Which is the Best.

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Just for intrest, who do you think was the best Roman general throughout the history of the republic to the end of the empire (westren empire)? There are quite a few canidates for the title besides the obvious Julius Caesar or Pompey the great.

Scipio Africanus,Giaus Marius,Lucullus (Sorry if my spelling is not what it should be),Sulla to name a few and there are probally plenty more I have not heard about or have forgotten to mention, so let us know who you think was the best and why.

Personally I have a very close first and seciond which I hate to seperate,

1) Scipio Africanus

He helped to reform the legions of the time, reconqured roman spain and added the carthago spain to it, and of course he beat Hanibal at Zama but sadly his own people turned against him because of his popularity and politics despite the fact that he played a major part if not thee major part in making Rome the dominant power in the mediterian world.

2) Giaus Marius

He came from humble enough background, he totaly reformed the legions and brought the concept of Rome keeping a standing army by employing the proletariat in the legions, he defeated Jurgatha and the germanic tribes who were migrating into northern Italy after they had destroyed previous Roman armies sent against them, he helped confirm Rome as a world power and possibly turned her eyes more twords gaul & germainia and his legion reforms evenyually would help lead to the end of the republic and beginings of the empire, However unfortunatley he went quite mad near the end and despite being elected consul six times he tarnished all the good he did by the attrocites he carried out against his political enemies, he did give the senate a warning though, he forsaw that if the senate did not reward soliders for there service in the legions by giving them land that the soilders would be more loyal to their generals who would reward them rather than to the state, had they heeded him maybe we would not have had Sulla the dictator, or Caesar the dictator...who knows.

Anyway that is my selections so let me know yours.

 

[Leprechaun]

Hmmmm

I really don't know, perhaps Scipio Africanus....
But I can tell you who the worst roman leader was...
Varus. He lost 3 Legions in an ambush agains fierce german tribes...

 

[Sir James]

I seem to recall from somewhere that the Romans rated Scipio as the benchmark.

Trajan and Hadrian were maybe the best Emperor-generals.

The title "Germanicus" is ringing bells. Who was he?

 

[Leprechaun]

Hmmmm

"Germanicus", "Africanus" etc.
Didn't the romans give such names to leaders where they fought and won battles and wars?

 

[Sir James]

Yes - I just can't remember who was awarded the Germanicus epithet.

 

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Germanicus

Germanicus was a nephew of Tiberius I think and the father of Caligulia (what a claim to fame) Fought in Germany against the same tribes who defeated Varus and even got back some of the lost eagles, was hostile to Tiberius and wanted to restore the republic, died mysteriously in the near east most likely by the hand of Tiberius supporters, Scipio got the name africanus for fighting in Africa, Germanicus was just named that way because his father helped subdue most tribes west of the rhine, but generally generals got the cognomen of the teritory where the won victories.

Varus was a bad general, but basically he was sent to Germany to organise government in the area as Augustus belived the tribes were beaten by then, bad mistake,

How about the generals Capieo and I think the other guy was called mannicus or something like that, they lost over 80,000 soldiers & non combatants to to the Germanic tribes in the battle of aurusio in northern Italy, that was nearly ten legions, hard to top that.

 

[Sir James]

Thanks for the info.

As for worst, what about the republican generals whipped by Hannibal at Cannae. Ciaus, who were they? Didn't they share command according to the day of the week back then?

 

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Canne

Yeah youre right cant remember their names though I know Scipio was there as a junior officer, will check my books tonight and see what the commanders names were, but yeah those guys really F****d up, wierd for one of the longest lasting empires of all time a lot of their generals sucked.

 

[Agelastus]

Cannae Generals-C. Terentius Varro and L. Aemilius Paullus. Varro is recorded as the Roman commander on the day of the battle (When two consuls were present they alternated command on a daily basis-not the best ever Roman idea.)

As for Germanicus-which one? Nero Claudius Drusus Germanicus was the Roman commander who occupied the German territories between the Rhine and Elbe rivers in 12=9BC, only to have all his work unravel due to his untimely death in 9BC. Germanicus Caesar (his son) was the Roman commander who won the battle of Idistaviso in vengeance for the Varian disaster.

