Why did Operation Barbarossa fail?

[phantomrider]

I agree that the US' capacity to assist the UK on the ground and in the air would have been limited, but the US had either the second-most powerful or most powerful navy in the world at the time (I'm not sure when they became top dog - I suspect with the ship building program replacements post-Midway, but they were still extremely powerful). If, in the very unlikely event, Germany had managed to damage the RN enough to allow Sealion in the first place, they could find themselves on the wrong end of the USN smashing up their beachheads (which is by far the greatest assistance they could provide in any event).

I think we are close to an agreement ... The problem for a US intervention (send the fleet) is timing. While the Navy was much more operationally competent than the Army in 1940 and 41 they really weren't a quick reaction force. So for example, the Germans kick off Sea Lion and after a couple of days the US gets news that things aren't going well for the Brits (the Germans make a few landings and are not thrown back into the sea immediately and oh by the way half the Royal Navy seems to be sunk trying to close the Channel which remains open to German resupply and reinforcement operations. The US then presumably declares war on Germany and dispatches a couple of battleship cruiser task forces and say 2 of the 4 carriers it has. It then take 10 days to cross the Atlantic and you have to refuel the fleet (something the Brits could do certainly) and then send it into the channel where it gets to take on the Luftwaffe which although they weren't great at anti ship in 1940-41 (or more correctly up to Japanese standards) they were pretty good (see Crete) and oh by the way they just managed to cripple the RN the week before so they are getting better. It also helps that the Luftwaffe has multiple bases along the French side of the channel so carrier strikes from ~150 carrier planes (technically inferior to Messerschmidts and Stukas) could knock out their bases. Sending a fleet into "narrow" waters controlled by hostile air is a recipe for disaster.

 

[Axe99]

I think we are close to an agreement ... The problem for a US intervention (send the fleet) is timing. While the Navy was much more operationally competent than the Army in 1940 and 41 they really weren't a quick reaction force. So for example, the Germans kick off Sea Lion and after a couple of days the US gets news that things aren't going well for the Brits (the Germans make a few landings and are not thrown back into the sea immediately and oh by the way half the Royal Navy seems to be sunk trying to close the Channel which remains open to German resupply and reinforcement operations. The US then presumably declares war on Germany and dispatches a couple of battleship cruiser task forces and say 2 of the 4 carriers it has. It then take 10 days to cross the Atlantic and you have to refuel the fleet (something the Brits could do certainly) and then send it into the channel where it gets to take on the Luftwaffe which although they weren't great at anti ship in 1940-41 (or more correctly up to Japanese standards) they were pretty good (see Crete) and oh by the way they just managed to cripple the RN the week before so they are getting better. It also helps that the Luftwaffe has multiple bases along the French side of the channel so carrier strikes from ~150 carrier planes (technically inferior to Messerschmidts and Stukas) could knock out their bases. Sending a fleet into "narrow" waters controlled by hostile air is a recipe for disaster.

We're getting there - it's an interesting discussion, and like all hypotheticals we're theorycrafting, so who knows what's actually right . Thoughts:

- You'd keep your CVs out of the channel - probably you'd keep them out of the conflict, and just use them to ferry aircraft to bases on US soil.

- As for the 10 days for the USN to come over and cause trouble, remember that Husky took a month, and the balance of forces (and land needed to be covered) for Husky was far, far more in favour of the Allies there than a Sealion ever was. It's a very different thing kicking off a blitzkrieg from a newly-formed beachhead than it is with large forces that have been preparing and supplying for months. The Germans would have the advantage of the UK having lost a lot of its heavy equipment, but keep in mind it's 1940, so you hardly need 6 or 17-pdr AT guns to take out the vast majority of the German tanks of the period.

- It's also going to take a few days to push enough of the RN out of the channel to make an invasion sensible, giving the US more time to get across.

- It's unlikely the RAF has been completely destroyed (they had substantial aircraft north of German fighter range whose airbases were never touched in the BoB - going from historical results to RAF armageddon is a pretty big hypothetical), in which case the airspace over the channel is still contested, although with the advantage to Germany.

