Nice to see an AAR with the New Order events....been curious to see what effect they have on the game. Keep up the excellent work.
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Fall Gelb – Invasion of France
Hitler makes a decision - Fall Gelb in October
Following the fall of the Netherlands, it was generally expected by the General Staffs of France and Britain that the worsening weather conditions would force a pause in operations until spring. The “Greatest field commander of all time” had other plans though, and when his weather boffins kept predicting nothing but rain, rain and rain, Hitler dismissed them with the comment that the Luftwaffe hadn’t lived up to expectations anyway and that the grounding of both air forces probably would hurt the western allies more than the Germans. In the Führer directive of September 23rd the OKH was ordered to prepare for carrying out plan “Fall Gelb” on October 1st at the latest. Once again, the main weight of the offensive would fall on Army Group A (HG A) of Field Marshal von Bock.
The Axis and the Allies on October 1st,1939
Concerns in the OKH
This directive was met with great scepticism among the OKH Staff Officers. Field Marshall von Brauchitsch, himself went on record claiming that the German forces were inadequate for the task, that more Panzers and fighters were needed and that attacking in October would represent a dangerous gamble. This was however a gamble the Führer was willing to make, and he did not rescind his decision. As a consequence, the Wehrmacht would soon find itself out on a limb and closer to total disaster than ever before.
The plan of operations
Plan “Fall Gelb” was unusual in that it did not specify any particular territorial objectives but rather emphasized the destruction of the French, British and Belgian forces in northern France. A concerted “Panzerblitz” was to bypass Brussels and pierce the French lines along the Franco-Belgian border at Sedan and/or Chaumont depending on the level of resistance encountered. The fast moving cavalry/motorized XIII Armekorps of von Falkenhorst would follow in the wake of the Panzer groups and secure their immediate rear area, while the 2., 4. 10. and 20. Armies would advance on a broad front and destroy any enemy pockets bypassed by the Panzers. Luftwaffe intervention was not relied upon, since the weather was expected to be generally hostile to air operations. After a breakthrough had been achieved, the advance would continue either towards the channel between the rivers Seine and Meuse, towards the Swiss border in the rear of the Maginot line or towards Paris depending on the situation.
The course of the French campaign – marching through Belgium
At dawn of October 1st 1939 operation “Fall Gelb” began. Guderian’s and Manstein’s Panzergruppen advanced from Eindhoven region in parallel columns on either side of Brussels. Behind and between them was the cavalry and motorized infantry of XIII Armeekorps of General von Falkenhorst and in the far rear and on the flanks, ranged from the sea to the German border were 2., 4., 10., and 20. Armies advancing on a broad front. In the west, 6. Armee crossed the border near Arlon threatening the right flank of the Belgian army. Upon hearing the news, the Belgian government issued a statement condemning the unprovoked German aggression. Plans for coordinating the direction of the war with the French High Command were set in motion.
The Luftwaffe vindicated
Taking advantage of an unexpected spell of good weather over western Belgium the IV and V Luftflotten struck at Belgian Air Fields. A series of savage aerial engagements ensued in which the Bf-109Es and E-4/Bs proved vastly superior to the defending Fairy Fox fighters. Kesselring was driving his men and machines relentlessly: with non-stop air raids succeeding each other throughout the day, the Luftwaffe gradually eroded the Belgian fighter force and the airfield attacks destroyed many bombers on the ground. By nightfall the Royal Belgian Air Force had for all practical purposes ceased to exist. From the second day of the offensive the Luftwaffe would shift its attention from airfield to troop concentrations, wherever the weather so permitted.
Battle of Brussels
At 8:00 hours of October 2nd, the mobile forces of Heeresgruppe A had advanced as far as Brussels and initiated a pincer attack destined to isolate the city. The Belgian defenders were not cooperating, having concentrated their strength on the flanks. By straining every muscle they managed to hold off the weight of the Panzergruppen long enough for the forces within the jaws of the pincer to escape, but they could not hope to hold back the german Panzers for ever. At 13:00 hours Guderian informed von Bock that a breakthrough had been achieved. I Panzergruppe shifted its axis of advance to the south, rolling up the flank of the Belgian forces facing II Panzergruppe. This proved too much and the Belgians shattered. A giant hole had been torn in the allied line. At 14:00 King Albert declared Brussels an open city but Guderian and Manstein did not waste any time with niceties, leaving it to von Falkenhorst to hold a triumphal entry into the capital of Belgium. Bypassing the city entirely the Panzergruppen rushed to the southwest, towards the French border. Luftwaffe reconnaissance indicated that it was held by nothing but skeleton forces and that a war winning breakthrough was within reach for the Germans.
