I go away for a few days and the thread has ballooned, so I'll just do a quick summary regarding the Panther:
First of all the problem with the German Army from 1943 onwards was not that their tanks were incapable of achieving a 3:1 or better kill ratio (indeed, the battle I mentioned involving 11th Panzer Division trouncing an entire Soviet tank army involved a Panzer Division equipped with Mark IIIs and IVs only).
The issue instead was that there was simply an enormous paucity of armored and anti-tank equipment for the German army as a whole. There were a hundred infantry Divisions, who maybe had a company of open-topped assault guns apiece; supported by a mere dozen or so Panzer Divisions. Against this, the Allies typically had two or more
battalions of tanks per infantry Division,
in addition to their armored Divisions which was closer to 1 in 5 of their Divisions.
Hence, the idea that a super tank would reverse Germany's fortunes were forlorn. What Germany needed was more tanks and anti-tank guns to counter the mechanization of the Allied forces.
The Panther moreover was in fact a disaster from a doctrinal perspective. The Panzer Division was not an anti-tank force. That title belongs specifically to the PAnzerjaeger abteilung - literally "Tank Hunter Battalion" - which were spread throughout the German army at the Divisional level and up. The role of the Panzer Division was instead to counter-attack and retake ground, or to lead offensive operations. A tank that is superior at anti-armor statistics but is only capable of driving 150 km before breaking down does
not fit the Panzer Division's mission profile.
Moreover, the Reichmarks cost of the Panther - which is supposedly only slightly more expensive than the Mk IV - is in fact a fabrication that is part of the propaganda effort to play up the Panther as a placebo to the German Army's real problem. The Panther is a 45 ton machine requiring a far more complex engine than a 25 ton Panzer IV. It is 50% more expensive from steel costs alone, exacerbated by inefficient machining which meant you actually likely needed 60 tons of steel instead of 25 tons to make a Panther. The only reason it costs so little Reichmarks is because of creative accounting - the sort done by Enron to fool investors and the sort done by Speer to make himself look good to Hitler.
Finally, and most damagingly, the entire narrative of "The US Army was unprepared for the Panther" was a fabrication, a combined effort by post-war Germany trying to play up its role in NATO, British historians who like to pretend that their tanks weren't awful and that the Firefly was a stroke of genius instead of just being a slightly worse Easy 8, and Belton Cooper + History Channel American historians who want to pretend that the American soldier was so disadvantaged and thus worthy of hero worship.
Why is this narrative a fabrication? Because while Cooper & Ambrose correctly claim that half of the Panzers in Normandy were Panthers, almost
none were deployed against the US Army!
Order of Battle re-examinations will reveal that the American Army faced only a single unit - the Panzer-Lehr Division - equipped with Panthers until the Cobra breakout. And this Division was not even fighting the Americans until one whole month after the invasion (and during this month 300+ American tanks had already been lost or damaged - mainly to towed anti-tank guns, artillery, and Stugs) - and the Panzer-Lehr's first combat deployment of Panthers in early July was an utter fiasco leading to 25% losses and the Americans capturing several Panthers. The captured Panthers, when tested against the 76mm guns of the M10 tank destroyers, proved just as vulnerable as they proved to be against the Firefly.
Indeed, the Americans would consistely
massacre Panther formations when they encountered them, and this is not mere exaggeration. Das Reich was obliterated by one battalion of National Guardsmen at Mortain. Two entire Panther brigades were annihilated in southern France, despite outnumbering the Shermans 3:1. And the Bulge was an utter fiasco for most of the German armor-on-armor engagements even before the Panthers ran out of fuel.
This is again why the Stug and Mk IV were in fact the best German AFVs. They worked. They actually killed real enemies instead of the imaginary kill counts of SS fanfiction.
Part of that was an intelligence conclusion that wasn't necessarily completely wrong but not completely right. We now know today, the US had liaison officers in the Soviet Union so they *knew* the Germans fielded both Panthers and Tigers at Kursk and have a rough estimation of their capabilities.
The thing is the Soviets were never impressed with the Panther. The first encounter of Panthers at Kursk was an utter fiasco, with the Panthers breaking down by the end of the first week of combat. Grossdeutchland, supposedly the best Wermacht Division, was apparently completely out of Panthers after the first day because the commander sent the Panthers into a minefield.
The Soviets respected the Tiger, and only the Tiger, but because of its performance at Third Kharkov in Feb/Mar rather than at Kursk. This was they developed the SU-152, which was actually fielded in the northern area of Kursk specifically to counter the Tigers (it turned out the Tigers were in the south).
It was only post-war German fanboy accounts that made the Soviets impressed of the Panther, with such nonsense ideas like the Soviets upgunning the T-34 to the 85mm gun because of the Panther, despite the fact that the T-34/85mm project pre-dated their first encounter against Panthers at Kursk.
Question for those more knowledgeable than me about British tanks:
Why didn't the British have domestic tanks with the firepower of a Sherman Firefly in production in time to equip Monty for Normandy? I mean, the Cromwell was in use by Normandy, but looking at the time frame of British tanks, it almost looks like the British didn't learn from their experiences in North Africa. The Churchill, Matilda, and Comet all seem... odd given British experiences in the war up until then.
Were they just a little slow in getting certain designs out the door, or was there still some kind of strong infantry/cruiser tank lobby at work even in 43?
The Brits were just bad at designing tanks, as the economy was oriented towards naval designs. British industry moreover was terribly backward by the 30s - too many old factories refusing or unable to modernize. They actually had the Challenger which was supposed to be a British 17 pounder tank, but it was unreliable compared to the Sherman hence dropped in favor of the American vehicle.