- Given this, Crete isn't that strong an example - the losses to the RN were relatively limited and they only withdrew when they ran out of AA ammo, and took out a number of German aircraft in the process - and this is with a far, far weaker force than the RN or USN are likely to put into the Channel, and the RN/USN is likely to have at least some fighter cover (a good deal more than Crete), and the Luftwaffe six less months of learning to bomb ships.

I just think you'd struggle to knock over enough of the UK from an invasion quick enough to take the USN out of the picture entirely, even if you had far-better-than-historic results against the RN and RAF. I wouldn't say it's impossible, but very, very unlikely.

 

[keynes2.0]

What Germany is just going to wave a magic wand and gain the ability to launch Sealion overnight? With the help of alien space bats I suppose?

Saying that the US lacked enough time to send troops to England for Sealion is about as implausible as saying that Germany lacked the time to send troops to France for Overlord. If Germany was actually building up the equipment necessary for an invasion of England, it would be known years in advance like Overlord was.

 

[phantomrider]

We're getting there - it's an interesting discussion, and like all hypotheticals we're theorycrafting, so who knows what's actually right . Thoughts:

- You'd keep your CVs out of the channel - probably you'd keep them out of the conflict, and just use them to ferry aircraft to bases on US soil.

- As for the 10 days for the USN to come over and cause trouble, remember that Husky took a month, and the balance of forces (and land needed to be covered) for Husky was far, far more in favour of the Allies there than a Sealion ever was. It's a very different thing kicking off a blitzkrieg from a newly-formed beachhead than it is with large forces that have been preparing and supplying for months. The Germans would have the advantage of the UK having lost a lot of its heavy equipment, but keep in mind it's 1940, so you hardly need 6 or 17-pdr AT guns to take out the vast majority of the German tanks of the period.

- It's also going to take a few days to push enough of the RN out of the channel to make an invasion sensible, giving the US more time to get across.

- It's unlikely the RAF has been completely destroyed (they had substantial aircraft north of German fighter range whose airbases were never touched in the BoB - going from historical results to RAF armageddon is a pretty big hypothetical), in which case the airspace over the channel is still contested, although with the advantage to Germany.

- Given this, Crete isn't that strong an example - the losses to the RN were relatively limited and they only withdrew when they ran out of AA ammo, and took out a number of German aircraft in the process - and this is with a far, far weaker force than the RN or USN are likely to put into the Channel, and the RN/USN is likely to have at least some fighter cover (a good deal more than Crete), and the Luftwaffe six less months of learning to bomb ships.

I just think you'd struggle to knock over enough of the UK from an invasion quick enough to take the USN out of the picture entirely, even if you had far-better-than-historic results against the RN and RAF. I wouldn't say it's impossible, but very, very unlikely.

I agree mostly again. SeaLion would not have succeeded as long as the RAF had enough planes available to make crossing the channel very very dangerous for Germans in boats and could inflict significant losses on them (with the help of the RN) so no need for US intervention as long as the Brits "win" the battle for the channel with their available forces. The "need" for US intervention comes only if it looks like the Brits are going to lose. As you say this is a hypothetical discussion and those would be my assumptions but who really knows.

By the way as far as Crete goes in addition to the ships sunk (and yes the Brits did sometimes run out of ammo but when you are using combat ships to evacuate people you don't always carry full combat loads) you also need to look at the ships damaged and put out of action. Those included 2 BB and 1 CV and the CV and the BB had to go to Bremerton Washington USA to undergo a major overhaul that could not be done in either the Med or UK. They were both out of action for almost a year. (In addition, by a couple months later the Brits were wishing that the BB that was only out a couple of months had gone to Bremerton as well since it was sunk by a U-boat (HMS Barham I think).

 

[phantomrider]

What Germany is just going to wave a magic wand and gain the ability to launch Sealion overnight? With the help of alien space bats I suppose?

