Why did Operation Barbarossa fail?

[krieger11b]

Germany was not going to mobilize Caucas oil, ship it to Romania for processing, and then to Germany for use on single track rail lines, of a different gauge then their own, with almost no locomotives or rolling stock to spare, without sufficient refining capacity in Romania, without the steel to upgrade that capacity, on routes harassed by partisans, with factories being bombed from the sky, during wartime with a time window of at most 2 years.

The different gauge of Soviet rail was devastating to resupply as you mentioned, they were dependent on captured trains and cars. Germany was doing a slow process of changing the gauge of the rail but that was still a difficult and expensive jobs.

Another really important aspect of logistics I want to add is how inaccurate the maps Germany had of the Soviet infrastructure. Where the map would show concrete/asphalt roads would in fact be dirt roads, and I think just about all of us have seen the famous videos of German trucks and sometimes even tanks being stuck in muddy roads in the USSR.


Also lets not act like everyone in the German intelligence and higher ranks underestimated how hard Barbarossa was going to be. Many in the various intelligence services and even high ranking Generals pleaded Hitler not to invade the USSR.

 

[Bicentius]

Something that if often not mentioned in conjunction with the "Russian Winter" argument is that the original German jump off date would have had them in Moscow with the pace that they did achieve. The original date had to be pushed back because of Italy's 'glorious' conquest of Greece and the Yugoslav coup which like most things made Hitler go into one of his trademark rages and invade Yugoslavia. If Germany didn't have to pull Italy's chestnuts out of the fire, and Hitler hadn't gone all Hitler on Yugoslavia the war may have played out very differently.

 

[Bicentius]

We've had some good posts. My perspective is to think of it not in terms of why the Germans failed, the overwhelming weight of industry, resources and manpower was against them with the combined Soviet-British-American side. Rather, why did the Germans succeed in the opening phases of the war? How did the Red Army manage to fail so badly? It wasn't really Germany's war to win, it was the Soviet's war to lose. And fortunately for them, they had sufficient resources and the capability to mobilise to such a degree that they could overcome the disasters of the first year and triumph.

A major reason the Germans were able to roll up division after division in the early phases of the invasion was Stalin. He had not only purged the officer corps throughout the 30's but had also unleashed massive terror upon his own population. In the early phases many soldiers simply surrendered and towns happily greeted the Germans seeing them as liberators. The lack of officers meant poor leadership and experience. And also Stalin refused to believe that he was being invaded even while he was! A blind man could have seen what a massive German buildup on your border in the 30s-40s meant.

 

[Zwiback]

The problem in HOI3 IMO was that

- divisions don't "burn" out by advancing and being on the offensive. Means no real attrition by driving equipment and men relentless for weeks and thousands of kilometers. As long as you don't take too many losses in combat you're fine
- that it didn't really have a system for putting up a mass of underequipped divisions thrown into the fray
- didn't have a good system for lend lease
- the supply model (unfortunately they missed out on railroads again)

 

[illathid]

No. Not after they showed their colors with Czechoslovakia. That started with territorial concessions, and how did it end? With total occupation.

Eh... As long as a bad deal (i.e. One where you don't trust the other party to uphold it) is better than no deal, a rational party should still take it. Hell, we know from declassified documents that Stalin was close to accepting a complete surrender in late 1941. I think it more than likely that had the deal been sweeter for him, he may have taken it. I couldn't say what a such a deal would need to look like, but I think it's more than possible such a deal to exist.

 

[Ulsterman]

Something that if often not mentioned in conjunction with the "Russian Winter" argument is that the original German jump off date would have had them in Moscow with the pace that they did achieve. The original date had to be pushed back because of Italy's 'glorious' conquest of Greece and the Yugoslav coup which like most things made Hitler go into one of his trademark rages and invade Yugoslavia. If Germany didn't have to pull Italy's chestnuts out of the fire, and Hitler hadn't gone all Hitler on Yugoslavia the war may have played out very differently.

Why do people think Russia would have surrendered if they had lost Moscow? They didn't surrender in the same situation in 1812, and there would have been even less reason to surrender in 1941. It was Hitler who claimed that Operation Marita was the main reason for Barbarossa's failure, but in reality the two weeks would not have made much difference.

