Why did Operation Barbarossa fail?

[D Inqu]

Officer Corp was purged in the 30's as well as during the early part of The Great Patriotic War

That's how dictatorships work. Hitler purged his officers before and during the war, and had his own officer corps make several attempts on his life.

Commissars (Political Officer post 42')

In a state driven by ideology, political officers were fairly obvious. The post 1942 political officers had limited authority, and were closer to a military chaplain.

9 million Soviet troops KIA vs 4 million German troops KIA (Eastern Front).

You are omitting axis allies losses for... what reason again?

Order No. 227 or as we all know, Not one step back

What is your point?

 

[Opanashc]

1. Officer Corp was purged in the 30's as well as during the early part of The Great Patriotic War
2. Commissars (Political Officer post 42')
3. 9 million Soviet troops KIA vs 4 million German troops KIA (Eastern Front).
4. Order No. 227 or as we all know, Not one step back.........or die by your fellow comrades

1. 10,000 arrested. Mostly dead wood (if you think Tukhachevskiy and his ilk were geniuses, you never done proper research on the man). See post-July 1944 purges in Werhmacht.
2. Worked well enough during Civil War. Falling back on what you know routine.
3. SU lost 5.4 million KIA, 1 million in hospitals. Rest come from POW casualties. Add Axis minors losses to the German ones, and picture gets much more even.
4. Seeing, how Germans published something like that 8 month earlier than the Soviets - your argument is weak.

 

[Henry IX]

The unsung heroes of the Great Patriotic War were the Soviet bureaucrats. The survival of the Red Army and the Soviet state largely came down to their ability to re-construct their entire industrial base within a few months and to recruit millions of new soldiers without causing the collapse of industry or agriculture. Whilst the long term effects of command economies are problematic, the Soviet response to Barbarossa demonstrated the advantages of this model. In contrast to the dismal performance of STAVKA and army commanders the civilian bureaucracy demonstrated an astonishing ability to mobilise the whole power of the state.

There have also been some disparaging comments about the effects of lend lease in 1941. Whilst the quantities shipped were quite small compared with both domestic production and losses they did arrive at a critical time. According to Robert Forczyc in Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1942, British lend lease tanks made up about 10% of the available armour for the defence of Moscow and the winter counter-attack. That is not an insignificant contribution to what could be argued to be the most important single battle of WW2. Whilst many earlier western histories of the war significantly overplayed the impact of lend-lease in the early part of the Great Patriotic War it was not totally irrelevant.

 

[Oakfan]

That's how dictatorships work. Hitler purged his officers before and during the war, and had his own officer corps make several attempts on his life.

Hitler did not execute his officer corp. Where did you read that? Reference?

In a state driven by ideology, political officers were fairly obvious. The post 1942 political officers had limited authority, and were closer to a military chaplain.

comparing political officers to chaplins is like comparing apples to oranges. I don't think I need to explain the differance. Anyone with half a brain figured that one out.

You are omitting axis allies losses for... what reason again?

add another million under the allies of Germany on the Eastern Front. Only German leadership came from the Army or Corp level. Cant say German leadership was bad because Italians cant hold the line. Thats the reason why.

What is your point?

How can superior and quality leadership put your troops to death for retreating? Hard to understand?

1. 10,000 arrested. Mostly dead wood (if you think Tukhachevskiy and his ilk were geniuses, you never done proper research on the man). See post-July 1944 purges in Werhmacht.

Dead wood? Like you have a clue. Not to mention the morale hit you take with the rest of your officers.

2. Worked well enough during Civil War. Falling back on what you know routine.

Is this statement suppose contradict the affect commissars had on the leadership and abilities of troops within their responsablities? hahah

3. SU lost 5.4 million KIA, 1 million in hospitals. Rest come from POW casualties. Add Axis minors losses to the German ones, and picture gets much more even.

I have read much larger numbers. 9million include MIA and POW. I should have broken the numbers down. You know 1+1+1=3 type of thing.

4. Seeing, how Germans published something like that 8 month earlier than the Soviets - your argument is weak.

Order 227 was issued by Stalin in 42'. German did not publish a order saying kill any troop retreating. lmao - your failed attempt to debunk my arguments are too funny. Good try though


Edit: I can see where this thread is going. I will stick to my above facts and leave it at that.