As for the worst general in Roman history, how (as suggested) about Gn. Mallius Maximus, who lost a reported 80,000 men at the battle of Arausio against the migrating Cimbri? Ancient commentators regard this defeat as as bad as or worse than Cannae. Of course, his insubordinate subordinate Q. Servilius Caepio deserved much of the blame.

The greatest Roman general of all time was probably G. Julius Caesar. Of course, as with most of the well known Roman generals, you have to take reports of his exploits cautiously. Scipio Africanus is best known from the works of Polybius. Unfortunately Polybius' patron was Scipio Aemilianus, Africanus' adopted grandson (also grandson of L. Aemilius Paullus, the second consul at Cannae, who recieves no blame for the disastrous defeat.) For example, the description of Ilipa makes very little sense with regard to the intricate flanking manoeuvre the Romans made. For example, why do it in this unneccessarily complex fashion, and why didn't Hasdrubal Gisgo do anything in response.

 

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Beliasarius.
Rare example of a Roman commander who used tactical methods to win his battles as opposed to the vast majoirity who relied on Roman effiecent methodology to win the battle for them, they limit themselves to little more than lineing them up in a straight line.

Daras 531 AD
With 25,000 he defeats 40.000 Sassanid Persians, he manovers his enemy into acepting battle with the wind behind him, Sassanids and Byzantines were very bow reliant, the Sassanids are in 2 lines with the mounted Immortals as a reserve( this is the cream). Beliasarius uses a Hunnic force in ambush to envelope a flank after the initial arrow exchange forces the Sassanids to close due to Byzantine advantage,Immortals are sent to help the threatened wing, Beliasarius waits for them to drive back this wing then unleashes uncomited troops into their now revealled flank, seeing the Immortals being cut to pieces the Sassanid levy infantry start to rout , closley followed by those can also extricate themselves.

Hannibal

 

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Cannae Generals-C. Terentius Varro and L. Aemilius Paullus. Varro is recorded as the Roman commander on the day of the battle (When two consuls were present they alternated command on a daily basis-not the best ever Roman idea.)
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Have you read "Cannae" isbn 1-85532-470-9 by Mark Heally?, convincing argument for Paullaus being in charge along with both Cn being of the same opion as to the desirability and location of the battlefield along with reasonable justification for the Livy/Polybian acounts being as they were, biased and for what reasons.

Hannibal

 

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Without equal or even close contemporary, Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus Maior stands alone as the greatest of all Roman general's. Undefeated in his lifetime, and one of the few of history's great commanders to have met and defeated another of history's greatest commander's in battle.

Ilippa - the flanking maneuver makes plenty of sense, and it is also not difficult to see why the Carthaginians could not maneuver in response. The only question is where the Carthaginian cavalry was while all the manuevering was going on.

Very few modern historians seem to believe that Varro was in charge at Cannae, and believe that this was a cover-up to absolve Paullus (grandfather of the patron of Polybius). As for the Roman plan at Cannae, one can convincingly argue that it was a quite good plan, given the earlier battle-results, and the quality of the troops at hand.

Gaius Marius was a good organizer and a good soldier, but not a particularly brilliant general. Like his predecessors, he could find no way to end the Jugurthine war, until Jugurtha was betrayed to him. His defeat of the Cimbri was competently handled, but can hardly be termed extraordinary - he let them come at his top-trained and drilled legionaries in a strong position and defeated them.

Caesar - a brilliant general, certainly, but also one with many flaws. Repeatedly got himself into disastrous situations from which he were only saved through the incompetence of the enemy.

Mallius Maximus can hardly be given the blame for the disaster of Aurausio against the Cimbri. this was a disaster caused by a divided command and probably (just like at Cannae) too many untrained and unenthusiastic troops in the Legions.

Varus was betrayed into an ambush by the chief of the Germannic contingent in his army. He can hardly be labelled an incompetent due to that.

Did I mention: Scipio Africanus Maior.