Situation in the evening of October 2nd
Death of a convoy
While 2. and 10. Armies were marching through Brussels, matters were developing nicely for the Wehrmacht in other sectors. At 2:00 hours on the 3rd October a coded signal from one of the U-boot wolfpacks in the North East Atlantic reached Kriegsmarine headquarters at Wilhelmshafen. A large convoy of troop transports had been spotted on a course for Britain. Dönitz spent a few frantic hours assembling his boats for the kill and at 5:00 the first torpedoes hit their marks. It was a Canadian convoy carrying several divisions to England under only light destroyer escort and it had sailed straight into a deadly ambush. It was slaughter. During a five hour engagement dozens of fully laden transport ships were torpedoed and capsized. Desperate Canadian soldiers threw themselves into the icy waters of the North Atlantic, but only a handful were rescued by U-boots and destroyers. One of the U-boot captains reportedly cried like a baby when he was forced to back away his already badly overcrowded boat from swimming Canadians. At 5:00 the same morning the Hochseeflotte safely reached Wilhelmshafen. Repairs of minor battle damage on Raeder’s proud ships began immediately. There had been no news of the British cruisers sighted in Baltic the previous month, so there was no sense in rushing the Fleet off unprepared.
Battles of Antwerpen and Arlon
Meanwhile, the flank battles were developing in Belgium. At 7:00 General Paulus led his 20. Armee in its first assault on the important port of Antwerpen. The Belgians defended their positions vigorously and the German infantry, deprived of Luftwaffe support by the worst imaginable weather, were unable to make much progress for the moment, although they would be joined on the next day by XIII. Armeekorps. This departure from plan was ordered by von Bock in the mistaken belief that the reinforcement of 20. Armee would allow Paulus to reduce Antwerpen quickly.
On the other end of the front, General Liebmann’s 6. Armee engaged the right flank of the Belgian army. Being the one area of the front were the weather currently allowed bomber sorties, Liebmanns troops enjoyed the undivided support of IV & V Luftflotten and they were thus able to rout the 4 defending divisions in a matter of hours. The same evening the Belgians were in full retreat along the entire front from Luxemburg to the sea, with the notable exception of Antwerpen.
Guderian at Sedan
Soon after midnight, in the early hours of October 4th, Panzergruppe I crossed the French border near Sedan. A single French division was holding far too much of the lightly fortified front in this sector and the volatile Panzer general lost no time. Driving his exhausted troops mercilessly (many of whom were living through their third sleepless night) “Hasty Heinz” smashed the French forces, tearing a gaping hole in their thin lines. Soon, his lead elements reported advancing unopposed towards the English channel. It was a clean breakthrough. Further east, recon units of the 7. Panzer Division reported to General von Manstein that the light fortifications along the border with Belgium in the Chaumont province were unmanned. The opportunity was too good to miss, and Manstein promptly sent his forces forward without consulting with von Bock. The Field Marshal was informed within the hour but in the light of Guderians earlier success at Sedan, he voiced no objections.
Hitler makes a decision - Fall Gelb in October
Following the fall of the Netherlands, it was generally expected by the General Staffs of France and Britain that the worsening weather conditions would force a pause in operations until spring. The “Greatest field commander of all time” had other plans though, and when his weather boffins kept predicting nothing but rain, rain and rain, Hitler dismissed them with the comment that the Luftwaffe hadn’t lived up to expectations anyway and that the grounding of both air forces probably would hurt the western allies more than the Germans. In the Führer directive of September 23rd the OKH was ordered to prepare for carrying out plan “Fall Gelb” on October 1st at the latest. Once again, the main weight of the offensive would fall on Army Group A (HG A) of Field Marshal von Bock.
The Axis and the Allies on October 1st,1939
Concerns in the OKH
This directive was met with great scepticism among the OKH Staff Officers. Field Marshall von Brauchitsch, himself went on record claiming that the German forces were inadequate for the task, that more Panzers and fighters were needed and that attacking in October would represent a dangerous gamble. This was however a gamble the Führer was willing to make, and he did not rescind his decision. As a consequence, the Wehrmacht would soon find itself out on a limb and closer to total disaster than ever before.
