Who says the Allies can't make monster tanks

[f1nalstand17]

Best choice they could make, is to not produce Panther at all, as it was worse than Pz4 unit for unit.

Sorry, but that's simply quite wrong. The Panzer IV was at the end of its (development) line in 1944/1945, it's chassis was already over-burdened and the tank itself was simply out-dated, and any further development ended with nothing since it simply wasn't possible (Pz. IV with Schmalturm anyone?). The Panther (albeit with some reliability issues that weren't exactly ironed out, but for the most part "fixed"by the end of the war) was still being developed by the end of the war, and was a much better tank in comparison to the late-model Pz. IV. This fact is further highlighted by the price per vehicle, which was ~103,00 RM for a Pz. IV and only ~117,00 RM for a Panther.

Also, Im not versed with the statistics of both of the tanks, but did the source where you got this from specifically compare the late model Pz. IV to the late model Panther?

 

[Chromos]

@Midden
I agree that being on the offense is harder then, even more if the enemy has air superiority and prepared positions.
But nonetheless, afaik GER tanks did some few succesfull attacks, as also other nations. Losses were of course higher.

I also think that if US Divs had used Persing instead of M4's, they had far less losses and faster breakthroughs.
Even with less reliability, if GER could keep tanks in the field, US would have been able much more so maybe.



@NikephorosSonar
At Kursk, that might be not surprising as at that battle GER was advancing into very well prepared defense lines in deep.





@f1nalstand17
True, the F might have come, but already PantherII was dropped and incorporated in PantherI(G) for setting up new standards, well who knows what would have happened hwo fast.
And the Schmalturm was really a design concept. From Krupp for TigerII, I have to correct myself here. Both turrets for Henschel and Porsche Tiger II designs were done by Krupp. And for Panther it was Rheinmetall for PantherII and Daimler-Benz for Panther I.

PzIV main reason was added firepower maybe, and also streamline production, But it is written that turret was too heavy for PzIv.
And also yes, the turret design for Porsche KT was harder to produce and also had a problem with shots ricochet from the turret to the top of the tank when mounted on Henschel chassis.
The Porsche chassis is kind of different in some ways, turret is at front or at the back of the tank, while at Henschel it is in the middle as we know it. Don't know if it had the same ricochet problem. After all the turret was designed for that chassis, but well, more tanks had that ricochet problem and it could be solved later on with some changes.


@Lech Kaczynski
Right.
It may be interesting that Patton was fine with the M4 too in regard to the doctrine used.
He thought this way about usage:
If enemy tanks are encountered. Fog is to be leayed at once, tanks should withdraw.
For that task one tank should have loaded a white phosphor grenade at all times.
(That rings a bell why maybe the M4's that disabled the KT had used that white phsophor that quick.. )

Than TD should called in, CAS, or ART should finish off the enemy tanks.
Once that is done, Own tanks should advance again.
He also argued about that many times the TF are hold to far behind, and that they should instead follow up the initial thrust etc..
That is quite along the doctrine of US forces of that day.

But thats different to GER/SOV, where tanks were seen to clear the situation with the other units around end engage the enemy.
And I think, with a different tank like the Pershing or having even a heavy "like a M-103" around would have changed the US way of tank usage.
At least with Pershing at hand later, US-tankers were not waiting for Art/CAS that much anymore but advancing on its own.



@1alexey
Do you have numbers about the M4's in stock/depot of that times?



@Dark Jakkaru
Agree here mostly.
TigerII, only build ~500..
And afaik at West Front only about below 500 Panthers at all time. As Allied Intel likely knowed that, they might have seen no need at the strategic lvl until the reports from units got more "demanding".

 

[Dark Jakkaru]

He maybe including over the long run of the war situation rather than a specific year. After all, the Panther wasn't really combat effective until mid-44, a year after its debut, and only "just". The design had a very short development cycle of just 1 year and had massive defects to the point it was a failure at Kursk. There is no way around it, it failed to do the job it was supposed to do no matter how much flowering comments were made about its combat debut. The final drive being a chief mobility failure with the vehicle was never enough time to properly design then produce that to correct in the Production Panthers. Therefore, the Panther could not effectively flank with it's speed like you can see clearly in the Kummersdorf testing footage going 40 kph which makes such a vehicle look phenomenal.