 

[Agelastus]

It seems that the two basic arguments for a Paullus command at Cannae are:
(1) Scipio Aemilianus gave Polybius the family lie.
(2) The two positions of honour in the Roman army were the citizen cavalry and the citizen legions-Paullus commanded the Roman citizen cavalry.

(1) is a pointless argument as there is no way to prove or disprove this. Indeed, "strategy", you take Polybius' description of Ilipa as reliable, despite it being one of the most likely items to have been embroidered to fit the Scipionic legend (forget the story, look at a diagram and ask how likely this is.)
(2) is a good argument, that I first saw in P. Connolly's book on Greek and Roman warfare. However, I would have expected Varro to have commanded the citizen legions if this was the case, since this was the other place of honour. As both consuls are in command of the cavalry, it appears they had recognised that containing Hannibal's mounted forces was the critical factor. Varro is in charge of what one assumes is the larger contingent (the Allied cavalry generally outnumbered the Roman by 3:1) and he is facing the Numidians, who have come down from the ancient historians as enjoying a truly formidable reputation, even prior to this time. Additionally Varro's position is of a piece with the unorthodox nature of the Roman infantry line. I doubt if their was another Roman battle in history where they deployed their maniples in such depth relative to the frontage.

I cannot completely discount the Paullus argument, but I feel that it is not strong enough to throw aside the only account we have from ancient times that is even remotely contemporaneous.

Caesar got himself into some remarkable messes, but I feel it was more his skill than the incompetence of his enemies that won the day.

Belisarius was certainly at least the second best Roman general in history. His accomplishments were made with a fraction of the resources of trained, disciplined manpower Caesar was able to call on. However, the majority of his opponents were not in the same class as Gn. Pompeius Magnus or Vercingetorix.

 

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Belisarius was certainly at least the second best Roman general in history. His accomplishments were made with a fraction of the resources of trained, disciplined manpower Caesar was able to call on. However, the majority of his opponents were not in the same class as Gn. Pompeius Magnus or Vercingetorix.
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Second is good, but i must insist on having the prettiest horse.
I have a theory about the depth of maniples that i will return to later for your opinions.

Hannibal

 

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Originally posted by Agelastus
It seems that the two basic arguments for a Paullus command at Cannae are:
(1) Scipio Aemilianus gave Polybius the family lie.
(2) The two positions of honour in the Roman army were the citizen cavalry and the citizen legions-Paullus commanded the Roman citizen cavalry.

Basically, yes. Also:
(3) There is a serious disrepancy in both Polybius and Livy's accounts. If you count the days from the first appearance of the Romans around Cannae (and the first known day when Paullus commands), then one will find that the day of the battle it is actually Paullus's turn to command. Yet both Paullus and Livy claim Varro commands - why this strange disrepancy? Why should they have exchanged days of command?
(4) Varro was never censured for his part in Cannae. On the contrary, he was praised by the Senate for saving the army, and retained in various military offices during the remainder of the war. Paullus performed the usual stunt of the defeated Roman commander - the self sacrifice.
(5) The Scipionic "party" - of which Paullus was definitely part of, was - throughout the war - supporters of an aggressive strategy against Carthage. Cannae was a natural extension of this clear-cut political programme; thus Polybius and Livy are almost certainly lying when they claim that Paullus and the Senate was against attacking Hannibal at Cannae. If they were lying about this, then if Paullus was actually in command, they would obviously have had to concoct a cover-up lie about this as well.

(1) is a pointless argument as there is no way to prove or disprove this. Indeed, "strategy", you take Polybius' description of Ilipa as reliable, despite it being one of the most likely items to have been embroidered to fit the Scipionic legend (forget the story, look at a diagram and ask how likely this is.)

Hmm - many eminent historians have come up with good descriptions of how this could have been done: Peter Conolly, Duncan Head, Lidell-Hart, etc., etc. The Spanish advanced to the front, while the Romans maneuvered on the flanks. The Spaniards on the Carthaginian flanks were not trained enough to perform the kind of wheeling to match the Romans (they were freshly recruited levies/mercenaries), and the Africans could not maneuver to compensate due to the Spaniard to their front. The Carthaginian horse did not interfere (and this is the only real mystery about the battle) - possibly they were blown by the lengthy cavalry skirmish that had preceded Scipio's attack. By Ilippa, Scipio commanded a superbly drilled army - hardened and trained by 4 years of warfare under Scipio's command, so certainly they were trained enough to perform the maneuvers required, if undisturbed by the enemy.

