Why did Operation Barbarossa fail?

[Mannstien]

It should never have been started, why not focus the Brits out of the Eastern Med/Middle East first (Minus the Megalomaniacal Maniac/ideology)? There was no reason for Barbarossa at least at the time it was executed and the resources that Germany so readily needed could have been gained quite quickly with the smashing of the British in N. Afrika and the Middle East along with the continued assistance of the Italians and with Germany on the borders of Russia from the northern Iraqi border plus eastern Europe, Turkey would have quickly (this is all conjecture I concede) fallen closer into an Axis dominated Europe and Franco would have most likely agreed to operation Felix though with Spanish as the main force and the Germans as back-up.

But many things must have happened prior to this also to ascend to this position (not necessarily but still would make a difference)

A. Army Group A pushes to Dunkirk prior to the BEF making it there (They could have as they were 30 miles closer before the panzers were stopped)
B. With A the Luftwaffe disables the British RAF (with our without cutting off the BEF from evacuation though the former would have been the preferred route)
C. If A and B are met or even if B is met then Stalin finds himself pretty much alone because it will either become another phony war with the British or possibly an armistice as Japan rises (minus a Pearl Harbor and even with let the Japanese fight their own battle instead of declaring war on a still (angry at Japanese sentiment in America and not Germany)

Another war would be inevitable either cold or hot but power corrupts and fools take victories in battle as an omen instead of a lesson. The greater fool is the one that doesn't learn the lesson taught be it victory or demise. There are just to many factors to make it a great discussion here but nonetheless it I hope will be able to be resolved with the awesome folks at Paradox.

 

[D Inqu]

It should never have been started, why not focus the Brits out of the Eastern Med/Middle East first (Minus the Megalomaniacal Maniac/ideology)?

Because it was both impossible and meaningless. Germany could could not supply significant troops across the Med, but even if they could, capturing more desert with no industry or discovered resources does absolutely nothing to weaken Britain.

There was no reason for Barbarossa at least at the time it was executed and the resources that Germany so readily needed could have been gained quite quickly with the smashing of the British in N. Afrika and the Middle East along with the continued assistance of the Italians and with Germany on the borders of Russia from the northern Iraqi border plus eastern Europe, Turkey would have quickly

No resources could be gained form any N. Africa campaign. North Iraq does not border the Soviets (that's before even considering the supply situation)

fallen closer into an Axis dominated Europe and Franco would have most likely agreed to operation Felix though with Spanish as the main force and the Germans as back-up.

Spain joining the Axis would actually be bad for both Spain and Germany. Bad for Spain, as their weak forces had no chance of holding the large coastline they had. It was bad for Germany, as they would lose a trade route by which circumvented the embargo.

A. Army Group A pushes to Dunkirk prior to the BEF making it there (They could have as they were 30 miles closer before the panzers were stopped)

Old myth. Some pause was required for the overstretched divisions. Plus the much bigger delay was was at Lille, where the Germans were held up for several days doe to stubborn resistance by the outnumbered defenders.

B. With A the Luftwaffe disables the British RAF (with our without cutting off the BEF from evacuation though the former would have been the preferred route)

The Luftwaffe never even came close to "disabling" the RAF. The factories kept producing aircraft at rates matching or exceeding losses for most of the BoB.

 

[Mannstien]

Because it was both impossible and meaningless. Germany could could not supply significant troops across the Med, but even if they could, capturing more desert with no industry or discovered resources does absolutely nothing to weaken Britain.

Show me where Italy could not in the beginning supply them from a Historian.

No resources could be gained form any N. Africa campaign. North Iraq does not border the Soviets (that's before even considering the supply situation)

Resources aside, sending the Brit fleet supply or battle wise around the Horn is not a crippling point no?

Spain joining the Axis would actually be bad for both Spain and Germany. Bad for Spain, as their weak forces had no chance of holding the large coastline they had. It was bad for Germany, as they would lose a trade route by which circumvented the embargo.

With Spain's geographical make up tell me how this could be avoided with Italian warships closing off the Med? It's not the coastline, you forget I said without the assistance of the US there is not enough Commonwealth to do anything against Spain no?