Now the idea of needing a Panther has merit since the trend was to have Medium Tanks in that mobility and armored range with a very good gun. The T-44 wasn't that far off from the T-34 which would have corrected the many things that held the T-34 design back. Not only that, the T-54 was just coming to fruition so you will see the challenges involved coming mid '45 going into '46. Then the British with the Centurion also puts pressure on the West given how good that design is meeting the new maturity in tank development in '45.

So now it is a question of when rather than if. The Panther would have been *needed* if the war was going into '45 to '46, that's for certain given the wide success the T-54/55 series is and how prolific those designs were. However, the Panther wasn't an effective design in '43 of its debut as was just too early of a design. I believe what is being suggested was that if the Panzer IV was mass produced during '43-44 to give time for the Panther to mature properly it might not have been as much of a waste of resources and could have done much to stabilize the Wehrmacht's dire situations mid-'43 to '44.

 

[f1nalstand17]

He maybe including over the long run of the war situation rather than a specific year. After all, the Panther wasn't really combat effective until mid-44, a year after its debut, and only "just". The design had a very short development cycle of just 1 year and had massive defects to the point it was a failure at Kursk. There is no way around it, it failed to do the job it was supposed to do no matter how much flowering comments were made about its combat debut. The final drive being a chief mobility failure with the vehicle was never enough time to properly design then produce that to correct in the Production Panthers. Therefore, the Panther could not effectively flank with it's speed like you can see clearly in the Kummersdorf testing footage going 40 kph which makes such a vehicle look phenomenal.

Now the idea of needing a Panther has merit since the trend was to have Medium Tanks in that mobility and armored range with a very good gun. The T-44 wasn't that far off from the T-34 which would have corrected the many things that held the T-34 design back. Not only that, the T-54 was just coming to fruition so you will see the challenges involved coming mid '45 going into '46. Then the British with the Centurion also puts pressure on the West given how good that design is meeting the new maturity in tank development in '45.

So now it is a question of when rather than if. The Panther would have been *needed* if the war was going into '45 to '46, that's for certain given the wide success the T-54/55 series is and how prolific those designs were. However, the Panther wasn't an effective design in '43 of its debut as was just too early of a design. I believe what is being suggested was that if the Panzer IV was mass produced during '43-44 to give time for the Panther to mature properly it might not have been as much of a waste of resources and could have done much to stabilize the Wehrmacht's dire situations mid-'43 to '44.

I agree, at Kursk the Panther was largely a failure, but as the war progressed and the Panther matured, it became quite effective. In regards to the mass-production of the Pz. IV for the Panther to mature, I largely agree, but at this point the Wehrmacht needed a new medium tank fast, and the Panther (especially Ausf. F) was what they needed until the E series started production.

 

[Lech Kaczynski]

@Lech Kaczynski
Right.
It may be interesting that Patton was fine with the M4 too in regard to the doctrine used.
He thought this way about usage:
If enemy tanks are encountered. Fog is to be leayed at once, tanks should withdraw.
For that task one tank should have loaded a white phosphor grenade at all times.
(That rings a bell why maybe the M4's that disabled the KT had used that white phsophor that quick.. )

Than TD should called in, CAS, or ART should finish off the enemy tanks.
Once that is done, Own tanks should advance again.
He also argued about that many times the TF are hold to far behind, and that they should instead follow up the initial thrust etc..
That is quite along the doctrine of US forces of that day.

But thats different to GER/SOV, where tanks were seen to clear the situation with the other units around end engage the enemy.
And I think, with a different tank like the Pershing or having even a heavy "like a M-103" around would have changed the US way of tank usage.
At least with Pershing at hand later, US-tankers were not waiting for Art/CAS that much anymore but advancing on its own.