The strategy at Baecula in 208 was exactly the same - Spanish infantry pinned down the enemy center, while Scipio and Laelius maneuvered and fell upon Hasdrubal's flanks. I fail to see how this applies to the "Scipio legend". The Legion certainly had the flexibility to pull of such a stunt if well-trained; a look at Hellenistic tactical manuals will show you that even the Phalanx was (theoretically) extremely flexible and could probably have performed a simmilar evolution if drilled well enough. Note the many battles in which Alexander's phalanx fights and marches in oblique order during a battle. Also Epamonindas somewhat similar maneuvers at Mantinea - Scipio at Ilippa is almost just a "Mantinea" on both flanks.

Yes - there are holes in our knowledge about the battle (the cavalry), but there are such holes about all ancient battles, and certainly no more problems in our understanding of Ilippa than for Chaeronea, Gaugemela, Issos, Cannae, Zama, Raphia, etc., etc.

I cannot completely discount the Paullus argument, but I feel that it is not strong enough to throw aside the only account we have from ancient times that is even remotely contemporaneous.

We don't throw away the account - we just don't believe in Varro being made a scapegoat for what was clearly a decision by the entire senate to pursue a battle - and especially when the Senate's later actions runs so counter to the villification that Polybius and Livy heaps on the poor man.

Caesar got himself into some remarkable messes, but I feel it was more his skill than the incompetence of his enemies that won the day.

At Dyrrhachium, Caesar himself said that it was only Pompey's laxity that saved his army. But one of the reasons I admire Caesar as a general is precisely because of his ability to get himself out of any military situation - it is in adversity that the true mettle of a general is tested.

Belisaurus certainly also ranks among the best in history. Though I don't see what Magnus and Vercingetorix are doing in that arguement.

Pompey was at best a pedestrian commander - great organizer but only average in the field (consistently outfought by Sertorius, for example). His only achievement of note was against the pirates - and that was a feat of organization and overwhelming force, not tactical brilliance.

Vercingetorix was simply a poor commander, whose ill-led rebellion played right into Caesar's hands (some historians go so far as to jokingly suggest that Vercingetorix was a paid pawn of Caesar). Caesar's control of Gaul was an elusive thing in 53BC - Vercingetoriz's rebellion vitally allowed him to take and snuff out the Gallic will to resist in basically a single campaign.

I think the Persian generals with which Belisaurus fought were at least their equals, if not better.

 

[Agelastus]

Yes, many historians have come up with plausible explanations/accounts for Ilipa. You are quite correct to put it in a long tradition of oblique attacks. However, the question remains "why all these complex maneouvres" (involving multiple turns and wheelings), when a relatively simple oblique advance, which the army was already positioned for, would have done as well. It is also interesting that subsequent Roman commanders didn't attempt such a manouevre in any battles to my knowledge (a move is genius the first time, then it becomes a part of the manual.)

As for the Paullus-Varro argument:
(1) see above
(3) Can't discount this entirely, but such discrepancies pop up throughout the ancient texts (for example, Herodotus loses two days in his parallel accounts of the Spartans at Thermopylae and the Greek fleet at Artemisium.) It is suggestive, but since our closest surviving major source (Polybius) was himself writing fifty+ years after the fact, and relying to a great extent (I assume) on oral traditions, one would expect such problems. Since Livy is working from earlier historians (such as Polybius) his chronology is even less reliable.
(4) It is possible that the Senate was trying to maintain morale following the defeat. Politically crucifying Varro would have confirmed the error of the Roman people in selecting him, and weakened the Allies faith in Rome, and the fortitude of the Roman people. Varro was given later commands, but they were never independent, or very important. Besides, we don't know how much money he and his allies paid in bribes. Given Roman political history, and his supposed origins, this is entirely possible. Paullus was probably (given the speed his command was overrun) just unable to escape, rather than being the suicide you imply.
(5) Yes, despite the histories I agree that Paullus and Varro were operating in agreement in seeking battle. Their pre-battle strategy is too well put together to be otherwise. This makes an attractive argument for the Paullus cover up story. However, given the influence and strength of the Fabian party (the wearing Hannibal down party) one would expect an alternative version of the battle to come down to us, even if only in tertiary sources. Given the libellous nature of Roman politics it is surprising that this is not the case, if Paullus was in command and a cover up had occurred.

