Not really.
For most of history they were rivals. This was just historical continuity. Remember the Great Game? Crimea War? Cold war?
Why did Operation Barbarossa fail?
- Thread starter Magnus Imperator Rex
- Start date
-
We have updated our Community Code of Conduct. Please read through the new rules for the forum that are an integral part of Paradox Interactive’s User Agreement.
Not really.
For most of history they were rivals. This was just historical continuity. Remember the Great Game? Crimea War? Cold war?
who bought the train tickets to Lenin and company to travel to russia?? who give the money to bribe tsarist officers?
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8497.1984.tb00562.x/abstract
David M Glantz has a nice summary of the entire Soviet-German War. If people want a nice 1 hour summary (actually less) this is a good view:
- 5
Who supported the people who forced the tsar to abdicate? Why did UK prime minister say "One of the goals of war is achieved" when he heard of the tsar's abdication?
Most of the people here think Barbarossa failed because of German mistakes. STRANGE.
Could it be Soviet resistance?
Could it be Soviet resistance?
- 6
Of course that was the main reason but I think the point is to see what Germany could did better.
- 1
It's no different than arguing about whether Overlord could have been pushed back into the sea. Change the variables on the Axis side and see if you can come up with better than historical performance.
- 2
this is video is worth watching if you have not already. it filled in a lot of gaps for me. especially with all of those forgotten battles. a few of the red army offensives that are not common knowledge but responsible for huge casualties. it makes it add up to the total number of dead in the war.
it is clear that the soviets were willing to do what ever it took to win. if what he says is true about the soviets using old men and little boys like the Germans did. I also had no idea the soviets used more than 2 million women. the won the war in the east because they had the will to do what the other side wouldn't or more specifically wouldn't until it was too late.
to the original post. the operation failed because of logistics. someone posted in this thread the economics of the trains. and the inherent cost associated with them the farther the front got from Berlin. it just cost too much.
Second had Moscow been the first and only objective in 41 they could strained the soviet logistic situation by taking their main rail hub in Moscow. making the soviets work harder to resupply their own units.
German was short about 3 million manpower in the form of replacements that it needed to replace its losses. but that would not have mattered in the end. even if they sign a bitter peace deal. Russia rebuilds and attacks again with what they have left. in the meantime Germany bleeds dry fighting partisans.
the plan was doomed. regardless of it being a second front or not. i feel that they could have kept western Europe, and built a defense in depth on the Russian border with a lot of mobile forces in reserve. Germany probably would have needed to invade Romania to secure the oil, and trade with the USSR for the other needed items.
with out Germany bleeding themselves dry in the east. an amphibious landing in western Europe would be much harder for the allies. and as German tech becomes more of reality such as jet interceptors ripping the allied bombers to peaces en mass.
the blockade would never really go away. but trading with the soviets, and bringing massive coal to oil plants online lessons the sting.
- 2
The only thing off about the video to my knowledge was his comment about German Mobilisation. Though this is dead wrong, it is forgivable because:
1. He is a military, not and economic, historian and
2. Common knowledge hasn't caught up with the recent shift in understanding regarding the war economy and
3. He's an expert in the Soviet Union not Germany (excepting where the two intersect.)
1. He is a military, not and economic, historian and
2. Common knowledge hasn't caught up with the recent shift in understanding regarding the war economy and
3. He's an expert in the Soviet Union not Germany (excepting where the two intersect.)
Moscow was defended by ad-hoc armies raised on the spot, the idea that Siberian troops were transferred is a myth that has been proven to be incorrect. Between the invasion and Jan 1 1942 the USSR raised the equivalent of over 800 rifle divisions according to Glantz.
Poor weather. Poor weather shouldn't ever affect the time table of a war as serious as the one Germany was preparing to launch. If poor weather is something you have to take into consideration, maybe invasion should be reconsidered.
