Which country was closest to become the hegemon in europe?

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Jodel is talking about one central country which has something everyone wants - money, technology, food, medicine, aid - that becomes hated because it is so necessary to all.
Being hated isn't necessarily part of it. But the way power relationships between nations work, it usually is.

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Hegemony is about being the predominant power against whose opposition other actors won't and can't act alone, and for some reason won't act together. It can be due to factors like the ones you list: They have something that everyone wants and that they can withhold, at small cost to themselves and high cost to the other party. Or they can directly dish out punishment.

A German word would be "Vormachtstellung", maybe those of you who speak other Germanic languages will recognize similar sounding terms from your own languages that are also terms for hegemony.
 
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Greek etymology of the day: Hegemony is a political, economical or military domination of others.

Hegemon = Dominator.

Effectively a vassal situation.

We have not had that throughout Europe many times and I suppose the best cases for this were already mentioned in the thread before the derail on Sweden's long friendship with Finland and semantica over wording.

Hitler's Germany could qualify, albeit briefly, since he had a large Germany, vassalized France, allied Italy, occupied most of the north and center and was in a peace treaty with the Soviets, while the British were hiding on their island.
So I reckon this was the last total hegemon in all senses we've seen.

On an economic base, the USA may qualify in terms of what happened after the post Soviet collapse, until the EU found its legs on the Euro, but that's a 10+ year period or so, as someone mentioned earlier.
 
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until the EU found its legs on the Euro
The euro being conceived for and by Germany, thus you confirm the earlier argument of Germany being a current EU hegemon. That makes for a two-decade long German hegemony so far, but since it is still ongoing it could naturally be more lengthy.
 
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The euro being conceived for and by Germany, thus you confirm the earlier argument of Germany being a current EU hegemon. That makes for a two-decade long German hegemony so far, but since it is still ongoing it could naturally be more lengthy.
The euro was against Germany... and it did its damage, by making the German industry following the Mediterranean model (benefit from devaluation and neglect the efficiency). The Swiss franc is about 30-40% stronger as compared to the euro and the Swiss companies are just in another league in profitability.
 
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The euro was against Germany... and it did its damage, by making the German industry following the Mediterranean model (benefit from devaluation and neglect the efficiency). The Swiss franc is about 30-40% stronger as compared to the euro and the Swiss companies are just in another league in profitability.
A lot of things here, but unfortunately most of it is wrong, both historically and economically. Firstly Germany conditioned joining the euro on maintaining a strong currency like the mark, imposing a series of provisions in the treaties on the ECB amongst others and dominates the European institutions. Secondly, there is no Mediterranean model, the Italian economy is different from the French, which is not like the Spanish and vice versa. Not quite sure where you are going when comparing Switzerland with Germany, they are not at all playing in the same league. With this in mind the claim that the euro was "against Germany", when you look at the current state of their economy, consider their commercial surplus and the fact that most of Eastern Europe depends upon them is rather disconnected from reality.
 
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A lot of things here, but unfortunately most of it is wrong, both historically and economically. Firstly Germany conditioned joining the euro on maintaining a strong currency like the mark, imposing a series of provisions in the treaties on the ECB amongst others and dominates the European institutions. Secondly, there is no Mediterranean model, the Italian economy is different from the French, which is not like the Spanish and vice versa. Not quite sure where you are going when comparing Switzerland with Germany, they are not at all playing in the same league. With this in mind the claim that the euro was "against Germany", when you look at the current state of their economy, consider their commercial surplus and the fact that most of Eastern Europe depends upon them is rather disconnected from reality.
Let´s take just this one:


Basically the German manufacturing industry is more or less stagnating since 2010 or more on the short term in decline since 2017.

Of course Germany is not playing the same league with Switzerland. Here is a Swiss company producing toilets:

in 2019 (before CoVid)

3.1 billion sales / 1.8 equity / 1.9 liabilities ... 0.65b profit. For every dollar invested they gained ~20 cent per year, for 1 dollar sales ~20 cent profit.

this is the crown jewel of the German industry the Daimler company
(2018 because 2019 was a really bad year)

167 billion sales / 62 equity / 223 liabilities ... 7.2 b profit. They cannot even hit the ~5 cent limit. Almost a non-profit organization for the welfare of the management.
 
Depends what exactly you mean by 'hegemon', and what you mean by Europe. Roman law held no sway over the lands that make up modern Russia, and the Hapsburgs' dream of universal empire was challenged by many.

The closest thing Europe has had to a hegemonic power was the United States after the fall of the USSR but before the rise of an (admittedly weaker) Russia. American missteps have also, to a certain extent, alienated their allies in Europe, which has likely weakened the hard influence of the hegemon. America's soft power is insane, though, and the rise of the internet has, if anything, made it stronger.
 