Vercingetorix was one of the prime movers in an impressive display of Gallic unity, given the fractious nature of the tribes (which, incidentally, later helped to undermine his strategy.) His conduct of the campaign, pre-Alesia, while not above reproach, came very close to driving the Romans out of central Gaul. It showed an excellent strategic grasp. Gn. pompeius Magnus, while not being an inspired general, was no mediocrity. He was highly experienced, and could call on the expertise of the long Roman military tradition. The campaign against the pirates (which you slightly disparage) was an impressive feat both of logistics and strategy. Previous campaigns against the pirates had been fairly disastrous for Roman arms. His plan of campaign against Caesar was based on some innacurate assumptions, but was was still far from being unsound for all that.

As for Belisarius, I feel that Totila was the only good general he faced, and he was undermined by the decline in quality of his Gothic army from the Fifth century.

 

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However, the question remains "why all these complex maneouvres" (involving multiple turns and wheelings), when a relatively simple oblique advance, which the army was already positioned for, would have done as well.

An oblique advance is actually not particularly easy to perform while maintaining ranks, and IIRC (away from my sources right now) the Carthaginian line overlapped the Roman. A simple oblique advance might not have sufficed to outflank the Carthaginians, which was what his maneuvers achieved.

It is also interesting that subsequent Roman commanders didn't attempt such a manouevre in any battles to my knowledge (a move is genius the first time, then it becomes a part of the manual.)

Typical Roman armies of this period were generally NOT very well trained - a fact that people tend to forget. It is highly unlikely that they would have had the training to carry out such an elaborate maneuver. Besides, most Roman commanders preferred simply to carry out frontal assaults.

Varro was given later commands, but they were never independent, or very important.

Which was not an unusual situation for an ex-consul. With the exception of Marcus Marcellus and Quintus Maximus, no consuls had more than a single term in office during the war.

Besides, we don't know how much money he and his allies paid in bribes. Given Roman political history, and his supposed origins, this is entirely possible.

Actually, a number of historians believe that Varro was supported by the Scipionic faction.

Paullus was probably (given the speed his command was overrun) just unable to escape, rather than being the suicide you imply.

Nope. Paullus was escaped the rout of the Roman cavalry and joined the infantry centre. He was later wounded by a sling and loses his horse. A Roman officer riding by offers to give him his horse, but Paullus refuses the offer - though by this time, IIRC, the battle is lost. I'd say this is a definite suicide - no way he could hope to escape on foot, with the Numidians on the loose.

However, given the influence and strength of the Fabian party (the wearing Hannibal down party) one would expect an alternative version of the battle to come down to us, even if only in tertiary sources. Given the libellous nature of Roman politics it is surprising that this is not the case, if Paullus was in command and a cover up had occurred.

True enough - but then again, the cover up only begins 50 years after the battle. Also, Paullus could hardly be slandered for his part in the battle - he had after all only carried out the orders given to him by the Senate - to attack Hannibal. And when the plan fails, he had acted honourably, and died with his troops. The only one's who would have had wanted to work against the "Varro scapegoat" cover-up would be Varro's family. Given his recent rise, it is not unlikely that his heirs (if any) could have done anything to prevent it.

His conduct of the campaign, pre-Alesia, while not above reproach, came very close to driving the Romans out of central Gaul.

When? He did manage to inflict a few defeats on the Romans through surprise at the very start, but never anything that threatened Roman hegemony, IMO. On the contrary, his uniting of the tribes ensured that Caesar was able to consolidate his position. A smarter man would have bided his time until Caesar's term in office was up (just 3 more years). Rome was far from eager to take on a new province.