 

[Bluestreak2k5]

Why do people think Russia would have surrendered if they had lost Moscow? They didn't surrender in the same situation in 1812, and there would have been even less reason to surrender in 1941. It was Hitler who claimed that Operation Marita was the main reason for Barbarossa's failure, but in reality the two weeks would not have made much difference.

Really, would stuff have really changed if Germany took Moscow?
Really, would stuff have really changed if Germany took Moscow?

Because it has nothing to do with the actual leadership and everything to do with industrial age (industry, and infrastructure). Capturing and holding Moscow completely cuts off every rail line to the northern Front which had 750,000 men extended along more then 500 miles, of which 250,000 were German. 0 reinforcements would be able to arrive in Finland, Leningrad, and anywhere else along any point North of Moscow because ALL railroad lines ran through Moscow.

Moscow captured and HELD for even a brief period of 1 month would essentially mean 400,000 minimum Russian soldiers completely cut off from supplies and reinforcements, and if the entire Finland front is secured, the amount of land needed to defend is reduced to the size of less then 100 miles and frees up a minimum of 250,000 German soldiers from the Northern Front.

Comparing it to Napoleon era is nonsense as nothing about this war even applies.

The only thing Germany needed to do was secure and hold Stalingrad and Moscow and the war would be over.

 

[MGL 86]

I think Barbarossa failed because of average Ivan the farm boy. He knew the they were losing the war in September 1941, But kept on fighting against superior enemy.

 

[Magnus Imperator Rex]

Really, would stuff have really changed if Germany took Moscow?
Really, would stuff have really changed if Germany took Moscow?

Because it has nothing to do with the actual leadership and everything to do with industrial age (industry, and infrastructure). Capturing and holding Moscow completely cuts off every rail line to the northern Front which had 750,000 men extended along more then 500 miles, of which 250,000 were German. 0 reinforcements would be able to arrive in Finland, Leningrad, and anywhere else along any point North of Moscow because ALL railroad lines ran through Moscow.

Moscow captured and HELD for even a brief period of 1 month would essentially mean 400,000 minimum Russian soldiers completely cut off from supplies and reinforcements, and if the entire Finland front is secured, the amount of land needed to defend is reduced to the size of less then 100 miles and frees up a minimum of 250,000 German soldiers from the Northern Front.

Comparing it to Napoleon era is nonsense as nothing about this war even applies.

The only thing Germany needed to do was secure and hold Stalingrad and Moscow and the war would be over.

I agree. Capturing Moscow in 1941 would be a huge boost to Germany in the homefront and to their war machine in the frontlines. Although the Russians were retreating to a fall back capital and they probably would not have surrendered after the Fall of Moscow, they were going to be affected in a major way by the loss of their biggest and most prestigious city in the Soviet Empire. The Wehrmacht was not capturing Moscow just because it was the capital but rather because it was the major network nucleus in the soviet state apparatus. In a way, they were stabbing the Reds in the heart of their country.

Hitler though (yes, another Hitler rant) was not suited to lead a 1940s army. His style of warfare was based on a rather modern doctrine of industrial destruction that could not just be carried out by the mostly non-mechanized Wehrmacht. In Russia, he tried an ambitious plan that was in the end too much for Germany to handle, added with the pressure of the western Allied front. He split his army too many times to go after simultaneous objectives which only made the Wehrmacht thin itself out. It wasn't necessary to spread out so much troops from Finland to Romania. Previous studies had shown that the Fall of Moscow should be the main objective of Barbarossa despite all others but Hitler just didn't want to listen to the Staff. Instead, he ordered them to go after Mursmansk, Sevastapool, Leningrad, Kiev, Karkhov, etc, because he wanted to cripple the economic ability of the USSR but in the process they overextended badly and couldn't even capture the capital. But failure to heed to the advice of his economic advisors who told him it would be a burden more than a gain to conquer western USSR and a weird perspective of reality meant he doomed the operation from the start

If you capture Moscow though, you can bet other cities will quickly fall due to lack of supplies and communication, unclear orders, panic and chaos. When the chinese capital Nanking fell, the Chinese retreated to Chongqin in the interior of China and the war was a stalemate until the end of the war. I can see something similar happening between Germany and Russia if they fall back from Moscow into the interior. They just wouldn't have the same kind of strength without Moscow, that's for sure.