Old myth. Some pause was required for the overstretched divisions. Plus the much bigger delay was was at Lille, where the Germans were held up for several days doe to stubborn resistance by the outnumbered defenders.

Again, show me somewhere that says the BEF could have made it to Dunkirk before the Panzer divisions with no equipment or any French counter that was close enough to stop it? The forts the french held were not about to break out nor if they could present a challenge to the tank corps. Yes they were stretched but how stretched were they compared to an almost encircled BEF and the the stubborn resistance came because they stopped, not before.

The Luftwaffe never even came close to "disabling" the RAF. The factories kept producing aircraft at rates matching or exceeding losses for most of the BoB.

They were not, so that is counter to all books I've read apparently they had enough pilots to continue the fight from the Poles and Free French?

I have no fight in this, history is conjecture, battles were won and lost we know that but to say any absolute is not possible even if you take out the political situation. I have the utmost respect and thankfulness for the British because they helped my get my grandfather to the lands of France and Belgium safely but please tell me how would it have played out. Subtracting the resources what does the UK do without the Suez to supply Iraq, Syria, and the rest of N. Afrika without leaving India and SE Asia completely undefended? The RN was awesome and had the best commanders of any fleet at sea but the stretch of the goal was not possible without some changes in direction.

Here's my reaction to all those I listed above happening AKA the worst of the worst for Britain.

A. Recall all fleets and personnel from Asia (Political fallout be damned no one on the homeland will care if they are under sever threat) and make a stronger case for the US to join the cause or at least extend additional support from the US. Focus on the Med. and N. Afrika first to kill any chance of a Desert Afrika force + close all shipping to and from Italy to N. Afrika.

B. The BEF is lost, with North Afrika Secure put what is needed to protect the Raj from Japan but only enough until things settle a bit, then focus on a push up through India back to the Middle East while you can still starve the Italian East Afrika colonies with a blockade (Suez does not mean a trump card) and blockade Spanish ports or sublte threaten too if they go full partner with Germany.. (I'm assuming still a neutral or semi-neutral French fleet).

C. When and if the Japanese attack work towards a political solution with India to allow a commonwealth state at least securing their manpower then send the best you have their to arm, equip, and train them to fight for their state.UK instead of spreading itself thin becomes the bulwark of a European resurgence with the aid of it's former colonies (I'm leaving out the rest because this would become a WOT which it already is).

 

[v.Falkenhayn]

Well, this is a rather controversial thread.
Before I start, we are not talking here why Germany lost the war, but only about faults of Barbarossa plan in itself. Nothing else.

1. Barbarossa as it was imagined never had a chance at completing its objectives. German offensive was to proceed along three main DIVERGING routes with forces divided roughly equally among them with Army Group Centre being stronger having 2 panzer groups (Germany had only 3200 to begin with). From strategic art point of view that was totally unacceptable.

2. All three objectives were given equal priority, that caused confusion and dispersion of forces once invasion commenced and other opportunities presented themselves. They had hard time making up their mind what to do once operation was launched.

3. Germans didn't bother to conduct proper intelligence gathering about soviet army, infrastructure and even climate. Had they bothered, they'd know russians had about 20000 tanks in European USSR (among them heavy tanks and latest T-34/KV-1/2 that germans could not even penetrate), roughly around 58 tank divisions (only those in wesern USSR), 16 Airborne brigades, 11 Cavalry divisions (and yes, they did have tanks as well), 52000 artillery pieces (only those, located in western USSR in 1941), roughly 10000 aircraft (only those in western USSR). There were over all around 250 Red Army division on/near or marching towards the border with Germany.
All that nonsense that germans got defeated by bad roads and weather are rubbish. Had they sent a single spy to check those before warring Russia, they would have known Russia was a big country with mud tracks at best and nasty winters, that started in October...(Even had they reached their objectives in 3-4-5 months, they'd then freeze anyways )
But nobody bothered to order appropriate vehicles and winter uniforms.
F.Paulus should have been shot (and would have been in any normal country) for making such a disaster of a plan and having no intelligence input used in it.

