Why did Operation Barbarossa fail?

[Dark Jakkaru]

I gave numbers ONLY for core populations. For those numbers, it works both ways. I did not include the French, Poles, Dutch, etc in Axis numbers, did I? Yet they were there, and worked for the Reich, albeit less efficiently then Germans did.

I actually don't know what argument you're trying to make just dumping out numbers without any sort of context as if the reply itself was meant for a lazy version of a rebuttal of something I'm not aware of that was being disproven. It sounds about as same as a director having a lieutenant say "charge" in a movie and we never see what actual platoon officers actually do in the movies other than a fanciful action scene of folks getting gunned down by machine gun positions. Looks dreadfully fantastic but I have to know what's going on.

So, what are you exactly doing with your numbers?

 

[Opanashc]

So, what are you exactly doing with your numbers?

From 1942, until summer 1944, SU did not have a numerical advantage in population over the Axis. Axis had more men they could: put in uniform, work the factories, farm. And yet they were not able to win on the Eastern front. In my book, that shows that Soviet leadership was better.

 

[Oakfan]

From 1942, until summer 1944, SU did not have a numerical advantage in population over the Axis. Axis had more men they could: put in uniform, work the factories, farm. And yet they were not able to win on the Eastern front. In my book, that shows that Soviet leadership was better.

Glantz, David, The Soviet‐German War 1941–45: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, p. 9.

LOL Soviet leadership was better? Anyone in there right mind can argue German leadership was better then Soviet leadership for the simple fact they lasted so long against OVERWHELMINGLY larger numbers and equipment.

 

[Oakfan]

You read too many German memoirs.
To start: US and UK war was very much different from the war USSR fought. In 1940, British "Home Defense" forces were armed with freaking pikes, in case Wehrmacht makes it across the channel - they were literally ready to throw lives away. USSR had no such moat.
US and UK soldiers were much better equipped then those of the SU. They had more time to train their soldiers then SU. They had a much greater numerical superiority when fighting then SU, over their enemy.
Stalin did not have a break down. That's a myth, started by Soviet elite after his death, in order to throw dirt on the man - sort of like electoral campaigns of today, when you throw dirt on your opponent, to show that you are the better choice.
UK did not face "Plan Ost", it was "business as usual" for them. Not so much for SU. If you have 2 men, one is forced to fight for his job, another for his life - who will accept defeat more easily?
UK and US DID sacrifice men - ill-fated Greece expedition, Dieppe Raid, Operation Market Garden.

SU had greater numbers. That fact has been proven for decades. General Winter and not being prepared for the conditions is what stopped the Germans in 41'. Thankfully SU could get a breather and push the German back. After that, it was simple overloading the lines with man and equipment.

 

[Loke]

SU had greater numbers. That fact has been proven for decades. General Winter and not being prepared for the conditions is what stopped the Germans in 41'. Thankfully SU could get a breather and push the German back. After that, it was simple overloading the lines with man and equipment.

Yea, agreed.

 

[Zaku]

SU had greater numbers. That fact has been proven for decades. General Winter and not being prepared for the conditions is what stopped the Germans in 41'. Thankfully SU could get a breather and push the German back. After that, it was simple overloading the lines with man and equipment.

I usually don't jump in to these pointless arguements, but your post is not true a hundred percent.
The soviets fought very hard to protect their country, you can't say that they only won because of the winter.

I do agree with you on your other point that the german leadership was better, but the soviets also learned their lessons after a few years of warfare.

 

[DocMorningstar]

You read too many German memoirs.
To start: US and UK war was very much different from the war USSR fought. In 1940, British "Home Defense" forces were armed with freaking pikes, in case Wehrmacht makes it across the channel - they were literally ready to throw lives away. USSR had no such moat.

"The pike was issued as a British Home Guard weapon in 1942 after the War Office acted on a letter from Winston Churchill saying "every man must have a weapon of some kind, be it only a mace or pike". However, these hand-held weapons never left the stores after the pikes had "generated an almost universal feeling of anger and disgust from the ranks of the Home Guard, demoralised the men and led to questions being asked in both Houses of Parliament" www.home-guard.co.uk

US and UK soldiers were much better equipped then those of the SU. They had more time to train their soldiers then SU. They had a much greater numerical superiority when fighting then SU, over their enemy.