Gn. pompeius Magnus

Previous campaigns against the pirates had been fairly disastrous for Roman arms.

This is incorrect - in fact all of the previous campaigns had done quite well, burning fortresses and villages, etc. both in Crete and Cilicia. Of course, this did not solve the problem, because Rome would not maintain a standing navy to suppress piracy and hunger still drove the cities to the sea. In addition, many of these campaigns were only half-hearted affairs, lacking in support due to heavy financial interests in Rome.

They also completely failed to attempt to remedy the roots of the problem. Pompey's achievements here was as much due to his diplomatic offers of amnesty and offers of resettlement as to the strength of his navy.

As for the rest of his campaigns, he had 1 success in Sicily against Marian rebels who had already lost the civil war, was resoundingly and repeatedly trashed by Sertorius only to be saved by Caecilius Metellus (and the assasination of Sertorius), beat a few fleeing Spartacian slaves after Crassus had defeated their main army, beat upon Mithridatus after Lucullus had conquored Pontus, and marched around in Asia Minor/Syria/Judea dictating terms to nations who knew they had no chance of standing up against the might of Rome.

As for Belisarius, I feel that Totila was the only good general he faced, and he was undermined by the decline in quality of his Gothic army from the Fifth century.

My memory may be playing tricks on me, but I seem to recall that several of his battles over there were strategic draw.

 

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Belisarius, mounted on a pretty horse, sits on a nearby hill watching and waiting, pondering whither its time to pitch in, but wait, whats this a civilised inteligent debate has erupted!. Must practice patience and await a more favorable time to intervine when one shows a weakness.

Hannibal

 

[Agelastus]

Strategy,
I can see we're not going to agree about Ilipa. Besides in the diagrams I have seen it is the light infantry and cavalry (by their very nature more mobile) that attack the flank, the legionaries hit the Carthaginian wings frontally. The key is the massing of the best Carthaginian troops in the centre to face the typical central advance, leaving poorer troops on the wings. Scipio had a flash of inspiration to deploy to exploit this, it is the Polybian padding of the maneuvre I take issue with. Oblique advances are difficult, but his army could have done it. As for the Carthaginian lack of response to the Roman move, Hasdrubal Gisgo was certainly no more than an adequate general at best, but in his ranks we certainly have Mago Barca (good) and, possibly/probably, Massinissa. Both could probably be relied on to take action, with or without orders.

Typical Roman armies of this period were generally NOT very well trained

Circa 200-180 Roman armies were packed with Punic veterans at both command and ordinary soldier levels (look at Livy's account, although probably apocryphal, of Spurius Ligustinus.) After this a number of Roman armies were ill-trained and suffered defeat, leading to the arival of competent commanders whose first act was always to institute a stern training regime. Particularly after the annexation of Macedonia as a province there was also usually a small reserve of trained soldiers "floating" around thanks to frequent frontier campaigns. Unfortunately the general quality of Roman generalship did decline in the later second century BC, and the expansion of frontier warfare plus a declining eligible (property qualification) manpower pool led to a decline in the overall standards of armies. It is the period 200-180 where you might expect such maneouvres against the phalanx anchored armies of Philip V of Macedon and Antiochus III.

exception of......no consul had more than a single term of office in this war

We're talking about military commands not political office. Look at your idol Scipio Africanus. The Romans did have a preference for employing Consulars (ex-consuls) in military commands on the basis of their supposed experience. Considering the casualties in the war they had no choice but to continue using Varro, particularly with the neccessity to maintain a united front for the Allies.

....Varro was supported by the Scipionic faction

Does it matter who pays the bribes? In fact, you would expect them to protect Varro to shore up their political position. It wouldn't help them if the proponents of decisive action were permanently tarnished AT THIS POINT.

Paullus refuses the offer......definite suicide

Sounds like it, except....sounds a bit traditionally Roman heroic. I wonder just how many of the right wing (Roman) cavalry did escape, given the way the sources seem to imply they were literally mown down. Certainly it is interesting the way the Carthaginian cavalry commander was able to keep control of his men, contrary to most other battles of this period or later. Madly scattering fugitives are such a tempting target. I do suspect this noble sacrifice, detailed to the wounds he received, could be partially Scipionic embroidery.

