Which is the Best.

[Agelastus]

Strategy,
Historical novels as well, eh? Good luck.

As for Ilipa, maybe I will e-mail you. I'll have to see what I can do.

Didn't the Romans use the old Persian pass at Thermopylae? The greeks didn't read their own histories did they. As for Corinth I've never been able to find a description of that battle. Thanks for the information (although I admit I haven't been looking very hard.)

Oh, and your Magnesia comments partially illustrate my point, Scipio's strange maneouvres should have been suicide (or at least very risky) at Ilipa.

Consuls and Consulars were not entirely the same thing, a point I think you are missing slightly. For this period look at the process for selecting a commander to oppose the Carthaginians in Sardinia. Earlier try the career of Camillus, and for later periods the commanders,and their immediate subordinates, appointed in the Social war or the career of Scipio Aemilianus. Perhaps I should have included ex-praetors. The tendency was real, but it only reallly showed in periods when more armies were required than the standard number of elected officials, a special problem existed, or an opponent had defeated previous Roman forces. These conditions certainly existed in the second Punic war.

Scipio's command is a very big concession for a discredited faction.

Exquisite tactical control was one of Hannibal's (and Scipio's) trademarks

Hannibal wasn't directly commanding the cavalry. Their relatively unknown commander pulled off a remarkable feat, particularly considering the quantity of Celtic cavalry included in his command.

Gallic cause....continuing guerilla warfare

In hindsight perhaps, but given the Roman reputation for persistence in this period, not really an option (Besieged Town, "We have food for ten years", Roman Commander "Then I will take you in the eleventh year", town surrenders.) This reputation was carefully fostered by the Romans as well as having a great basis in fact. As for the problems with the scorched earth strategy, that was due to tribal conflict (ie. Avaricum.) It would have taken a commander of Hannibal's genius to prevent this. I said Vercingetorix was good, not that good. His big mistake came at Alesia when he ordered, or allowed, all his cavalry to disperse back to their tribes to raise the relief force. Had a significant number remained they would have been able to harass Caesar's foragers, forcing him to break the siege.

Can't remember who you are thinking of here. Metelllus Numidicus? No, that's the Jugurthine war. An equally good example of Roman friction is the Lucullus-Fimbria incident during the Mithridatic wars.

Belisarius lost a battle at Sura, possibly via insubordination of his troops, agreed. Perhaps he faced two reasonable commanders then. As for the strategic indecisiveness of the campaigns, neither side was trying for such results, or had the resources for them. We're not in the Seventh century yet!

 

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Originally posted by Agelastus
Historical novels as well, eh? Good luck.

Ah - just a passing distraction when I need a rest from Imperium.

Didn't the Romans use the old Persian pass at Thermopylae?

Supposedly - just gave it as an example of a pinning attack on front, supported by an outflanking move. I'll see if I can find the source for Corinth.

Scipio's strange maneouvres should have been suicide (or at least very risky) at Ilipa.

Yes - if faced by cavalry. But as mentioned, there may be many reasons why the Carthaginian cavalry could not respond - either they'd been run off by the Romans (and Polybius forgets to mention this), or their horses are simply to winded by this time by the long skirmish battle that has preceded the Roman advance. Either case could explain the inaction of the cavalry.

Consuls and Consulars were not entirely the same thing, a point I think you are missing slightly.

Nope - but we may be talking past each other here. As I mentioned - the Punic war was a crisis situation solved making an extraordinary use of the "best" Roman commanders.

Camillus I will hesitate to discuss, as he belongs mostly in the realm of myth.

Scipio's command is a very big concession for a discredited faction.

Supposedly Nero (a Claudii) was offered the command in Spain (he actually went there in 211), but he didn't want it. Probably, the anti-Scipio's did not consider it a concession, since it does not seem they were interested in this command.

Hannibal wasn't directly commanding the cavalry.

I know, I know - but it was still his battle plan/idea.

Vercingetorix...
Had a significant number (of cavalry) remained they would have been able to harass Caesar's foragers, forcing him to break the siege.

Considering that the huge relief force failed to achieve this, I doubt it.

Can't remember who you are thinking of here. Metelllus Numidicus?

No, Metellus Pius, son of Numidicus. A very competent commander who fought with success in the Social War defeating the Marsian Silo, though unable to defend Rome in 86, he preserved his troops by retiring to Africa, later returned to join Sulla and defeated Norbanus in 82 in one of the conclusive victories of the war. Poorly supported by the Senate in Spain against Sertorius (surely one of Rome's most brilliant generals), nevertheless all of the major successes scored in Spain can be attributed wholly or partially to his tactical competence.