 

[Opanashc]

Oakfan, have you READ the order 227? Nowhere, does it say "shoot those who retreat". It states "remove those commanders, who retreat without authorization from higher command".
Italians can't hold the line - because "superior German leadership" gave them a line that is 3 times too long to hold.
Want to count POWs and MIA as well? Then to the 4 million Germans, add 1 million Axis minors killed (your words), and 3 million Axis POWs in the East. Wow, we are now at 9 million Soviets to 8 million Axis - not much different, huh?

 

[Gethsemani]

Hitler did not execute his officer corp. Where did you read that? Reference?

He killed or disposed of them all the time, even as earl as the 30's. Blomberg was forced to resign in 1938 and in late WW2, when Germany was losing, he was removing officers from command left and right while demanding they be shot for insubordination. Most weren't, but that's because Hitler had lost control at that point.

comparing political officers to chaplins is like comparing apples to oranges. I don't think I need to explain the differance. Anyone with half a brain figured that one out.

Then you don't understand whta Opanashc meant. The Politruk (political officer) had command authority in the early war and could rescind any order they felt weren't in the spirit of the Soviet Union or Communism. This was, obviously, an unwieldy and terrible system and the Politruks were stripped of command authority and were returned to their original role: To serve as a political motivator and political teacher to the soldiers. Their job was to make sure the soldiers were proper communists and were motivated to fight for the Soviet Union and to counsel soldiers that might have doubts or show signs of wavering fighting spirit. The chaplain likeness is not 1 to 1, but it is the closest you get for armies that don't have political officers.

How can superior and quality leadership put your troops to death for retreating? Hard to understand?

Germany made use of the execute retreating troops tool too, particularly in 1944 and onward and had its' own "No retreat"-orders (remember that Hitler loved to give orders that no one was to retreat from point x and designate cities as "fortress cities" to be defended to the last man). This is a moot point, since both sides shot their own fleeing troops at different points in the war.

Dead wood? Like you have a clue. Not to mention the morale hit you take with the rest of your officers.

A lot of Red Army officers in the 30's were corrupt to the core and most of the high ranking ones were old guard from the civil war who had little understanding of how a modern war would be conducted, just look at how bad Voroshilov and Budyonny performed in WW2 (and they were the ones spared). Morale in the Red Army was already low and this was in large due to the widespread corruption caused by incompetent and self-serving officers. That's not to say they deserved to be killed or deported, but the purges probably had a positive effect on the Red Army by getting rid of much of the corruption.

 

[Mannstien]

SU had greater numbers. That fact has been proven for decades. General Winter and not being prepared for the conditions is what stopped the Germans in 41'. Thankfully SU could get a breather and push the German back. After that, it was simple overloading the lines with man and equipment.

The Germans won the war of attrition from start to finish, they just didn't throw as much away and didn't choose to throw what they did have away like the Soviets did, at least their commanders didn't. You also didn't get shot for disagreeing with the leader like the Soviet's generals did, no wonder the poor guy's didn't take initiative.

 

[aqvamare]

The order from Hitler to split central army in juli 1941 to support the advance against lenningrad and kiew after the fall of smolensk, even when manstein flyed on the same day back to the OKH to say, we need to push muscovy, gave sovietunion the time they needed to survive.

german army needed 6 weeks for the distance german-soviet border to push to smolensk, which is the more distance than smolensk-muscowy. the operation of germans after fall of kiew showed, that they could push even to muscovy in dezember....witout this order, germans would have seen the outerline of muscovy at the beginning of september, 1 month before the far east troope reached muscovy, the defence lines around muscovy would be far worse, and the weather would support the german advance around muscovy.

Germany would have encircled muscovy in october, and could be ready to defend musovy over the winter... germans as defender of muscovy in november and dezenmber, and russian army would have lost there last bit of moral. It is a great difference to do a counterattack against a enemy who has advenced over 2 month in a attack in the winter, like soviets done in history. Or to counterattack agaisnt a enemy who digged in for 2 month and were winterready.

The ukraine soviet armies in kiew and region wouldn't be able to hold this area, or even do a counter attack against the rumanian, hungary, italines and german troops there, as long the germans had air supporie in this area. The chances are even really high, that stalin would have ordered the retreat of this armies to defend of muscovy.