Saying that the US lacked enough time to send troops to England for Sealion is about as implausible as saying that Germany lacked the time to send troops to France for Overlord. If Germany was actually building up the equipment necessary for an invasion of England, it would be known years in advance like Overlord was.

From what i know about Sea Lion is that the Germans were preparing for it like it was a large river crossing with barges, small boats (not as small as the ones that the Brits used to evacuate their troops earlier in 1940) etc. Once ashore they would seize ports and resupply through them. It was to be only a couple of months of planning and the attack was against an "underequiped" defeated army and would have kicked off once the Luftwaffe had control of the air over the channel (which they never achieved). So if the US wanted to add a division or two to the defense of Britain in 1940 they needed to be sent in the summer of 1940 not once the Germans had landed in Britain.

As far as Overlord goes, the Germans had plenty of time to reinforce France before Overlord and the number and quality of German divisions in France increased significantly from 1942 to 1943 to 1944. The problem for the Germans is that they were running out of divisions and men because things weren't going so well for them in the Soviet Union, they had to keep armies in Italy that was slowly being lost as well, there were troops needed in Norway and the Balkans too. The Germans were massively overextended everywhere yet they really couldn't retreat and shorten lines anywhere for "political" and economic reasons. Its kind of why they lost the war.

 

[keynes2.0]

That wasn't preperations for Sealion, which is part of why it never went through. If you want to talk about Sealion, Germany need to make real preperations first. Not a bunch of rafts that cant make it across the channel and no escorts from them.

 

[phantomrider]

That wasn't preperations for Sealion, which is part of why it never went through. If you want to talk about Sealion, Germany need to make real preperations first. Not a bunch of rafts that cant make it across the channel and no escorts from them.

Maybe, maybe not but if the Germans couldn't make it across the channel in force there would be no need for US intervention and the outcome would be historical or maybe a little worse for the Germans and better for the Brits. That is sort of the point of this "alternate" history hypothetical scenario.

 

[Secret Master]

Saying that the US lacked enough time to send troops to England for Sealion is about as implausible as saying that Germany lacked the time to send troops to France for Overlord. If Germany was actually building up the equipment necessary for an invasion of England, it would be known years in advance like Overlord was.

Yes, and to prove that point...

That wasn't preperations for Sealion, which is part of why it never went through. If you want to talk about Sealion, Germany need to make real preperations first. Not a bunch of rafts that cant make it across the channel and no escorts from them.

Which the British knew about despite not even being enough. If they knew about those preparations, they would have plenty of foreknowledge about a bigger invasion with real equipment.

 

[KyrionMyrthar]

The August Pause and the decision to divert the panzers south to Kiev stalled the movement toward Moscow. That one act is as much responsible for the failure of Barbarossa as most of the other items already mentioned (I didn't wade through all nine pages to see if it was brought up).

The allure of trapping a sizable amount of the Soviet army in the Ukraine was too tempting. Had they instead continued on to Moscow, the capture of the single most vital rail hub in the Soviet Union would have hampered the Soviets greatly. Would they have collapsed? I don't know, I don't have a time machine, but capturing the rail links would have had a devastating affect on the Soviet ability to move troops quickly around, not to mention supplies.

 

[phantomrider]

The August Pause and the decision to divert the panzers south to Kiev stalled the movement toward Moscow. That one act is as much responsible for the failure of Barbarossa as most of the other items already mentioned (I didn't wade through all nine pages to see if it was brought up).

The allure of trapping a sizable amount of the Soviet army in the Ukraine was too tempting. Had they instead continued on to Moscow, the capture of the single most vital rail hub in the Soviet Union would have hampered the Soviets greatly. Would they have collapsed? I don't know, I don't have a time machine, but capturing the rail links would have had a devastating affect on the Soviet ability to move troops quickly around, not to mention supplies.