4. At the start of hostilities Germans didn't have enough fuel to even reach objectives they were going for. I.e., they wanted to drive through Texas without having a full tank (a very big full tank) of gas with them. Look at Herr Halder's diary and what he had to say about fuel situation in Wehrmacht not even half way to the Urals

5. They failed to notice that Red Army was actually standing in 2 main echelons with 2nd being around Dnieper river line. They were rather surprised to run into a whole new army once they finished with those armies units near the border. (While Germans were fighting border action, uncle Stalin's mobilisation machine managed to reinforce and resupply 2nd echelon into a new Red Army.)

6. Barbarossa didn't take into account transport system of the Soviet Union. Russian rail gage is different from that of the European countries (1520mm vs 1435mm in Europe) Germans had not had enough locomotives and rail cars to support their logistics. What were they thinking, I wonder. I guess, IQ tests were not standard in German General Staff at that time. They couldn't even use well developed russian railroad network to support their advance. (And yes, it was well developed and taken good care of, before some amateurs from Reich got their hands on it.)
If one takes a look at the rail way map of the USSR, it is obvious that almost all major railways come to Moscow (they come through the city). Moscow is the MAIN rail road hub in European Russia. There were no roads worth mentioning in USSR at the time (just as now, once you leave Moscow-Leningrad highway). Rail roads were the main transport means. Moscow HAD to be taken to deny Red Army use of its logistics and split their armies and industry supply. Soviet rail roads worked exceptionally well and were governed as a military establishment.

7. German high command didn't bother to stockpile and supply parts for german vehicles/weapons, even there were relatively few of them with absolute majority of infantry units marching and having their artillery pieces towed by horses (I bet they loved those mud tracks in October/November and all those poor animals with broken legs they had to shoot). They started experiencing problems with spare parts and engines for their tiny mobiles forces around late august - early September.

8. The sad fact is that most senior German officers at the strategic level were not qualified for the job and all they could manage was a disaster of a plan and they didn't even bother to make proper preparations for it. It is unheard of to let a relatively junior officer plan the biggest invasion in human history and not even keep him accountable (i.e. check his work in progress and. perhaps, correct some issues). There was not a strong leader at the top of military leadership to point out the faults and try to argue correction with Hitler.
German generals didn't have balls to stand up to Hitler (and try to correct the campaign plan) and then said Hitler was amateur and fool and it was all his fault, while they, generals, were brilliant sons of the Vaterland.

 

[v.Falkenhayn]

because nobody bothered to take a look at the map?

How many times I said the same in many games

 

[Mannstien]

It's all hypothetical, I'm glad they didn't listen any of my advice nor most likely would King Schmuck. We live as a testament and I'd stick my neck next to any European as my Grandfather did to see that it doesn't again for humanities sake, countries and empires are a human fault, but a good fight is a good fight nonetheless, I just wish it was as simple as it seemed today.../tipshat

 

[D Inqu]

They were not, so that is counter to all books I've read apparently they had enough pilots to continue the fight from the Poles and Free French?

It's not counter to anything. It's fairly common knowledge. No air production factory as significantly damaged, nor were pilot training facilities. Even wikipedia is now up to date:

Retired air marshal Peter Dye, head of the RAF Museum, discussed the logistics of the battle in 2000[161] and 2010,[162] dealing specifically with the single-seat fighters. Dye contends that not only was British aircraft production replacing aircraft, but replacement pilots were keeping pace with losses. The number of pilots in RAF Fighter Command increased during July, August and September. The figures indicate the number of pilots available never decreased. From July, 1,200 were available. In 1 August, 1,400 were available. Just over that number were in the field by September. In October the figure was nearly 1,600. By 1 November 1,800 were available. Throughout the battle, the RAF had more fighter pilots available than the Luftwaffe.[161][162] Although the RAF's reserves of single seat fighters fell during July, the wastage was made up for by an efficient Civilian Repair Organisation (CRO), which by December had repaired and put back into service some 4,955 aircraft,[163] and by aircraft held at Air Servicing Unit (ASU) airfields.[164]