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A lot of things here, but unfortunately most of it is wrong, both historically and economically. Firstly Germany conditioned joining the euro on maintaining a strong currency like the mark, imposing a series of provisions in the treaties on the ECB amongst others and dominates the European institutions. Secondly, there is no Mediterranean model, the Italian economy is different from the French, which is not like the Spanish and vice versa. Not quite sure where you are going when comparing Switzerland with Germany, they are not at all playing in the same league. With this in mind the claim that the euro was "against Germany", when you look at the current state of their economy, consider their commercial surplus and the fact that most of Eastern Europe depends upon them is rather disconnected from reality.
Um, no. What's disconnected from reality is the warped fiction you presented with your post.

The Euro was the consequence of French demands, it had nothing whatsoever with conditions made by Germany. In fact, Germans were vehemently opposed to the idea of the Euro, and Helmut Kohl basically had to force it through. Closer cooperation on that matter was a requirement for German re-unification. Some set of guidelines for what economic integration would mean did not hinge on Germany demanding them, they were always bound to happen. You always have this weird fiction of Germany being some sort of draconian overlord who forces its ideas onto others, conveniently ignoring that in most cases some of the smaller nations to the west and north follow far more drastic approaches than Germany does.

Germany was the leading economic power in Europe prior to the Euro, so it was always likely to be the leading economic power once the Euro arrived. Taking from that that the Euro was somehow a German demand, or that it somehow caused a German domination, is completely absurd and without any logic.

Stating that the Euro was "being conceived for and by Germany" is a flat out lie. Stop making things up.
 
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Um, no. What's disconnected from reality is the warped fiction you presented with your post.
If you don't make the effort of reading what I post, you will indeed end up with a lot of fiction and lies. If you read my posts and consider their content rather than a straw man there is none of that. I never said the euro was a German "demand", I said Germany posed several conditions to joining the euro.

The Euro [...] had nothing whatsoever with conditions made by Germany.
Claiming that Germany joined the euro unconditionally without any prior negotiation is blatantly false. You even contradict yourself when you mention the fact that it was a complicated process for Kohl. Naturally a key member state of the euro will make demands before joining a currency zone, and the more economic weight the more importance will be attached to those conditions. Two very simple examples illustrate this. France did not have the absurd German fear for inflation, and Karlsruhe is not situated within France. Germany would obviously never have joined the euro without being able to influence its conception and getting a series of guarantees on its nature (conditions).

Stating that the Euro was "being conceived for and by Germany" is a flat out lie. Stop making things up.
It is a simple conclusion on the basis of two key factors. First of all the German economy dominates the euro zone, it is impossible to contest. Secondly Germany was crucial in conceiving the euro framework and still today controls it. On that basis, if you look at the damage the euro did to Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and France before Mario Draghi decided to breach the treaties that German politicians had defended, and still does to the economy of these countries, will looking at the benefits for Germany in terms of commercial surplus, you can safely conclude that the euro was "being conceived for and by Germany". No other member state has benefitted as much as Germany and had as much influence, and it never will unless the treaties are changed in a way that explicitly contradicts the policies of the German CDU-CSU governments and the social-liberal SPD.

Some set of guidelines for what economic integration would mean did not hinge on Germany demanding them, they were always bound to happen.
No, there is no universal model for "economic integration" inevitably leading to orthodox German economic policies as envisioned by their right-wing. There are many alternative models of economic integration which set different guidelines.

You always have this weird fiction of Germany being some sort of draconian overlord who forces its ideas onto others, conveniently ignoring that in most cases some of the smaller nations to the west and north follow far more drastic approaches than Germany does.
There are not that many other members of the eurozone. Given Germany's economic weight it would be absurd to cite the Netherlands and Austria without considering the fact that their agenda is largely tied to the German one due to dependence. Germany doesn't need to impose ideas as a "draconian overlord", they are natural due to their domination of the continent and the fact that no one can contradict them.

Germany was the leading economic power in Europe prior to the Euro, so it was always likely to be the leading economic power once the Euro arrived. Taking from that that the Euro was somehow a German demand, or that it somehow caused a German domination, is completely absurd and without any logic.
It is perfectly possible for a common currency to reinforce the advantages of the leading economic power at the expense of smaller economies. That is how Germany benefitted from the euro while a series of states to its south were disadvantaged. That being said, it doesn't mean Germany wouldn't have dominated the zone without the euro, it means it is one of the tools strengthening its domination given the nature of the framework.
 
There are not that many other members of the eurozone. Given Germany's economic weight it would be absurd to cite the Netherlands and Austria without considering the fact that their agenda is largely tied to the German one due to dependence. Germany doesn't need to impose ideas as a "draconian overlord", they are natural due to their domination of the continent and the fact that no one can contradict them.
In general you make a good case but this is overstating it. The Netherlands and Austria have their own interests and they've pushed for it at times against Germany's wishes, e.g. dismissing German concessions to France. (I'm not saying that's a good thing, the most fruitful EU policies came out of Franco-German negotiations.) The Netherlands used to hide behind the UK when it wanted something different; after Brexit it's increasingly common for them to seek common ground with Baltic and Scandinavian countries to make a bloc that can't simply be overruled.
 