I wouldn't really say so. Soviet equipment was typically decent enough, and some of it was fairly stellar. Sure there was a lack of equipment after the cream of the soviet army got obliterated. Noone can absorb losses like that and be able to replace them at 'full quality' quickly. The training issue was only really caused by the massive losses in early Barbarossa and the need to put more bodies in the way. The soviets suffered a cascading collapse, though. The airforce got reamed, which allowed for wide-scale bombing of logistics and supply routes, which slowed down movement, and prevented reinforcement & organized retreat. The Soviets, much like the French, planned to fight a very different war than what actually emerged. The Soviets, though, had the space and manpower to recover. The fact that they did so after the disaster of early Barbarossa is amazing.

Stalin did not have a break down. That's a myth, started by Soviet elite after his death, in order to throw dirt on the man - sort of like electoral campaigns of today, when you throw dirt on your opponent, to show that you are the better choice.

Really, I don't know enough about that claim to debunk it, but I have heard, from many places that he appears to have some sort of breakdown. Whether it was a nervous breakdown, or simply a 62 year old man working himself to exhaustion, I do not know.

UK did not face "Plan Ost", it was "business as usual" for them. Not so much for SU. If you have 2 men, one is forced to fight for his job, another for his life - who will accept defeat more easily?

Undoubtedly - the average Russian soldier faced a much more grave consequence if he failed; he was quite likely to get shot, and his family and friends to boot if the Germans won. That gives motivation like none other.

UK and US DID sacrifice men - ill-fated Greece expedition, Dieppe Raid, Operation Market Garden.

There is a huge damned difference between a failure in planning/execution (which I would classify all three of those as) and simply accepting high casualties as a necessary cost of a particular operational or strategic need. The Soviets were in a terrible position, and really, I wouldn't call what they did to their troops as 'sacrifice' - at least until the later stages of the war, when they were definitely going to 'win' vs the Nazis. By that point, though, the Red Army (and the civilians back home) had become acclimated to terrible casualty rates, and basically responded with a 'well, fvck the Germans to hell with a shovel'.

Contrast that to WW1, where the threat was not as dire, and the casualty rates were much better, yet it still prompted revolution...

I usually don't jump in to these pointless arguements, but your post is not true a hundred percent.
The soviets fought very hard to protect their country, you can't say that they only won because of the winter.

Absolutely. The Red Army went head to head with the most experienced, most 'advanced' large army on the planet. They got their butts kicked for about 6 months, and managed to hold their own from that point forwards. That is outstanding performance from an army that had it's leadership gutted, and then lost so much material out of the gate. I doubt there are more than one or maybe two historical cases of suffering such terrible single-sided beatings and coming back to win.

I do agree with you on your other point that the german leadership was better, but the soviets also learned their lessons after a few years of warfare.

The germans had been field-testing their officers for a while, and at the same time the gutting of the old officer corps post WW1 allowed for 'new thinking' and skilled junior officers to advance rapidly (not to mention a rapid expansion = rapid promotion). It isn't surprising that so many good officers rose to the top. You can see the same thing in the Soviet Army post-Barbarossa, or in the US army post-Pearl. Alot of 'good' colonels etc were cooling their heels.

Ike had just made brigadier in October of '41 - by '42 he was a 3 star, and by '43 he was supreme commander. That is an insane rise in rank. Ridgway was a Colonel when the war started. Bradley was a light colonel!!!!

Eisenhower: 1 star -> 5 star (he had just made brigadier when the war started)
Ridgway: Colonel -> 2 star
Bradley: Lt. Colonel (!) -> 4 star (temp - made perm in '49)
Mark Clark: 1 star -> 3 star (he had just made brigadier when the war started)
Patton: Colonel -> 4-star
King: 3 star -> 5 star
Nimitz: 2 star -> 5 star (made flag in 38)
Halsey: 2 star -> 4 star (made flag rank in 38)
Fletcher: 2 star -> 4 star
Spruance: 2 star -> 4 star

Looking at all of those guys, they spent between 5-10 years at the rank of Colonel/Captain 'pre-war' and then rammed to the top once the ball got rolling.

You see the same thing with the Soviets, the good officers got promoted really fast.

The difference with the Germans was that they got started on serious 'wartime' promotions 2-3 years earlier than everyone else.

 

[Gethsemani]

I wouldn't really say so. Soviet equipment was typically decent enough, and some of it was fairly stellar.