Richard Overy agrees with Dye and Bungay. Overy asserts only one airfield was temporarily put out of action and "only" 103 pilots were lost. British fighter production produced 496 new aircraft in July and 467 in August, and another 467 in September (not counting repaired aircraft), covering the losses of August and September. Overy indicates the number of serviceable and total strength returns reveal an increase in fighters from 3 August to 7 September, 1,061 on strength and 708 serviceable to 1,161 on strength and 746 serviceable.[165] Moreover, Overy points out that the number of RAF fighter pilots grew by one-third between June and August 1940. Personnel records show a constant supply of around 1,400 pilots in the crucial weeks of the battle. In the second half of September it reached 1,500. The shortfall of pilots was never above 10%. The Germans never had more than between 1,100 and 1,200 pilots, a deficiency of up to one-third. "If Fighter Command were 'the few', the German fighter pilots were fewer".

As great as the help from polish pilots was, it was symbolic, rather than decisive. Some older poorly researched books tried to portray the situation in Britain as a dangerous struggle, which it never was, for dramatic purposes.

Subtracting the resources what does the UK do without the Suez to supply Iraq, Syria, and the rest of N. Afrika without leaving India and SE Asia completely undefended? The RN was awesome and had the best commanders of any fleet at sea but the stretch of the goal was not possible without some changes in direction.

There is virtually no resources in the N Africa, Iraq, Syria to "subtract". Oil exploitation in the region began much later.

UK would carry on just fine. On the other hands, for Germany, having troops in the poor infrastructure in the region would be a complete disaster. El-alamein failed because the German supply capabilities could simply not support the requirements of the forces in N. Africa. 1000+km truck journeys just to supply the troops, meant that each Panzer division in africa was eating more fuel that a Panzer Corps in Europe.

The thought of having any German forces in Syria or Iraq was just a pipe dream.

A. Recall all fleets and personnel from Asia (Political fallout be damned no one on the homeland will care if they are under sever threat) and make a stronger case for the US to join the cause or at least extend additional support from the US. Focus on the Med. and N. Afrika first to kill any chance of a Desert Afrika force + close all shipping to and from Italy to N. Afrika.

No reason to do either. Germany lost 1/3 of their surface fleet just invading Norway, and they scared witless about the RN. The Home Fleet outnumbered and outclassed everything the Germans had.

 

[TheDecider]

According to this documentary ( yeah perhaps not the greatest source of proof, please deny the following ) I got this gist from: No Swastikas - Mr. C
-The generals were not listened to and just overriden by "the leader" frequently, often changing plans and objectives.
-Inadequate winter training and equipment halted the attack on Moscow. What if the war had started 1 month earlier?
-No immediate threat from invasion in the east by Japan allowed Stalin to move 30 divisions to the west.
-Obsession with taking Stalingrad, which apparently had no immediate strategic importance (except perhaps morale on Stalin)
---Stalin was given 2 extra weeks to prepare the defences of Stalingrad because panzers from army group B in the South Army was rerouted south to assist AG A in the mountains.
----Because AG B now had advanced so much slower towards Stalingrad, a larger pincher movement which could've cut of russian troops in south was aborted when the panzers were rerouted back north. (keeps changing plans)
---When the Army attacking Stalingrad was surrounded they could've broken out, but was ordered from "the leader" to stay and fight to death, that they were going to be air supplied instead. They needed 600 tonnes a day but never received more than 8 - the weather was too bad and red airforce commanded the skies.
-... and so the momentum was lost and Stalin had time to prepare for an offensive along the whole front.

If Moscow could've been taken swiftly and extensive use of the railroad happened.... who knows? Question is if USSR would've surrendered if Stalingrad, Leningrad and Moscow would've fallen like in HoI3 - or kept on fighting until the last bear in Siberia was dead.

But as a player in HoI4, you can perhaps stray less from the important strategic objectives

 

[Opanashc]

According to this documentary ( yeah perhaps not the greatest source of proof, please deny the following ) I got this gist from:

If only everything went perfect from the German point of view - this is what I gather.

 

[D Inqu]

The generals were not listened to and just overriden by "the leader" frequently, often changing plans and objectives.

Nothing to do with the first months of Barbarossa. Not to mention, "generals" were different, and their ideas were not necessaritly good.

-Inadequate winter training and equipment halted the attack on Moscow. What if the war had started 1 month earlier?

