react faster (they had decided for various reason at various junctions to not be able to react faster) and were therefore defeated.
It goes all the way down to the OODA loop and its relation to time and space.
That is the German loop of Orientation, Observation, Decisions and Action was so much faster than either the French or the British that the time elapsed and the space traversed by them during the time lapse it took for the Allied OODA loop to run through its stages circumstances had changed enough to make the Allied decisions and actions at best less dangerous and at worst counterproductive.
So in general i would say 1) is immaterial. The Germans simply did not concern themselves with taking cities (until Hitler decided to have a dick waving contest over Stalingrad) but did with cities what they did with other pockets: isolate them and reduce them at your leisure. Bonus points because a city with its civilians population is actually a much softer target than a purely military pocket.
2) is semi-correct if you assume a world where things do not have root cases, e.g. that there was no reason why the Germans fought as they did just as there was no reason why the French fought as they did.
2a) again, is largely immaterial. It is a product of the old dichotomy between being fast and being well-equipped. The more stuff you have to carry the slower you get or the longer and more vulnerbale your supply tail gets. So either you are fast and 'under-supplied' but it does not matter because you can move faster than the enemy can throw up holding positions in front of you or you are well-provisioned but slow and will need all that ammunition to blast your way through the increasingly calcifying defense.
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You are subscribing to an overly deterministic world view. Just because the Germans had better OODA loops does not mean OODA loops determined everything. The Germans were lucky in their placement of troops and that was not skill but simply a matter of making the correct choice in the complete absence of information. The French were incorrect.
Keep the OODA loops the same but swap the German and French luck and WWII is probably over by Christmas 1940.
Keep the OODA loops the same but swap the German and French luck and WWII is probably over by Christmas 1940.
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I disagree.
Once the disposition of troops is made 1940 is not much different from 1914 or 1840.
Information does not come through or gets messed up.
Troops cannot be readily redeployed with out throwing logistics, frontlines and marching plans in disarray.
An error in disposition is even today as bad as it was in 1800, maybe more so since more supplies are needed today.
And as for the complete absence of information, that is exactly the nature of small unit combat and there the OODA loop is of vital importance, because even if you decide wrong but your loop is fast you can faster correct your mistake than the enemy, who is as blind as you, can exploit it.
No, then France falls only in 1941, unless the Americans intervene.
More so since luck is something that mainly comes into play when you are taking risk; France and the doctrine of the bataille conduite tried to reduce chance, and therefore the domain of luck, as much as possible.
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Encircling cities,outmanuvering french divisions,pressing deeper into france.
All this plays in favour of my scenario in which France goes balls to the walls and counter-attacks with everything they can muster.
The farther the Germans go,the thinner their lines get and the more exhausted and easy to cut off they become.
Simply put,under my scenario the battle of france goes from a German blitzkrieg to a French Battle of Anihilation which could threaten the existance of the bulk of the Wehrmacht.
For sake of visualisation imagine that garbage disposal room from Star Wars with the walls closing.
Thats the general idea.
Exploit the Blitzkrieg fatal flaws to destroy it,by making concentration of force impossible and brining their shoddy logistics and reserves to the forefront.
All the French have to do to pull this off is order attack across the front by everyone,and tell them not to relent regardless of losses,while simultaneously drafting more men to throw into the grinder with whatever stockpiles they have lying around.
They will have more men than the germans,their armor is better,their positions already in the German's rear.
In this fight the German's are bonned.
All this plays in favour of my scenario in which France goes balls to the walls and counter-attacks with everything they can muster.
The farther the Germans go,the thinner their lines get and the more exhausted and easy to cut off they become.
Simply put,under my scenario the battle of france goes from a German blitzkrieg to a French Battle of Anihilation which could threaten the existance of the bulk of the Wehrmacht.
For sake of visualisation imagine that garbage disposal room from Star Wars with the walls closing.
Thats the general idea.
Exploit the Blitzkrieg fatal flaws to destroy it,by making concentration of force impossible and brining their shoddy logistics and reserves to the forefront.
All the French have to do to pull this off is order attack across the front by everyone,and tell them not to relent regardless of losses,while simultaneously drafting more men to throw into the grinder with whatever stockpiles they have lying around.
They will have more men than the germans,their armor is better,their positions already in the German's rear.
In this fight the German's are bonned.
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You are floundering on two important assumptions:
1. That the French can draft soldiers faster than they died in the 'relentless assault regardless of losses'. Not even the Soviet Union could do that. What saved them was the ability to take more or lesser their whole Far Eastern Army and transport them to their Western Front.