This is where I must respectfully disagree. The Germans and Soviets did not have similar doctrines associated with tank usage or deployment. I find myself somewhat of an expert on ruski mentality (my wife was and forever will be a soviet), what I can tell you is that they developed their tanks and their doctrine out of necessity. They were responding to the onslaught of Germans, and in a very simple way their doctrines reflected their limited abilities. Linear mentality, straightforward solutions, if German have tank that we cannot penetrate, build a larger tank. One of the reasons they have so much pride is that they know they performed poorly, and used horribly costly doctrines, but they have no other options available to them. If Soviets had better options, better co-ordination, better combined arms tactics, would they have chosen the path they did and doctrines?

The USA had to fight a very different non linear type of battle. How could they have invaded Sicily with large tanks, how were they going to get them on this island for example? In most of these invasion scenarios, the ports were heavily fortified for the simple fact it was easy to bring material into a country by them. Why did Americans invade Normandy instead of Calais for example, it would have cost many. People say, everyone mentions bringing them by boat, I simply don't think people have thought it through long enough. There was not an infinite number of ports and places to bring them to the shore, second those places where you could easily transport them too were heavily fortified. Later it was possible for them to bring larger and larger tanks through ports, but it took them a long time to secure a port of entry in Europe, and let us not even consider the Pacific theatre. It would be possible if they fought like Soviets, but the casualties and the length of time it took them would have increased. Would it have made sense for them to poor more money into the development of heavy tanks and not their air force? I doubt it.

Let me ask you this, when would the Americans have fought a huge drawn out tank battle like Kursk? Would they have ever needed to do so with air superiority? The Germans would have been annihilated by air, before the American heavy tanks ever reached the battle.

What I am trying to say is that each of the major players, they developed their doctrines in response to conditions and lessons they learned from the battle field. If situations and conditions different, they would have required different tactics.

 

[Beagá]

Please, no Pantherpocalypse. Want to talk about the thing do it in the history fórum.

Wasn´t technically the Char Bis a monster tank? It was heavier than anything the germans had. People talk as if anyone could have a Tiger equivalent by 1941, that´s silly. EVERYONE had to learn how to do better tanks and that takes time.

 

[f1nalstand17]

Please, no Pantherpocalypse. Want to talk about the thing do it in the history fórum.

What's Pantherpocalypse? Simply stating that the Panther became better as its development progressed and that it wasn't completely horrible like the Maus and to an extent the KT?

 

[frolix42]

Also, Im not versed with the statistics of both of the tanks, but did the source where you got this from specifically compare the late model Pz. IV to the late model Panther?

Virtually the only, certainly the most popular, source on this forum used to diminish the Panther.
http://worldoftanks.com/en/news/pc-browser/21/chieftains-hatch-french-panthers/

The article is actually a good source, mostly if you avoid using it to jump to conclusions (i.e. claiming the article shows the Panther as a "bad" or "good" tank)

It says plenty of good things about the Panther. Particularly about it's gun, accuracy, stabilization and suspension.

In all cases, the great range of the gun should be exploited to the fullest. Fire can commence at a range of 2000 meters with considerable accuracy. The majority of hits were accomplished at a range of 1400 to 2000 meters. The ammunition expenditure was relatively low; on the average the fourth or fifth shot found its mark, even when using HE shells.

This observation describes the aspect that American (and Soviet) tankers feared most in the Panther. Its gun was accurate and powerful at long ranges, and its armor protected it from return fire. In close quarters the Panther could often be out-maneuvered, despite its engine power and speed. But if faced across open fields, the Panther was a fierce adversary.

When firing off a round the chassis demonstrates no unfavorable reaction, regardless of what position the turret is in.

The Panther was a large vehicle. The suspension provided very good stability. Some tanks demonstrate adverse effects from firing, particularly when firing to the sides. But not the Panther.

Mostly their argument boils down to the fact the final drive (and only the final drive) was very prone to breakdowns.

The truly weak spot of the Panther is its final drive, which is of too weak a design and has an average fatigue life of only 150 km.

It takes only one weak link to break a chain. The Panther had many fine qualities. But here we find a severe weakness.

For obvious reasons the French couldn't easily manufacture final drive replacements for the Panther in 1949, therefore according to this school of thought this shows the Panther was a bad tank for the Germans in 1944.