Well - Belisarius was a great commander, regardless of whether or not his opposition was competent. Lousy politician, though.

 

[Agelastus]

Camillus I will hesitate to discuss...realm of myth

His role does seem embellished (although the man certainly existed.) Basically used him as an example off the top of my head. Still suggest you look at the other two examples I mentioned, although I suspect you are right that we are talking past each other here.

As for Vercingetorix there is a period of time at the beginning of Alesia when Caesar's men were foraging the area to build up the grain reserves he needed to withstand the expected relief army. With Vercingetorix's cavalry hanging around he would have had great difficulty doing this (look at what happened to Hannibal's foragers when going into winter quarters with Fabius watching him the year before Cannae.) Without a large enough grain stockpile Caesar would have had to break off the siege.

Ah, Metellus Pius. A good general in the Roman mold, cruelly under-rated in his own time. Pontifex Maximus too.

It's sometimes fun imagining Belisarius as the king of the Ostrogoths! Really shouldn't have let Justinian learn about the offer though.

Still no sign of Hannibal entering the fray.

 

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Caesar's legionaries break off a siege - Never! Haven't you read the Commentaries; they'd live of grass and air if need be, rather than accept defeat.

There is actually a Belisarius revolts scenario in Imperium Romanum II - quite fun, actually.

Found the reference to Corinth in the Duncan Head's the "Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars" - it's in Pausanias "Guide to Greece", Bk. VII (should be available in Penguin).

 

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Im on a long flank march, excpect me when you dont excpect me.

Hannibal

 

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Generalship is much in the eye of the beholder. Much depends on your view of the ancient general, do you admire Alexander for his courage and achievments whilst thinking that anyone of his fathers top flight officers would have done as much.

Untill the advent of the gun changes warfare beyond recognition, its easy to think that any commander can be transposed to a differnt timespan and be able to effectivky comprehend what was going on in the battlefield. Could/would Epammindas have understood Pydna?.

Before i ramble on to far, what i like are those who use the different elements to their best advantage, troop management if you like, im less impressed by those that change a force structure and win with it untill the correct response is found against it. So in summation while i recognise Scipio/Marias as great reformers, i find others more appealling to my biased idea of what it was to be a great ancient commander. You know...Hannibal, who wins with arguably an inferrior weapon of war by better battle management. Ducks for cover as counter claims look likly. BTW Scipio is still A number 1 as far as Rome goes.

Hannibal, getting on a fast horse.

 

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Hannibal using an inferior weapon of war? In what universe is that? Consider the core of the Carthaginian army: highly motivated Carthaginian cavalry, veteran Libyo-Phoenician spearmen (trained in constant wars against the Spaniards), Iberian and Celtiberian Scutarii (universally acknowledged as exceptional soldiers due to their "life of brigandage and uninterrupted war"), Iberian and Celtiberian cavalry (as above), Numidian light horse (only the best light horsemen of their time). The Celts were no mean fighters, as proven by the Telamon campaign and at Cannae. In Samnium and Apulia/Lucania, Hannibal once again got access to top quality soldier material. Finally, consider the huge cavalry advantage that Hannibal had (in this period, winning on the flanks almost always resulted in winning the battle).

Consider that he was facing what was still, essentially a militia army, many of whose soldiers would not have faced combat before (this particularly goes for the army at Cannae). An army that was additionaly completely deficient in cavalry.

Call that an inferior weapon? I'd like to know what you consider a superior army...? Hannibal's whole strategy at least during the early years was to bring the enemy to battle; hardly the act of any sane general who believes his army inferior.

IMO, Hannibal's genius lay in the many ruses and stratagems he performed - not only the ambush at Lake Trasimene but also his continuous and efficient use of light infantry and cavalry to draw the enemy to battle.

Scipio was no reformer (at least there are none that can be properly credited to him), but he was exceptionally good at getting the best out of the Roman military system; and seemingly the first to properly realize and compensate for the Roman deficiency in cavalry. Here too we see a general capable of exceptional inventiveness in deployment, ruses and stratagems.

Personally I do not consider Marius particularly great as a commander; good organizer though.

Alexander is a hard problem; certainly he had some exceptional moments (Jaxartes and Hydaspes being the best performances), but the question will always remain whether Phillip could not have done just as well (and whether Alexander could have achieved what Phillip did). His record commands respect though.

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by strategy
Caesar's legionaries break off a siege - Never! Haven't you read the Commentaries; they'd live of grass and air if need be, rather than accept defeat.