I love the use of death zone. It evokes the concept of Everest. This is something that most people really don't understand. Germany was in a death zone. It had taken such brutal losses in the invasion of the USSR that for all intents and purposes Germany was done by November 1941.
Much of German superiority in the first 6 months of the war was predicated on the professionalism and skill of its NCO's and enlisted men. These groups were essentially wiped out during the invasion. This superiority is being lost at a rate it cannot be replaced. Germany inflicted far greater casualties on the USSR in those 6 months, but it took the more important casualties. It took casualties it couldn't replace, the USSR did.
This brings the issue around to Moscow. People talking about taking Moscow being some sort of victory for Germany don't understand the logistical situation on the ground. They don't understand the cost inflicted on Germany in the constant counter attacks the Red Army was launching. They don't get that if Germany somehow does take Moscow, we have Stalingrad a year earlier with a much larger force trapped and defeated.
To address the question of the thread, Germany failed with Barbarossa, despite Barbarossa being a massive success in any context you can measure. They failed because the objectives of Barbarossa were unattainable. They represented the wrong solution to a problem. Barbarossa was an operation designed based on hopes and dreams. In its most simplistic form this is what Barbarossa was.
We will attack, beat them up, and they will collapse and surrender. Think about that for a moment. Now posit the question "What if they don't surrender?". Exactly. There was no plan to bring about surrender. There was no plan for Germany to force capitulation. In France occupy important parts of the country and Paris. That forces France to surrender. That doesn't work in the USSR, too decentralized, too big.
It's almost like everyone in OKW and with Hilter just stuck their head in the sand regarding any alternative outcomes and just assumed the outcome they most wanted was the only logical result.
- 6
- 1
Try to give points.
1) Military genius" Hitler was supreme commander of German Army. -1 for Germans
2) Soviet Military Genius Stalin introduced "dual-command" to already complicated Red Army command structrure, purged entire officer corps. -1 for Soviets.
3) Khalkhiin Gol 1939: It secured Soviet back door in 1941 and Zhukov began his meteoric rise. Japans look elsewhere for glory. +1 Soviets
4) Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: Soviet border moved 200 km farther from Moscow, a distance which proved the difference. +1 Soviets
5) Finnish Winter War: Red Army displayed its weakness. Change is started in Red Army at last. It gave the Hitler idea that Soviets would be easy picking. +1 Soviets
6) Blitzkrieg, professionalism, experience: No argument here. +2 Germans
7) Red army doctrine: Cavalry corps, dispersed tank formations, stalin line -1 Soviets
8) T-34: Increasing number of T-34 meduim, KV heavy tanks were superior to all current and projected German tanks. +1 soviets
9) Soviet ability to create new divisions: Germans couldn`t really afford to trade body to body. -1 for Germans
10) Nazi racist propoganda: "Theory of Leaderless Red army`s sub human slav soldiers" make Germans a) to underestimate soviet power, b) Gave russian populace good reason to fight Nazis. -1 Germans
11) Nazi racist propoganda: This theory ALSO played right into Stalin`s hand who throw away party and bring out the flag. This in turn made sure that "house will not collapse even with big crack". +1 Soviets
12) Soviet people: Soviet troops usually fight to death, while factories worked non stop. Soviet citizens literally live in shortages like nothing wrong. +1 Soviets
13) Industry movement: 1523 factories with its workers moved to Urals within 4 months. Almost 1.5 million rail cars involved. This astonishing relocation and reorganization of heavy industry enabled Soviets to produce more than Nazis. Also denied Germans much needed industry potential later in war. (people don`t really discuss this.) +0 Soviets because it has nothing to do with Barbarossa failure
14) Weather: It is either too hot, too muddy, too snowy or too cold for Germans. -1 Germans
15) Geography: Too large -1 Germans
16) Supply situation: Since we all discussed this -1 Germans
17) German intelligence: Why german tankers had to heat the engines two hours before the start, where are the lubricants? Couldn`t they build temporary structure to house vehicles? Why Russian road situation was shock to Germans? -1 for Germans
18) Soviet intelligence: Soviet intelligence did its job. But Stalin, like Nero before him literally fiddled instead of preparing for biggest defense in history. It cost Soviet Union dearly (forbidden topic). Stalin himself should have taken out and shot for imbecile. -1 Soviets
+2 Soviets and -5 for Germans in "Why Barbarossa failed".