France would be committing all its forces pretty much from day one (even before the disaster in Belgium their reserves were danerously low) with no additional forces to draw upon while losing recruiting grounds with every step the Germans take (most French population and industry is concentrated in the way of the German advance on paris, meaning that any lost ground would be thrice dangerous).
The second part is the problem with regards to killing each other. Historically, according to Dupuy, German troops killed roughly 2 Western Allied troops for every one German casualty regardless of circumstances (the number holds true irrespective of air superiority, relative superiority, stance or time). So France would need about 7 million troops, probably more since they just vacated tactical and operational sensibility, which translates to about 20% of their total population.
Given that half is female and about 60% of the population tend to be either too young or too old, you would literally send every able bodied Frenchman to die.
Even ignoring who is then manning the factories (while women would be capable they tend not to be trained) France would at that point have lost the war since they will never recover from this war.
2. That France is able to restricts the Wehrmachts operational mobility by that kind of human wave mess.
I think that dubious because given that the Germans are now handed the tactical defensive while enjoying the strategical offensive this would only be true if every last German soldier would be needed to hold the Line.
Given the assumed front line (French German border, Belgian plains) that seems unlikely which would allow the Germans to amass strategic reservers and then launch an offensive.
And another. And another. Given that every gain of territory or even the ability of denying the North-Eastern industrial areas (France main industrial areas) or any areas with population and or industry to France even if those offensives stall, they will do damage most likely beyond the damage the French are able to inflict (since even if they are able to extract double casualties from the Germans, the loss in recruits, weapons and foods will doom them in the long run).
Finally the ultimate irony is that what you propose was more or less the French plan.
They were convinced that the war would result in a war of attrition and that the side better able to husband their ressources would win.
Which was one of the reasons they were averse to risky operations and kept a sizable part of their air force in reserver.
1. That the French can draft soldiers faster than they died in the 'relentless assault regardless of losses'. Not even the Soviet Union could do that. What saved them was the ability to take more or lesser their whole Far Eastern Army and transport them to their Western Front.
France would be committing all its forces pretty much from day one (even before the disaster in Belgium their reserves were danerously low) with no additional forces to draw upon while losing recruiting grounds with every step the Germans take (most French population and industry is concentrated in the way of the German advance on paris, meaning that any lost ground would be thrice dangerous).
The second part is the problem with regards to killing each other. Historically, according to Dupuy, German troops killed roughly 2 Western Allied troops for every one German casualty regardless of circumstances (the number holds true irrespective of air superiority, relative superiority, stance or time). So France would need about 7 million troops, probably more since they just vacated tactical and operational sensibility, which translates to about 20% of their total population.
Given that half is female and about 60% of the population tend to be either too young or too old, you would literally send every able bodied Frenchman to die.
Even ignoring who is then manning the factories (while women would be capable they tend not to be trained) France would at that point have lost the war since they will never recover from this war.
2. That France is able to restricts the Wehrmachts operational mobility by that kind of human wave mess.
I think that dubious because given that the Germans are now handed the tactical defensive while enjoying the strategical offensive this would only be true if every last German soldier would be needed to hold the Line.
Given the assumed front line (French German border, Belgian plains) that seems unlikely which would allow the Germans to amass strategic reservers and then launch an offensive.
And another. And another. Given that every gain of territory or even the ability of denying the North-Eastern industrial areas (France main industrial areas) or any areas with population and or industry to France even if those offensives stall, they will do damage most likely beyond the damage the French are able to inflict (since even if they are able to extract double casualties from the Germans, the loss in recruits, weapons and foods will doom them in the long run).
Finally the ultimate irony is that what you propose was more or less the French plan.
They were convinced that the war would result in a war of attrition and that the side better able to husband their ressources would win.
Which was one of the reasons they were averse to risky operations and kept a sizable part of their air force in reserver.
So in 1914, the entire German army was being supplied by a three mile long chain of trucks, which if disrupted in the least would have left them without ammo?
Or do you consider that not important?
1.They can mostly certainy draft even more WW1 veterans.
And the Soviet Far East divisions never moved,that myth is unusually persistant.
2.The French dont need to kill off every German soldier.
Its entirely enough to keep them fighting untill the Panzers break down,their guns run out of bullets and their crappy logistics fully collapses.
The whole idea is to keep the Wehrmacht engaged in battle 24/7 for as long as it takes untill their lack of reserves and logistical background finally takes its toll.
