Why did Operation Barbarossa fail?

[Opanashc]

Surprisingly enough I have. Moving a car around is easily done with three people, even over longer distances. onestly, do you have any idea what you are talking about? Considering your "statement" about the ammunition it is plainstakingly obvious that you might have not the slightest idea...

Have you been moving a car on asphalt/concrete? Or in a farmer's field?

 

[Opanashc]

Could the Germans have likewise concentrated on destroying Soviet formations and pulled back to a defensible line for the winter? In other words - could they have usefully applied von Manstein's 'backhand blow' in 1941-42 and, by compelling the Soviets to attack, wrecked the Soviet army enough to allow a grand offensive in 1942?
Or was it a case of 'all-in, win or lose'?

Without German occupation of Ukraine and so on, SU has access to a lot more manpower, resources, does not get its industry so severely disrupted, has the option of choosing a time and place to strike, making it much easier for Moscow to conduct the war.

 

[Director]

Agreed. But going forward in a headlong offensive across an ever-expanding front didn't work well - Germany ran out of manpower and formations among other problems.
Would the war have been more manageable on a smaller front? Or was it a case of all-out offensive until victory or death?

 

[MGL 86]

Agreed. But going forward in a headlong offensive across an ever-expanding front didn't work well - Germany ran out of manpower and formations among other problems.
Would the war have been more manageable on a smaller front? Or was it a case of all-out offensive until victory or death?

It is basically attrition war which Germans wanted to avoid. Front line around Moscow is harder to supply than Kiev-Minsk front line. But in return it would give Soviets more manpower, industry, resources etc.

 

[Kovax]

Agreed. But going forward in a headlong offensive across an ever-expanding front didn't work well - Germany ran out of manpower and formations among other problems.
Would the war have been more manageable on a smaller front? Or was it a case of all-out offensive until victory or death?

Of course, tt was only a matter of giving it a good kick, and the whole house of cards would crumble, Hitler promised it. The German army managed to destroy more Soviet divisions than they thought the Soviets had, and it still wasn't nearly enough. Once they got into it, the only choices were to stop and give the Soviets more time to bring all of that massive industry and manpower into play, or else keep going and hope the Soviets broke first. It didn't work.

 

[keynes2.0]

Why do you think Operation Barbarossa failed? Was it the winter? The advantage of size for the USSR? Was the operation too ambitious to start with?

I think unrealistically high goals. The military operations were about as effective as they could possibly be hoped to be. That they would be that effective and still the operation was a failure shows that the goals were unrealistically high in the first place.

 

[Secret Master]

As I remember, Napoleon's original strategy was to crush the Russian armies close enough to the border to avoid a protracted campaign in the interior. And that worked well...

Could the Germans have likewise concentrated on destroying Soviet formations and pulled back to a defensible line for the winter? In other words - could they have usefully applied von Manstein's 'backhand blow' in 1941-42 and, by compelling the Soviets to attack, wrecked the Soviet army enough to allow a grand offensive in 1942?

Or was it a case of 'all-in, win or lose'?

Sure, if Germany is not under a blockade, so she can import 100% of her resource needs. That way, there is no immediate economic imperative on securing things like the Ukraine agricultural areas or the Caucus oil fields.

Of course, Germany's resource problems were not and could not be solved by seizing those areas (and others), but I wonder what things look like for the General Staff and key leaders if Germany isn't in a resource deficit situation that needs rectifying sooner rather than later. I also wonder what a narrower front coupled with more forces deployed in Eastern Poland looks like in 1942 when the Soviets try an offensive. With no problems in the west, things could be interesting, but...

Without German occupation of Ukraine and so on, SU has access to a lot more manpower, resources, does not get its industry so severely disrupted, has the option of choosing a time and place to strike, making it much easier for Moscow to conduct the war.

Which is the other side of the coin. Even if Germany's resource problems are somehow solved, buying the Reich time to pick its battles with the Soviets, the Soviet Union can't be allowed to fully utilize its industry, manpower, and resources. This gives the Soviet Union a huge advantage back to them they didn't have historically.

In fact, when I play the Soviets in HOI3, I assume my half of Poland is disposable (it's just there to be a buffer to protect the parts of the Soviet Union I care about), but if the Germans take the Ukraine, I consider myself a failure even if I win the war. Regardless of the Germans gaining those resources and IC, I don't want to lose them. There's another 50 armored divisions waiting to be built, and damn it, I need every lousy IC to get there.