Other than that...

The parts of the power train (with the exception of the final drive) meet the planned fatigue life. The replacement of a transmission requires less than a day.

These comments, from operational experience, highlight that many aspects of the Panther were in fact quite comparable in reliability to American or British contemporaries. (Chieftain's Note: As an aside, when on the 'phone with Tom Jentz, he was quite adamant about the fact that though the M4 had a huge reputation for reliability, there was no documentary evidence to prove this. In all fairness, I have not seen any either: We'd be looking for a 'mean time between failures' figure. Operational Readiness rates, for example (eg Xth Armor Battalion had 99 working tanks out of 100 on any particular day) may simply reflect the efficiency of the supply chain or ease of repair work to commonly failing components, not the chance that the tank will break down to begin with. Not having seen such, I take no firm position.)

The_Chieftain is pretty insightful, pointing out the fact that the Allies had a superior supply chain and could repair faulty components relatively quickly. It is very possible that the M-26 Pershing when it was first introduced had a similar engine failure rate as the Panther. This is not to say the M-26 was "bad", it is to say that all new tanks have reliability issues and Germany by 1944 did not have the resources to handle this.

Please, no Pantherpocalypse. Want to talk about the thing do it in the history fórum.

I hope we get something game related to talk about soon. Just filling f1nalstand17 on the story so far. Also the previous assertion that the Panther was anywhere near as expensive to manufacture as the Tiger I or Tiger II deserves to be addressed.

 

[f1nalstand17]

Virtually the only, certainly the most popular, source on this forum used to diminish the Panther.
http://worldoftanks.com/en/news/pc-browser/21/chieftains-hatch-french-panthers/

The article is actually a good source, mostly if you avoid using it to jump to conclusions (i.e. claiming the article shows the Panther as a "bad" or "good" tank)

It says plenty of good things about the Panther. Particularly about it's gun, accuracy, stabilization and suspension.


Mostly their argument boils down to the fact the final drive (and only the final drive) was very prone to breakdowns.


For obvious reasons the French couldn't manufacture final drive replacements in 1949, therefore according to this school of thought this shows the Panther was a bad tank for the Germans in 1944.

Other than that...

The_Chieftain is pretty insightful, pointing out the fact that the Allies had a superior supply chain and could repair faulty components relatively quickly. The M-26 Pershing probably had the same engine failure rate as the Panther did. This is not to say the M-26 was "bad", it is to say that all new tanks have reliability issues and Germany by 1944 did not have the resources to handle this.

Just filling f1nalstand17 on the story so far. Also the previous assertion that the Panther was anywhere near as expensive to manufacture as the Tiger I or Tiger II deserves to be addressed.

Very interesting article, thank you.

The_Chieftain is pretty insightful, pointing out the fact that the Allies had a superior supply chain and could repair faulty components relatively quickly. The M-26 Pershing probably had the same engine failure rate as the Panther did. This is not to say the M-26 was "bad", it is to say that all new tanks have reliability issues and Germany by 1944 did not have the resources to handle this.

Very good point, and I agree with this completely. Does anyone know if the E-50 would face the same reliability problems of the Panther and Tiger or would its "just enough weight" save it from these nightmares? Or does nobody really have an idea since no prototype was ever built?

 

[tommylotto]

Not to throw a bone between fighting dogs, but here are some tank strength, loss and repair numbers for US 3rd Armored Division.
http://niehorster.orbat.com/013_usa/44-06-06_Neptune/44_tank-strengths/3_AD.htm

 

[1alexey]

Sorry, but that's simply quite wrong. The Panzer IV was at the end of its (development) line in 1944/1945, it's chassis was already over-burdened and the tank itself was simply out-dated, and any further development ended with nothing since it simply wasn't possible (Pz. IV with Schmalturm anyone?). The Panther (albeit with some reliability issues that weren't exactly ironed out, but for the most part "fixed"by the end of the war) was still being developed by the end of the war, and was a much better tank in comparison to the late-model Pz. IV. This fact is further highlighted by the price per vehicle, which was ~103,00 RM for a Pz. IV and only ~117,00 RM for a Panther.