Not really. Even before the war the average soldier in the Red Army got far less and more primitive equipment then soldiers in Western Armies. For most of WW2 a Soviet soldier got a pair of boots (initially felt boots, eventually most got leather boots thanks to Lend-Lease), one summer uniform or winter uniform (depending on which season it was), a combined bedroll/tent, canteen, eating utensils (a spoon and a bowl most often), a bread bag, a backsack (because it was a sack with two slings to put your arms into) two holsters for rifle clips and a rifle. This is a really spartan equipment by anyone's standards. There was a constant shortage of basic equipment like helmets, entrenching tools (which was issued to every GI, tommy and Landser) and gas masks, which were supposed to be handed out on a "in case of"-basis, just like most winter equipment.

There is a huge damned difference between a failure in planning/execution (which I would classify all three of those as) and simply accepting high casualties as a necessary cost of a particular operational or strategic need. The Soviets were in a terrible position, and really, I wouldn't call what they did to their troops as 'sacrifice' - at least until the later stages of the war, when they were definitely going to 'win' vs the Nazis. By that point, though, the Red Army (and the civilians back home) had become acclimated to terrible casualty rates, and basically responded with a 'well, fvck the Germans to hell with a shovel'.

Dieppe and Market Garden should really be considered as Generals playing casual with the lives of their soldiers though. The Dieppe Raid was so poorly planned that it is a miracle that no one canned it. When the idea is to attack a target that hasn't reconnoitered properly with a force that hasn't practiced the very particular form of attack (beach landing) under those circumstances (night) and complete an extremely ambitious goal that it doesn't have the equipment to fulfill (hold Dieppe for a "prolonged" period of time, without getting entrenching equipment), it is the military equivalent of rolling the dice and hoping for snake eyes. Why do all this? Supposedly to "show that it could be done" and to "gather intelligence". It was essentially High Command deciding to sacrifice Canadian lives so that they could see how the Germans would react to an amphibious landing.

The same goes for Market Garden, which involved Generals all deciding that a plan that relied on the relief force making extremely good time and not encountering any problems to even be able to make its' objectives and paradropping lots of paratroopers into poorly reconnoitered areas and not encountering anything but light resistance was a good plan. It was, just like Dieppe, a huge gamble and one that had so many possible failure states and potential disasters that could befall it that it was playing loosely with the lives of your soldiers. Especially when the only gain of Market Garden compared to more conservative plans was that it would get Allied forces to the German border quickly and, hopefully, "end the war by Christmas".

Both were stupid gambles, even if you only go on the information available to the responsible officers at the time, that got lots of people killed. It might be a "failure of planning", but both were extremely callous operations with very dubious benefits even if they succeeded.

The germans had been field-testing their officers for a while, and at the same time the gutting of the old officer corps post WW1 allowed for 'new thinking' and skilled junior officers to advance rapidly (not to mention a rapid expansion = rapid promotion). It isn't surprising that so many good officers rose to the top. You can see the same thing in the Soviet Army post-Barbarossa, or in the US army post-Pearl. Alot of 'good' colonels etc were cooling their heels.

This is a very good summary of the progression of the officer corps during WW2. Germany got an early start and could get good officers into high positions by 40/41 thanks to that. The Red Army and the US Army both had to do some fighting (and get rid of some officers that weren't suitable) to do the same, their problem was that they had to fight the Germans who already had gone through the same process. It is also telling that most disastrous Western Allied operations (see above) of the war were chiefly conducted or planned by British generals, where the officer corps didn't undergo the same revitalization process as it did in Germany, the USSR and USA.

 

[ggsimmonds]

Isn't everything in here really glossing around the simple fact that Barbarossa - and the general invasion of the Soviet Union - failed for the simple reason that of the two madmen willing to throw millions of lives away, Stalin had more to throw?

To put it another way, if Stalin had approached each attack and counter-attack in the same was as the Western armies, he would never keep throwomg numbers at the problem (weren't frontal-assaults still quite predominant even when the SU was on the offensive in late '44?) The UK or US would never have sacrificed men in almost so casual a manner - look at how Monty wouldn't attack until he had numerical superiority, or how much planning went into each US offensive (and the impact of each death on the national psyche). Stalin, though, lost hundreds of thousands of troops and, essentially, said 'Not to worry, here's hundreds of thousands more'. Can you imagine the UK or the US accepting losses of 100% of their initial strength and just carrying on? Of course they wouldn't. I've seen it suggested before, for example, that had the UK lost the BEF then they might have sought peace.

That's not to downplay the skill of Russian generals or the tenacity of their fighting, but Soviet losses in any campaign were generally much higher than for any other army. Had Stalin not been compliant in accepting such casualty rates then the war on the Eastern Front could have been very different. Didn't he also have a breakdown (where he was not contactable for a few days) and considered seeking peace as the Germans closed-in on Moscow?