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But my personal opion, barbarrossa was useless....after germans had so easy game in greek, they should have pushed there advantage in southern europe with a attack on turky...turky wasn't war ready and the would overrun turkey at this time. After turky, the middle easy to suez, iraq and saudi arabia would be easy game....and they would have gained the control over the biggest oil area in history. and there idea of 1000y reich could be possible.

and the money from export post war of saudi araibien oil would give them the founds to be stable.

 

[Alias72]

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But my personal opion, barbarrossa was useless....after germans had so easy game in greek, they should have pushed there advantage in southern europe with a attack on turky...turky wasn't war ready and the would overrun turkey at this time. After turky, the middle easy to suez, iraq and saudi arabia would be easy game....and they would have gained the control over the biggest oil area in history. and there idea of 1000y reich could be possible.

and the money from export post war of saudi araibien oil would give them the founds to be stable.

so you want the German army to push through a hostile nation filled with mountain passes and limited infrastructure so that it can engage French and British colonial troops in Syria? With supply problems worse then Barbarossa? Against an Empire with many more reserves that it can call upon for colonial service? Germany may be able to conquer turkey but their not going to be able to run supply lines sufficient for an army through the mountains in the central and southern peninsula. Then there are the partisans. at the end of the road (or no road as the case may be) lies a huge quantity of oil infrastructure, all of which will be sabotaged with a route back to Germany more perilous then that proposed in Fall Blau.

 

[D Inqu]

Hitler did not execute his officer corp. Where did you read that? Reference?

Don't tell me you never heard of Blomberg–Fritsch Affair or the systematic removal of disloyal generals during the war.

I don't think I need to explain the differance

Because there wasn't much of one.

Cant say German leadership was bad because Italians cant hold the line.

Yes we can. It was German leadership which screwed up so badly that they had to stretch allied forces to so thin. Rather we can't say romanian/italian leadership was bad, because the German stretched their under equipped division to 20 km/division.

How can superior and quality leadership put your troops to death for retreating?

They can't and they don't. Can we get back to reality?

German did not publish a order saying kill any troop retreating.

Nor did anyone else publish a order saying "kill any troop retreating". Hitler did publish "no retreat" orders during the Battle of Moscow. Whether it was a private or a general, retreating without orders was severely punished, even for senior leadership like Hoepner and Brauchitsh.

 

[D Inqu]

The order from Hitler to split central army in juli 1941 to support the advance against lenningrad and kiew after the fall of smolensk, even when manstein flyed on the same day back to the OKH to say, we need to push muscovy, gave sovietunion the time they needed to survive.

No, it was simple the only order which allowed any offensive to continue.

german army needed 6 weeks for the distance german-soviet border to push to smolensk

And that's also where the offensive ground to a halt with heavy casualties. The rest of the post is pure fantasy,

 

[aqvamare]

German army showed in greek, that they can push fast and hard through mountains and bad infrastructure, and britsh showed that they cannot defend agaisnt german army.

British colony troops done only sucessful pushes when bristish RAF and navy could cut of the enemy supply lines....in north africa and ethopia. in the moment the supply lines were landbased and save ( blacksea and orient express) or italy after sicily....british colony army showed that they have no punsh. Without american and russian, british would still sit on there island and in italy, on sicily, but not on mainland.

Supply routes to iraq would be go over black sea, turkish railroad like in WW1, or even over russia railroad network (a question of price and negoations).

And yes, if germans would push over turkey, englsih france colonial armies wouldn't be able to defend syria, iraq, saudi arabia and egypt.

 

[aqvamare]

No, it was simple the only order which allowed any offensive to continue.
And that's also where the offensive ground to a halt with heavy casualties. The rest of the post is pure fantasy,

From Wiki, After the Operation Smolensk
The Battle of Smolensk was another severe defeat for the Soviets in the opening phase of Operation Barbarossa. However, this Axis victory did not come without strategic implications. For the first time, the Soviets tried to implement a determined coordinated counterattack against a large part of the front, although the counterattack was almost entirely a failure. Nevertheless, the increasing resistance showed that the Soviets were not yet defeated, and that the Blitzkrieg towards Moscow was not going to be an easy task. This exacerbated a division between the German high command and political leadership. The leaders of the General Staff, Franz Halder and Walter von Brauchitsch, and frontline commanders like von Bock, Hoth, and Guderian counseled against dispersing the German armored units and to focus directly on Moscow. Hitler reiterated the lack of importance of Moscow and strategic encirclements, and ordered a concentration on economic targets such as Ukraine, the Donets Basin, and the Caucasus, and more tactical encirclements to weaken the Soviets further. As a result, the German offensive effort became more fragmented, leading to the battles at Kiev and Uman. Those battles were also German victories, but also cost them vital time, men, and material on their approach towards Moscow, allowing the Soviets time to prepare the defenses of the city.