...work against the Varro cover up story.....his heirs

Fabius was too much the politician to ignore the possibility of discrediting his opponents strategy, if not persons. The Aemilii Paulli were key Cornelii supporters. If Paullus had been in command it would have been worthwhile trying to discredit him. As you pointed out Varro was a "New Man" in Roman politics, and destroying him was not worth the damage to Senatorial unity. It would be to easy for the Cornelii to disassociate themselves from him.


Now as for Vercingetorix. Pre-Alesia Caesar is in trouble. His army is being dogged by a larger Gallic force preventing foraging. His remaining allies among the Gallic tribes have either been forced to join the revolt, are under attack or inaccessable from his current position, so he cannot replenish his grain supplies from them. To make matters worse Vercingetorix is pursuing a scorched earth policy, so the land his army does cross is relatively barren. He has taken Avaricum, but Vercingetorix did not want to defend it anyway, and his other attempt to tie Vercingetorix down in positional warfare has led to a serious repulse at Gergovia. To cap it all he can no longer rely implicitly on Rome's long time allies the Aedui for support. Before Vercingetorix's mistakes at Alesia, Caesar was almost in the position of having to withdraw into Gallia Narbonensis, temporarily forfeiting all his conquests. This could have had disastrous political repercussions in Rome, where the anti-Caesar bent of the "Boni" was gathering force. Gaul might have been lost for decades, if not forever.

Campaigns against the pirates. Ignoring the roots makes most of them failures. Besides, what about the disastrous campaign of M. Antonius (father of the Triumvir), whose campaign was concluded by such a disastrous forced treaty that it arrived in Rome accompanied by his ashes! Now he really was a suicide.

Gn. Pompeius Magnus was still a competent general, more so than many of Belisarius' opponents. I did say Totila was a good general didn't I, assuming you were referring to the Italian campaign in the last part of your post?

And to Hannibal. I look forward to crossing s"word"s with you in another thread. Given your recent penchant for Belisarius' horse, did someone pick the name you wanted before you joined up?

 

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Originally posted by Agelastus
I can see we're not going to agree about Ilipa.

Hmm - I'm still not exactly sure what it is that you are unhappy about in Polybius's description. As I'm dabbling with writing a historical novel on Scipio (and have parts of a biography of the guy published on the web), so I am quite interested in the exact questions you have about this battle. Perhaps you can send me a mail off-forum (strategy@cs.auc.dk)?

It is the period 200-180 where you might expect such maneouvres against the phalanx anchored armies of Philip V of Macedon and Antiochus III.

Completely agree with your assessment of the Roman army's capabilities (in fact I hope to model a simmilar "form curve" in Imperium). However, I don't feel there is any mystery about why simmilar evolutions are not attempted in latter battles. For one - Scipio was up against clearly second-rate troops on the flanks. For seconds, I don't believe any of the latter engagements make this sensible. Consider the primary engagements of the period where such maneuvers where practicable:
(1) Cynoschephalae was a meeting engagement, rather than the planned encounter at Ilippa - and we note here that the Roman legions proved very flexible.
(2) Thermopylae, the Romans DO outflank the Seleucids (one of the flanking columns led by our friend Cato ).
(3) Magnesia, Antiochus leads several thousand heavily armored cataphracts. Making strange oblique maneuvers in the face of that would have been suicide - the Romans couldn't even stand up to them when charged frontally.
(4) Pydna is another meeting engagement - and in addition, we here find the Macedonians with skilled and efficient light infantry to guard their flanks (the Thracian mercenaries). Another show of manipular flexibility though.

After this time, the quality of the Legions falls rapidly, until the reforms of 110-100 BC change the Legions. Though actually at Corinth in 146, we find the Romans outflanking the phalanx with their Legions (after engaging the phalanx frontally with parts of the Legions). So perhaps the Romans had not entirely forgotten the Scipionic tactics...