Myth. Germans had winter equipment. The collapse of the supply network (which was entirely predictable) was the reason most of that equipment never made it to the front. Which brings us to the other point. If the war started 1 month earlier, the Germans would have spent that month slogging through the spring mud.

-No immediate threat from invasion in the east by Japan allowed Stalin to move 30 divisions to the west.

The Soviets kept over 1 million men in the Far East throughout the war, easily matching the Japanese forces in Manchuria, in terrain that heavily favoured the defender. Plus Japan had their hands full trying to make any progress in China.

-Obsession with taking Stalingrad, which apparently had no immediate strategic importance (except perhaps morale on Stalin)

Stalingrad a huge strategic importance within Fall Blau (which by itself was insanely overambitious). Fall Blau called for a increasing front line, which was only remotely plausible by building a defence line on the Don and Volga (large rivers making good defensive positions). The 2 rivers extend towards each other, and at the narrowest points sits Stalingrad. Add in the fact that this was a major supply hub, and you can see it had real strategic importance.

---Stalin was given 2 extra weeks to prepare the defences of Stalingrad because panzers from army group B in the South Army was rerouted south to assist AG A in the mountains.
----Because AG B now had advanced so much slower towards Stalingrad, a larger pincher movement which could've cut of russian troops in south was aborted when the panzers were rerouted back north. (keeps changing plans)

Nope. the 4th Army never went anywhere to the mountains. The encirclement failed due to soviet counterattacks on the 6th Army, preventing them from completing the encirlcment.

---When the Army attacking Stalingrad was surrounded they could've broken out

The Soviets hoped the Germans would break out. A force abandoning all vehicles and heavy equipment, low on critical supplies to dash across the open plains in winter across over 100km. What a massacre that could have been.

 

[TheDecider]

If only everything went perfect from the German point of view - this is what I gather.

It might very well have failed anyways, I wouldn't call resolving those failures as "everything going perfect".

 

[Secret Master]

Pay attention to links you post to sources and documentaries.

If I see any more swastikas, I'll have to kill the thread.

 

[TheDecider]

...

If what you're saying is true, then it looks like that documentary was bad indeed But pretty colours instead of just black and white at least.

Off-topic:
By the way, does the process of "colorization" cause that swaying "drunken" camera effect or is that damage from the original reel?

 

[Chepicoro]

With hindsight everything its easier, true Barbarossa was flawed but at the same time inflicted massive losses on the USSR... if you are going to invade the USSR something similar to Barbarossa is a good idea.

First, the decision to invade the USSR was logical, after the defeat of France, but the impossibility to cross the channel to force Britain to surrender, Germany tried to form a coalition of powers with interest in parts of the British Empire, these probable allies were Spain, France, Turkey, Japan and the USSR at this point the Reich policy was antibritish, Ribbentrop worked hard in this direction, and people like Goring or Doenitz shared the view that Germany should deal with Great Britain first.

This started to change late in June 1940 with the soviet ultimatum to Romania, with the occupation of Bessarabia (included in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact) and northern Bokovina not included in the pact, a former austrian territory, in theory belonging to the german sphere of influence. this soviet movement placed the red army to close to ploesti oil fields, vital for the german economy. Furthermore the soviet government claim more romanian territory southern Bokovina. after the second viena award in august 1940, Germany give a guarantee over the remaining romanian territory.

In July 1940 Hitler reverts the order to demobilize infantry divisions to release manpower to the industry in order to wage war against Britain, order the increase of the army, and the first plan to invade the USSR called "Plan Fritz is completed. But this is still only a possibility.

The other source of friction between both dictatorships was Finland, the USSR consider Finland a "threat" even to the point to go to war again if necessary probably to annex this country originally in the soviet sphere of influence in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. During november 1940 Germany proposed to the USSR to become a full member of the axis and joining the war against Britain, the soviet role would be to attack middle east, Molotov agreed but put 4 conditions

- The USSR want bases in Bulgaria... they annexed the baltic states after the deployment of similar bases.
- The USSR want bases in turkish territory in the straits and the cooperation of Italy and Germany if this country refused.
- They want free hand on Finland
- They want the german government if the guarantee of romanian territory was directed against the USSR.