We know all the history what happend after smolensk, germans splitted there army and done kiew and push on lenninggrad...and we now how battle for muscovy ended muscovy in dezember.

And sure, rest is fantasy, the big "if question" is...after defeating the russian army around smolensk, would be the road to muscovy open or not? How much progress woudl a further advance of german army push the russians back to muscovy. Russian army got pushes in nov-dez back to muscovy....after they got the sep and oct to bring fresh troops between smolensk and muscovy.

Without the kiew, the possibilty that germans would be encircle muscovy in october, and force russians to counterattacks alongeside all of there frontline in hope to break german advance, when they are not ready for counterattack....could break the rest of sovietunion at this time.

Fact is, if germans would dig in ther northern and souhern front, and focus on push on muscovy after fall of smolensk, gernams would stand in front of muscovy at end of september and could advance and endcircle muscovy during october, without soviet counterattack at muscovy.

The troops which soviets used to counterattack the germans, reached muscovy in end of october and november....the time advantage woul dswitch from advantage soviets to advantage germans.

What happens after muscovy, I cannot prognose. You can only prognose 2 month after smolensk, with the soviet army movements to protect muscovy and at which dates they reached muscovy, and the progress and speed germans pushed to muscovy from jun-dez....with the big break in push middle through kiew and lenningrad.

 

[Beagá]

This thread feels so 2007. Déjà vu hitting me hard here lol

 

[Dark Jakkaru]

Yes weather affected both sides, but look at it from this perspective. Would you rather be the attacker or defender in bad weather?

And this is the crux of the point that is missed. The Soviet Union, whilst I understand was invaded and the de facto "defender", had to attack and stuck to a policy of attacking as many strategic sectors of the front with as many fronts as possible to pressure the Wehrmacht everywhere so they would break and route, weakening the advance. This almost happened in the winter of 41 but Hitler's orders to stand fast as places like Rzhev stymied the repeatedly attacking Soviet Army. The Soviet Army attacked with everything and is wasn't only the Siberian troops that saved the day.

As for Rzhev, it was picked because it was a battle that lasted for over a year during what is considered good weather periods. It was part of a long list of examples of the Soviet Army attacking and attacking repeatedly. The only notion of the Wehrmacht lacking winter clothing paints a dreadful picture of the Wehrmacht rotting outside the gates of Moscow losing some sort winnable Pyrrhic victory instead of being pummeled by the Red Army since day one of the invasion which was the reason where the delay came from. There were several counter attacks done prior to Operation Typhoon that continually held up the Wehrmacht's advance just as there were counter attacks done in the Smolensk region as Guderian turned south to free up the bogged Southern Front that couldn't crack Kiev frontally. Barbarossa wasn't a walk in the park.

Oh I forgot to comment about this

General Winter and not being prepared for the conditions is what stopped the Germans in 41'

Balone!

 

[D Inqu]

And sure, rest is fantasy, the big "if question" is...after defeating the russian army around smolensk,

OK, stop there. The Germans inflicted a tactical defeat on the Soviets at Smolensk, but strategically it was a disaster. AG Centre could not advance any further and being stuck at Smolensk for several weeks was a problem

How much progress woudl a further advance of german army push the russians back to muscovy.

None. Zero. That was the reason for the AG Centre's stop in the first place.

Without the kiew, the possibilty that germans would be encircle muscovy in october,

Without Kiev, 500k well equipped Soviet troops keep actively pushing AG Centre's flank while it tires to advance hanging on a single decent road in the area. The Germans would not get anywhere near Moscow.

if germans would dig in ther northern and souhern front,

The Soviets simply redeploy their forces too.

gernams would stand in front of muscovy at end of september

Not a chance.

and could advance and endcircle muscovy during october

With all supplies hanging on a single road. Nope, not happening.

