Seriously, I'm not an expert on the topic you are discussing but I think you got this exactly the wrong way around. You can vaguely describe his statements as fairy tales and not listening to facts, but if he says he doesn't trust your sources then it's immediately an ad-hominem attack against those historians. You can write down your opinion in a short, one-sentence-style like an absolute truth, but his opinion is completely invalid if he doesn't back everything up with complete sources. I'm not saying you are wrong about the actual content, but that discussion culture... ouch. It hurts so much that it made me write this post although I don't contribute anything to the topic.
Why did Operation Barbarossa fail?
- Thread starter Magnus Imperator Rex
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Seriously, I'm not an expert on the topic you are discussing but I think you got this exactly the wrong way around. You can vaguely describe his statements as fairy tales and not listening to facts, but if he says he doesn't trust your sources then it's immediately an ad-hominem attack against those historians. You can write down your opinion in a short, one-sentence-style like an absolute truth, but his opinion is completely invalid if he doesn't back everything up with complete sources. I'm not saying you are wrong about the actual content, but that discussion culture... ouch. It hurts so much that it made me write this post although I don't contribute anything to the topic.
But if you also consider 25 years earlier when Germany had its major force on the western front while winning over the Russians in the east. The winterwar when tiny Finland making the Russians look like incompetent clowns - maybe not so overconfident after all.
Barbarossa failed because it didnt reach its original goals.
If one only considers losses then Barbarossa was a major success.
One word: logistics.
Hitler couldn't supply the army he had, and he couldn't replace the losses he incurred as well as the Soviets could theirs. The Wehrmacht had to win a quick victory or none at all and the entire German high command knew it, even Hitler. When they failed to do so, QED war is over.
Taking Moscow or the Caucusus were irrelevant. Even if the Germans had taken the oil fields it would have been years before they could utilize the oil. That whole operation was more about denying the oil to the Soviets than it was gaining oil for the Germans. Regardless all the Soviets had to do was wait it out and let attrition decide the game, and that's exactly what they did, with some spectacular victories of their own due to German desperation and hubris.
Hitler couldn't supply the army he had, and he couldn't replace the losses he incurred as well as the Soviets could theirs. The Wehrmacht had to win a quick victory or none at all and the entire German high command knew it, even Hitler. When they failed to do so, QED war is over.
Taking Moscow or the Caucusus were irrelevant. Even if the Germans had taken the oil fields it would have been years before they could utilize the oil. That whole operation was more about denying the oil to the Soviets than it was gaining oil for the Germans. Regardless all the Soviets had to do was wait it out and let attrition decide the game, and that's exactly what they did, with some spectacular victories of their own due to German desperation and hubris.
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Hitler's megalomania was not yet manifest in 1941. Yes, he interfered a lot in the dealings of the military, but in 1941 he was still listening to his generals. The simple truth is that even German High Command was not some hive mind and many generals held very different ideas on what was the proper way to conduct a war. Those that didn't get their way simply took the chance after the war to "explain" that had they only gotten their way Germany would have won. It is classical ego and boasting, nothing more.
And what would have happened if hundreds of thousands of veteran Red Army soldiers would have been allowed to stick around on AGC's southern flank while they rushed towards Moscow? Leaving sizable enemy forces to threaten your flank is always a grievous strategical mistake and that's why the OKH ordered the destruction of Red Army forces in Ukraine, because had AGC instead rushed towards Moscow the Red Army might have been the one doing the encircling of AGC and not the other way around.
Order no. 227 ("Not One Step Back") wasn't issued until July 1942. In fact, the first reaction of the Red Army was to fall back on its' pre-war doctrine and training, which called for immediate and forceful counter-attacks. This was the norm for most of 1941, that wherever Germany advanced the Red Army would inevitably counter-attack in force with everything available. It was a costly and fruitless strategy and can certainly help explain the extreme Soviet losses, but it also bogged down the German advance in constant battles and is ultimately responsible for the August and November "resupply stops" that the Wehrmacht had to perform because their forces were simply ground down, exhausted and out of supplies due to the constant fighting.
The Red Army won its' first major victories before the major lend-lease shipments started (Lend-Lease really took off in 1943 and was a mere pittance in 1941). Don't get me wrong, Lend-Lease undoubtedly shortened the war and saved lots of Soviet lives, but everything suggests that the USSR could have won the Great Patriotic War anyway, albeit with far more casualties and over a longer time.
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This is incredibly important and a very salient point.
Even when these counter attacks were horrific failures, they did two things.
They killed Germans, and they slowed the Germans down.
In those first 6 months, the German military was losing the bulk of the NCO corps, irreparable losses. On top of that, there was the general bleeding of manpower which Germany simply couldn't afford to lose which the Soviets could.
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Are you actually suggesting that Glantz isn't one of the best WW2 historians to ever grace us? Someone who believes from my understanding that the USSR would have won the war alone, without any help. Someone who is arguably the greatest champion for revising history to reflect it as it actually was, not as German generals, NATO generals, and western historians buying into propaganda told it.
How do we know Glantz isn't biased? Simple, he calls it like he sees it, and because he has drawn attention to many battles Soviet historians have attempted to white-wash, he has become a somewhat unpopular person. This isn't about slant, or bias, it's about truth, and Glantz is one of the best we've got, Russian or American.
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I've made some fairly lengthy, in depth posts regarding exactly this subject. Dates, figures, etc.
Even without "outside assistance", the Axis Belligerents did not cause the break up of the Soviet Union (not just Russia) with its great mass continued to fight against the invasion made up basically of everyone in the Union.