Unfortunately I don't think the Dyrrhachium root grows in Gaul. You could argue that Caesar broke off the action at Gergovia due to his supply problems. Thanks for the Pausanias reference, no wonder I've never seen it.

As for Marius. Strategy, I am in 100% agreement, good organiser but not a great general. It is an open question as to just how much of his supposed reform can be attributed to him. Cohorts are first mentioned as tactical units (probably erroneously, but still) in Africanus' day.

Hannibal's army certainly had superior components, but the Roman army, with its homogenous structure and common tactical doctrine, was better organised and a more certain instrument for carrying out its commander's will. Still, as the Romans found, its hard to beat real quality troops under a real quality general.

Alexander's record does command respect, but it is clear that while he was off charging at the head of his cavalry, having the time of his life, he had an exceptionally competent core of subordinate commanders to rely on, as the subsequent records of many of them as "Diadochoi" demonstrate. Both Phillip and Alexander seem to have been especially capable of instilling tactical skill in others.

 

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Strategy, with respect, please tell me again how good my favorite army is, it sounds sooo much better coming from another!!

In respect of the cannae Roman army though, while i concur that at least 4 legions were freshly raised, that a large element of the remainder were also new to the standards, but in the centre would be the core of the Scipio Trebia veterans of some experience of the task before them. They had done before and were being asked to repeat the feat. So i contend that the legions would be drawn up on a frontage of some 3000 metres, to include allies with cav on the flanks. this allows the 6400 Rome/allied cav to be 10 deep, 2mtr a horse with usual gaps for turmae. The cav are anchored on the river and low hills the space between filled by the legions raked up 5x30(?) deep, as polybius says "several times greater than their width", if so this gives a maniple 15 foot, a Legion 300 feet, allowing standard deployment frontages.
As we see the Romans are confident that they can smash the center while preventing being surprised, or flanked. So its logical that the best legions will be in the center, its here they see the battle being won, break the center and carry the day.
The reasons it all goes wrong are well known by all, but at the center was a body of some 10.000 experienced troops who saw no reason they would not cut their way through.

I see where in agreement in what we call the "art of war" when appied to generals. Which is what i was after. In addition Hannibals excells at getting the very best out of his different troops. Most armies were never this multi cultral. I think the Celts were still formidable at this stage, particulary the Insubres.

BTW have you read Ross Lickie, he does Hannibal and Scipio. Fiction but intresting.

Hannibal

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca
So i contend that the legions would be drawn up on a frontage of some 3000 metres, to include allies with cav on the flanks. this allows the 6400 Rome/allied cav to be 10 deep, 2mtr a horse with usual gaps for turmae.

Isn't the most common estimate for the frontage of the legions 1500m or so? (P. Connolly et al.) Delbruk even goes as low as 700m. 3000 is often given as the total battleline including cavalry. Where do you think they deployed in relation to the Aufidus river?

Good point reminding us of the quality at the core of the Cannae army. Wrong place for the creme de la creme to be in this battle, eh?

 

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Where do you think they deployed in relation to the Aufidus river?

I think i prefer the angled deployment, diagonaly across the plain, reverting to a deep formation , must mean a reversion to a "hoplite push" at the outset, that it is broken down in impetus, is that the desire to maintain an unbroken front, would stuter givin the nature of Hannibals deployment to prevent contact on a uniform front. So the extra impetus is lost, then deprived of room to manouver, they wait their turn/chance to surge again. Difficult to achieve in view of the dust, din of battle. I suspect for many the battle was lost long before they knew anything was amiss. Given their past success, its logical to put them in the center no?, its these that all eyes are turned for example, they set the pace and tone of the effort. The legions display a rigid lack of flexability here, if from limited training or actual deisign, your guess is as good as mine. Either way the battle plan hinges on the vets in the center. Again i favour a resticted frontage for the Legions, 700-1000mtr.

What do you both believe the libyans were armed with, LTS or shorter/lighter spears?

What did you make of the Nuremburg documentry?
Hannibal

 

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Following Healy, it is clear that only 2 of the Legions from the Trebbia were still in existence at Cannae (the other two had been wiped out with Flaminius at Lake Trasimene). Both of these had been significantly reinforced with new recruits to bring them up to the strength of 5000. Giving the 15-20k killed at the Trebbia (50% losses) and moderate wastage and losses, we're probably talking at most 5-6000 veterans from the Trebbia. Apart from these, we have 4? legions raised in 217 who have served under Fabius, and 2 completely new legions (no knowledge about the Allies). All of the Legions would have had to be significantly reinforced though due to the last 1 1/2 years operations (including Minucius's debacle). I think it is interesting to note the Roman deep formation - throughout history a typical formation used with troops of uncertain morale and discipline.