On the ground the bulk of their infantry is still rellying on bolt action rifles,the MGs scattered around each platoon wont have enough ammo to keep this up for long.
Their tanks are by and large inferior to the Allied ones and wont do much to stop them.
Leaving the scattered 88s with a collapsing logistical network the only speed bump the Allies face.
Also Barbarossa involved the bulk of the fighting power of Axis Europe against a non-mobilized USSR.
In this case its just Germany against the mobilized armies of France and Britain.
The two situation's are very different.
And the Soviet Far East divisions never moved,that myth is unusually persistant.
2.The French dont need to kill off every German soldier.
Its entirely enough to keep them fighting untill the Panzers break down,their guns run out of bullets and their crappy logistics fully collapses.
The whole idea is to keep the Wehrmacht engaged in battle 24/7 for as long as it takes untill their lack of reserves and logistical background finally takes its toll.
On the ground the bulk of their infantry is still rellying on bolt action rifles,the MGs scattered around each platoon wont have enough ammo to keep this up for long.
Their tanks are by and large inferior to the Allied ones and wont do much to stop them.
Leaving the scattered 88s with a collapsing logistical network the only speed bump the Allies face.
Also Barbarossa involved the bulk of the fighting power of Axis Europe against a non-mobilized USSR.
In this case its just Germany against the mobilized armies of France and Britain.
The two situation's are very different.
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The key to defeating Blitzkrieg was keeping strong reserves behind the frontline able to move quickly and blunt the enemy's armoured spearheads. Bad infrastructure helps because said armoured spearheads have to more in a slower way, thus giving more breathing room to the defenders. The Blitzkrieg was defeated in the USSR because the Soviets were able to keep mobilizing new units and counterattack, while the Germans could not reinforce their troops at the same rate; eventually the relation of forces shifted and the Germans were defeated ... quite deep into Soviet territory. France did not have the strategic depth of the Soviet Union, and so the only way available to the French and British would've been to keep strong reserves behind the frontline (the more mobile, the better) ready to counterattack; there was little room for mistakes.
These Soviet counterattacks and the stubborn resistance of encircled Soviet armies cost immense losses to the Wehrmacht. Of 3.117.000 men available to the Ostheer on 22 June 1941, it suffered 861.000 losses during the next six months, a 26.6% ratio. And even worse, these losses were concentrated in the front-rank soldiers, NCOs and officers, often irremplaceable because they were men with high levels of experience. The cost the Soviets had to pay to achieve this was startling: 4.308.094 men, plus 60 millions of citizens in the territories occupied by Germany (30% of the Soviet population), along with a large part of its economic base.
I doubt that any other of the anti-Axis powers of WWII would've been able to sustain such losses and keep on fighting. But it was probably a tribute in blood that had to be paid, the German Wehrmacht was simply too efficient a machine to be stopped otherwise.
For an interesting comparison:
German forces in the West, 10 May 1940: 3.350.000 men (joined on 20 June 1940 by 300.000 Italians in the Alps).
Allied forces in West, 10 May 1940: 2.240.000 French, 650,000 Belgians, 500,000 British , 400,000 Dutch (and 176,000 French in the Alps).
Total German losses: 157,000 men (killed, missing or wounded).
Total Allied losses: 360,000 men killed, missing or wounded, plus 1,900,000 prisoners after the armistice.
Ratio of German:Allied troops in May 10 1940 --> 1:1.13
Ratio of German losses:Allied losses --> 1:2.29 (not counting prisoners) or 1:14.39 (counting prisoners).
Allied forces in West, 10 May 1940: 2.240.000 French, 650,000 Belgians, 500,000 British , 400,000 Dutch (and 176,000 French in the Alps).
Total German losses: 157,000 men (killed, missing or wounded).
Total Allied losses: 360,000 men killed, missing or wounded, plus 1,900,000 prisoners after the armistice.
Ratio of German:Allied troops in May 10 1940 --> 1:1.13
Ratio of German losses:Allied losses --> 1:2.29 (not counting prisoners) or 1:14.39 (counting prisoners).
German forces in the east (including Norway), 22 June 1941: 3.117.000 (plus 470,000 Finns, 325,000 Romanians and 44,000 Hungarians)
Soviet forces in the western Soviet Union (not including forces in the Causasus, Far East or Central Asia) 22 June 1941: 2,743,000 men.
Reinforcements received by the Red Army in the front against German between June and December 1941: 3.544.000 men.
German losses during Barbarossa: 861.000 men (killed, wounded or missing).