1) Military genius" Hitler was supreme commander of German Army. -1 for Germans
2) Soviet Military Genius Stalin introduced "dual-command" to already complicated Red Army command structrure, purged entire officer corps. -1 for Soviets.
3) Khalkhiin Gol 1939: It secured Soviet back door in 1941 and Zhukov began his meteoric rise. Japans look elsewhere for glory. +1 Soviets
4) Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: Soviet border moved 200 km farther from Moscow, a distance which proved the difference. +1 Soviets
5) Finnish Winter War: Red Army displayed its weakness. Change is started in Red Army at last. It gave the Hitler idea that Soviets would be easy picking. +1 Soviets
6) Blitzkrieg, professionalism, experience: No argument here. +2 Germans
7) Red army doctrine: Cavalry corps, dispersed tank formations, stalin line -1 Soviets
8) T-34: Increasing number of T-34 meduim, KV heavy tanks were superior to all current and projected German tanks. +1 soviets
9) Soviet ability to create new divisions: Germans couldn`t really afford to trade body to body. -1 for Germans
10) Nazi racist propoganda: "Theory of Leaderless Red army`s sub human slav soldiers" make Germans a) to underestimate soviet power, b) Gave russian populace good reason to fight Nazis. -1 Germans
11) Nazi racist propoganda: This theory ALSO played right into Stalin`s hand who throw away party and bring out the flag. This in turn made sure that "house will not collapse even with big crack". +1 Soviets
12) Soviet people: Soviet troops usually fight to death, while factories worked non stop. Soviet citizens literally live in shortages like nothing wrong. +1 Soviets
13) Industry movement: 1523 factories with its workers moved to Urals within 4 months. Almost 1.5 million rail cars involved. This astonishing relocation and reorganization of heavy industry enabled Soviets to produce more than Nazis. Also denied Germans much needed industry potential later in war. (people don`t really discuss this.) +0 Soviets because it has nothing to do with Barbarossa failure
14) Weather: It is either too hot, too muddy, too snowy or too cold for Germans. -1 Germans
15) Geography: Too large -1 Germans
16) Supply situation: Since we all discussed this -1 Germans
17) German intelligence: Why german tankers had to heat the engines two hours before the start, where are the lubricants? Couldn`t they build temporary structure to house vehicles? Why Russian road situation was shock to Germans? -1 for Germans
18) Soviet intelligence: Soviet intelligence did its job. But Stalin, like Nero before him literally fiddled instead of preparing for biggest defense in history. It cost Soviet Union dearly (forbidden topic). Stalin himself should have taken out and shot for imbecile. -1 Soviets
+2 Soviets and -5 for Germans in "Why Barbarossa failed".
Last edited:
- 1
Winter is not the only problem with Russia. The Rasputitsa is a less known beast, but one that mauled the Germans all the same. Those two weeks would have been two weeks of mud, which means the German army would have done little with them.
You're free to consider living in a country residing on latitude where the weather conditions are volatile enough that after Spring snow starts to melt you may have areas that are perfectly fine and 100km further up North you have quagmire season with freezing temperatures still at night alongside frozen roads which thaw yet again during days. Or in more realistic scenario fairly clear weather down South and still witnessing frost and varying quality of gravel roads next to large melting piles of snow and mixture of mud. In area that is full of them with maybe one single modern highway that has to be branched.
Or putting up with a more modern example when a police patrol stops your car and reminds you you are well past the time you're supposed to change winter tires to summer tires and you just reply "I'm heading North." "OK, have a nice trip." and let you go despite technically breaking the law blatantly. In mid May.