The plan of operations
Plan “Fall Gelb” was unusual in that it did not specify any particular territorial objectives but rather emphasized the destruction of the French, British and Belgian forces in northern France. A concerted “Panzerblitz” was to bypass Brussels and pierce the French lines along the Franco-Belgian border at Sedan and/or Chaumont depending on the level of resistance encountered. The fast moving cavalry/motorized XIII Armekorps of von Falkenhorst would follow in the wake of the Panzer groups and secure their immediate rear area, while the 2., 4. 10. and 20. Armies would advance on a broad front and destroy any enemy pockets bypassed by the Panzers. Luftwaffe intervention was not relied upon, since the weather was expected to be generally hostile to air operations. After a breakthrough had been achieved, the advance would continue either towards the channel between the rivers Seine and Meuse, towards the Swiss border in the rear of the Maginot line or towards Paris depending on the situation.
The course of the French campaign – marching through Belgium
At dawn of October 1st 1939 operation “Fall Gelb” began. Guderian’s and Manstein’s Panzergruppen advanced from Eindhoven region in parallel columns on either side of Brussels. Behind and between them was the cavalry and motorized infantry of XIII Armeekorps of General von Falkenhorst and in the far rear and on the flanks, ranged from the sea to the German border were 2., 4., 10., and 20. Armies advancing on a broad front. In the west, 6. Armee crossed the border near Arlon threatening the right flank of the Belgian army. Upon hearing the news, the Belgian government issued a statement condemning the unprovoked German aggression. Plans for coordinating the direction of the war with the French High Command were set in motion.
The Luftwaffe vindicated
Taking advantage of an unexpected spell of good weather over western Belgium the IV and V Luftflotten struck at Belgian Air Fields. A series of savage aerial engagements ensued in which the Bf-109Es and E-4/Bs proved vastly superior to the defending Fairy Fox fighters. Kesselring was driving his men and machines relentlessly: with non-stop air raids succeeding each other throughout the day, the Luftwaffe gradually eroded the Belgian fighter force and the airfield attacks destroyed many bombers on the ground. By nightfall the Royal Belgian Air Force had for all practical purposes ceased to exist. From the second day of the offensive the Luftwaffe would shift its attention from airfield to troop concentrations, wherever the weather so permitted.
Battle of Brussels
At 8:00 hours of October 2nd, the mobile forces of Heeresgruppe A had advanced as far as Brussels and initiated a pincer attack destined to isolate the city. The Belgian defenders were not cooperating, having concentrated their strength on the flanks. By straining every muscle they managed to hold off the weight of the Panzergruppen long enough for the forces within the jaws of the pincer to escape, but they could not hope to hold back the german Panzers for ever. At 13:00 hours Guderian informed von Bock that a breakthrough had been achieved. I Panzergruppe shifted its axis of advance to the south, rolling up the flank of the Belgian forces facing II Panzergruppe. This proved too much and the Belgians shattered. A giant hole had been torn in the allied line. At 14:00 King Albert declared Brussels an open city but Guderian and Manstein did not waste any time with niceties, leaving it to von Falkenhorst to hold a triumphal entry into the capital of Belgium. Bypassing the city entirely the Panzergruppen rushed to the southwest, towards the French border. Luftwaffe reconnaissance indicated that it was held by nothing but skeleton forces and that a war winning breakthrough was within reach for the Germans.
Situation in the evening of October 2nd
Death of a convoy
While 2. and 10. Armies were marching through Brussels, matters were developing nicely for the Wehrmacht in other sectors. At 2:00 hours on the 3rd October a coded signal from one of the U-boot wolfpacks in the North East Atlantic reached Kriegsmarine headquarters at Wilhelmshafen. A large convoy of troop transports had been spotted on a course for Britain. Dönitz spent a few frantic hours assembling his boats for the kill and at 5:00 the first torpedoes hit their marks. It was a Canadian convoy carrying several divisions to England under only light destroyer escort and it had sailed straight into a deadly ambush. It was slaughter. During a five hour engagement dozens of fully laden transport ships were torpedoed and capsized. Desperate Canadian soldiers threw themselves into the icy waters of the North Atlantic, but only a handful were rescued by U-boots and destroyers. One of the U-boot captains reportedly cried like a baby when he was forced to back away his already badly overcrowded boat from swimming Canadians. At 5:00 the same morning the Hochseeflotte safely reached Wilhelmshafen. Repairs of minor battle damage on Raeder’s proud ships began immediately. There had been no news of the British cruisers sighted in Baltic the previous month, so there was no sense in rushing the Fleet off unprepared.
