Why did the Nazis lost WWII?

[grumbler]

Originally posted by shawng1
sean & Hannibal,

I would submit that Rommel's biggest problem until El Alamein regarding supplies was his own reputation. Honestly, it wasn't until Torch that Hitler saw fit to really attempt large-scale resupply of Rommel. By then it was too late. Hitler laughed off most of Rommel's aid requests as little more than the typical prattering of a over-anxious commander. He "knew" Rommel would show enough genius to avoid his logistical problems.

O course, it wasn't until after Torch that Hitler COULD send reinforcements. See von Crevald.

Part of the assumption I am making here is the 42 strategy operates under is that Germany would've shifted forces and supplies to North Africa that is used in other places (like Stalingrad). Yes, there were logistical questions. But I think this was more an issue of Hitler's will than port size--especially after Tobruk was seized.

Tobruk did not ease the Axis supply situation. See von Crevald. If you are really interested in the actual answers to this question, you need to do the research. Simply stating that "this was more an issue of Hitler's will than port size" is ignoring careful research that has been published. It may make your scenario more interesting to you, but suffers from the fatal flaw that it flies in the face of reality! I actually enjoy more the games that ignore this aspect of the cruel reality of war (Clash of Steel gave me hours and hours of fun creating a huge German force in Africa and smiting the Brits there, and is available for free from The Underdogs.org), but it is pure fantasy. Afrika Korps was as big as it was going to get barring the withdrawal of practically the entire Italian force in North Africa (and remember that italians had far less logistical support requirements than Germans), and even in that case you have to factor in the loss of Italian support in Russia.

Remember also that the British could have reacted to any german reinforcement of Africa with their own forces. More German troops to Rommel would have meant less British troops to Burma, but Rommel would still have faced stiff odds. The Germans simply could not sustain the effort in Africa needed to overcome the likely British forces there, IMO.

CoolElelphant (on the German southern strategy in 1941),

If the Germans were sending in lots of infantry to their hugely expanded front (Kiev to Astrakahn is further than Kiev to Riga!), then their supply ituation would seem to me to become a nightmare. An armored raid towards the Causcasus, with the whole campaign hinging on the success or failure of a coup de main, might be feasible. Dragging AGS into the fray, with a million more troops to supply beyond the railhead, would seem to me to be a recipe for disaster. The Soviets could choose ANY point along the front to launch their offensive (masked by numerous other apparent offensives), and any Soviets reaching the Black Sea would see all Germans to the East of them cut off and out of supply. I see the Germans being very quick to high-tail it back towards supply if this move were even seriously contemplated, and the whole maneuver wasted.

 

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grumbler,

Actually, I've done more than a little study on it. I don't think the logistical issues were as insoluable as your source indicates.

Difficult? Yes. But not impossible. Certainly no worse than the Allies were going the other direction, for instance, while the Luftwaffe could bomb and torpedo the Allied resupply convoys.

 

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shawng1
Difficult? Yes. But not impossible. Certainly no worse than the Allies were going the other direction, for instance, while the Luftwaffe could bomb and torpedo the Allied resupply convoys.
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But, did you consider the Allied alternate supply routes, India to Egypt ,Australia via Iraq to egypt, UK via Nigeria/Sudan to Egypt, US via Brazil/Nigeria/Sudan to Egypt, UK around the cape to Egypt, these routes will take longer but do allow the Allies alternatives not available to the Axis, there is an oft overlooked nasty little war to clear the pro Axis/Vichy elements from Africa, but once done allowed more options for the allies.

Hannibal

 

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The Vichy French weren't really pro axis but rather neutral. They provided only very limited support to the axis war effort. (I'm speaking of the colonies, not Vichy France)

I believe the supply situation could have been at least bettered. I'm not really sure by 1941 or early 1942 Rommel needed more troops. I rather think he needed more supply for his troops which could have been accomplished if the axis seriously devoted itsaelf to the war. It may not have been swimming in fuel and throwing ammo at the enemy but at least a better situation than it was. Maybe this would have been enough for the first run at Tobruk.

 

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Vichy not proaxis ?

I think solesurvivor that you are wrong about Vichy.
The Vichy Gov was totally pro-axis after 43, the french police was, somtimes, more antisemitic than the german. On several occasions they arrested jews, even if the Nazi did not ask for them.
This is probabely due to a strong right wong - antisemitic tradition in french politics (remember Dreyfus ?).
Before 43 some generals around Petain were seeking revenge against germany.
you could argue that Vivchy was neutral as they did not helped the german in their war effort against the allies, and they did not helped the allies against the axis.

But they ideology (la revolution nationale, national revolution) was a fascist ideology, somehow linked to the supremacy of german people (the franks are a german people), not speaking about the french antibolchevic legion.
This subject is still a problem in France, and now the french justice is investigating on the subject (the papon case for instance).