In general you make a good case but this is overstating it. The Netherlands and Austria have their own interests and they've pushed for it at times against Germany's wishes, e.g. dismissing German concessions to France. (I'm not saying that's a good thing, the most fruitful EU policies came out of Franco-German negotiations.) The Netherlands used to hide behind the UK when it wanted something different; after Brexit it's increasingly common for them to seek common ground with Baltic and Scandinavian countries to make a bloc that can't simply be overruled.
I'm not as convinced as you of the utility of bilateral Franco-German "negotiations" imposing its wishes upon the rest of the EU, but the focus was on the euro, and on the policies relating to that the Netherlands or Austria going even further than Germany isn't a direct threat or challenge to the German domination but rather a part of natural considerations as each state seeks to push its own agenda. I agree that it would be wrong to consider those two countries as mere dependencies without their own interests, they can not be reduced to their relation to Germany, but said relationship and the power ratio within the bloc means it it is difficult within the euro zone to envision a situation where Germany would be harmed by something the Netherlands or Austria would have imposed against its interests.
 
I'm not as convinced as you of the utility of bilateral Franco-German "negotiations" imposing its wishes upon the rest of the EU, but the focus was on the euro, and on the policies relating to that the Netherlands or Austria going even further than Germany isn't a direct threat or challenge to the German domination but rather a part of natural considerations as each state seeks to push its own agenda. I agree that it would be wrong to consider those two countries as mere dependencies without their own interests, they can not be reduced to their relation to Germany, but said relationship and the power ratio within the bloc means it it is difficult within the euro zone to envision a situation where Germany would be harmed by something the Netherlands or Austria would have imposed against its interests.
Good, we agree for the most part. About the French-German axis, surely you've noticed how often a joint French-German proposal became an important EU policy. France and Germany are aware of the influence they have by working together, which they've often done in bilateral talks behind closed doors before presenting their compromise to the rest of the EU.

(Only the UK had the clout to refuse to join in such policies. Most of the time not enough clout to change it but enough to opt out. There are a few other opt-outs but the majority by far were exceptions made for the UK, some of them subsequently extended to other member states.)

I think the process is something like this: France is the strongest of the southern economies (in close competition with Italy but France has a stronger government), Germany is the strongest of the northern economies, both are seen as leaders of their "side" in the EU. When these two come to agreement, their respective sides lose a lot of clout. Much of the time both remainders are then unable to present an alternative of their own with enough backing. The Franco-German compromise, having been worked out across "partly lines" so to speak, also presents itself as a deal that can credibly be reached with all or most the other side. In such situations the objective of the remainder blocs (including the Dutch-Austrian-and-other-assorted-misers) is not so much to present an alternative as to amend the compromise in their direction.
 
The Euro was the consequence of French demands, it had nothing whatsoever with conditions made by Germany.
.......
Stating that the Euro was "being conceived for and by Germany" is a flat out lie. Stop making things up.
The argument seems to be between two absolute end points, one where the Euro had "nothing whatsoever with conditions made by Germany", and one where it was "conceived for and by Germany". It should be pretty obvious that both statements are false, since Germany did have a substantial amount of input in the creation of the Euro, but it was primarily conceived and pushed for by France, with significant changes and conditions added by Germany and possibly other EU members. The whole argument seems ridiculous to me.
 
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The argument seems to be between two absolute end points, one where the Euro had "nothing whatsoever with conditions made by Germany", and one where it was "conceived for and by Germany". It should be pretty obvious that both statements are false, since Germany did have a substantial amount of input in the creation of the Euro, but it was primarily conceived and pushed for by France, with significant changes and conditions added by Germany and possibly other EU members. The whole argument seems ridiculous to me.
My point is that ultimately, given Germany's input and conditions, the Euro and the framework advantaged Germany so much comparatively to other countries that it can be considered to have been "conceived for and by Germany", even if it wasn't initially a specifically German demand and France naturally played a role, as did other member states. When negotiating, Germany was conscious that they could condition their support on it being done within a set of rules and a context that heavily favoured them. France wasn't really that advantaged by the Euro since it wanted to go much further in terms of fiscal and social harmonisation, which never happened. For France the Euro wasn't the end in itself.

Good, we agree for the most part. About the French-German axis, surely you've noticed how often a joint French-German proposal became an important EU policy. France and Germany are aware of the influence they have by working together, which they've often done in bilateral talks behind closed doors before presenting their compromise to the rest of the EU.