Battles of Antwerpen and Arlon
Meanwhile, the flank battles were developing in Belgium. At 7:00 General Paulus led his 20. Armee in its first assault on the important port of Antwerpen. The Belgians defended their positions vigorously and the German infantry, deprived of Luftwaffe support by the worst imaginable weather, were unable to make much progress for the moment, although they would be joined on the next day by XIII. Armeekorps. This departure from plan was ordered by von Bock in the mistaken belief that the reinforcement of 20. Armee would allow Paulus to reduce Antwerpen quickly.
On the other end of the front, General Liebmann’s 6. Armee engaged the right flank of the Belgian army. Being the one area of the front were the weather currently allowed bomber sorties, Liebmanns troops enjoyed the undivided support of IV & V Luftflotten and they were thus able to rout the 4 defending divisions in a matter of hours. The same evening the Belgians were in full retreat along the entire front from Luxemburg to the sea, with the notable exception of Antwerpen.
Guderian at Sedan
Soon after midnight, in the early hours of October 4th, Panzergruppe I crossed the French border near Sedan. A single French division was holding far too much of the lightly fortified front in this sector and the volatile Panzer general lost no time. Driving his exhausted troops mercilessly (many of whom were living through their third sleepless night) “Hasty Heinz” smashed the French forces, tearing a gaping hole in their thin lines. Soon, his lead elements reported advancing unopposed towards the English channel. It was a clean breakthrough. Further east, recon units of the 7. Panzer Division reported to General von Manstein that the light fortifications along the border with Belgium in the Chaumont province were unmanned. The opportunity was too good to miss, and Manstein promptly sent his forces forward without consulting with von Bock. The Field Marshal was informed within the hour but in the light of Guderians earlier success at Sedan, he voiced no objections.
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This is an excellent AAR, Yogi! The steady military pace makes for excellent reading. Question, are the leader's names automatically displayed when you use counters, or is that the result of a mod?
Thanks everyone! Its really so much more fun to write when there are appreciative readers.
The names of top ranking leaders is automaticaly displayed when using counters, ie Field Marshals, Air Marshals and Grand Admirals are shown.
Breakout into France...look forward to seeing how Guderian and von Manstein perform. Looks like the Kriegsmarine is holding up it's part of the war pretty well so far.
Fall of Antwerpen
During the night of October 4th-5th, XIII Armeekorps joined 20. Armee in its ongoing battle for Antwerpen, but had little impact. The German forces did not lack numbers, what was needed was to break the morale of the Belgian forces defending the each house of the city like it was a fortress. German losses were mounting and progress was painfully slow. The cold and weather, with heavy cloud cover and a never-ending drizzle also sapped the morale of the Landsers, who were tired, cold, wet and thoroughly miserable. But as the first trickle of grey light on the eastern horizon heralded a new day, the rain stopped and the skies began to clear somewhat. Reich Marshal Goering had been forewarned a few hours earlier by Luftwaffe meteorologists of the upcoming change of weather and had ordered all available bombers to launch an all-out strike on the defiant city.
At 5:00 in the morning a droning sound was heard growing louder and louder by the terriefied citizens of Antwerp. Soon Ju-87B Stukas dove on the doomed city by the hundreds, sirens wailing, striking AA-positions, artillery emplacements and government buildings. Their 500 kg bombs blew up huge clouds of flame, debris and black smoke. The “trumpets of Jericho” were driving the inhabitants mad with fear and panic struck citizens were running about, franticly trying to escape the inferno. The first wave of the attack was over in 30 minutes, and then the real purgatory of Antwerpen began. High above the city the black crow-like silhouettes of He-111 medium bombers appeared in frightening numbers. One after another they opened their bomb bays and dropped thousands of 250 kg fragmentation bombs and incendiary bomblets without any attempt at precision or aim.
The destruction caused was mind-numbing. Buildings flew apart as if hit by giant sledge hammers. Entire blocks vanished in clouds of dust and smoke and civilian casualties numbered in the thousands. Soon the city core was ablaze, and the German language gained a new verb:“Antwerpieren”.
German "Landsers" watch the destruction of Antwerpen
Watching in awe as huge columns of smoke gradually obscured the stricken city, even the Wehrmacht soldiers fighting in its outskirts were horrified by what their country had wrought, many of them fearing that a day of reckoning should arrive. Von Paulus is said to have quoted Homer as he regarded the burning city with a blank face: “The day will come when Holy Ilion shall fall”, the same words spoken by Scipio Aemilianus as he witnessed the destruction of Carthage. Within minutes of learning of the bombing of Antwerpen, King Albert sent emissaries to von Paulus, asking for terms for the surrender of the city. By nightfall, Antwerpen was in German hands.