Hitler was a lot of things but at this time he was not in Stalin's league when it came to throwing the lives of his soldiers away. That actually contradicts the consensus that he expected to march right through the SU without trouble.

Of course towards the end when defeat was assured it was different, but that is not a trait unique to madmen, I'm sure the UK would have done the same.

 

[Oakfan]

I usually don't jump in to these pointless arguements, but your post is not true a hundred percent.
The soviets fought very hard to protect their country, you can't say that they only won because of the winter.

I do agree with you on your other point that the german leadership was better, but the soviets also learned their lessons after a few years of warfare.

True, I did not mean to say ONLY winter won the war for Soviets. Trying to point out it stopped the Germans in 41'. Though it's hard to argue, if the weather did not turn foul, the German could have overrun Moscow.

 

[Kovax]

Though it's hard to argue, if the weather did not turn foul, the German could have overrun Moscow.

Not really. By the time the Germans got within distant sight of Moscow, they were already cannibalizing their support services, technical crews, and supply drivers for more riflemen at the front, because they were rapidly running out of them. It was a last-ditch desperation move on the part of Germany, because either they succeeded and forces a surrender right then and there, or else the war was lost. There was practically nothing left of the fighting arm of the army by the time winter set in, and the experienced support personnel had taken massive casualties that could not easily be replaced.

 

[redflag]

How the red army defeated germany

 

[Krafty]

Glantz, David, The Soviet‐German War 1941–45: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, p. 9.

LOL Soviet leadership was better? Anyone in there right mind can argue German leadership was better then Soviet leadership for the simple fact they lasted so long against OVERWHELMINGLY larger numbers and equipment.

So much this. The Russians lost 4 million men between June 22nd and December 1st 1941.

Yet their army went from 5.5 million to to 5.3 million.

Thats basically going from 5.5 million to 9.5 million in 6 months.

The Soviets lost their entire army, 4 times over by the end of the war.

 

[Oakfan]

Not really. By the time the Germans got within distant sight of Moscow, they were already cannibalizing their support services, technical crews, and supply drivers for more riflemen at the front, because they were rapidly running out of them. It was a last-ditch desperation move on the part of Germany, because either they succeeded and forces a surrender right then and there, or else the war was lost. There was practically nothing left of the fighting arm of the army by the time winter set in, and the experienced support personnel had taken massive casualties that could not easily be replaced.

Glad we can post our opinions. I will follow up with facts.

No where have I ever read that the Germans where down to there last man, during Operation Typhoon. Depleated, most defiantly. The operation began in Oct., by November, the coldest winter to date in Soviet Union engulfed the area. The logistics were failing miserably, mostly due to the weather and distance from their supply line, i.e. Germany. Germany had more troops (not tank or arty though) for Typhoon then the Soviets had to defend Moscow. They captured over 500,000 troops 100miles west of Moscow in Oct. alone.

Troops were lost more to the WINTER, then combat. This fact alone reinforces my original statement, winter and not being prepared for the weather, is what stopped the Germans in 41 from taking Moscow. I am NOT arguing the Germans would have won the war if Moscow was taken. In my educated opionin, a counter attack could have retaken Moscow.

Not to take away from the Soviet forces, they defiantly played a major part. But without the weather on their side, they would not have had the breathing room to build the defenses, hold the line, etc.

Where do I get my information from? I will peak over to my book shelves and read a list of books written on the subject:

Operation Typhoon: Hitler's March on Moscow, October 41, - David Stahel
Moscow 1941: A City and it People at War, - Rodric Braithwaite
Panzer Operation: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945, - Erhard Raus
The Drive on Moscow, 1941: Operation Taifun and Germany's First Great Crisis of World War II, - Niklas Zetterling

 

[Dark Jakkaru]

Not to take away from the Soviet forces, they defiantly played a major part. But without the weather on their side, they would not have had the breathing room to build the defenses, hold the line, etc.

The weather held up Soviet forces as well as the policy to stand firm was correct for the Axis forces in the winter of 41-42. The policy of the Red Army was to attack on as many sectors of the front and as many fronts as possible simultaneously. The goal being to force a break somewhere in the Axis lines which the much vaunted Siberian troops took advantage of during the counter attack out of Moscow. There's a reason why the battles of Rzhev right after the Moscow assault during January (which didn't let up until March of '43 when the Wehrmacht abandoned the salient) were named "slaughterhouse" or "meat grinder" as the weather and terrain bogged down advancing Soviet Troops into kill zones that made if very difficult point to take.