(Only the UK had the clout to refuse to join in such policies. Most of the time not enough clout to change it but enough to opt out. There are a few other opt-outs but the majority by far were exceptions made for the UK, some of them subsequently extended to other member states.)

I think the process is something like this: France is the strongest of the southern economies (in close competition with Italy but France has a stronger government), Germany is the strongest of the northern economies, both are seen as leaders of their "side" in the EU. When these two come to agreement, their respective sides lose a lot of clout. Much of the time both remainders are then unable to present an alternative of their own with enough backing. The Franco-German compromise, having been worked out across "partly lines" so to speak, also presents itself as a deal that can credibly be reached with all or most the other side. In such situations the objective of the remainder blocs (including the Dutch-Austrian-and-other-assorted-misers) is not so much to present an alternative as to amend the compromise in their direction.
Yes, but I would stress that Germany has the upper hand on France, which in general struggles far more than Germany. Therefore even the bilateral axis is a false one in the sense that there is a direct power struggle between Germany and France with contradictory interests. By default Germany is the dominant party of the two, and the only country which can pretend to dominate Europe overall. The question is if France can benefit from the bilateral relationship by getting concessions from Germany that still means it gets more than the average in proportion to its weight or if France ends up just being a caution in a system where Germany increasingly dominates.
 
My point is that ultimately, given Germany's input and conditions, the Euro and the framework advantaged Germany so much comparatively to other countries that it can be considered to have been "conceived for and by Germany", even if it wasn't initially a specifically German demand and France naturally played a role, as did other member states. When negotiating, Germany was conscious that they could condition their support on it being done within a set of rules and a context that heavily favoured them. France wasn't really that advantaged by the Euro since it wanted to go much further in terms of fiscal and social harmonisation, which never happened. For France the Euro wasn't the end in itself.


Yes, but I would stress that Germany has the upper hand on France, which in general struggles far more than Germany. Therefore even the bilateral axis is a false one in the sense that there is a direct power struggle between Germany and France with contradictory interests. By default Germany is the dominant party of the two, and the only country which can pretend to dominate Europe overall. The question is if France can benefit from the bilateral relationship by getting concessions from Germany that still means it gets more than the average in proportion to its weight or if France ends up just being a caution in a system where Germany increasingly dominates.
In general, yes, Germany has the stronger economy and is usually able to exert a bit more influence. But Germany also needs France, in order to not appear too dominating as well as to overcome veto and consensus decision-making rules. I would add that the question is only partly about countries getting their interests served; the other part is about realizing their vision of what European union should look like, which frequently varies according to which party is in government. Monnet and De Gaulle are a perfect example. De Gaulle was president and clearly the more powerful politician in France but his Europe of the Nations failed. Monnet got more of his vision realized by working closely with the Germans, who had their own historical reasons for de-emphasizing the nation. I wouldn't say the outcome went against France, I think Monnet has a pretty decent claim to representing its interests, and I wouldn't say the outcome was determined by German national interest either but by a vision of transcending narrow national interests that was widely shared in Germany.
 
In general, yes, Germany has the stronger economy and is usually able to exert a bit more influence. But Germany also needs France, in order to not appear too dominating as well as to overcome veto and consensus decision-making rules. I would add that the question is only partly about countries getting their interests served; the other part is about realizing their vision of what European union should look like, which frequently varies according to which party is in government. Monnet and De Gaulle are a perfect example. De Gaulle was president and clearly the more powerful politician in France but his Europe of the Nations failed. Monnet got more of his vision realized by working closely with the Germans, who had their own historical reasons for de-emphasizing the nation. I wouldn't say the outcome went against France, I think Monnet has a pretty decent claim to representing its interests, and I wouldn't say the outcome was determined by German national interest either but by a vision of transcending narrow national interests that was widely shared in Germany.
I generally agree with this. Jean Monnet is often accused of defending American or foreign interests more than French ones, but I rather think he genuinely believed in market liberalism, with free trade, profit and the competition it implies, so being convinced by those ideas it was natural for him to get all the support he could get.
 
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For my own argument i think i shall first put out my own definition of a "hegemon over an area". It is a power so powerfull that it can decide wether wars even between other powers can happen in that neighbourhood and decide the outcomes of them should they get involved or feel required to do so. Roughly speaking that would be when it's millitary power at land, sea and/or air outclasses that of all the rest. Afcourse any other power could still start a war in that area withought the consent of that Hegemon but the implication would be that the Hegemon then can stop it by force.

By that definition: The roman empire surely, and then it's not even a matter of comming close but having been the hegemon at certain times. The roman Empire stopped expanding more because it was unfeasable rather than inabillety to defeat certain others within Europe. And that would be about it. Napoleonic France couldn't outpower Brittain at sea.
 
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Ah, the Universal monarchy, the Humanist dream.

Then this damned little monk came, with his coarse peasant babbling, and ruined everything. :mad:
e4e.png
 
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