Hearing the news first thing in the morning, Hitler phoned Goering and jovially invited him to the Chancellery that afternoon for a cup of herbal tea and a talk. Apparently the Reich Marshal was back in favour.
Race to the Channel
After having stopping for a few hours to allow his exhausted panzercrews a minimum of rest, Guderian pushed on throughout the night, arriving in undefended Amiens at 5:00 in the morning of October 5th. The tanks drove straight through the undefended city, the stunned inhabitants waking with a start at the sound of German tanks and halftracks clattering through their streets by the hundreds. Guderian had his eyes fixed on Rouen and the Channel coast, the capture of which would pocket an entire French Army in Lille. Having met no resistance whatsoever, I Panzegruppe captured Rouen at 17:00 hours. The Channel had been reached and the supply lines of the French and Belgian troops opposing 20. Armee in its advance from Antwerpen had been cut. But “Hasty Heinz” was not content with this great victory. He had done his share of team play and now he was going to indulge a little something for himself – a little something like Paris…
Situation on the morning of September 5th
Manstein plays it safe
Meanwhile, in Chaumont, Manstein found that his scouts had been somewhat overoptimistic. As his forced approached the French fortified line, he discovered that it was indeed manned after all, although by very few troops. French High Command had apparently started to plug the gap in their front left by the Belgian collapse, rushing whatever troops they could find to form a new front. In this case, the troops had been taken from the garrison at Metz, a fact capitalized on by General Liebmann, commander of 6.Armee in Arlon. Furiously pursuing the retreating Belgian forces, he set course on Metz, hoping to arrive there before the Belgians had time to establish themselves in the impressive fortifications of the northern end of the Maginot line.
The French defenders of Chaumont could have done little to stop Manstein, numbering only one division but one of that brilliant military mind’s maxims was “you can never bee to strong in the decisive spot” so since the morning sun shone from a clear sky, he called upon the Luftwaffe to clear the way for him. At 8:00 hours, having rearmed and refuelled after the “Blitz” of Antwerpen, Kesselrings Heinkels, Stukas and Messerschmitts were above Chaumont, blasting the defending positions with precision and brutality. By 10:00, II Panzergruppe had cleared the fortified zone and was advancing at maximum road speed in the direction of Nancy, with 6.Armee force-marching its way towards undefended Metz on the left flank. It was beginning to look as if an encirclement of the Maginot line might actually be pulled off.
At nightfall, von Bock established the forward HQ of Heeresgruppe A at Sedan while 2. Armee took up positions in the area.
Battle of Nancy
In the early hours of October 6th, II Panzergruppe made contact with French forces in the vicinity of Nancy. French supreme commander, General Maurice Gamelin had seen the danger to Paris and was detaching strong forces from the Maginot line to rush to the defence of the capital. It was these forces that had been intercepted by II. Panzergruppe and a pitched battle ensued. The Germans had the advantage of superior tank forces but the French, 14 divisions strong, had numbers going for them. Time and again German tank battalions had to rush to the aid of Panzergrenadier units being swamped by massive infantry assaults, and the French artillery (vastly superior to Manstein’s light and mobile pieces) kept up a withering fire. Not even the Stukas, Germany’s “flying artillery”, could break the French forces since French fighter squadrons from Strasbourg gave the Luftflotte IV’s “jabos” a run for their money. In the end the D. 501 interceptors were chased off and the He-111’s and Stukas enjoyed a free reign, but even so the matter was still undecided by nightfall.
During the night of October 4th-5th, XIII Armeekorps joined 20. Armee in its ongoing battle for Antwerpen, but had little impact. The German forces did not lack numbers, what was needed was to break the morale of the Belgian forces defending the each house of the city like it was a fortress. German losses were mounting and progress was painfully slow. The cold and weather, with heavy cloud cover and a never-ending drizzle also sapped the morale of the Landsers, who were tired, cold, wet and thoroughly miserable. But as the first trickle of grey light on the eastern horizon heralded a new day, the rain stopped and the skies began to clear somewhat. Reich Marshal Goering had been forewarned a few hours earlier by Luftwaffe meteorologists of the upcoming change of weather and had ordered all available bombers to launch an all-out strike on the defiant city.