Varro and all that...
The Romans did have a preference for employing Consulars (ex-consuls) in military commands on the basis of their supposed experience.

Not quite true. Livius makes a point out of mentioning that the Romans were making an exception in selecting Consuls according to military experience during the Punic wars. Under normal circumstances, a Consul had his year in office, and that was that. Having two terms in office was exceptional - and Scipio's career was particularly exceptional.

Even after Cannae, Rome was chock-full of Consulars with distinguished records. So why take collective responsibility, when it would be much better to have a scapegoat?

Does it matter who pays the bribes? In fact, you would expect them to protect Varro to shore up their political position. It wouldn't help them if the proponents of decisive action were permanently tarnished AT THIS POINT.

There certainly was more than enough infighting during other stages of the war - Marcellus's Sicilian expedition, for instance, and the almost continual harassment of Scipio after his return from Spain. And there is a very clear swing of power after Cannae from the Scipionic to the Anti-Scipionic block: until 207, there is a clear dominance of Fabius Maximus and the Claudians; both clans that we know were against the Scipio/Aemilius "coalition".

So why did the Fabians not make a bigger effort to discredit Varro at this point (they had certainly had no problem condemning Flaminius earlier)?

Let us assume - just for a moment - that Cannae was the brainchild of Aemilius Paullus and the Scipio's from the very start; that Varro was elected in as Colleague because as a "new man" he would not strongly oppose Scipionic policy; and that Paullus did lead the army on the day of battle, and subsequently died in the battle.

There would be no point (it would in fact be very bad politics) to blame a man who had paid for his failure by the act of "Devotio", as Paullus may have done. In fact, the most useful form of rebuke that the Fabian faction could do in this situation would be to do exactly as they did: show public appreciation for Varro's conduct of the campaign.

That it worked is certain - as mentioned there is not a single of the consuls until Livius in 207, whom we can trace as being even mildly associated with the Scipios. Africanus's assumption of command in Spain is the sole exception - apart from him, we see a total domination of the high offices by the non-Scipionic factions. Clearly the Scipio/Aemilius faction were discredited in this period - though Varro was not...

Certainly it is interesting the way the Carthaginian cavalry commander was able to keep control of his men, contrary to most other battles of this period or later.

Exquisite tactical control was one of Hannibal's (and Scipio's) trademarks.

[Paullus]
I do suspect this noble sacrifice, detailed to the wounds he received, could be partially Scipionic embroidery.

Which doesn't invalidate the theory that he deliberately performed suicide. The Roman's did have a romantic inclination toward this.

Before Vercingetorix's mistakes at Alesia, Caesar was almost in the position of having to withdraw into Gallia Narbonensis, temporarily forfeiting all his conquests.

Hmm - but Vercingetorix never got the Gauls to pursue the schorched earth strategy properly. Sure - Caesar was under pressure, but hardly ever desperate in the way he was during the earlier almost frantic attempts to pacify the guerilla warfare against him. IMO, the Gallic cause would have been furthered much greater by continuing this guerilla warfare and bided their time. Vercingetorix whole mistake lay in trying to mass the Celts into one large army that Caesar could defeat all at once.

Campaigns against the pirates. Ignoring the roots makes most of them failures.

Militarily, most of them were not failures and Antony was a fool. Also, the great rivalry between various commanders didn't help (e.g., the guy who raised a siege against an enemy stronghold and disbanded his armies when he learned that he was being replaced ).

I did say Totila was a good general didn't I, assuming you were referring to the Italian campaign in the last part of your post?

Nope - was referring to the Persian campaign. Just made a brief check on Britannica, and it confirms my memory: after his victory of Dara in 530, he lost a battle at Sura in 531 and the result of the war can at best be described as a draw. Being able to defeat Belisarius doesn't sound incompetent to me. His stint on the Mesopotamian frontier in the 540s wasn't particularly glorious either (though he did win a couple of battles) and the Generals of Khosrow I's reign had numerous successes against the Byzantines during this period (including the conquest of Antioch in 540). So I must say, I don't buy the notion of the Persians being incompetent.