Soviet losses during Barbarossa: 4.308.094 (killed, wounded and missing, of which aprox. 2.350.000 prisoners or MiA).
Ratio of German: Soviet troops in June 22 1941 --> 1.13:1 (not counting Germany's allies)
Ratio of German losses:Soviet losses by December 31 1941: 1:2.27 (not counting prisoners) or 1:5 (counting prisoners) (not counting Germany's allies)
Soviet forces in the western Soviet Union (not including forces in the Causasus, Far East or Central Asia) 22 June 1941: 2,743,000 men.
Reinforcements received by the Red Army in the front against German between June and December 1941: 3.544.000 men.
German losses during Barbarossa: 861.000 men (killed, wounded or missing).
Soviet losses during Barbarossa: 4.308.094 (killed, wounded and missing, of which aprox. 2.350.000 prisoners or MiA).
Ratio of German: Soviet troops in June 22 1941 --> 1.13:1 (not counting Germany's allies)
Ratio of German losses:Soviet losses by December 31 1941: 1:2.27 (not counting prisoners) or 1:5 (counting prisoners) (not counting Germany's allies)
Which means that, while the western Allies enjoyed a slight numerical superiority against the Germans in May and June 1941, they performed actually worse against the Germans than the Red Army did in 1941.
Source for German and Allied forces in the West:
The Blitzkreg Legend, by Roland Frieser.
Sources for German and Soviet forces in the East:
Vabanque:Hitlers Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941 als Versuch, durch den Sieg im Osten zu bezwingen, by Hartmut Schustereit.
When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, by David M. Glantz.
Stalin's Keys to Victory: the Rebirth of the Red Army in WWII by Walter S. Dunn.
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How do you get from one to the other?
They already had.
Only as soon as the Germans are able to halt, as your proposed operation is supposed to make sure, logistics get much easier.
So either you let them attack and penetrate and hope you can choke them off, in which case their logistics will be strained or you attack relentless and gift them the advantage of tactical defense which makes supply that much easier (most of all because you can establish railheads and the distance does not grow larger).
You also assume that France can fully mobilize while out-producing Germany, which given the relative sizes of the population and the industry i find highly questionable.
Only the French will be too.
And it is only a question of time until their supplies run out too.
And most likely, since they are going full hog everywhere, much more rapidly than the Germans.
Well, at least they have proper MGs and good mortars. The French MG is FM 24/29 (yes, those are design and redesign year) with a 25 shot magazine and the WW1 vintage Hotchkiss MG with a rate of fire of 450 s/min and a thirty round stripper clip. And their standard rifle is still very much a bolt-action.
Which only matters if you want to fight tanks with tanks and why would anybody want to do that?
Thats what the 37 mm (for Renault R1 and the Hotchkiss tanks) and the 88 is for (for all the rest).
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The different variables need to be considered.
Many Soviet formations were destroyed before they even learned the war had begun.
Secondly the forces attacking the USSR were far larger and stronger than what the Wehrmacht had in France in 1940.
And finally the better infrastructure works both ways,while the Germans have little they can bring to reinforce the front,the French would have easier time reinforcing their lines with the cobbled together replacements.
Mobility while preferable isnt a neccessity if you attack the enemy along the entire front.
That was a common theme in Soviet operations pre-Stalingrad.
Just line up men and tanks along the entire lenght of the front and attack everything,admittedly in those cases it was a bloodbath since the German's had time to entrench themselfes.
In France in 1940 they have no such chance,wherever they come under counter-attack they will have to improvise,and they arent anywhere near well supplied or equiped enough to keep it up for long.
Germany outproducing anyone would be a non-issue.
Under the timetable im thinking off the Wehrmacht should be forced on the back foot in a few weeks of such combat,by the time the first month was up the whole of the Wehrmacht in France would be nearing total collapse from lack of reserve,supplies or a logistics network to efficiently move them.
At that point its either Route to the Rhine or destruction.
The whole idea is the French and British already have the neccessary superiority in men and material,they just need to use it together with some last second mobilizations,while Germany has already played all its cards.
Many Soviet formations were destroyed before they even learned the war had begun.
Secondly the forces attacking the USSR were far larger and stronger than what the Wehrmacht had in France in 1940.
And finally the better infrastructure works both ways,while the Germans have little they can bring to reinforce the front,the French would have easier time reinforcing their lines with the cobbled together replacements.
Mobility while preferable isnt a neccessity if you attack the enemy along the entire front.
That was a common theme in Soviet operations pre-Stalingrad.