 

[ringhloth]

Really, would stuff have really changed if Germany took Moscow?
Really, would stuff have really changed if Germany took Moscow?

Because it has nothing to do with the actual leadership and everything to do with industrial age (industry, and infrastructure). Capturing and holding Moscow completely cuts off every rail line to the northern Front which had 750,000 men extended along more then 500 miles, of which 250,000 were German. 0 reinforcements would be able to arrive in Finland, Leningrad, and anywhere else along any point North of Moscow because ALL railroad lines ran through Moscow.

Moscow captured and HELD for even a brief period of 1 month would essentially mean 400,000 minimum Russian soldiers completely cut off from supplies and reinforcements, and if the entire Finland front is secured, the amount of land needed to defend is reduced to the size of less then 100 miles and frees up a minimum of 250,000 German soldiers from the Northern Front.

Comparing it to Napoleon era is nonsense as nothing about this war even applies.

The only thing Germany needed to do was secure and hold Stalingrad and Moscow and the war would be over.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but that major line running from Moscow to Leningrad is connected by Novgorod and Kalinin, both cities taken by the Wehrmacht and held for at least a month. Not only that, but Stalingrad lost its major line, severed at Rostov, and it managed to be supplied by minor rail lines. I think you're underestimating the ability of the Soviet war machine to adapt to a bad situation.

 

[Axe99]

A random thought (and I don't really know my way around the eastern front as well as I could, so this may be a silly idea), but riffing off the quality of Germany's panzer armies (which were strong enough that even outnumbered at Kursk in '43, and no longer with air superiority, still caused damage larger than you would expect an outnumbered attacker fighting through some of the largest minefields and deepest defensive lines on the eastern front to incur). Could the Germans perhaps have 'won' (as in, taken Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad, and created a defensible, supplied line) if:

- What about not going 'all in' in '41. Focus on getting to, say, Leningrad, Smolensk and Kiev or Rostov (so still neutralise similar numbers of Soviet troops).

- Then instead of pushing poorly supplied into poor weather and taking over-the-odds losses for little gain, use the panzer forces (in better shape now, because the Soviet winter offensive is likely to have hit better dug-in, supplied and prepared troops, and with time to resupply over winter) to surround Moscow, cutting off its supplies and disrupting the Soviets in '42, and potentially taking the city.

- Then doing the same with Stalingrad, hopefully in late '42.

A lot of the German advance, after the initial breakthroughs, seemed to be a bit 'desparate', wasting men and material for little gain (and little Soviet loss). Could the Wehrmacht have done better if it stopped earlier, dug in harder, then struck out again? The Soviets aren't likely to be much stronger than they were historically (and could even be weaker, as I'd expect there to be a Soviet winter offensive in any event, and it would have had a harder time if the Germans had stopped sooner and been better prepared for it), and the Germans should be a good deal better off.

Keep in mind that while the USSR had a manpower advantage over Germany, a lot of this advantage evaporated after Barbarossa, and if the Germans can take Leningrad and surround Moscow, that's another huge manpower blow (in terms of manpower that can be given new equipment, outside of what they can produce in the city), and would push the strategic balance in Germany's favour.

So, in short, after the long (because that's the best way to write it, not ), is part of the reason for Germany's failure, the 'white-line fever' they had in late '41?

 

[Alias72]

Also lets not act like everyone in the German intelligence and higher ranks underestimated how hard Barbarossa was going to be. Many in the various intelligence services and even high ranking Generals pleaded Hitler not to invade the USSR.

I did not mean to spread the notion that the general staff was unanimously ignorant. I am aware many realized that this operation was folly. Some threatened to resign. But it's the institution as a whole that matters. that was the point I was trying to make.

 

[krieger11b]

I did not mean to spread the notion that the general staff was unanimously ignorant. I am aware many realized that this operation was folly. Some threatened to resign. But it's the institution as a whole that matters. that was the point I was trying to make.

I wasn't really aiming that post at you specifically. Just a general statement I wanted to make.

 

[adam_grif]

With respect to the delay of Barbarossa, there is some evidence suggesting that poor weather (or more specifically, a late spring) would have delayed the operation from going ahead even without the Balkan diversion. The impact of the Balkan campaign is, imo, more about extending the Axis occupation duties further and the loss of men and war material in the campaign (which wasn't all that severe, but was something).