The troops which soviets used to counterattack the germans, reached muscovy in end of october and november.

Don't forget, you have 500k that were not encirled in Kiev, and another 100k who were not encircled north.

 

[Oakfan]

@Dark Jakkaru, @Opanashc , @D Inqu , and @Gethhunter

You have all made many validate points, and in some degree, changed my outlook on Eastern Front Red Army tactics. I think we can all agree to disagree on certain aspects.

As heated as the arguments have been, the forum is better with differant views.

 

[aqvamare]

Watch this map:

- at 1sep before kiew, germans had in south the best possible to defend line in 1941 possible.
- in north, germans were in the last line of "friendly" territory.

FIRST part:
The order from OKH was now to switch central, 400km from moskau away, and this order wasn't given at first 1.september.

Am 19. Juli 1941 befahl Hitler trotz Protesten von Halder und von Brauchitsch mit der Weisung Nr. 33 die Reduzierung der HG Mitte, welche Panzerkräfte an die HG Nord und HG Süd abgeben musste. Hintergrund war eine Konzentration auf die Ziele Leningrad und die rohstoffreiche Ukraine.

In english, at the 19.juli, after the battle of Jelnja the 16.juli, Hitler gave order against the generals in charge, to reduce the army in mid to support the arny north and south.
It stopped every big advance and pushing until the 2.october and the start of Taifun. Simply spoken, it gave the soviets 6 weeks to dig in the 400km between smolensk and moskau.

At the same time, the groups which gone south and north, traveled the distance smolensk- kiew 500km, 100km less than to moskau.

They got this troops back for the 2.10 taifun operation, so this support troops traveled 1000km in 6 weeks from smolensk to kiew and back....with all the pressure on the support lines.

SECOND Part:
possible counteroffensive at kiew:
the 500k troops, if they wanted to push against central, would open at the same moment they flank alongeside the DNEPR, and would open army group south to counterattack them. And armygroup south "would" stay in a very good situtaion to defend along side of the river for the rest of 1941. If the russian could or could not pressure from the south a attack on moskau is from this map hard to belief.


Third part:

Die Mitte Oktober einsetzende Schlammperiode mit den aufgeweichten Wegen und Straßen erwies sich bald als wirksamer Helfer der Sowjetunion im Kampf gegen die Wehrmacht. Der Nachschub der an den Angriffsoperationen unmittelbar beteiligten Divisionen sank schlagartig von 900 Tonnen täglich auf nur noch rund 20 Tonnen.

Your supply problem: Operation Taifun run 2 weeks after start in october in more or less in a no supply situation, but not because of enemy army pressure on the roads, the run into trouble simply through the weather, the bad infastructre in russia with non asphalt roads. (which germans didn't know from rest of europe) brought them high troupble in the supply roads. In my opion it was the moment germans had to cancel taifun...but they didn't, lucky for russia, and that is the resaon why Order 33 was the biggest german mistake in 1941.

Order 33 coast the german 6 weeks with good roads for supply. 6 Weeks they needed for moskau.
This changed from the 3. November and the frost period, when supply roads opened again, but germans needed 2 more weeks to bring new to supply to frontline. Or simply, there fall advantage were done with 4 weeks with horrible supply, compare to a focus armygroup centrel at 19.07 to 02.10. periode. 6 weeks wasted, plus 4 weeks bad supply from mid october to mid november are already 10weeks for soviets to dig in at moskau.

Fourth part,

10 weeks gain for soviets compare to kiew and leingrad.
You number kiew + lenigrad, 500k POW south, 100k POW in north.

Now check soviets defence gains from 19.juli to 30.november 1941 between smolensk and moskau.

At 14 to 17. oct . 663.000 POW at Wjasma and Brjansk, followed up with a mass panic in moskau between 16-18 oct.
This battle would been happen without order 33 6 weeks earlier, and it was more or less last battle in TAIFUN with good supply. 6 weeks earlier means 1.sep.1941. or still 6 weeks left with good supply. MY problem with this battle, it was a follow up battle from kiew. without kiew, you can say this battle would happen even 2 weeks more early., at mid august 1941

on the 1.oct leand and lease from UK was fixed in moskau (at this time 200km away from frontline), if they would have pushed to moskau directly, leand and lease would never support the battle of moskau

Far eastern soviet army group: the far eastern soviet army group got ther march order from vladivostok to muskau in mid august. they had to bypass 8000km and they done 750km per day. so we can say they needed 2 weeks to moskau and reached it at beginning of september. total number 700k. which now had to reoganize to be effectivly.