These conditions were unacceptable to Germany, and they never replied to the last soviet offer.

In december 1940, Hitler decide to put a date for the invasion 15 May. Through February and March 1941, the germans started to fly reconnaissance flights over the border and discover the red army deployment, these become a concern to the general staff, because the possibility of a soviet attack, especially against the romanian oil fields. The italian blunder in Greece change the date for June 22.

The argument of the heavy rains making impossible Barbarossa to start in may 15 is partially true... I find unlikely that heavy rains made impossible any action for 5 weeks from the Baltic sea to the black sea, after all, later during the war a pause in operations like that never existed.

If the ultimate objective of Hitler was to achieve autarky, then Germany needed Ukraine and the Caucasus, this objective in 1941 was easier than a naval invasion of England or the seizure of Middle east, from the german point of view they have good reasons to distrust the USSR "there are no honor among thieves". England could not be an existential threat to Germany, but the USSR was different, and definitely his policy towards Romania was expansionist.

If you are interested

http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/Germany/Hitler-Molotov Meetings.htm#SOVIET REPLY

 

[Secret Master]

If the ultimate objective of Hitler was to achieve autarky, then Germany needed Ukraine and the Caucasus, this objective in 1941 was easier than a naval invasion of England or the seizure of Middle east, from the german point of view they have good reasons to distrust the USSR "there are no honor among thieves".

Except that the resource areas of the Soviet Union could not give Germany autarky. The plan was flawed in its conception and there were ministers that even told him this before the war.

(Another problem is whether or not autarky was even a worthwhile goal to strive for.)

 

[Chepicoro]

About why Barbarossa failed...

- Lack of coordination between the army and the Foreign office.
Italy invaded Greece without warning Germany, but some sort of common strategy surely would be better than no strategy at all. A delay of 5 weeks in the invasion (probably less because the rains) was important, the resources spent in the Balkans were not insignificant one panzer division out of combat, a lot of casualties among parachutist and transport airplanes.

Until june 22 the foreign office tried to push Japan to wage war against Britain, at the same time OKW/OKH coordinated the efforts not only of the german forces but Finland, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary but they not consider a japanese attack in the far east necessary.

The argument "there is nothing of importance in the far east for the USSR" is not true. Northern sakhalin had important quantities of oil (at least form the point of view of Japan) and at least 50% of the Lend and Least arrived through Vladivostok in the Pacific. Despite the soviets keeping the number of their far east forces, they transferred some divisions to the counteroffensive in front of Moscow in December 1941, and exaggerated or not, certainly siberian forces had a role in the winter offensives.

In any case any help would be useful for the germans.

- Incapacity to be pragmatic for ideological reasons this includes.

Misuse of human resourcesThose millions of POW´s could be working in polish farms, changing the gauge of rails or in generally being useful to the war effort instead of starving in the open. Even if they are worked to death this is still more useful than what they did.

Oppress instead of "Liberate" Ukraine, but also all those minorities oppressed by the stalinist regime

Unwillingness to create and support any opposition to communism or Stalin inside the USSR as soon as june 22, when the germans were very successful creating an opposition inside Russia in WW1.

- changing industrial priorities in september to the navy and air force instead of ground forces.

- Bad use of the replacement army and reserve material, was possible to keep most of the infantry and panzer divisions at full strength or close to this in december 1941.

Even in the case of Barbarossa with no mistakes probably the USSR will choose to keep fighting even without Moscow and will be necessary a second campaign in 1942.

 

[Chepicoro]

Except that the resource areas of the Soviet Union could not give Germany autarky. The plan was flawed in its conception and there were ministers that even told him this before the war.

(Another problem is whether or not autarky was even a worthwhile goal to strive for.)

In a free trade world autarky is a bad idea, but the world in 1939 was not free trade oriented, the same ideas existed in all powers perhaps with the exception of US because was the most advanced country and everyone else had disadvantages compared with the american industry.

Now probably if germany is able to conquer Ukraine and the Caucasus, still will be an importer of sugar, rice and rubber, but with no doubts will improve its situation compared with Germany in 1933 or even in 1913.