On the other hand 600,000 Soviet soldiers would not have been "bagged" and were there to fight another day. If this group was added to the winter 1941-2 counterattack that came close to running the german army off could the Soviets have bagged/destroyed even more of the German army in late 1941 early 1942 when (maybe) Hitler's stand and hold order is said to have saved the German army from total destuction.

 

[Overestimate]

On the other hand 600,000 Soviet soldiers would not have been "bagged" and were there to fight another day. If this group was added to the winter 1941-2 counterattack that came close to running the german army off could the Soviets have bagged/destroyed even more of the German army in late 1941 early 1942 when (maybe) Hitler's stand and hold order is said to have saved the German army from total destuction.

Not just counterattack in the winter, but pushing for Moscow and ignoring Kiev would have led to a massive flank exposure, which for troops already experiencing supply problems might have caused huge problems almost immediately.

 

[KyrionMyrthar]

However, that misses one key factor - those troops were battered and often without equipment and supplies. Take Moscow out (and obviously protect your right flank as you push on the city) and the efficacy of those troops in the future is in question.

It's all speculation, though.

 

[Secret Master]

The August Pause and the decision to divert the panzers south to Kiev stalled the movement toward Moscow. That one act is as much responsible for the failure of Barbarossa as most of the other items already mentioned (I didn't wade through all nine pages to see if it was brought up).

The allure of trapping a sizable amount of the Soviet army in the Ukraine was too tempting. Had they instead continued on to Moscow, the capture of the single most vital rail hub in the Soviet Union would have hampered the Soviets greatly. Would they have collapsed? I don't know, I don't have a time machine, but capturing the rail links would have had a devastating affect on the Soviet ability to move troops quickly around, not to mention supplies.

On the other hand 600,000 Soviet soldiers would not have been "bagged" and were there to fight another day. If this group was added to the winter 1941-2 counterattack that came close to running the german army off could the Soviets have bagged/destroyed even more of the German army in late 1941 early 1942 when (maybe) Hitler's stand and hold order is said to have saved the German army from total destuction.

These two posts highlight the problems facing German planners during Barbarossa.

So, you find out that the Red Army is twice as large (or even larger), than you thought it was. You are defeating them, but any troops you let escape will come back to haunt you when you already have a large disparity in numbers. What do you do? Take a strategic objective like the rail hubs in Moscow and let entire army corps live to fight another day? Delay the attack on Moscow rail hubs to wipe out another large portion of the Red Army, but let the Soviets continue to use those rail hubs to move assets around?

There really isn't a great answer to this dilemma, is there?

 

[Theodorian]

Immediately after the Battle of Smolensk, Army Group Center's 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups were within 150km of Moscow. They had come 500km in 18 days and Feodor von Bock said he was confident they could take Moscow before August.

Hitler however did not see Moscow as that important and ordered 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups to halt to regroup and resupply. They were eventually sent North to Leningrad and South to Stalingrad while infantry forces attempted to assail Moscow, which eventually failed.

Hitler, assuming the Soviets were true Bolsheviks and less than human, was under the presumption that simply taking the capital would not force the Soviets to surrender. I can't speak in a political sense, but my great grandfather fought at the Battle of Kursk in 1943 as an engineer and later served in the NKVD said that Moscow was and still is the shining light of the Russian people. It stood before the Soviet's took power and would stand long after they fell from it. A city named after the Premier (Stalingrad) meant little to him, and when he heard that panzers were closing on Moscow he nearly wept. In fact, most people in the Soviet Union couldn't find Stalingrad on a map, let alone care about it's significance. The Russians, like the French, Poles, Belgians and Dutch would have been easier to force to surrender if they knew the capital was lost.

 

[Secret Master]

Hitler, assuming the Soviets were true Bolsheviks and less than human, was under the presumption that simply taking the capital would not force the Soviets to surrender.

I would argue that the people in the Soviet Union were real human beings with the will to fight and the competence to do so effectively and not subhuman Bolshevik automatons, and I would still argue that losing Moscow is not going to cause the Soviet Union to wave the white flag.