So germans had still a 2 week window, were moskau was mostly unprotected.

At 30.nov soviets had at moskau following numbers:
1.060.000 soilder
700 tanks and increased arterlery (no ecact number)
1.400 airplanes.

Without ORder 33, germans would be at Chimki, theere furtherst advance to moskau at 2.dez roughly 8 weeks earlier. or simply at the 2.sep.1941. or more or less the same date the gsoviet far east army reached moskau.

We would now have the situation, that germans had still a 6 weeks window with good supply, and russian had to send all there troops immediatly to defence moskau.

I simply say, with the experience from the war post 22.jun to 2.dez 1941, the germans would have encircled and POW all soviet defender at moskau if they would have reached Chimki between 2.sep and end of sep, with 2 weeks rest of good supply window.

And the soviets had an no of there border enough troops to cut of the central advance, because kiew could be stqalemate from south, and north could protect the north.

ORDER 33 from Hitler at 19.jul. 1941, cost germans the advantage at the east front they got through surprise BArbarossa.

 

[Cpt Crash]

Barbarossa, as initially envisioned, was doomed to fail--it simply was not possible. So, one question would be, why did OKW develop a plan that was impossible to execute? The plain answer is a lack of strategic intelligence on the USSR. Although there were good reports of Soviet tank production, overall, the Germans were in the dark regarding Soviet industry, infrastructure and military size.

The first 5 months of operations can be sliced up in however many ways one wants--the USSR was not gong to collapse or surrender. It was not possible in the slightest for the Axis to advance to a point to bring about victory before winter (or the rainy season that crippled the advance). Keeping units in supply was nearly impossible over the great distances on roads that vanished into pools of mud. While the actual capture of Moscow could have happened by mid October, it would have been at a trade off of other critical objectives--and great successes that were actually achieved.

The Maps presented in this thread are not quite...accurate. The fronts may be close, but those do not show the hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers that were in various pockets in the rear. Those forces were not just going to walk back to POW camps because they were cut off--nope, the German infantry had to finished those battles. The reality is that the advance of the mobile formations of AG Center was so fast that both supplies lines and the infantry armies were left far behind. Also, there is a little factor (missed by many) of equipment maintenance--armored fighting vehicles are mechanical monster that require loving care every few hours--if you want the equipment to function. Sustained operations come at a price--a big one. Although I don't have the figures, I would bet my soul that at least 25% of the panzers that went into Russia were down for mechanical problems by mid July, 1941. Add that to combat losses and you are looking at a real problem. The bottom line is that 2nd and 3rd PZ Gruops had to stop in mid July--or minimal activity to allow the infantry armies and supply to catch up. IMO, that could have been achieved by early/mid August, then an advance could have resumed towards Moscow--at great risk to the situation in the south. BTW, the Hollywood history of the road to Moscow being empty of defense is, well, Hollywood history. AT gunners and LW AA gunners of AG C claimed (and was verified by investigations from OKW) of destroying thousands of Russian tanks in August of '41. The Russian were there and were getting impatient waiting for the Germans.

IMO, Barbarossa was an incredibly successful operation for the first five months. Although more could have been done on one front or another, it would have come at a cost to some other critical area. The huge failure was not recognizing that the war against the USSR was going to take another one or two campaign seasons to complete. This led Hitler and OKW to push on for Moscow after the Vyazma operation. That laid the seeds for defeat. Had OKW sought good defensive positions at the end of October, put priority on issuing winter gear (which was not possible if supplies for another offence were moved forward) the huge losses of the winter could have been avoided--whilst Soviet losses would likely have been higher. Had this choice been made, the options for Germany would have been far less limited in 1942.

The short answer for the OP is--bad strategic intelligence on the USSR compiled by Germany. Had better information been available, Barbarossa would have had different objectives, plans, and possibly delayed or not conducted at all.

 

[Lamahorse]

If the Germans had captured Moscow, would they have severely damaged the Soviet rail infrastructure? Could the USSR have supplied their lines without the central hub of Moscow?