I sure as Hell wouldn't feel comfortable letting the historical Soviets keep that stuff to do what I do in the game.

Of course, tt was only a matter of giving it a good kick, and the whole house of cards would crumble, Hitler promised it. The German army managed to destroy more Soviet divisions than they thought the Soviets had, and it still wasn't nearly enough.

My assumption is that even if you retreated to defensible positions and tried it again (ignoring the economics for a second), that it would not keep working. You could pull off destroying that many divisions once, and that's it. You'd never get that kind of result a second time. (You might get good results doing other things, but not ever to the same level as the first months of Barbarossa.)

 

[phantomrider]

One of the interesting things about the German invasion of the Soviet Union is that from the German point view it is like entering a funnel from the bottom or narrow end and advancing to the top or the wide end. If you want to pull off breakthroughs and encirclements the "space" has to be right. You have to have two concentrated "sprearhead" breakthrough points and then enough follow on troops to hold the flanks behind the spearhead as they advance to complete the encirclement. In the Barbarossa campaigns the biggest and best (from the German point of view) encirclements were early in the war when there was less space (and also the axis troops also probably outnumbered the Soviets at the front. After the summer fall 1941 campaign the frontage that ghe Germans needed to cover was much more than double that at the start of the Barbarossa campaign and even though they scored tremendous victories in 1942 the numbers of Soviets pocketed kept going down because the "encircled" troops could find their way our to the pockets because there weren't enough troops to contain them. Similarly, the Soviets who kept getting better at combined arms warfare and "breakthroughs" also had trouble containing the Germans who when they didn't have a hold at all costs order made some fairly spectacular (as well as routine) "escapes" "Unlimited space" makes Cannae like battle outcomes much more difficult to pull off.

 

[VinceDN]

(information from wages of destruction.) The Soviet Union had some of the poorest infrastructure in Europe. there were only 3 main rail lines for which the Wehrmacht could ferry supplies. One per army group. This is significantly less then what they were used to and comfortable with. This also meant that offensive operations were limited by the maximum length they could operate with a truck as fuel supply. The problem is the truck burns the fuel it intends to deliver. There is a point at which diminishing returns forces you to have a ridiculous number of trucks to fuel your army. This meant conducting a sequence of short bursts. Each burst had to encircle or destroy part of the Soviet army so that the next burst could be handled quickly. This limited the advance of German armies, necessitated zero serious delays, and allowed for almost no detours in planning (except where they may reduce the Soviet Army as in Belorussia).

this brings us to part 2

The Germans greatly Underestimated and overestimated the Soviet Union in three critical ways.

1. The Germans Overestimated the material and manufacturing resources and their relative importance west of Moscow. Ukraine was thought to be a breadbasket capable of feeding Germany through the war and it was believed that eliminating Soviet infrastructure would drop them below the Reich's production such that Germany could win if it took the Leningrad Moscow Volga line. It just so happened that soviet production exceeded that of Germany in 1942. Adam Tooze described this as the True armaments miracle of the second world war. I tend to agree considering how much damage had been done in 1941. It is also important to note that this rate of production was unsustainable (Russia was eating through its metal stockpiles) but it didn't need to be sustained.

2. Germany underestimated the size of the Soviet army. Germany had around 150 divisions in the east. They estimated the Soviets had approximately 200. They realized they were wrong after they hit the Ukraine and had already broken 200 divisions. They were utterly horrified when they were fighting near Moscow and had encountered 400 divisions with the soviets still having more in reserve. Ultimately the number of divisions is less important than total strength. the Wehrmacht started out at close numerical parity but the soviets rapidly expanded their military from 3.2 million to 6 million between 1941 and 1943.

3. Germany underestimated the quality of the Soviet Union. This seems a bit contradictory. Initially Soviet units performed quite poorly. They were smashed all along the east. but as the red army fell back to Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad, it also began to improve in fighting ability. Every time the Wehrmacht slowed the Soviet Union had more time to promote competent NCO's, fire Incompetent ones (sometimes fire is meant literally) and rebuild shattered divisions. when Germany stood at the heights of her gains the red army was in the middle of a transformation. Some of the most competent operational commanders in history lead its army groups, its soldiers were veterans, and its coordination was getting better daily. By the time the Soviets began operation Bagration in 1944 their military effectiveness was closely approaching that of western armies.