Just line up men and tanks along the entire lenght of the front and attack everything,admittedly in those cases it was a bloodbath since the German's had time to entrench themselfes.
In France in 1940 they have no such chance,wherever they come under counter-attack they will have to improvise,and they arent anywhere near well supplied or equiped enough to keep it up for long.
Germany outproducing anyone would be a non-issue.
Under the timetable im thinking off the Wehrmacht should be forced on the back foot in a few weeks of such combat,by the time the first month was up the whole of the Wehrmacht in France would be nearing total collapse from lack of reserve,supplies or a logistics network to efficiently move them.
At that point its either Route to the Rhine or destruction.
The whole idea is the French and British already have the neccessary superiority in men and material,they just need to use it together with some last second mobilizations,while Germany has already played all its cards.
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We dont need to agree that this sort of thing would be enough to destroy the Wehrmacht and end WW2 in 1940.
Could we at least agree that it would have far more meaningfull impact on defeating the Third Reich than what happened historically with France basically bending over and Britain evacuating?
Could we at least agree that it would have far more meaningfull impact on defeating the Third Reich than what happened historically with France basically bending over and Britain evacuating?
Actually the UK wasnt evacuating early. Right after Dunkirk they were preparing a second BEF. They just had nothing left to equip them with. They could only muster two divisions worth of equipment.
Also the thought of France waging a war of atrittion against Germany after the fall of Paris is nothing but hilarious.
Also the thought of France waging a war of atrittion against Germany after the fall of Paris is nothing but hilarious.
I am not sure.
It might just as well have kicked Britain out of the war for good horrified by the fate of France.
As it was they could rationalize French defeat as a french moral(e) deficit just as you did and pretend they had done great things by evacuating Dunkirk.
If France had taken the way through a German meatgrinder and lost and also had lost any chance of retaining its power status (since now almost all Frenchmen are 6 feet under, maimed or captured with the coming generations most likely being extremly tiny) they might decide that German guarantees as pertains to their overseas possession is a sufficient reason to stop all this.
Before they go the way of the French.
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How can Paris fall if its defended and all the encircled French formations fight on counter-attacking.
But the reverse side of this is that the French are now properly hostile to the Germans and Vichy France is impossible.
If however Britain does give up then Stalin has no more reason to be nice and start mobilizing,with the Wehrmacht having recieved a far more significant beating.
Either way the German's will be facing far more serious opposition from 1941 onwards.
By the French failing.
No, the reverse side is that France is over as a power and their oversea possession go to whoever can grab them first.
No Free French, no staging area for a American intervention, no ressources from the French colonies for the Allies.
No France.
Ever.
What does that have to do with the price of milk?
No.
It might just as well mean that the US never starts Lend-Leasing to anybody and that would be a problem for the SU.
Such a victory might even earn foreign policy credit.
What you are proposing is that the French sacrifice themself for the greater good of humanty to bring the Nazi Empire down faster.
While if they had done that it would certainly have saved more lives it is beyond the scope of the reality of 1940 to expect them to do that.
They had mobilized that they had. They had distributed the arms they had available. They threw the tovel when if was sensless to them to continue.
Warsaw wasnt taken by storming it,it surrendered after being bombed and encircled for a while,Paris isnt gonna be taken by the Wehrmacht rushing into it,and it cant be kept besieged if all of France is descending on the pincers.
France was over as a world power before WW2 even happened,worst case scenario Britain takes their colonies without issue since they are now full of angry vengefull Frenchmen and America has a better demonstration of Reich brutality to garner support for the remenants of free Europe.
If anything this makes the Axis campaign in Africa utterly hopeless since they no longer have a secure rear and the French Navy is actively fighting alongside Britain.
I think your view of the timeline is way to pessimistic.
Im proposing that France fight as long as they can,giving up just because your forces are temporarily cut off is a bit premature.
But that just goes back to the failure of morale and inept decision making being the prime cause of the defeat.
In which case it would not be encircled.
The German aim is not Paris.
The German aim is a decisive battle to defeat any French troops capable of fighting.
After that taking Paris is simply a rerun of 1870 on the double.
No, they weren't, neither was England for that matter.
Also, there are no vengeful Frenchmen anymore.
You killed them all.
What French Navy?
Those sailors?
They died, let by their officers, defending Paris.
All that is left are two guys with the timers to blow the whole thing when the Germans get into town.
Yes, i am sure losing effectivly all of your adult male population cannot possibly be that bad.
Are you even aware that there was a Case Red after Case Yellow?
Because from your statements i doubt it.
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