It was in no way "fixed". You may want to check out a number of treads on the subject on this forum for further evidence.

Also, Im not versed with the statistics of both of the tanks, but did the source where you got this from specifically compare the late model Pz. IV to the late model Panther?

It fought worse against allies in late 1944 than Pz4 serving beside it.

He maybe including over the long run of the war situation rather than a specific year. After all, the Panther wasn't really combat effective until mid-44, a year after its debut, and only "just".

And it still didn`t even match Pz4.

Wasn´t technically the Char Bis a monster tank? It was heavier than anything the germans had.

FCM 2C would certainly qualify being 75 tonne 13-crew member monster.

People talk as if anyone could have a Tiger equivalent by 1941, that´s silly. EVERYONE had to learn how to do better tanks and that takes time.

Even more, people could have a non-crappy-suspension version of Tiger. KV-43 for one, was almost tiger equivalent, just 10 tonne lighter.

 

[frolix42]

It fought worse against allies in late 1944 than Pz4 serving beside it.

I know it's been asked two times now where the "source" for this assertion comes from. It becomes evident it's from the same place where Steven Colbert gets his sources.

[video=youtube;OBRKPoAPXEQ]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OBRKPoAPXEQ[/video]

It is unreasonable to expect the planners in the 3rd Reich to buy into the defeatist line of reasoning "The 3rd Reich will not last long enough for the Panther completely replace the Panzer IV". It's kind of funny to imagine someone trying to explain this to Hitler.

Does anyone know if the E-50 would face the same reliability problems of the Panther and Tiger or would its "just enough weight" save it from these nightmares? Or does nobody really have an idea since no prototype was ever built?

I am convinced that the final drive was a big problem for the Panther, more to the point the root cause for not correcting this mechanical deficiency was the indisputable fact that German industry was overloaded trying (but failing) to keep up with Allied production. Nazi Germany did not last long enough for the E-50 to be fielded, if it did last longer it would mean it was in a better logistical position than historically was. So I imagine that that the E-50 would have that corrected, but it's impossible to know for certain. I guess it's a "gut feeling" and I'm not trying to pass this speculation off as fact. But I do not think it's ridiculous to speculate that if Germany were not collapsing at an extraordinary rate in late 1944, the Panther Ausf. F probably would have had a more powerful final drive.

 

[Chromos]

This is where I must respectfully disagree. The Germans and Soviets did not have similar doctrines associated with tank usage or deployment.
...

Hey, I didn't wrote that.
I wrote that:

But thats different to GER/SOV, where tanks were seen to clear the situation with the other units around end engage the enemy.
And I think, with a different tank like the Pershing or having even a heavy "like a M-103" around would have changed the US way of tank usage.
At least with Pershing at hand later, US-tankers were not waiting for Art/CAS that much anymore but advancing on its own.

So the main message is that SOV used all it had and didn't wait for ART/CAS etc.. but if a tank unit got a goal to take a position it went for it as it had what was needed to even fight of enemy tanks. Sure ART/CAS was called in if at hand, but SOV/GER didn't had that "doctrine" to leave the tank fighting for TD/AT/ART..
Germans and Russians trained together before the war. They shared many views about how to use tanks. And that was quite different as the other Western Nations exept some experts there. Or lets say, SOV/GER had more political backup in the military to go new ways.

Then SOV was also the only country wich developed an own full new doctrine about mobile warfare. And of course that was different to the way of how GER mostly saw the new tank usage.
The purge then made it impossible to have enough experienced officiers in that new doctrine to be used, and with unexperienced soldiers it is hard to do complex maneuvres. And of course SOV did the best ist could to repell GER. The people that try to make a lough about "bad SOV tactics" often forget the desperate situation SOV was. That had of course also an impact on the design. ANd I agree that SOV was capable enough to keep up with GER. To be completely clear here, SOV had the better designs initially. And given the fact that they needed to pull back the most of its industry, they did pretty pretty well imo.