The reality was that the operation was too ambitious to succeed. The Soviet Union had no intention of surrendering. They would have fought a guerrilla war in Siberia if they had too. as for why they chose to invade... well... they had no choice really. The war Germany had already started was unwinnable. The industrial capacity of the British empire was at least equal to that of Germany and the United states was openly backing Britain financially at this point. Germany thought the resources of the Soviet Union would even the scales. This ignores something critical.

Germany was not going to mobilize Caucas oil, ship it to Romania for processing, and then to Germany for use on single track rail lines, of a different gauge then their own, with almost no locomotives or rolling stock to spare, without sufficient refining capacity in Romania, without the steel to upgrade that capacity, on routes harassed by partisans, with factories being bombed from the sky, during wartime with a time window of at most 2 years.

I will say this. The winter was overrated. Not because it didn't have an effect. The effect of the winter was devastating. but because the window had already closed. Germany had spent all its spare combat strength in the dash to Moscow Stalingrad and the Ukraine. The Soviets were patching the holes in their military and had stabilized the northern fronts. Germany

Extremely detailed and concise. I never considered the logistical issues with the rail track difference. Thanks for the info!

 

[Alias72]

Extremely detailed and concise. I never considered the logistical issues with the rail track difference. Thanks for the info!

Most of the German army used horses. Imagine supplying those armies without adequate trucks and trains!

 

[Magnus Imperator Rex]

Its insane to consider the sheer scale of Operation Barbarossa and how the german staff was planning to pull it off. That was some real megalomania going on there by Hitler. I wonder what was going on through their minds when they were planning it with their maps in their ultra secure compounds. Thoughts of glory and fame perhaps, maybe some were nervous or afraid. Very interesting indeed.

Wasn't it smarter to pound the UK by air for years using the resources of continental europe and massive trade with the USSR until they agreed to an armistice or white peace?

Instead of doing Barbarossa, send the Wehrmacht to North Africa and Spain and close Suez and Gibraltar. Support colonial nationalism. Strangle the global integrated economy of the UK with U-Boats and isolate them with a continental blockade.

If the UK loses North Africa, Middle East and India, they will agree to a peace. Then prepare a few years for Barbarossa and you will be in a much better position to defeat the USSR.

 

[Alias72]

Its insane to consider the sheer scale of Operation Barbarossa and how the german staff was planning to pull it off. That was some real megalomania going on there by Hitler. I wonder what was going on through their minds when they were planning it with their maps in their ultra secure compounds. Thoughts of glory and fame perhaps, maybe some were nervous or afraid. Very interesting indeed.

Wasn't it smarter to pound the UK by air for years using the resources of continental Europe and massive trade with the USSR until they agreed to an armistice or white peace?

even the UK alone could win an air war. They had the backing of the US and American entry in the war was imminent. Germany had already fully mobilized their natural resources and needed a means to increase production. They believed conquering the soviet Union would allow them to win their war of attrition.

I imagine the mood leading up to Barbarossa was one of anxiety and imminence. Germany was on a clock and couldn't afford any problems. They found many (about 2.5 million to be precise.)

 

[ringhloth]

Its insane to consider the sheer scale of Operation Barbarossa and how the german staff was planning to pull it off. That was some real megalomania going on there by Hitler. I wonder what was going on through their minds when they were planning it with their maps in their ultra secure compounds. Thoughts of glory and fame perhaps, maybe some were nervous or afraid. Very interesting indeed.

Wasn't it smarter to pound the UK by air for years using the resources of continental europe and massive trade with the USSR until they agreed to an armistice or white peace?

Instead of doing Barbarossa, send the Wehrmacht to North Africa and Spain and close Suez and Gibraltar. Support colonial nationalism. Strangle the global integrated economy of the UK with U-Boats and isolate them with a continental blockade.

If the UK loses North Africa, Middle East and India, they will agree to a peace. Then prepare a few years for Barbarossa and you will be in a much better position to defeat the USSR.