So essentially, the weather was a double edged sword for both the Wehrmacht and Soviet Army.

 

[Loke]

Yea a doubled edged sword but one army was still using summer uniforms...

 

[Oakfan]

The weather held up Soviet forces as well as the policy to stand firm was correct for the Axis forces in the winter of 41-42. The policy of the Red Army was to attack on as many sectors of the front and as many fronts as possible simultaneously. The goal being to force a break somewhere in the Axis lines which the much vaunted Siberian troops took advantage of during the counter attack out of Moscow. There's a reason why the battles of Rzhev right after the Moscow assault during January (which didn't let up until March of '43 when the Wehrmacht abandoned the salient) were named "slaughterhouse" or "meat grinder" as the weather and terrain bogged down advancing Soviet Troops into kill zones that made if very difficult point to take.

So essentially, the weather was a double edged sword for both the Wehrmacht and Soviet Army.

Yes weather affected both sides, but look at it from this perspective. Would you rather be the attacker or defender in bad weather? Soviet need time to shore up defenses and bring up more troops, using there own infrastrure. Moscow being the major hub for northern Soviet Union. The weather slowed down the attackers, bought the defenders more time. Time they would not have if the weather was a sunny 80 degrees.

You are basically proving my point by bringing up the Battle of Rzhev. The roles were reversed and the weather hampered the Soviets from successfully counterattacking the Germans.

Let me bring back my original argument.

SU had greater numbers. That fact has been proven for decades. General Winter and not being prepared for the conditions is what stopped the Germans in 41'. Thankfully SU could get a breather and push the German back. After that, it was simple overloading the lines with man and equipment.

 

[phantomrider]

I still think that this discussion is underestimating the importance of the Red Army in the German defeat. While it was not a "skilled" force in the western sense of being able to minimize the casualties it took, it was 1) very stubborn and willing to accept casualties when necessary (while at the same time significantly attriting the Germans) 2) it was well adapted to its own terrain, weather and technological advantages/disadvantages, 3) well motivated so that even after taking horrendous casualties that would have shattered almost any other army in the world (by shattered I mean giving up the fight as an institution and which the Germans counted on happening in their war plans) 4) and its skill at replacing losses and continuing to fight, learn and eventually win was something that no other army in the world could have done in that era. All this in spite of the fact that it had to worry about not only the Germans but its own political leadership taking it out.

 

[MarcoRossolini]

I still think that this discussion is underestimating the importance of the Red Army in the German defeat. While it was not a "skilled" force in the western sense of being able to minimize the casualties it took, it was 1) very stubborn and willing to accept casualties when necessary (while at the same time significantly attriting the Germans) 2) it was well adapted to its own terrain, weather and technological advantages/disadvantages, 3) well motivated so that even after taking horrendous casualties that would have shattered almost any other army in the world (by shattered I mean giving up the fight as an institution and which the Germans counted on happening in their war plans) 4) and its skill at replacing losses and continuing to fight, learn and eventually win was something that no other army in the world could have done in that era. All this in spite of the fact that it had to worry about not only the Germans but its own political leadership taking it out.

To add to that, their leadership learned, and quickly.
People deride the Red Army by saying the Germans did everything they did first. That's often true, but the Red Army did all those and more and better.

To another poster, I think the Soviet leadership was vastly superior to the German leadership. In a nutshell, Stalin was simply more pragmatic. (and to be honest, when it came down to it, the guys at the top of these Totalitarian regimes were what mattered most often enough.

 

[Oakfan]

To add to that, their leadership learned, and quickly.
People deride the Red Army by saying the Germans did everything they did first. That's often true, but the Red Army did all those and more and better.

To another poster, I think the Soviet leadership was vastly superior to the German leadership. In a nutshell, Stalin was simply more pragmatic. (and to be honest, when it came down to it, the guys at the top of these Totalitarian regimes were what mattered most often enough.

I see nothing bias coming from the STAVKA REPRESENTATIVE. But for the life of me, what facts do you have that back this up?

How is any of this define superior leadership?

1. Officer Corp was purged in the 30's as well as during the early part of The Great Patriotic War
2. Commissars (Political Officer post 42')
3. 9 million Soviet troops KIA vs 4 million German troops KIA (Eastern Front).
4. Order No. 227 or as we all know, Not one step back.........or die by your fellow comrades

Just some fine examples of superior leadership.