At 5:00 in the morning a droning sound was heard growing louder and louder by the terriefied citizens of Antwerp. Soon Ju-87B Stukas dove on the doomed city by the hundreds, sirens wailing, striking AA-positions, artillery emplacements and government buildings. Their 500 kg bombs blew up huge clouds of flame, debris and black smoke. The “trumpets of Jericho” were driving the inhabitants mad with fear and panic struck citizens were running about, franticly trying to escape the inferno. The first wave of the attack was over in 30 minutes, and then the real purgatory of Antwerpen began. High above the city the black crow-like silhouettes of He-111 medium bombers appeared in frightening numbers. One after another they opened their bomb bays and dropped thousands of 250 kg fragmentation bombs and incendiary bomblets without any attempt at precision or aim.
The destruction caused was mind-numbing. Buildings flew apart as if hit by giant sledge hammers. Entire blocks vanished in clouds of dust and smoke and civilian casualties numbered in the thousands. Soon the city core was ablaze, and the German language gained a new verb:“Antwerpieren”.
German "Landsers" watch the destruction of Antwerpen
Watching in awe as huge columns of smoke gradually obscured the stricken city, even the Wehrmacht soldiers fighting in its outskirts were horrified by what their country had wrought, many of them fearing that a day of reckoning should arrive. Von Paulus is said to have quoted Homer as he regarded the burning city with a blank face: “The day will come when Holy Ilion shall fall”, the same words spoken by Scipio Aemilianus as he witnessed the destruction of Carthage. Within minutes of learning of the bombing of Antwerpen, King Albert sent emissaries to von Paulus, asking for terms for the surrender of the city. By nightfall, Antwerpen was in German hands.
Hearing the news first thing in the morning, Hitler phoned Goering and jovially invited him to the Chancellery that afternoon for a cup of herbal tea and a talk. Apparently the Reich Marshal was back in favour.
Race to the Channel
After having stopping for a few hours to allow his exhausted panzercrews a minimum of rest, Guderian pushed on throughout the night, arriving in undefended Amiens at 5:00 in the morning of October 5th. The tanks drove straight through the undefended city, the stunned inhabitants waking with a start at the sound of German tanks and halftracks clattering through their streets by the hundreds. Guderian had his eyes fixed on Rouen and the Channel coast, the capture of which would pocket an entire French Army in Lille. Having met no resistance whatsoever, I Panzegruppe captured Rouen at 17:00 hours. The Channel had been reached and the supply lines of the French and Belgian troops opposing 20. Armee in its advance from Antwerpen had been cut. But “Hasty Heinz” was not content with this great victory. He had done his share of team play and now he was going to indulge a little something for himself – a little something like Paris…
Situation on the morning of September 5th
Manstein plays it safe
Meanwhile, in Chaumont, Manstein found that his scouts had been somewhat overoptimistic. As his forced approached the French fortified line, he discovered that it was indeed manned after all, although by very few troops. French High Command had apparently started to plug the gap in their front left by the Belgian collapse, rushing whatever troops they could find to form a new front. In this case, the troops had been taken from the garrison at Metz, a fact capitalized on by General Liebmann, commander of 6.Armee in Arlon. Furiously pursuing the retreating Belgian forces, he set course on Metz, hoping to arrive there before the Belgians had time to establish themselves in the impressive fortifications of the northern end of the Maginot line.
The French defenders of Chaumont could have done little to stop Manstein, numbering only one division but one of that brilliant military mind’s maxims was “you can never bee to strong in the decisive spot” so since the morning sun shone from a clear sky, he called upon the Luftwaffe to clear the way for him. At 8:00 hours, having rearmed and refuelled after the “Blitz” of Antwerpen, Kesselrings Heinkels, Stukas and Messerschmitts were above Chaumont, blasting the defending positions with precision and brutality. By 10:00, II Panzergruppe had cleared the fortified zone and was advancing at maximum road speed in the direction of Nancy, with 6.Armee force-marching its way towards undefended Metz on the left flank. It was beginning to look as if an encirclement of the Maginot line might actually be pulled off.
At nightfall, von Bock established the forward HQ of Heeresgruppe A at Sedan while 2. Armee took up positions in the area.
Battle of Nancy
In the early hours of October 6th, II Panzergruppe made contact with French forces in the vicinity of Nancy. French supreme commander, General Maurice Gamelin had seen the danger to Paris and was detaching strong forces from the Maginot line to rush to the defence of the capital. It was these forces that had been intercepted by II. Panzergruppe and a pitched battle ensued. The Germans had the advantage of superior tank forces but the French, 14 divisions strong, had numbers going for them. Time and again German tank battalions had to rush to the aid of Panzergrenadier units being swamped by massive infantry assaults, and the French artillery (vastly superior to Manstein’s light and mobile pieces) kept up a withering fire. Not even the Stukas, Germany’s “flying artillery”, could break the French forces since French fighter squadrons from Strasbourg gave the Luftflotte IV’s “jabos” a run for their money. In the end the D. 501 interceptors were chased off and the He-111’s and Stukas enjoyed a free reign, but even so the matter was still undecided by nightfall.