The Soviets weren't sitting around twiddling their thumbs in 1940 while the country who's dictatorship essentially thrived on anti-Bolshevic propoganda took over Europe. Had Germany attacked in 1944 or 1945, even without any other allies, the Soviets would be significantly more prepared, and Barbarossa wouldn't even have reached the outskirts of Moscow and Leningrad.. What's more is that the US didn't want the UK to fall, and would have almost certainly intervened if it was about to. Public opinion in early 1941 was in favor of doing anything necessary to keep the UK fighting, just short of entering the war, and had Japan not attacked, the US would have joined the war in 1942 or 1943, perhaps 1944. If the UK was in danger of being defeated (which it never was) the US would have picked up the slack.

 

[Magnus Imperator Rex]

even the UK alone could win an air war. They had the backing of the US and American entry in the war was imminent. Germany had already fully mobilized their natural resources and needed a means to increase production. They believed conquering the soviet Union would allow them to win their war of attrition.

The UK won the BoB by a long shot, that's for sure. But if Germany took different decisions the outcome could have been different. The US entering the war being inminent? I doubt it. If there is no PH and you don't give the US excuses such as unrestricted sub warfare, the population won't be rallying to invade Europe.

Sure, attacking the USSR later means they will be stronger but so will Germany and they could employ brand new technologies such as jet fighters and bombers to devastating effects.

 

[ringhloth]

The UK won the BoB by a long shot, that's for sure. But if Germany took different decisions the outcome could have been different. The US entering the war being inminent? I doubt it. If there is no PH and you don't give the US excuses such as unrestricted sub warfare, the population won't be rallying to invade Europe.

No, but they would be rallying to protect England. If you look up the gallup polls taken in 1941, the American public was completely fine with nationalizing industries, breaking strikes at defense industries, American ships guarded by the American navy transporting weapons to the UK, increasing taxation to pay for an increased national defense budget, getting involved in the war if a Central/South American country was invaded or aligned with Germany (which they thought Germany was trying to do) and more. This was at the very start of 1941, and it only intensified as the months passed, eventually being in favor of declaring war on Japan if they invaded the DEI, and believed that making sure that Germany didn't win the war was more important than staying out of it.

 

[Alias72]

The UK won the BoB by a long shot, that's for sure. But if Germany took different decisions the outcome could have been different. The US entering the war being inminent? I doubt it. If there is no PH and you don't give the US excuses such as unrestricted sub warfare, the population won't be rallying to invade Europe.

economically the US was already at war. Lend lease effectively meant giving Britain all the resources they need to win the war. furthermore lend lease was merely an escalation from cash and carry. cash and carry was put in place in 1939 and allowed the sale of arms to belligerents. now one of those belligerents doesn't have easy access to american resources. guess witch one. Additionally the United States was in a period of "unlimited National emergency". that is not a very neutral stance on the conflict. Also the BoB is already over. Germany has lost its edge in the air and the British Empire will soon be sending in more planes and pilots than Germany can match.

Here's an interesting bit of info I found.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_aircraft_production

It looks like after blunting the spear Britain was ahead. As for 1944 Germany had reallocated raw resources to focus on aircraft production. (Goering lost the air ministry to speer who gave it "panzer priority" essentially redirecting steel and aluminum to build up production. This was more then necessary given the strategic bombing campaign and its effects on sub-components.

 

[Simoleum]

Don't forget chaotic advances, and the constant swapping of generals and leaders between Army Groups.

 

[Zinegata]

Over rough ground?

And what exactly is your point about my "statement" about the ammunition?

You can't haul the 50mm PAK for kilometers by manpower alone, you use pack horses for that (since they probably didn't have any trucks). Otherwise you end up with a tired crew that's left far behind by the march.

However when the shooting starts you can't move your pieces using your horses anymore - it's too easy to spot and that assumes the horses cooperate. At which point the ability for manpower alone to move the gun around short distances becomes invaluable. And note it's not that hard to move - it still has wheels.

The 88 by contrast basically stays in place and can't be moved anymore until you bring up a truck to move it. Indeed, it was the truck shortage that caused most of them to be left behind in the first place, since you needed fairly powerful trucks to move such a big piece.

For a practical example, take an AT position sited on a hill. The 88 has to be placed on top of the hill and stay there - exposed to enemy fire. The 50mm meanwhile can be put just below the reverse slope of the hill to be hidden from the enemy, and be pushed up to the top to fire a few quick rounds before being pushed back down out of sight again.

This is why the 50mm PAK was the top tank killer in 1942 and even in 1943. It is not until 1944 that the 88 becomes a significant killer, which is also when the Soviets have a lot more T-34s. And even then, most German units still had both (or more correctly 50mm and 75mm guns) for the same reason the Brits kept the 6 pounder even though they had the 17 pounder: the 6 pounder could be man-handled, the 17 pounder required a limber.