US could have landed also hvy on shore like they did lighter ones. LST could have done that the same way as with M4's. They just would have had fewer in each LST.
Or you secure a port first and then bring in your tanks, that was also done.
Also US was developing hvy tanks already. They just did not bring them in time. Likely -as I assume-, because they thought the war will be over and more easily won with the given ones/doctrine.
But afaik there has been a constant demand for more well protected/firepower tank in US since the landings in Normandy. Quite many debates back then about if/how/why etc..

Please, no Pantherpocalypse. Want to talk about the thing do it in the history fórum.

Wasn´t technically the Char Bis a monster tank? It was heavier than anything the germans had. People talk as if anyone could have a Tiger equivalent by 1941, that´s silly. EVERYONE had to learn how to do better tanks and that takes time.

That was an early heavy. But 1alexey is more right with mentioning about Char 2C, a ww1 design superheavy build only in '22. FRA had that superheavy mothballed, and was about to produce new new design FCM F1 when GER attacked "suddenly".

Char b1 bis:

Char 2C

FCM F1

Not to throw a bone between fighting dogs, but here are some tank strength, loss and repair numbers for US 3rd Armored Division.
http://niehorster.orbat.com/013_usa/44-06-06_Neptune/44_tank-strengths/3_AD.htm

Thx! Forgot about Niehorster. Would like to have a look at the units diary myself though.

Virtually the only, certainly the most popular, source on this forum used to diminish the Panther.
http://worldoftanks.com/en/news/pc-browser/21/chieftains-hatch-french-panthers/

The article is actually a good source, mostly if you avoid using it to jump to conclusions (i.e. claiming the article shows the Panther as a "bad" or "good" tank)

It says plenty of good things about the Panther. Particularly about it's gun, accuracy, stabilization and suspension.
...

I like to add this blog here too:
http://tanksandafv.blogspot.de/2014/02/panther-reliability.html

I thought it might be an interesting exercise to go through some of my books and post snippets that pertain to Panther reliability. It seems that in the forums people often argue without providing sources or repeating the same source over and over. This list should provide people with a mosaic of information regarding the Panther's reliability (or lack thereof), particularly in regards to the final drive and engine life issues.

Some of the quotes:

According to a report written by Guderian on March 5, 1944, the constant improvements to the Panther tank series resulted in some positive feedback from the user community. He wrote that one Panther tank-equipped unit on the Eastern Front stated that they felt their tank was far superior to the Red Army T-34 medium tanks. They went on to report that all the early mechanical difficulties that had so bedeviled the early production units of the Panther tank had been ironed out of the design. As roof, they offered the fact that service life of the tank's engine had gone up to 435 to 621 miles (700 to 1,000 km). In addition, the same Panther tank-equipped unit reported that final drive breakdowns had ended and that transmission and steering gear failures were now within an acceptable range, which is damning with faint praise.

Page 50 "Panther: Germany's Quest for Combat Dominance" by Michael and Gladys Green

The Panther initially experienced numerous automotive problems with required a continuous series of modifications to correct. These problems can be traced to three main causes: leaking seals and gaskets, an overtaxed drive train originally designed for a 30 metric ton vehicle, and an untested engine. But, following modification of key automotive components, with mature drives taking required maintenance halts, the Panther could be maintained in a satisfactory operational condition.

page 127 Germany's Panther Tank" by Thomas Jentz

Although the Panther's AK 7-200 transmission was nominally superior to the clumsy transmission on the t-34, about 5 percent broke down within 100km and over 90 percent within 1500km in combat. The final drive on the Panther Ausf. D was so weak that the tank could not even turn while it was backing up, which occurred frequently in the retreat to the Dnepr River. It's two fuel pumps were probably the biggest mobility weakness in the Panther Ausf. D because they were prone to leaks and caused serious engine fires. As least three Panthers were destroyed by fuel pump-caused fires during Zitadelle, and a high proportion of the mechanical breakdowns was caused by this troublesome component. Nor did the problem go away after Kursk: the initial batch of Panther Ausf. A tanks what were handed over to the SS-Leibstandarte in Italy in September of 1943 were so problematic that every one was rejected for service.