@+

warl

 

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Sole Survivor
Some Vichy french conflicts in the early war period, all of these distractions sucked up resources and attention from the main theatres, men and material better imployed elswhere, but were vital to future prosecution of the war.

some examples may-nov42, invasion of madagascar. 4 UK brigades, +2cv,BB, 2ca, 9DD, 2 main battles.

april-july41, Syria, palestine, Iraq, Vich general Dentz 38000 force sues for peace, of which only 5700 opt to join the free french, ok iraq under Rashid arnt Vichy , but they are pro Axis.

italian Somalia vichy somalia,and ethiopia/eritria, july-feb41, italian + pro axis forces, need to be sorted. quite large scale combat involving SA coming up from Kenya, Indian and Uk coming down from sudan. Duke of Aosta goes into the bag with some 400.000 italian and africans at a cost of 4000 commenwealth casualties.

hannibal

 

[Agelastus]

And Wavell's reward for the remarkably successful Ethiopian and Syrian/Iraqi operations, performed with what, in many circumstances, could be considered inadequate forces?

Exile to India and the forlorn hope command of ABDA.

Churchill and Hitler both had a habit of firing some of their best generals. Unfortunately for Hitler he didn't have to replace them with other trained individuals. He could rely on his own genius.

 

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Agelastus,

Indeed, the one real advantage of Roosevelt over all the other leaders is that he knew he was an amateur, and generally speaking, he let the professionals run the war. He spoke to them of he political necessities, and did make strategic judgements from time to time. But he never meddled in tactics like the others did, or come up with these wacky brainstorms that kiled troops and sank morale (like the Churchillian fixation with the "soft underbelly of Fortress Europe.")

Not that Roosevelt was perfect in his war conduct, but as civilian military leaders go, he was as close as it gets.

 

[Agelastus]

You're right about his (Churchill's) fixation with the Balkans. Italy, however was and should have been exactly the soft underbelly he was describing. That it wasn't was due to Allied caution (Sicily), Allied incompetence (Anzio) and PR/career posturing (occupation of Rome.)

 

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Agelastus, the terrain in Italy made it an easy location to defend. A central spine of mountains seperating two allied columns. Agree about Sicily, they could have cut off another German army, but didn't, and the only chance they had to encircle Kesselring was abandoned for a nice parade through Rome.

I think Clark may have been one of the worst allied Generals of the war, but in his defense there's not many different routes anyone else may have taken.

After knocking Italy out of the war, and meeting strong resistance, the front should have been abandoned. Just enough troops to ensure that Germany needs to hold their defensive positions.

As for Wavell, I thought he was fired after a disaster in Libya, IIRC including the loss of Tobruk. I'd have to check, as the merry-go-round of British commanders, and see saw action there is a test for any memory

 

[Agelastus]

Wavell caught it after the entirely avoidable Greek fiasco led to Rommel's first reconquest of Cyrenaica. Auchinleck got the boot after the Tobruk fiasco.

As for Italy-
If one of the more ambitious options had been chosen (landing in the boot) the entire German/Italian force would have been trapped. Higher risk, much higher gain, and no need for Salerno.

Anzio had an excellent chance of unhingeing the German line, forcing a withdrawal from central Italy. This momentary chance, when the Germans had literally nothing with which to oppose the invasion, was thrown away.

As for Rome, Clark wanted the kudos of capturing the first Axis capital to fall into Allied hands rather than let Normandy and its' commanders steal all the limelight. As a result an opportunity to trap a good portion of the German army in Italy, including many of its best units, was thrown away.

Italy's political weaknes made it an inviting target. I agree that the Italian peninsula is tailor made for defence along its axis. However the Allies needn't have fought this kind of campaign, at least as far as the Po valley and its protecting mountains. The very shape of the peninsula lends itself to multiple Anzio/Inchon style landings. The Germans should never have been in a position to hold a line south of Rome.

 

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Anzio was only invaded by a small number of troops, something like 3 1/2 divisions and was supposed to be coordinated with the breakthrough of the Gustav line. The beachead alone could not have done any damage. Although there was little initial German resistance, the inevitable counterattack would have recaptured any gains, and driven the Anzio troops into the sea.

No excuse for the diversion into Rome though.

 

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BTW did anzio have an airfield?

 

[Agelastus]

Sean 9898
The Anzio forces were supposed to advance inland though, despite what you say. It was indeed a coordinated operation, but Anzio was the vital part, designed to distract and divert the Germans, and even possibly impede their supply lines.

SoleSurvivor
You're obsessed with airfields. Leaving out the presence of "jeep" carriers with the naval force, it was close enough to the front to be able to rely on some air support from the main forces in Italy. This is not the short ranged Luftwaffe facing the RAF of 1940.

 

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Originally posted by Agelastus
The Anzio forces were supposed to advance inland though, despite what you say. It was indeed a coordinated operation, but Anzio was the vital part, designed to distract and divert the Germans, and even possibly impede their supply lines.

General Alexander's final instructions, the Fifth Army was "to carry out an assault landing on the beaches in the vicinity of Rome with the object of cutting the enemy lines of communication and threatening the rear of the German 14 Corps [defending the Italian west coast along the lower Garigliano River

and further:

"The enemy will be compelled to react to the threat of his communications and rear, and advantage must be taken of this to break through his main defenses [along the Garigliano and Rapido Rivers], and to insure that the two forces operating under Comd [sic] Fifth Army join hands at the earliest possible moment. Once this junction has been effected Comd Fifth Army will continue the advance North of Rome with the utmost possible speed"

The first duty of Lucas was to ensure that he could hold the beachead. An optimistic 7 days was given as the time for the main forces to link up with the Anzio force at Alban Hills. As it turned out, Lucas's cautiosness was justified. Had he moved inland, it's possible that the entire force would have been destroyed, instead he dug in, defended and just held on.

 

[Agelastus]

Lucas was overcautious-he was there to help ensure an Allied breakthrough, not to take a few square miles of terrain and leave his forces stuck for several months.

Actually, the quotes you used make it look as if Lucas was disobeying orders. Lucas effectively never tried to threaten enemy communications.

 

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Agelastus, I agree Lucas was very overcautious, but I think that it in hindsight it may be justified by the way the actual events unfolded.

Yes, in the context of what Alexander wanted Lucas did not carry out his orders, but Clark inserted his own interpretation of those orders to Lucas;

"Mission. Fifth Army will launch attacks in the Anzio area.... a) To seize and secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Anzio. b) Advance on Colli Laziali [Alban Hills]"

So, even in the planning stages, Anzio is a mess, with Lucas being in the position to interpret those orders as he chose. Changing from specific objectives to vague objectives was deliberate, to allow a flexible response to the situation, but it is the cause of the whole Anzio mess.

Looking at the forces Lucas had, 2 full and 1 partial division, it's hard to be too critical of him because he did not advance towards Kesselring.

 

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sean and Agelastus,

I'm not too sure Lucas was overcautious. Let's be honest here, the Anzio landing was the closest thing the entire war to an invader being thrown back into the sea. The Germans nearly got to the beach, only air strikes and Naval bombardment stopped them.

3 1/2 divisions were facing at least equal numbers of entrenched German positions. The real issue here was that Gen Mark Clark was about the most incompetent commander the Allies could have picked for the Italian campaign. He combined all the arrogance and glory hunting of Patton with none of the combat savvy or ability to exploit enemy weakness.

Probably the best thing the Allies could have done is leave Italy alone once Mussolini fell. They would''ve been out of the war, which is what the Allies wee after in the Med. theatre. And the Germans, if they wanted to keep the Allies out of the "soft underbelly" of Europe, would've still tied down whole divisions of their best soldiers policing the state.

The whole campaign was a slogging mess to please Churchill's Mediteranean fixation. Plus as noted, the whole boot of Italy is made for defensive warfare. Anyone with strategic sense could see that.

 

[Agelastus]

Shawng
What entrenched Germans? Every text I've ever read makes it clear that for several crucial hours the road inland ("to Rome") was effectively open. I know the Germans were there later, but that isn't the point.

Salerno was probably as close a run thing, if not more so.

The geographical "boot" wasn't even defended by the Germans, other than by extensive boobytraps. Italy's "Spine" is wonderful defensive terrain if advancing from north to south (no one's mentioned the rivers either) but against even minimally adventurous Allied commanders they shouldn't have been able to hold a line anywhere south of the mountains below the Po, and the length of that position is considerably longer than the southern one. Despite a winter delay, the actual line at this point was pierced easily enough in 1944-5, and the Lombardy area was the location of much of Italy's industry. Removing that from German control as rapidly as possible would have been a useful result from Italian operations. By the time this occurred it really didn't matter.

It was certainly Churchill's fixation (I suspect he was remembering the Salonika offensive of WWI) and I don't see a breakthrough into Germany or Yugoslavia either, but it could still have been a useful campaign if conducted more skilfully, rather than the bloody sideshow it was historically.

As for allied usage of tactical invasions, they tried them on a smaller scale several times towards the end of the Sicily operation. THey should have maintained and perfected the model.

 

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Originally posted by Agelastus
What entrenched Germans? Every text I've ever read makes it clear that for several crucial hours the road inland ("to Rome") was effectively open. I know the Germans were there later, but that isn't the point.

Do you think Lucas should have advanced on Rome? I know there was nothing to stop him taking the city, but the eventual German counter attack would have destoyed him.

Salerno was probably as close a run thing, if not more so.

At one point they considered sending the landing craft back in to retrieve the soldiers at Salerno, a damn close run thing as Wellington might have said.

The geographical "boot" wasn't even defended by the Germans, other than by extensive boobytraps. Italy's "Spine" is wonderful defensive terrain if advancing from north to south (no one's mentioned the rivers either) but against even minimally adventurous Allied commanders they shouldn't have been able to hold a line anywhere south of the mountains below the Po, and the length of that position is considerably longer than the southern one. Despite a winter delay, the actual line at this point was pierced easily enough in 1944-5, and the Lombardy area was the location of much of Italy's industry. Removing that from German control as rapidly as possible would have been a useful result from Italian operations. By the time this occurred it really didn't matter.

"Italy is a boot, best entered from the top"- Napoleon, which is pretty much the strategy the allies might have pursued.