Edit: Now let us assume how ridiculous and utterly incompetent it would look like to proceed the invasion as planned prior June, advance maybe solid 50-100km on steady front and then be abruptly put down to barely marching halt because it's just that plain awful and unpredictable.
Last edited:
Not sure what you're really saying here. Being able to move quickly and exploit the terrain optimally is very important and their whole operation was based on being able to exploit breakthroughs to encircle and destroy mass formations. Some of the earlier Fall Gelb delays were also attributed to weather and those were much less ambitious plans against a proportionally weaker foe. If they ran into heavy mud in the first two weeks of Barbarossa they would have been far less successful in what they accomplished, because reduced momentum on account of poor ground conditions would mean the Soviets would have more time to reorganise and respond, perhaps saving certain formations that aren't as close to the front.
A private conversation recorded secretly between Hitler and Mannerheim of Finland. You can almost feel the anxiety and the weight of the Eastern front on Hitler's voice. In the video, he explains some very valid points from a personal perspective, which surprisingly, has a lot of compatibility with the reality of the time.
- 1
A point that I don't think gets enough attention - although it has been alluded to by some posters:
According to Barbarossa, the Soviet armies needed to be destroyed within a couple of hundred kilometres of the border causing the Soviet union to collapse or a simple advance without significant resistance to the Volga line. This means that Barbarossa met its military objectives spectacularly. Its failure was that the military objectives were not sufficient to achieve the overall aims of the plan. The Soviets had plenty of reserve forces that couldn't be destroyed within 300km of the border because the were not within 300km of the border as well as a capacity and willingness to replace vast casualties and a very short period of time. The advance on Moscow was an attempt to rescue a victory from a plan that had already failed.
The reason that Barbarossa had the objectives it possessed was that the German general staff knew they could not support a fighting advance deep into Soviet territory so they came up with a plan that they knew they could achieve and just hoped that it would be enough to win the war. The Germans simply lacked the capacity to inflict enough damage on the Soviet Union to win the war. Thankfully the reverse was not true.
According to Barbarossa, the Soviet armies needed to be destroyed within a couple of hundred kilometres of the border causing the Soviet union to collapse or a simple advance without significant resistance to the Volga line. This means that Barbarossa met its military objectives spectacularly. Its failure was that the military objectives were not sufficient to achieve the overall aims of the plan. The Soviets had plenty of reserve forces that couldn't be destroyed within 300km of the border because the were not within 300km of the border as well as a capacity and willingness to replace vast casualties and a very short period of time. The advance on Moscow was an attempt to rescue a victory from a plan that had already failed.
The reason that Barbarossa had the objectives it possessed was that the German general staff knew they could not support a fighting advance deep into Soviet territory so they came up with a plan that they knew they could achieve and just hoped that it would be enough to win the war. The Germans simply lacked the capacity to inflict enough damage on the Soviet Union to win the war. Thankfully the reverse was not true.
- 1
- 1
The point is, if you are launching a massive land based invasion and the weather is absolute critical to your time table that you will fail if the weather doesn't cooperate, you should reconsider the decision to invade.
Not because you can't operate in the muck, but because you choose not to, because it isn't traditional, and it isn't civilized. The Soviets operated in the cold, in the mud, in the rain and the snow. They did it because they had to. They did it because contrary to German belief, it actually WAS possible.
That is what I am punching at. Germany had this concept of when to wage war. This had absolutely nothing to do with the USSR or eastern Europe. It had to do with something that was ingrained into their military culture. YOU DO NOT WAGE WAR IN THE WINTER.
This is why we have the Sitzkrieg. Germany was capable of attacking in the mild western European winter. They just didn't want to because it wasn't part of their military culture. This is why the Germans were so completely shocked when the Soviets began launching massive and ultimately successful winter campaigns. The Germans didn't even consider it a possibility. No civilized person could possibly function out doors in the winter. That is the thinking that pervaded the German officer corps at the start of WW2.