The Panther's poor mobility forced the Wehrmacht to move units around by rail and get them as close to the front as possible before unloading. Throughout 1943, the Panther was essentially tied to conducting all major movements by rail, including the equally short-legged tiger, and units could not even move 100km without significant losses. Thus, the Panther did not meet Guderian's requirement for a tank with superior mobility, and it was the t-34's continued advantage in mobility and reliability that contributed greatly to the Soviet victory in the Ukraine in 1943.

page 33 "Panther vs T-34: Ukraine 1943" by Robert Forczyk

Note that was in '43! Comapare that with the quotes above from later like '44..

Although the Panther had the potential to emerge as one of the great tanks of World War II, the first version, which debuted at Kursk in summer 1943, suffered appallingly poor reliability. On average, only one-quarter of the Panther Ausf. D tanks deployed in the panzer regiments in 1943 were operational at any given time. While technical difficulties are not unusual in any new weapon system, the Panther was worse than average. This situation gradually improved through the course of 1943 as specific shortcomings were rectified. the Panther's operational rate rose from an appalling 16 percent at the end of July 1943 to the merely wretched rate of 37 percent by December 1943.

An improved version, confusingly called the Panther Ausf. A, entered production in August 1943. This version standardized improvements that had been gradually introduced into the Panther Ausf. D and included an improved turret with a new commander's cupola. Additional changes continued to be incorporated into the design through 1943 and into 1944. These improvements began to have an effect on the availability rate of the tanks deployed on the Eastern Front, going from the 37 percent in February to 50 percent in April and 78 percent by the end of may 1944.

page 10-12 "Panther vs Sherman: Battle of the Bulge 1944" by Steven Zaloga

There are many more quotes on that site though..

I know it's been asked two times now where the "source" for this assertion comes from. It becomes evident it's from the same place where Steven Colbert gets his sources.

Good one..

 

[Beagá]

Oh I get it you´re talking about the super-heavies only.

I think they are stupid investments. Aren´t they too slow and big to be easy targets by bombs and artillery? Also their reliability would probably be abyssal.

Finally, germans were doing 128mm AT guns by 1944, how thick would have to be one of those beasts, to not be immobilized? Because you don´t have to hit the structure only to cripple it a lot.

Even more, people could have a non-crappy-suspension version of Tiger. KV-43 for one, was almost tiger equivalent, just 10 tonne lighter.

The absolute value is not that important, what matters is relative weight. I belive that making a comercial airliner that is 30% heavier than, say, the current Airbus will NOT be an easy task. Similarly, packing the same firepower and armor of the Tiger in something so lighter will not be easy either. Tiger was certainly more reliable than KV from all acounts. I also doubt that the germans couldn´t put na even better gun (and the one it had was already vastly superior to the KV) on the Tiger if they wanted - it just wasn´t necessary because, well, it could kill almost everything all the way to 1945.

 

[1alexey]

It is unreasonable to expect the planners in the 3rd Reich to buy into the defeatist line of reasoning "The 3rd Reich will not last long enough for the Panther completely replace the Panzer IV". It's kind of funny to imagine someone trying to explain this to Hitler.

Every time somebody in the leadership of the 3d Reich made a mistake, all is blamed on Hitler.

The absolute value is not that important, what matters is relative weight. I belive that making a comercial airliner that is 30% heavier than, say, the current Airbus will NOT be an easy task. Similarly, packing the same firepower and armor of the Tiger in something so lighter will not be easy either. Tiger was certainly more reliable than KV from all acounts. I also doubt that the germans couldn´t put na even better gun (and the one it had was already vastly superior to the KV) on the Tiger if they wanted - it just wasn´t necessary because, well, it could kill almost everything all the way to 1945.

But there was, KV-85. It had 85mm cannon, equivalent to Tiger`s, and similar armor. It proved too slow for Soviet liking, but really was not that slower than Tiger.

Putting a "better" gun would only overweight it further.

 

[Bigleady]

I would have thought that by 1944, the idea of using heavier and heavier tanks is already competing in an arms race that has naturally ended. The shaped charge and airpower I suspect have fundamentally shifted the balance (hence MBT and IFV combo ever since)

But everyone loves the heavier German tanks - they just look right (chunky and Germanic) for some reason

 

[f1nalstand17]

I know it's been asked two times now where the "source" for this assertion comes from. It becomes evident it's from the same place where Steven Colbert gets his sources.