In addition Hannibals excells at getting the very best out of his different troops.

I'm less impressed by this, because he does have the perfect combination of troops. Hats off for his ability to keep them under his command without mutiny, of course.

I hate Ross Leckie - I've never understood how anyone can write historical fiction that is that far-fetched, and still call it historical. Especially the book on Scipio is horrible, though the Hannibal book is not much better from what I hear.

 

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To compare yours and mine figs we get a 10%-20% spread of close order who are vets. I doubt we will get closer than that.

So you would attribute celtic staying power at Cannae to "elan" not yet lost, rather than phased usage by Hannibal?. Or do you rely on the initial deployment to regulate their timing of engagement.


Ross is brutal to the extreme, its just that he makes some points, completly unsupportable, but possible, example, singling out of signifers to disrupt command/control during early phase of engagement.

Hannibal

 

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Originally posted by Hannibal Barca
So you would attribute celtic staying power at Cannae to "elan" not yet lost, rather than phased usage by Hannibal?. Or do you rely on the initial deployment to regulate their timing of engagement.

Hard to say. Hannibal stiffened the line using his Spanish veterans and fought in the center himself, so there are lots of factors involved in this.

Ross is brutal to the extreme, its just that he makes some points, completly unsupportable, but possible, example, singling out of signifers to disrupt command/control during early phase of engagement.

The brutality doesn't bother me - the utter unhistoricity of it does - to call Leckie's books historical fiction, in my opinion, comes very close to insulting all the other historical books out there. A couple of examples of the top of my head.
- Hannibal supposedly teaching his troops to cut for the tendons.In addition, it would have been stupid since the Romans wore greaves (or could have got them in short order) and the Scutums would have provided good protection against such an attack.
- Africanus inventing whistles to signal his troops in battle.
- Lucius Cornelius Scipio being a drunk.
- Africanus having conquored Macedonia and Syria?
- Hannibal's wife being taken and raped by the Romans?!?!?
- Gaius Laelius's father being killed and mutilated by the Carthaginians.
- Insinuations of homosexuality against Scipio, IIRC. This despite the fact that the one flaw Scipio is "accused" of in the literature was a fondness for beautiful women.
- Fabius Pictor and Fabius Maximus Cunctator being one and the same person.
- Fabius (Maximus or Pictor?) being the "teacher" and friend of Scipio (and Cato).

The list goes on and on and on (let's not even dwell on the likelihood that Hannibal's secretary ends up being Scipio's secretary). Of the list above, there exists not even one shred of evidence to support these ideas, and in very many cases, lots of evidence to suggest that they are almost certainly false.

The thing I remember most about the Hannibal book (which I have to admit I got too sick of to complete), were all of the scenes that Leckie had plagiarized almost verbatim from Mary Renaults excellent "Fire from Heaven".

The Signifer thing: the standards of the Roman legion were carried with the Triarii, and their sole purpose was to provide a rallying point if the hastati and principes were forced to retreat. So
- It would have been impossible for the Carthaginians to attack these during the early phases of the engagement.
- They were not used for command/control.
- Even if the signifer was killed, someone else would simply have picked up the standard (happened all the time in 17th and 18th century combat). In fact, Italian commanders occasionally threw their standards into the midst of the enemy and challenged their men to get it back.

Another Leckiesm.

 

[Agelastus]

Hannibal,
Just re-read your original Cannae frontage post and realised I misread it. Damn, sorry! As for the books by Leckie(?), I've never read them, although if their the ones I'm thinking of I remember picking the Hannibal one up in a shop, glancing at a bit, thinking "what crap", and putting it down.

 

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Stilicho

I wouldnt disagree with Scipio Africanus as a first choice....but I think that Stilicho - Stilicon deserves a mention

 

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and Aetius - same vein as Stilicho

 

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http://www.theunderdogs.org/game.php?id=2042

Try this out Hoplites, its free, and is quite a nice little game.

Hannibal

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by Hannibal Barca
http://www.theunderdogs.org/game.php?id=2042

Try this out Hoplites, its free, and is quite a nice little game.

Hannibal

Found it months ago. Anyone ever played the original games it's based on? I even used the original games as a quoted information source once when doing a paper for my history degree (curiously enough the paper was a ten thousand word effort about the military of Charlemagne's empire!!)

 

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Have played Caesar, which is the same system as SPQR. Generally I don't like the boardgames: many of the interactions between the various unit types doesn't reflect history well, and the leader activation system is bad too in this respect. Hoplites is a great game though, and avoids most of the problems of the board game.