Oh, and D Inqi noted shooting at 2km range was very rare. In North Africa the war diary of an 88mm unit with the DAK claimed they only killed 1 tank for every 20 shells expended at 2km range. They typically allowed the enemy to get much closer - typically 600 meters being seen as more optimal to save on ammo.

 

[DocMorningstar]

As far as the train supply issue goes: A basic rule of logisitics is that, assuming the same supply point, if you double the distance which you are supplying you more than double the amount of ships/trains/trucks needed to keep a unit going. This is because a train running, say 500km, can make 1 full cycle per day. If you double the distance, now the train is only making 1/2 of a full delivery per day, plus is consuming 2 days of fuel per delivery. Or, effectively, the operational cost of that train per load of supplies has quadrupled. You spend 2x the maintenance, and coal, but only get half the stuff. If you quadruple the distance (the situation on the Russian front) your trains are 16 times less efficient than if you are operating outside of Warsaw.

That means that for the germans, supplying a division outside of Moscow costs them ~5-6 times the logistics capacity as supplying that same division outside of Warsaw (or in Belgium). That is just brutal and the single biggest reason you can't knock out Russia in a single major effort. Russia could *only* manage supplying their own troops because of the unique railhead situation; with Moscow the effective distribution point (where much of the military supplies were piled up) the effective supply range was manageable. Feeding moscow with supplies was a challenge, but one that the russian rail network was already designed to handle.

As the germans advanced, the Russian supply situation got better and better, while the German got worse and worse.

Hitler would have been better off building an effing buttload of engines and rolling stock, rather than Bismarck & Tirpitz...


*edit

I should note, that is why I consider taking Moscow the single critical point of the entire campaign. It makes almost as big a mess out of the Russian supply situation as the German one, and, potentially, allows the Germans to establish a single 'dump' to support operations both in the north, center, and south. That means you ship your daily 'expected' needs directly to the N/S fronts, and everything else direct to moscow. From moscow, you get a whole new line of logisitics to build up for a push.

That is, if you hold Moscow, you can supply your troops outside leningrad along two major rail lines, rather than just one. That actually lets you build up enough material to launch a major offensive.

 

[geogus]

As far as the train supply issue goes: A basic rule of logisitics is that, assuming the same supply point, if you double the distance which you are supplying you more than double the amount of ships/trains/trucks needed to keep a unit going. This is because a train running, say 500km, can make 1 full cycle per day. If you double the distance, now the train is only making 1/2 of a full delivery per day, plus is consuming 2 days of fuel per delivery. Or, effectively, the operational cost of that train per load of supplies has quadrupled. You spend 2x the maintenance, and coal, but only get half the stuff. If you quadruple the distance (the situation on the Russian front) your trains are 16 times less efficient than if you are operating outside of Warsaw.

That means that for the germans, supplying a division outside of Moscow costs them ~5-6 times the logistics capacity as supplying that same division outside of Warsaw (or in Belgium). That is just brutal and the single biggest reason you can't knock out Russia in a single major effort. Russia could *only* manage supplying their own troops because of the unique railhead situation; with Moscow the effective distribution point (where much of the military supplies were piled up) the effective supply range was manageable. Feeding moscow with supplies was a challenge, but one that the russian rail network was already designed to handle.

As the germans advanced, the Russian supply situation got better and better, while the German got worse and worse.

Hitler would have been better off building an effing buttload of engines and rolling stock, rather than Bismarck & Tirpitz...


*edit

I should note, that is why I consider taking Moscow the single critical point of the entire campaign. It makes almost as big a mess out of the Russian supply situation as the German one, and, potentially, allows the Germans to establish a single 'dump' to support operations both in the north, center, and south. That means you ship your daily 'expected' needs directly to the N/S fronts, and everything else direct to moscow. From moscow, you get a whole new line of logisitics to build up for a push.

That is, if you hold Moscow, you can supply your troops outside leningrad along two major rail lines, rather than just one. That actually lets you build up enough material to launch a major offensive.

Very interisting.

Im no logistics specialist but It made a lot of sense.

If this is correct, it sems that taking moscow would have been a major blow to soviets that could make them lose the war, at sipte many argue that URSS woud win even in this scenario