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I don't think the idea of an invasion of the USSR itself was overconfidence. I disagree with those that say it was too ambitious of a plan. It was definitely a bold move, but this isn't sealion we are talking about.
But I do think the Germans were overconfident in their planning and execution of the invasion. A lot of people are citing logistics and rightfully so, but I think that too is related to being overconfident. Hitler calling an audible mid-campaign was a significant mistake as well, and it displays how he overrated his tactical genius.
The Germans did not expect Soviet resistance to be so strong (who could resist the Third Reich amiright?) but it was. That is what brought the logistical problems to light.
With respect, saying it failed because it did not reach its original goals is akin to saying you lost a soccer match because you didn't score more goals than the opponent. Well yeah, that is what failed means, but it doesn't get to the why of it.
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I agree Glantz is great. His books are great.
I also agree that the Soviet Union would have won the war by themselves. By Jun/Jul 1944 they had pushed the Axis back to their starting points and that's just when the other Allies were getting started in France.
I also agree that the Soviet Union would have won the war by themselves. By Jun/Jul 1944 they had pushed the Axis back to their starting points and that's just when the other Allies were getting started in France.
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I posted this some pages ago...
Some reasons Barbarossa failed in 1941:
* The delayed start of Barbarossa because of Yugoslavia & Greece campaign.
* Mud season in the fall, turning the roads into mudpits.
* Crappy Russian roads/different railroad size, no asphalt.
* The Finns desicion to stop advancing on different front regions starting in august.
* The German lack of winter clothing & winter equipment.
* The German underestimant of the size of the Russian army.
* Richard Sorges intelligence; that Japan was not gonna attack Russia, it allowed Russia to transfer 18 fresh divisions, 1,700 tanks, and over 1,500 aircraft from Siberia to the Moscow area to be used in the battle of Moscow starting in october 1941, used to attack the now exhausted German troops.
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I posted this some pages ago...
Some reasons Barbarossa failed in 1941:
* The delayed start of Barbarossa because of Yugoslavia & Greece campaign.
Why do people keep posting this? Barbarossa couldn't have been launched significantly earlier even had the Germans not been involved in those campaigns. The weather simply wouldn't have allowed it.
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That is correct. The reason people keep posting it is because it was sourced 50 years ago and almost every historian has quoted that source since (that doesn't mean it's true though).
Well, they could have started two weeks earlier. They would have just spent two weeks with tank recovery vehicles trying to get panzers and trucks out of the mud.
Yeah. Now we would be talking about why Hitler should have wait for two more weeks.Well, they could have started two weeks earlier. They would have just spent two weeks with tank recovery vehicles trying to get panzers and trucks out of the mud.
Resulting in getting not one, but 2 "mud seasons" in 41 East campaign. Only that gives SU more time to mobilize and deploy troops where needed.
Happens every year. Whole idea of Barbarossa was to win the war before that happens.
Was evident from way before the war. In Russia there is a saying, centuries old - "we got 2 problems - idiots and roads, and one is constantly trying to solve the other".
Finns were in it for their own benefit. They were not equipped to storm a big city like Leningrad.
Once again - Barbarossa was to finish before that.
Only sound reason in the post.
Transfer started before hand, also Far Eastern Front was forming new divisions as it sent its original ones, so Tokyo's reply to Berlin was "nope, SU still has as many troops facing us as before". Red Army kept one million men facing Japan through the entire war, using them as training formations, but nevertheless, they were there.
Also, if Japan attacked SU, only thing affected would be LL though Vladivostok. If you think Germans had it bad with roads, in the most developed part of USSR, think of how Japan would have fared in Siberia, where there are NO roads period. Even in China the road network was much better, simply due to number of people living there.
Overall, your reasons suggest, that German High Command was full of idiots, who had zero clue about the weather, size and infrastructure of USSR.
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The importance of the delay is still debated.[61]William Shirer argued that Hitler's Balkans Campaign had delayed the commencement of Barbarossa by several weeks and thereby jeopardized it.[62] He cited the deputy chief of the German General Staff in 1941 Friedrich Paulus, who claimed the campaign resulted in a delay of "about five weeks."[63] This figure is corroborated by both the German Naval War Diary and Gerd von Rundstedt.[63]Antony Beevornames a variety of factors that delayed Barbarossa, including the delay in distributing motor transport, problems with fuel distribution, and the difficulty in establishing forward airfields for the Luftwaffe.[64]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa
This is one reason why its still being posted.
Single most important reason why Barbarossa failed was that the Wehrmacht and the Axis Belligerents didn't expect an army that would take OVER five hundred thousand casualties would continue to fight after absorbing another loss of a half a million men (500,000 was the estimate alone when Guderian's Panzers swept from Smolensk south to cut the Kiev forces and encircle a good chunk of the Red Army) would continue to fight tooth and nail to the winter at the gates of Moscow. I think people truly underestimate the staggering losses on the Eastern Front in the first five months of the War (22 June - 22 November).
Arguing about whether two weeks, 1 month, or two does not erase or diminish the fighting capability of the Red Army. It just means in the final equation that the Wehrmacht would have less mechanized troops since the French Campaign didn't end until 25 June 40!! The Axis belligerents had less than 1 year before Barbarossa and folks still expect up to the present that Barbarossa was winnable.
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In fairness to the axis though, who should expect that? It is staggering when you think of it. The Germans inflicted 4 million casualties and yet failed.