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Ah, great job. You going too finish off France or are you going too have a little fun?
the counters add a nice "war room" touch but do you actually pay the game that way. I can't stand looking at those little boxes while playing.
PS I love your after action report i look foward to next installment
PS I love your after action report i look foward to next installment
I always use the counters when playing, I even use a mod that replaces the unit class icons (those on the build screen) with NATO symbols.
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From the peak of triumph to the edge of disaster
The Swastika flies over Paris
While II. Panzergruppe was battling it out in front of Nancy, the I. Panzergruppe was retracing it steps, leaving small occupation detachments behind to hold captured ground. As Guderan's divisions again approached Amiens in the morning hours of October 6th , the reconnaissance battalion of 3. Panzer-Division reported French infantry in road column east of the city, marching north – Gamelin had apparently launched some sort of counter-attack, trying to re-establish contact with his surrounded forces at Lille. Caught on the march in open terrain and outnumbered in divisions 3:1, the French infantry had all the chances of an ice-cube in hell against the German Panzers. Guderian shattered the French divisions and drove on towards the French capital via Reims, where he arrived at 20:00 of the evening, making short break for his crew to catch some much needed sleep. What he didn’t know was that the forces he had just routed were the garrison of Paris, a telltale sign of the growing desperation of the French High Command. Thus, when Guderian entered Paris at 13:00 of 7th, the city was undefended, and was declared an open city by the stunned mayor. The Parisians watched in impotence as their conquerors took possession of their city, some crying openly at the humiliation of France. They were unaware that in what seemed to be the peak of German success, the situation on the extreme flanks of the front was taking a turn for the worse.
Fall of Metz
While I. Panzergruppe was still advancing towards Reims, Liebmann’s 6.Armee continued its pursuit of the Belgian forces falling back on Metz from Arlon. As they reached the unmanned Maginot line by the evening of October 6th, the Belgians desperately tried to deploy for a stand, but there simply was no time. Liebmann’s tropps rushed to the attack and quickly put the Belgians to flight before they had any time to reorganize a defence. By 18:00 hours, the Maginot fortresses north of Metz were in German hands, with the Belgians running towards Nancy as fast as their legs could carry them, pausing only to dive for cover as Luftflotte IV Stukas pounded the retreating columns. At this point Liebmann broke of pursuit because a crisis was developing on his right flank – Chaumont had been reconquered by French Forces, Manstein’s gruppe was cut off at Nancy and soon thereafter, German troops were fighting for their lives at Lille.
Crisis in the east
As the attentive reader might remember, von Bock had reassigned XIII. Armeekorps (Falkenhorst’s mobile cavalry and motorized troops) from its original task of securing the rear of the Panzer formations to supporting 20.Armee in its assault on Antwerpen. After the fall of that city, XIII. Armeekorps did not resume its previous duties but instead accompanied 20. Armee in its advance on Lille, von Bock’s thought being that von Paulus could use some extra troops in reducing the strong enemy forces pocketed there. The absence of XIII. Armeekorps providing rear area security was acutely felt by von Manstein late at night of October 6th, as strong French forces advancing from Troyes cut his lines of communications in Chaumont. As he quickly formed his forces into a hedgehog defence, the enemy forces engaging II. Panzergruppe were heavily reinforced by several additional divisions from the garrisons of the Maginot line in Alsace-Lorraine. Surrounded and under increasing pressure, von Manstein swallowed his pride and radioed von Bock for help. Worried, the Field Marshall assessed the situation, coming to the conclusion that 6. Armee had to hold its position in Metz or risk being surrounded itself. The best hope of relieving Manstein lay in the Heeresgruppe A reserve, Halder’s 10. Armee and 2.Armee under von Bock’s personal control. He immediately gave orders for these two formations to advance towards Chaumont and relive Manstein’s beleaguered forces. The two armies force-marched throughout the night – and then, at 10:00 on October 7th, von Bock received a frantic plea for help from von Paulus, commander of the 20. Armee at Lille.