[video=youtube;OBRKPoAPXEQ]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OBRKPoAPXEQ[/video]

Hahaha, that was perfect. To bad Colbert's show ended and he left his persona behind:sad:

I am convinced that the final drive was a big problem for the Panther, more to the point the root cause for not correcting this mechanical deficiency was the indisputable fact that German industry was overloaded trying (but failing) to keep up with Allied production. Nazi Germany did not last long enough for the E-50 to be fielded, if it did last longer it would mean it was in a better logistical position than historically was. So I imagine that that the E-50 would have that corrected, but it's impossible to know for certain. I guess it's a "gut feeling" and I'm not trying to pass this speculation off as fact. But I do not think it's ridiculous to speculate that if Germany were not collapsing at an extraordinary rate in late 1944, the Panther Ausf. F probably would have had a more powerful final drive.

Ok, very interesting, thank you. I wonder if the Panther Ausf. F was actually produced and fought that many people on this forum wouldn't believe the myth that the Panther was a complete "failure" and that its reliability issues (although never completely fixed) would've gotten better.

Every time somebody in the leadership of the 3d Reich made a mistake, all is blamed on Hitler.

Yes because Hitler made the biggest and most mistakes. It was Hitler, not Guderian who wanted an 1000 ton tank. It was Hitler who single-handedly altered the development of the Me 262 because he demanded it to be a fighter-bomber, not an interceptor like everyone wanted it to be. The list goes on...

 

[1alexey]

@1alexey
Do you have numbers about the M4's in stock/depot of that times?

I red somewhere that only like 10k actually saw combat. No source unfortunately.

Yes because Hitler made the biggest and most mistakes. It was Hitler, not Guderian who wanted an 1000 ton tank. It was Hitler who single-handedly altered the development of the Me 262 because he demanded it to be a fighter-bomber, not an interceptor like everyone wanted it to be. The list goes on...

Precisely the thing I`m talking about. ME-262 story is particularly funny, as Hitler never "altered" it in any way shape or form. Luftwaffe policy was to have all fighters able to be able to carry bombs. Unlike some very "loud" voices of "incompetence" want it to seem, entire Me262 program was greatly delayed buy regular engineering issues, which the logs reveal, and it`s development as an interceptor never ceased. The fighter-bomber approach was quite obvious and was there from the start. Jet fighter was only somewhat more efficient(roughly equivalent of 1.5 of piston fighter) than regular ones, and to fight Allied aviation, jet fighters were just too little, as Germany would have to produce them by thousands every month, and the capacity was not there even for already long-in-production piston fighters, not to mention the new, plagued by engineering issues planes. However Germany did have a lot of experienced bomber pilots, and the plane could be, and was effectively utilized as a bomber to destroy bridges and other high-value targets which other German planes couldn`t do. They didn`t need to take a lot of fighters for that, and it certainly was more valuable than just destroying a few more allied bombers, of which thousands were build every month. The entire "Hitler" issue was just an excuse by Speer to make it seem like he could do something about allied bombings.

Source "Ten myths of WW2" by Isaev.
Исаев, Алексей Валериевич
Десять мифов Второй мировой

 

[Beagá]

But there was, KV-85. It had 85mm cannon, equivalent to Tiger`s, and similar armor. It proved too slow for Soviet liking, but really was not that slower than Tiger.

Putting a "better" gun would only overweight it further.

The KV 85 was na upgrade to the KV (and even then with abyssal performance and outdated armor). If you want to compare the Tiger compare it to the first KV version. Doesn´t shine, eh? That KV was replaced ASAP also speaks volumes about its quality...

The Tiger was na excellent tank. The biggest flaws were the cost and non-sloped armor. With those it would have been competitive all the way to 1945. It had issues, but ALL tanks had. There isn´t a single "perfect" tank in WW2. But it´s undeniable it´s overall better than at least the KV.

 

[SonGoku]

Dat Char 2C. hmy: