Why did the Nazis lost WWII?

[Agelastus]

It's certainly not what I'd call an optimal choice for the campaign, but with the majority of Russia's southern armies surrounded and destroyed at Kiev, what did the Russians have to stop them? Particularly given the likelihood of Stalin still perceiving there to be a threat to Moscow (witness the response to Germany's "case blue" operation of 1942.) Hitler's already thrown away probably the best chance at Moscow. Now he's moved half of AGC's Panzers so far south why not gamble? Particularly as I doubt the Russian army was operationally skilled enough to successfully break through the German flank and cut off the Caucasus spearheads.

Actually, I've never been convinced that Hitler's move south was such an enormous mistake. The Wehrmacht's eventual success in any Russian campaign was predicated on the destruction of the enemies main armies in the field. Whether the southern armies were high quality or not, they still represented a large percentage of the Soviet Union's mobilised strength, and they had had some success at holding up Rundstedt's drive south of the Pripet Marshes.

 

[Carlos Duarte]

I believe that the north africa campaign is somewhat diminished in importance... if the germans managed to capture the oil lines things could have been very different. Also the general logistics of the Wermacht were awful!!!!!

The Barbarrosa operation was a fiasco for two reasons: first, it failed on basic level logistics, like no one remembering the rail track width difference between the Soviet Union and Germany and second that stupid assault on Stalingrad... it was sheer madness... no strategical advantage... just ego...

Carlos

 

[unmerged(4007)]

Carlos,

Actually, one of the most interesting "what ifs" of WWII is just this issue.

Let's imagine for an instant that in early 1942 Hitler sees the opportunity to knock out the British by cutting off their oil supply. Not only this but the Japanese, who are in fact in Berlin conducting high-level talks on how to conduct the war, are convinced to combine with Germany in this undertaking.

Germany will reinforce Rommel and strike east to the Suez. Japan will ignore the prostrate US forces and stike for the wealth of India. The British do not have the forces to defend the Empire, they were lost with Singapore. The two will meet over the dead remains of British Imperialism somewhere in Persia. And with the whole wealth of the Mid and Far East to draw on, they will both then turn on Russia.

England, even if she stayed in the war, would not have the wherewithal to fight. Russia would be caught hammer and anvil between the Axis powers with fresh and near infinite resources to conduct the war. The US would be left to have to slug through the whole island fortress chain to Japan, with the Japanese at full strength and an infinite oil supply for her fleets.

But totalitarian regimes do not go in for such combined war efforts. The Axis was, in truth, more a propaganda stunt than an alliance. All that was concluded by the talks between Germany and Japan was the dividing of the world into "spheres of operation" that ran just west of India. Then the US hit Tokyo with the Doolittle raid, and any concern Japan had for East Indies operations went out the window. The Imperial Fleet sallied East to oblivion at Midway.

 

[hjarg]

Originally posted by Carlos Duarte

The Barbarrosa operation was a fiasco for two reasons: first, it failed on basic level logistics, like no one remembering the rail track width difference between the Soviet Union and Germany and second that stupid assault on Stalingrad... it was sheer madness... no strategical advantage... just ego...

Carlos

Just ego... and the fact that one of the main oil supply lines for Russia was Volga. Taking Stalingrad would cut Russians off their oil, or would at least make it harder to get. (errr... Russian oilfields in south, not in Siberia)

 

[unmerged(598)]

Originally posted by shawng1
Let's imagine for an instant that in early 1942 Hitler sees the opportunity to knock out the British by cutting off their oil supply. Not only this but the Japanese, who are in fact in Berlin conducting high-level talks on how to conduct the war, are convinced to combine with Germany in this undertaking.

Germany will reinforce Rommel and strike east to the Suez. Japan will ignore the prostrate US forces and stike for the wealth of India. The British do not have the forces to defend the Empire, they were lost with Singapore. The two will meet over the dead remains of British Imperialism somewhere in Persia. And with the whole wealth of the Mid and Far East to draw on, they will both then turn on Russia.

Hi Shawn,

Japan and Germany certainly had the military forces in '42 to attempt this plan, but once again the logistical efforts to complete Africa and India defeated them.

Japan shocked the British by showing up for tea in Burma, then chasing them all the way to India. They even assaulted Indian positions on the border. However, the logistical problems of attacking, and conquering India was far beyond the Japanese.

Burma not only lacked rail transport, but the roads there were insufficient to supply a large enough army to even make a dent in India. Even if the Japanese had been able to successfully cross the Indian border, how exactly do they conquer a land that size?

Moving to the desert, while at first the front was simply a method of tying down the British Army, when Rommel was sufficiently reinforced, he again had the problem of supply. After his attack in '42, the offensive stalled in front of Knightsbridge, not because of British defense, but because there was no gasoline. To take Suez, Malta has to be neutralized, or the British Navy has to be confined to port. Germany simply does not have the assets required to do this. It's not the lack of tanks and infantry which lost North Africa, but the lack of a heavy bomber, and insufficient numbers of Uboats.

Luftwaffe redeployment? Most of the Luftwaffe had already arrived in northern France by early July anyway. As for air superiority, as we mentioned, it would've been fought for over the Channel, rather than the English homelands

According to Shears; the Luftwaffe was unable to base their fighters in Northern France until the end of July, then the weather was so bad that the operation was further delayed until early August. The Germans cannot risk an intact RAF waiting in England, their strategy was to destroy the RAF. Anything less than the Channel being a German lake means that the RN has the ability to engage the invasion force. The Luftwaffe tried to tempt the RAF into the channel at the beginning of BoB, but the RAF would not bite.

If you were the German army commander, would you risk the operation with air parity? If not, then you must destroy the RAF, which takes you to October if at all, and thus Britain has time to defend herself.

Regarding those barges, the speed was closer to 2knots than 5 knots, Army Chief of Staff Halder, who took part in a excersise on board said "when I consider that you plan to cross the Channel at a somewhat slower speed than Caesar's legions 2,000 years ago, I don't think much of it."

Germany is caught in a Catch 22, if they could land in July, while the Home Guard was drilling with pikes stockpiled for an invasion 400 years earlier, then they have a good chance of landing, and also a chance to capture a port. However, to cross at that point, there is no possibility of air superiority, or of keeping the RN out of the channel.

IMHO Germany's best chance of defeating Britain lay in Uboats. Had Doenitz been given the numbers he wanted he could have closed the Atlantic. Had they also used similar numbers in the Mediterranean and simply waited for the islands to starve, then the war in the west could be won.

 

[unmerged(2539)]

The Kiev diversion.

Sending Guderian and 2Pnzr(80% of afv TOE) to effect the closure of the Kiev pockets, and securing the southern flank, after it was stalled, put over 1000 klms onto the AFVs, by the end of the ops 2Pnzr had 25% of its TOE in afv strength on hand. Many more were back at field depots and were not a total loss. The choice to do this was to fold, as mentioned, to remove any sov threat in the south, by another super cannae, militry sound and in keeping with operational aims laid down prior to invasion, Hitler was very keen to drive deep in the south to aquire the Ukraine/crimea, secondly was the hoped pschological effect on Stalin, but he had lost already to many to worry about another host going under. Every militry act has a political motive.
Another facter in all this is that the Inf,art, and the munitions needed for a second push onto Moscow were being moved into place and there was a window of time for the Pnzrs to do something, but what?, the delay was in part that the supply net was 30% lower than expected due to the need of major overhauls to vehicles, horses were dying at 1000 a day, and this is in good weather.

Hannibal

 

[grumbler]

Originally posted by sean9898
Moving to the desert, while at first the front was simply a method of tying down the British Army, when Rommel was sufficiently reinforced, he again had the problem of supply. After his attack in '42, the offensive stalled in front of Knightsbridge, not because of British defense, but because there was no gasoline. To take Suez, Malta has to be neutralized, or the British Navy has to be confined to port. Germany simply does not have the assets required to do this. It's not the lack of tanks and infantry which lost North Africa, but the lack of a heavy bomber, and insufficient numbers of Uboats.
(snip)

IMHO Germany's best chance of defeating Britain lay in Uboats. Had Doenitz been given the numbers he wanted he could have closed the Atlantic. Had they also used similar numbers in the Mediterranean and simply waited for the islands to starve, then the war in the west could be won.

The problem with supply in North Africa was not the continued resistance of Malta, but the lack og port facilities. Tripoli simply lacked the size needed to support a larger army in Africa than the Axis had deployed there. Martin von Crewalt's Supplying war has an excellent study of the German logistic difficulties in Africa. Most of the shipping that made it through to Tripoli spent days and even weeks waiting in the queue to unload. Hitler reinforced Africa after Torch because by then he could, having gained access to the French ports.

The only "islands" that could starve in the Med were Malta and Cyprus. Cyprus was out of the way, and Malta was already under as tight a U-boat and air blockade as could be managed. It is unclear that the Germans could have won the Battle of the Atlantic without a massive prewar submarine building campaign, which would not have been ignored by the British. besides, diversion of all that steel and diesel engine production would have cut down on the number of vehicles and aircraft produced, and so Germany maybe doesn't win in 1940.

To argue that Germany should have been more ready to conduct strategic warfare in 1939-1941 argues that they should have been less ready to conduct tactical warfare. In this case, you have to take into account the effect that such a development would have on the whole war. You may very well be right, but the consequences are worth examining.

Germany cannot have their cake and eat it too.

Originally posted by Carlos Duarte
The Barbarrosa operation was a fiasco for two reasons: first, it failed on basic level logistics, like no one remembering the rail track width difference between the Soviet Union and Germany and second that stupid assault on Stalingrad... it was sheer madness... no strategical advantage... just ego...

The Germans knew and prepared for the rail gauge issue (which was actually more of an inconvenience to the Soviets than the Germans, since the Germans merely had to move the rails closer and saw off the ties, while the Russians had to replace the ties completely to expand the gauge).

Stalingrad was incredibly bungled on the operational elevel, with 4th Panzer Army moving hither and yon without much consideration of the impact of "order, counter-order, disorder" and the decision to sieze the city rather than just interdicting the Volga, but there were sound operational reasons to sieze the city AFTER the Volga's west bank was cleared. The Volga's banks were never cleared, however, and the battle for the city sucked in far more men and materiel than its taking justified. THAT part was pure ego (taking Stalin's name-city) and the Soviets played Hitler's ego like a drum. There is an interesting parallel, what with the "victory disease" on the part of the Axis, combined with the strategic ambush policy on the part of the Allies, between Stalingrad and Midway, the two great "turning point" battles of the war.

 

[unmerged(598)]

Originally posted by grumbler
The problem with supply in North Africa was not the continued resistance of Malta, but the lack og port facilities. Tripoli simply lacked the size needed to support a larger army in Africa than the Axis had deployed there. Martin von Crewalt's Supplying war has an excellent study of the German logistic difficulties in Africa. Most of the shipping that made it through to Tripoli spent days and even weeks waiting in the queue to unload. Hitler reinforced Africa after Torch because by then he could, having gained access to the French ports.

Agreed, to a point, and add to this problem that every mile Rommel moved East was another mile his supplies had to be carried. But in '42 he came within a hair of making it to Cairo. Perhaps, and it's still a long shot, without all those ships now sitting at the bottom of the med there might have been a chance for him to get there.

The only "islands" that could starve in the Med were Malta and Cyprus.

Sorry, I should have been more clear, I meant the home island- Britain.

To argue that Germany should have been more ready to conduct strategic warfare in 1939-1941 argues that they should have been less ready to conduct tactical warfare. In this case, you have to take into account the effect that such a development would have on the whole war. You may very well be right, but the consequences are worth examining.

Germany cannot have their cake and eat it too.

Absolutely correct, but between June 1940 and 1941 Germany has little else to do. A concentrated effort to flood the Atlantic before even considering Barbarossa may have given them the opportunity.

[/quote]
Stalingrad was incredibly bungled on the operational elevel, with 4th Panzer Army moving hither and yon without much consideration of the impact of "order, counter-order, disorder" and the decision to sieze the city rather than just interdicting the Volga, but there were sound operational reasons to sieze the city AFTER the Volga's west bank was cleared. The Volga's banks were never cleared, however, and the battle for the city sucked in far more men and materiel than its taking justified. THAT part was pure ego (taking Stalin's name-city) and the Soviets played Hitler's ego like a drum. There is an interesting parallel, what with the "victory disease" on the part of the Axis, combined with the strategic ambush policy on the part of the Allies, between Stalingrad and Midway, the two great "turning point" battles of the war. [/B][/QUOTE]
Yes, and don't forget as a previous poster stated, that 350k were trapped in Africa in early '43 as well.

India, Africa, Russia, and Britain appear to be outside the grasp of Germany despite all the "what ifs." But we never seem to tire of discussing them. Personally, there would have been a better chance for France and Britain to capture Berlin in '39 than all these fanciful chances for Germany to win.

 

[unmerged(4253)]

AGC

true, a long penninsula of german troops would develop similar to that of the french in 1812. But if german infantry would be following in column then it would hardly be an unprotected flank. Furthermore, incircling such a wide peninsula of an entire army group would be an enormous task. It has never happened in history. It would have required more resources than were used in stalingrad and the russians had fewer trucks and tanks in 1941 than 1942. If the russians did amask for an attack it would be a greater strategic opportunity to incircle them then it was to incircle Kiev in 1941.

 

[unmerged(4007)]

sean & Hannibal,

I would submit that Rommel's biggest problem until El Alamein regarding supplies was his own reputation. Honestly, it wasn't until Torch that Hitler saw fit to really attempt large-scale resupply of Rommel. By then it was too late. Hitler laughed off most of Rommel's aid requests as little more than the typical prattering of a over-anxious commander. He "knew" Rommel would show enough genius to avoid his logistical problems.

The thing is, when he reached El Alamein, he was out of options. It was forward or abandon his equipment. He didn't have enough gas to return to Tobruk. But Alexandria, with the largest British depot operating outside of England at the time, was just on the other side of the battlefield.

Of course, in reality, it might as well have been on the dark side of the moon.

Part of the assumption I am making here is the 42 strategy operates under is that Germany would've shifted forces and supplies to North Africa that is used in other places (like Stalingrad). Yes, there were logistical questions. But I think this was more an issue of Hitler's will than port size--especially after Tobruk was seized.

One should also remember here that the Med was not necessarily a happy place for Royal Navy vessels either...ask the Ark Royal.

 

[Agelastus]

Don't mention the Ark Royal!

I hate being reminded of British incompetence with regard to damage control. Discovering all the electricians had left the ship just when the electrical systems vital for firefighting etc. went down is not very pleasant to read about. What happened to the Illustrious in 1941 is a much better example, even if she wasn't sunk.

I agree that Rommel's reputation hamstrung him. Unfortunately it was one he'd been building since Caporetto during the First World War.

 

[unmerged(2539)]

How about this,

" My friend Duce doing well in Africa, dont you think?"

Later
"Got in Himmel, Mussalinis fubared this balkans buisiness, just like the cake walk into S france, we need to secure this area quickly, ive i mind to visit Russia and i dont want the Brits landing up and down the med, those greeks have got to go, Greeks gave us democracy, phiosophy, mathamatics and then nothing for 2000 years, now there going to cause trouble again, i tell you im not having it".

later,
"Ok thats all settled, now i can talk Turkey into our camp along with Iraq and Persia... what? Africas all fubared as well, sigh..."

"Ok get me Rommel, he works wonders, doesent get on with anyone giving him orders, ill send him to Africa to stop this sideshow from making Mussilini look any siller than he is, that way he can have his little Roman empire and be happy, and Rommel will be happy in an independant role"

later yet.

"Rommels done what you say?, maybe this presents posobilitys, Russias getting on my nerves, its endless horizons really get you down".

Hitlers an oportunist, Rommels a victim of his own success.

Hannibal

 

[unmerged(592)]

Mussalinis fubared this balkans buisiness,

?? I just looked into the Longman dictionary, I didn't find that verb. What does it mean? Something like mess up?

 

[unmerged(2539)]

F-ucked U-p B-eyond A-ll R-ecognition.

Hannibal

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca
F-ucked U-p B-eyond A-ll R-ecognition.

Hannibal

American and British military slang. HB's showing his origins,

 

[unmerged(592)]

just wanted to know

 

[unmerged(4007)]

Agelastus,

Sorry, didn't mean to bring up any bad memories.

Of course we in the US Navy have had our fair share of unforgivable losses at sea. Savo Island comes to mind.

 

[Agelastus]

Guess I'm a little sensitive about these things, considering we were the world's premier naval power for a couple of centuries.

Still we've got an even longer history of naval incompetency. Everyone must have heard of the Mary Rose!

 

[unmerged(2539)]

I dont feel so bad now that hes fessing up to losing an entire Island!

Then again we lost a couple of continents....
Hannibal

 

[unmerged(592)]

maybe I should be happy Germany never had serious colonies that would have hurt to lose :d