 

[Gethsemani]

Immediately after the Battle of Smolensk, Army Group Center's 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups were within 150km of Moscow. They had come 500km in 18 days and Feodor von Bock said he was confident they could take Moscow before August.

500km in 18 days is part of the reason why they couldn't just push up some more and grab Moscow as an afterthought. When you advance that fast you outrun your supply lines, which was the reoccurring problem for the Wehrmacht during Barbarossa, and need to make frequent halts to let the supplies catch up so that you can resume your offensive. Men don't move without food and tanks don't move without fuel, just as guns don't fire without ammunition. That German officers, after the war, kept saying they could have is posturing to improve their own reputation and isn't necessarily grounded in what actually happened.

The truth is that the German troops that eventually reached the outskirts of Moscow were exhausted, depleted and short on supplies, simply put in no state to launch more offensive operations. What they faced, meanwhile, were fresh Soviet troops that were dug-in and had plenty of supplies to help them resist any attacks.

 

[KyrionMyrthar]

Losing Moscow alone likely wouldn't have done the trick, but this is one area I think HoI3 accurately portrays - get the key regions and an enforced peace may have been possible.

Of course, given Hitler's ways, he would have upgraded and rebuilt his armies, and would have likely gone after them again.

 

[KyrionMyrthar]

Let me toss out the names of John Erickson and David Glantz for some excellent reading on the Soviet side of things. Glantz is the modern expert on the Soviet efforts in the war.

Honestly, Hitler was doomed from the outset. That the Germans came so close in spite of him speaks volumes on the quality of the German army. I'm no fawning fanboy of the Wehrmacht, but I'm willing to admit that they were good - very good. The Soviets weren't good in 1941, or even in 1942 - in places, yes, but overall? No. They bought time with space and bodies until they could get on a more equal footing, and even then took ridiculously high casualties.

The German generals obviously never heard the phrase later ascribed (whether rightly or not) to Stalin, "Quantity has a quality all its own."

 

[Theodorian]

I would argue that the people in the Soviet Union were real human beings with the will to fight and the competence to do so effectively and not subhuman Bolshevik automatons, and I would still argue that losing Moscow is not going to cause the Soviet Union to wave the white flag.

There is simply no evidence to support this, except for Soviet propaganda. The Russians are as the other Westerners are and would not have deliberately fought on if defeated. The Russians were still very much antiquated in their thinking and for the most part adhered to the very Western notion of the pitched battle. While it's quite possible the Russians MAY have fought on, the general consensus, especially those that lived there is that if Moscow had fallen, so too would the fighting spirit of the people.

There exists two things required to continue fighting. An army, and a capital. Napoleon's capture of Moscow in 1812 was incomplete because Alexander I had saved most of his army after Borodino. With Barbarossa however the Soviets were largely beaten (though not destroyed), and a capture of Moscow would have almost assuredly led to the people's capitulation.

 

[Secret Master]

There exists two things required to continue fighting. An army, and a capital.

Well, yes, but Germany didn't even come close to destroying the Red Army in 1941. So, my statements still stand. Seizing Moscow would not be enough to force surrender. Especially if taking Moscow comes at the cost of not encircling and capturing 600,000+ troops (because the forces that did this went to Moscow instead of completing additional encirclements in the Ukraine as what was happening historically), as we were discussing earlier.

Keep in mind that the Soviet Union added hundreds of divisions to the OOB from August to January. The Red Army was hurt, but even if Germany wiped out 50% more troops AND took Moscow within six months (which I don't think anyone thinks is possible), the Red Army still is in the fight. Even in this absurd situation, Germany can't meet the requirements you just set out: take capital, wipe out army.

There are some other factors in play that we can't talk about, but with those other factors in play, surrendering after a hypothetical loss of Moscow makes even less sense if the Red Army still has even some fighting capability.

(Note: Once again, I'm not claiming that things are hunky dory for the Soviets, either. What victory looks like for the Soviet Union if they lose Moscow in 1941 is far different since they don't have those rail lines and hubs.)