 

[Opanashc]

Unwillingness to create and support any opposition to communism or Stalin inside the USSR as soon as june 22, when the germans were very successful creating an opposition inside Russia in WW1.

It wasn't Germany, who created the opposition to the government in Russia in WW1. It was UK and France. Surprising, isn't it?

 

[Magnus Imperator Rex]

Tying Op. Barbarossa to HOI3, did most of you have a lot of success in the invasion of the USSR?

I usually beat the USSR and completed the Drag Nach Osten wargoal in about 6 months, more or less. Last time I pulled it off was ridiculous.

I was playing as GER on Very Hard and I had annexed the Baltic, which got Moscow closer to my lines. I then placed huge amounts of armored division in both flanks, in the Baltic and Romania. I then declared war and sent the panzers forward in a very deep rush to the interior. The plan was to perform a grand pincer movement focused on the entire western USSR front armies and it had to link up to close the encirclement a few provinces behind moscow.

To say the least, it was very impressive and it absolutely worked and meant the entire collapse of the surrounded Red Army in a few months. I felt this was so out of reality and was not too accurate because I doubt the Soviets would not have retreated IRL if this happened. Just saying, the AI sucks sometimes.

 

[Axe99]

Sure, if Germany is not under a blockade, so she can import 100% of her resource needs. That way, there is no immediate economic imperative on securing things like the Ukraine agricultural areas or the Caucus oil fields.

My assumption is that even if you retreated to defensible positions and tried it again (ignoring the economics for a second), that it would not keep working. You could pull off destroying that many divisions once, and that's it. You'd never get that kind of result a second time. (You might get good results doing other things, but not ever to the same level as the first months of Barbarossa.)

I'm (perhaps cluelessly) with Director on this. Not that it would be certain thing, but could Germany have done better if she'd planned a two (or three)-stage invasion, with thrusts in '41, '42 and '43. Germany did achieve large encirclements and destroying large numbers of divisions up to Kursk (Manstein's 'miracle' after Stalingrad, for example). After Kursk, I'm pretty sure the game was up, but if the USSR is allowed to get to where it was in mid-'43 then it's all over whatever happens.

Going back to '41 though - historically the Germans push in hard, hit the outskirts of Leningrad, Moscow and almost get to Rostov-na-Don (so have taken a substantial amount of the Ukraine already). but over-stretch, particularly in the centre, and get a bit of a beating in the counter offensive. What if the Germans decide to stop at Smolensk but surround and push on Leningrad, and then position to respond to a counter-attack. It's unlikely they'd cop near as much a beating as they did, would still have taken about as much of the economic areas as they did historically, and be in a far better position to push in '42. There's also a fairly decent chance the Soviet counter-attack could be mauled and then 1942 would start with the Germans stronger and the Soviets weaker than they were historically.

In '42, again set more realistic aims, and focus them on the economics of it. In the North, use the position in Leningrad to cut off lend-lease through Murmansk and Archangelsk, and push hard on the rest of the Ukraine and the Caucasus. Play a holding pattern in the centre, as was the case historically. All being well, there are more troops available in the north and south (due to less losses from the winter offensive), and 'pausing' earlier will mean more time to build up the supply lines and bring supplies forward for the offensive.

It's not a sure thing - I can't imagine any invasion of the USSR that would be - but I'd say it'd have a better chance of success. Cut off lend-lease through Persia and the Arctic Circle, and cut off the resources of the Donbas and Caucasus, and all those Soviet factories have a lot less to work with. Convince Japan to cut off lend-lease through Vladivostok and it might even make the war of attrition more feasible (although I'd imagine then that you might see some kind of lend-lease through northern India and Afghanistan, although there would be huge bottlenecks along that route, at least early on), particularly as the USSR would likely no longer have an edge in population or industry by this stage.

Germany still needs to be on top by the end of '42 - and even if they are, 1943 will still be hard, with the potential for a good Soviet offensive to upset the applecart, but if they could get this far, then there's a chance to go all the way in terms of taking everything to the Urals. After that, as you say, it's all a slow, guerilla war slog for 20 years or something silly like that, but if the remnants of the USSR are cut off, then it's probably Germany's to win if they're happy to do the bleeding necessary.