 

[Magnus Imperator Rex]

The Balkan campaign was a necessary flank clearing operation that needed to be done before the launch of Barbarossa to prevent the allies from threatening the southern rear of the Wehrmacht once they were heading deep into Russia.

 

[Alias72]

The Balkan campaign was a necessary flank clearing operation that needed to be done before the launch of Barbarossa to prevent the allies from threatening the southern rear of the Wehrmacht once they were heading deep into Russia.

Italy didn't need to (invade? retreat from? Vacation briefly in?) Greece. The Greek government was pursuing neutrality and was sympathetic to the axis.

 

[geogus]

And the real OOB says, that those 18 divisions composed 250,000 people at most, out of over 2 million soldiers involved on the soviet side. Calling them veterans is hardly fair - they were just as trained as a lot of pre-war divisions in the west.

i believe siberian troops were veteran because they fought in khakim gol battle and soviet japanese border war

 

[Opanashc]

i believe siberian troops were veteran because they fought in khakim gol battle and soviet japanese border war

65,000 men were involved in that battle from the Soviet side. Those involved in the Winter War were veterans, and they were far more numerous.

 

[Zinegata]

How about...

Moscow was 8km too far from Berlin?


But seriously...

It's about 900 km from Berlin to Paris, about half of which is actually through Germany but it's about 1,800 km from Berlin to Moscow, almost all of which is through hostile territory. Not to mention hostile territory with crap infrastructure.

Too many Soviets.

Not enough Germans.

Allied bombing tied-up a lot of men & kit, especially Flak 88s which were soooo much better against KVs & T-34s than the door-knockers. Instead of 200 & something Flak 88s in 51 batteries used at the start of Barbarossa, they could have sent a thousand batteries. 4,000 flak 88s! Twenty times the number actually deployed would have had a significant impact.

Lend-Lease. Guns, tanks, food, bullets, bombs, shells, trains, aircraft & trucks. Thousands of them that Russia didn't have to manufacture herself allowing her to concentrate her resources & manufacturing capacity on tanks, guns, tanks, rockets, tanks, aircraft, tanks & more tanks.

Allied bombing was hardly happening in 1941, and didn't really cause a major stir among the Germans until July 1943 when Hamburg burned. It wasn't really a factor in Barbarossa.

And it wasn't really Moscow being 8km too far from Berlin. Being 8km away from Moscow meant that the Germans were about 100-200km overextended already from their supply sources. The German armies had in fact placed themselves in a death zone where they couldn't get enough supplies; which is why they eventually had to pull back in the first place.

 

[Zinegata]

The different gauge of Soviet rail was devastating to resupply as you mentioned, they were dependent on captured trains and cars. Germany was doing a slow process of changing the gauge of the rail but that was still a difficult and expensive jobs.

No, I've seen an actual translation of a report from the German officer in charge of converting Soviet railways for German use. The different gauge was never the issue - it was in fact ridiculously easy to resolve. Just pull out all the bolts, get the men to lift the ties and move it a couple of feet, put the bolts back in, and suddenly you have German-compatible gauge in just five minutes. All this can be done very quickly even with unskilled labor.

The real problem is that German trains sucked for long-range resupply. They were designed to operate in Western Europe which had a very dense rail network and plentiful coaling stations. The Soviets by contrast had a sparse rail network - with only a handful of lines connecting the widely separated cities; which often had no coaling stations in between. The German trains simply ran out of coal before they could travel between the great distances of the Soviet rail stations.

To resolve this, they had two options. The first was to use captured Soviet trains - which were larger and had sufficient range to make the trip - but this was done rarely because then they had to keep the track in the Soviet gauge and there weren't enough trains captured in the first place. The second, more time-intensive solution was to build additional coaling stations in between the long distance tracks so that the German trains could make the trip.

And to add to the macabre insanity of the situation, the German train system was apparently still under civilian control in December 1941 - and almost everyone involved in the project went on holiday for Christmas. So while your average Landser froze to death trying to reach Moscow, behind them the new coaling stations that were supposed to help supply him were left unmanned and unfinished - because all the civilian workers were toasting to the troops at home as part of the Christmas holidays.