- 1
I am born and raised in Canada thank you very much. Grew up the son of a logger, spent more than a few summers, springs, falls and winters working with him in the Canadian mountains. I am well aware of what changing temperatures do. Guess what. It doesn't stop you from working. The only time you shut down is when you HAVE to shut down by government order so that the water sheds are not devastated by heavy machinery.
Yes, in the Spring and the Fall the work is far less efficient because of mud. Everything is slower. Everything is harder. However, something is better than nothing. Inefficient work still makes money.
Inefficient advancing still takes ground. The 50-100 KM that Germany could have taken, is according to some, all that was needed to take Moscow and win the war. If you're not willing to fight in the mud, maybe you should reconsider an invasion of a country that is muddy for 4 months, frozen for 4-5 months and dry for 2 or 3. Delaying your invasion to avoid the unavoidable does not compute.
- 1
I never meant to imply it stops working altogether but it clogs up potential movement so much it might as well not move at all. It runs to the inevitable issue that as long as there is no real resistance, even that one road is more than capable to move through regardless of traffic issues as long as they get through. Now add some form of organised resistance and at very least there are severe delays in a bottleneck. Now assuming poor advance that is grinded to a halt loss of surprise and potential avenues of advance limited, it gives the enemy time to breathe and organise resistance once more and the end result might be the war just got a lot shorter.
(After all, I recall reading general estimation that during a combat march average lenght of Panzer division from vanguard to rear elements can exceed 70km. Artillery etc that is not part of Panzer divisions are sitll restricted to roads and if that road is rendered incapable of supporting movement for say a week or two, I doubt they will drag them through forests and whatnot. Horses and mules are subject to weather as mechanical equipment is, and moving such large number of stuff by hand is like going back to Thirty Years' War in which it if army advanced more than 2-3km per day on average was already a miracle. Keeping in mind the whole, not just what individually small group can do or potentially advance in a day.)
Unless of course we assume early invasion meant rapid initial advance and success, then they run into issue of mud far late in Spring and meanwhile the Russians are not doing anything but await their inevitable defeat with bullseyes painted on them, which seems quite unlikely.
Edit: And yes, weather works both ways. But if one side loses iniative and is essentially stuck in poor ground conditions while the other party is free to possibly formulate a plan and get over the initial shock. The biggest German breakthrough in Barbarossa happened with Army Group North and Centre in area that is "unsuitable" for tanks in any prolonged engagement, all they had to do was to get through the weakened line and exploit the hole whereas down South where the terrain is ideal they ran into quite a lot of stubborn resistance and were unable to achieve anything comparable what happened near the Baltic coast. How much was the German goal affected when they diverted panzers from AGC down South because they got bogged down and back North when the situation looked better with little maintenance inbetween, when they could have pressed on and let the pocket dwindle around Kiev?
Feel free to also consider would the Russians have counterattacked and weakened their position with late rasputitsa in full effect in early invasion.
Last edited:
Ultimately, Germany had little choice but to either do "something", or lose the war. They needed the resources of the Soviet Union, they needed to remove the growing threat on that border while it was still weak, and there weren't a lot of other options. Whether it was "possible" or not is highly debatable, and even at the time with the information available it seemed like a long shot at best to many of the German officers, but it was still probably better than inevitable defeat.
The disastrous failure to assess the true military strength of the Soviet Union is hard to fathom, but then again, how would you collect all of that scattered information. The Soviet Union was heavily decentralized, which makes it difficult for an insider to control, but makes it even harder for an outsider to spy on and get reliable information on anything outside of the immediate vicinity. There are a LOT of vicinities, and a lot less spies. Ultimately, the Germans destroyed more of the Soviet army than they thought existed. It wasn't even close to being enough. The ability of Stalin to prevent panic and the dissolution of the state under the stresses of losing those early battles was enough to turn the "improbable" into the "impossible" for Germany.