As for the infantry-cavalry tank thing... it wasn't until the Centurion that they finally got the bright idea to drop the split. It was partly political - the cavalry branch (who wanted the cruisers) were still at loggerheads with the Royal Armored and infantry (who wanted infantry-support tanks, albeit not necessarily Churchill-type tanks anymore) as late as 1944 and it wasn't going to get resolved due to the cavalry's political clout overriding the Royal Armored and infantry's good common sense.
It's also the reason why, save for the 7th Armored, the British lagged far behind the Americans, Germans, and Soviets in terms of "battlegroup" formations. By this point the Germans had their Kampfgruppes, the Americans the equivalent "Combat Command" or "Task Force", and the Soviets had the "Forward Detachment" - all battalion/regiment-sized formations with a mix of infantry, armor, and artillery. The Brits by contrast insisted on seperating the tanks and infantry and have the Divisions "cooperate" instead, which in the case of the cavalry-minded armored Divisions meant "charge off into the sunset without infantry support so they can get massacred by German 88s". Epsom and Goodwood were the results; yet despite this the politicking continued and it was 7th Armored's officers who got sacked for a relatively minor defeat at Villers-Bocage (20 British tanks lost) while the cavalry officers were exonerated for Goodwood (a hundred British tanks lost).
The Centurion was in large part given a greenlight because the cavalry "charge into the sunset" ideas had finally been totally discredited by Market-Garden. The problem thereafter was the British historians pretending that the Centurion was some kind of revolutionary design; when in reality everyone else had already dropped the cruiser/infantry split years before the British did and made much more effective tanks because of it. Really, that such a belated design like the Centurion gets so much good press owes much to English-speaking audiences refusing to take to task (or even just recognize) the massive amount of nationalistic whitewashing done by British historians.
No it wasn't
It was created as an anti aircraft weapon, hence its name "Flugabwehrkanone" (air defense cannon), or Flak for short.
It was discovered to be an excellent anti tank gun during the SCW, and the Germans improved the original Flak 18 to the Flak 36, which was designed as you described (more mobile carriage, telescopic sight for engaging ground targets, AP ammunition, etc etc). Still, they were a defensive and last ditch weapon in 1940, Rommel deployed them along with his artillery in a "last line of defense" to stop the Matilda attack at Arras only when everything else had failed.
Later of course, in Africa the 88 became a fixture in Rommel's tactics, probably because his tank guns were about as successful in stopping the Matilda as harsh language or a tennis ball would be
The 88 already had the dual-purpose carriage during the Spanish Civl War. It was always designed from the beginning to be dual-purpose.
Again, this is another "British historian myth" because they like to pretend the Germans were unsportsmanlike for "resorting desperately to 88mm guns" to stop their Matilda tanks at Arras, when in reality had the British done their homework they would have known the 88 was already a superb AT gun even during the SCW.
The Brits frankly fought the most incompetently in the war, even accounting for the huge losses suffered by the Soviets at Barbarossa, simply because their military leaders refused to do their homework and insisted on bad ideas (e.g. cruiser tanks). This is why the craziest of the crazy Allied projects - the iceberg aircraft carrier - is a British invention. The Americans at worst only tried turning cats into guidance systems.
TheBrits moreover had so few excuses for all the obvious mistakes they made; yet they're constantly given a pass because of the biased narratives their historians spin (most especially Churchill and his "Second World War" series which is still treated as a historical account instead of Churchill's editted version to glorify himself and Britain)
Also, I don´t buy the "build moar Panzer IV and win the war" POV. Think it´s totally false. Do you know how many AT guns could knock down a Panzer IV? Hint: a LOT. Even the relatively crappy gun of the T34 41 could do it.
Germany was done regardless by 1943. The thing to remember however, is that war is not about anti-tank gun vs tank combat. The fact that the Mk IV was inferior to the T-34 in 1943 did not stop Balck from trouncing an entire Soviet Tank Army using only 1 Division.
It is in fact much more about maneuver, which is why the single greatest cause of tank losses is mechanical failure - more than all combat loss causes combined. War is not necessarily won by winning battles. In fact it is increasingly clear that those who keep seeking direct combat are the ones who keep losing.
This is why the sane successor to the Mk IV was the 35 ton VK3002DB. It at least had the same mechanical reliability as equivalent Allied designs while getting over the issues of the aging Mk IV (of which lack of armor never was one - since the best protection was to not be seen in the first place).
Agreed. The "best" choice would be to mass produce StuG's/Jagdpanzer IV's and Panthers with Schmalturms (Ausf. F).
I don't mean to get off track, but what was the plan for the Schmalturm to be equipped with? I heard that it was supposed to be the 88mm KwK L/71, but that sounds like a complete fantasy (like the Jagdpanzer IV being modified to fit the 88mm KwK L/56). Does anyone have any info on this?
Much as I like the Panzer IV S, it was impractical. The Mk IV was already terribly overweight even in the F2 or H configuration with the long gun, and adding the Panther turret just made it worse. They really needed a larger design at this point if they wanted a bigger gun.
The real question though is whether or not a bigger gun was all that necessary. The L48 in fact could take on pretty much all Allied armor, and had trouble only against a tiny handful of Churchill and IS-2 tanks, which could still be killed by 88s anyway. This was a big reason why the Jagdpanzer IV's entire conception and deployment was questioned even within the German army in the first place.