The initial stages of the invasion were a huge tactical success and a significant strategic one for Germany, but were simply insufficient on a Grand Strategy level. The German army pulled off a miracle, but found that several more of such miracles were required. The Soviets replaced their losses and just kept fighting. Other nations' armies reinforced understrength divisions in the field; Germany waited until its divisions were reduced to combat ineffectiveness, then pulled them back as a unit to receive replacements and rest. Until they reached that pathetic state, the Germans typically pulled their skilled technical and support personnel off their normal assignments in those divisions and threw them onto the front lines in desperation, where they were chewed up almost as quickly as raw recruits would have been. You can train and replace riflemen in a matter of a couple of weeks or months, but training and replacing the technical support elements takes years. Germany never recovered. In essence, Germany's armed forces "ate" their own logistical tails. While it can work to provide a final push in a short war, it's a recipe for disaster in a long campaign.
Note that Republican Rome's famed Triarii were on the same order as a more modern army's support elements. They included the armorers, paymasters, surgeons, carpenters, architects, accountants, clerks, and various other essential support functionaries (often with decades of experience and expertise) that allowed the unit to carry on in a variety of conditions on extended campaigns. They were NOT the elite fighting elements as often pictured in wargames, but their sizable pensions which were forfeit if the Legion were to be defeated and disbanded made them close to fanatical as a last-ditch defense. This was what Germany lost in the winter of 1941-42, which effectively made most of those battered divisions "green" due to the sacrifice of those key personnel. At one point, an exasperated Hitler commented that "This is not the same army as conquered Poland and France", to which his general replied, "That army lies buried in shallow graves across the Soviet Union".
The disastrous failure to assess the true military strength of the Soviet Union is hard to fathom, but then again, how would you collect all of that scattered information. The Soviet Union was heavily decentralized, which makes it difficult for an insider to control, but makes it even harder for an outsider to spy on and get reliable information on anything outside of the immediate vicinity. There are a LOT of vicinities, and a lot less spies. Ultimately, the Germans destroyed more of the Soviet army than they thought existed. It wasn't even close to being enough. The ability of Stalin to prevent panic and the dissolution of the state under the stresses of losing those early battles was enough to turn the "improbable" into the "impossible" for Germany.
The initial stages of the invasion were a huge tactical success and a significant strategic one for Germany, but were simply insufficient on a Grand Strategy level. The German army pulled off a miracle, but found that several more of such miracles were required. The Soviets replaced their losses and just kept fighting. Other nations' armies reinforced understrength divisions in the field; Germany waited until its divisions were reduced to combat ineffectiveness, then pulled them back as a unit to receive replacements and rest. Until they reached that pathetic state, the Germans typically pulled their skilled technical and support personnel off their normal assignments in those divisions and threw them onto the front lines in desperation, where they were chewed up almost as quickly as raw recruits would have been. You can train and replace riflemen in a matter of a couple of weeks or months, but training and replacing the technical support elements takes years. Germany never recovered. In essence, Germany's armed forces "ate" their own logistical tails. While it can work to provide a final push in a short war, it's a recipe for disaster in a long campaign.
Note that Republican Rome's famed Triarii were on the same order as a more modern army's support elements. They included the armorers, paymasters, surgeons, carpenters, architects, accountants, clerks, and various other essential support functionaries (often with decades of experience and expertise) that allowed the unit to carry on in a variety of conditions on extended campaigns. They were NOT the elite fighting elements as often pictured in wargames, but their sizable pensions which were forfeit if the Legion were to be defeated and disbanded made them close to fanatical as a last-ditch defense. This was what Germany lost in the winter of 1941-42, which effectively made most of those battered divisions "green" due to the sacrifice of those key personnel. At one point, an exasperated Hitler commented that "This is not the same army as conquered Poland and France", to which his general replied, "That army lies buried in shallow graves across the Soviet Union".
- 2
- 1