Crisis in the West
Nobody at the Staff of Heeresgruppe A, nor in the OKH for that matter, had realized just HOW strong the Allied forces at Lille were. As 20. Armee was about to form a close siege perimeter in the morning of October 7th, the French began a breakout attempt and the would-be besiegers realized with horror that they were badly outnumbered by the besieged. Far from the demoralized, unsupplied and weak forces the Germans were expecting to met at Lille, the troops coming at them were full of piss and vinegar and aching for a fight. Some 20 French and Belgian divisions (the latter being the erstwhile defenders of Antwerpen, which should have given the Germans pause), including two of the feared Moroccan professional divisions, charged the deploying German forces with bayonets and hand grenades, broke up their formation and attacked isolated battalions and companies with overwhelming strength.
German infantry fighting at Lille
German casualties began to mount at an alarming rate as the battle soon degenerated in a disorganized mess where all attempts at direction from 6. Armee HQ were in vain. The survival of the German forces now depended on the skill of their battalion and company commanders and the toughness and bravery of the rank and file troops. Von Paulus immediately realized that he needed support, lots of it, and he needed it yesterday. Upon contacting Heeresgruppe HQ he was dismayed to hear that the HG reserve had been force-marching AWAY from his position for the whole night and would not reach him for days. Desperate, von Paulus then called for the Luftwaffe but even if Kesselring responded wholeheartedly to his pleas, the Germans discovered that it wasn’t just troops that had been concentrated to Lille. The Stukas and Heinkels were intercepted by several squadrons of French fighters, and although the Bf-109E-4/B “Jabos” were able to overcome their resistance after a long day of aerial battle, they had managed to blunt the German bombers long enough that darkness and worsening weather put a stop to continued sorties. As darkness fell, a series of confused close range engagements, often fought with bayonets, sub-machine guns and hand grenades followed throughout the night. German casualties were reaching appalling levels, several divisions having lost 30-40% of their strength and the situation showed no sign of improvement.
Situation September 7th - von Bock is radioed by von Paulus
The Swastika flies over Paris
While II. Panzergruppe was battling it out in front of Nancy, the I. Panzergruppe was retracing it steps, leaving small occupation detachments behind to hold captured ground. As Guderan's divisions again approached Amiens in the morning hours of October 6th , the reconnaissance battalion of 3. Panzer-Division reported French infantry in road column east of the city, marching north – Gamelin had apparently launched some sort of counter-attack, trying to re-establish contact with his surrounded forces at Lille. Caught on the march in open terrain and outnumbered in divisions 3:1, the French infantry had all the chances of an ice-cube in hell against the German Panzers. Guderian shattered the French divisions and drove on towards the French capital via Reims, where he arrived at 20:00 of the evening, making short break for his crew to catch some much needed sleep. What he didn’t know was that the forces he had just routed were the garrison of Paris, a telltale sign of the growing desperation of the French High Command. Thus, when Guderian entered Paris at 13:00 of 7th, the city was undefended, and was declared an open city by the stunned mayor. The Parisians watched in impotence as their conquerors took possession of their city, some crying openly at the humiliation of France. They were unaware that in what seemed to be the peak of German success, the situation on the extreme flanks of the front was taking a turn for the worse.
Fall of Metz
While I. Panzergruppe was still advancing towards Reims, Liebmann’s 6.Armee continued its pursuit of the Belgian forces falling back on Metz from Arlon. As they reached the unmanned Maginot line by the evening of October 6th, the Belgians desperately tried to deploy for a stand, but there simply was no time. Liebmann’s tropps rushed to the attack and quickly put the Belgians to flight before they had any time to reorganize a defence. By 18:00 hours, the Maginot fortresses north of Metz were in German hands, with the Belgians running towards Nancy as fast as their legs could carry them, pausing only to dive for cover as Luftflotte IV Stukas pounded the retreating columns. At this point Liebmann broke of pursuit because a crisis was developing on his right flank – Chaumont had been reconquered by French Forces, Manstein’s gruppe was cut off at Nancy and soon thereafter, German troops were fighting for their lives at Lille.
Crisis in the east
As the attentive reader might remember, von Bock had reassigned XIII. Armeekorps (Falkenhorst’s mobile cavalry and motorized troops) from its original task of securing the rear of the Panzer formations to supporting 20.Armee in its assault on Antwerpen. After the fall of that city, XIII. Armeekorps did not resume its previous duties but instead accompanied 20. Armee in its advance on Lille, von Bock’s thought being that von Paulus could use some extra troops in reducing the strong enemy forces pocketed there. The absence of XIII. Armeekorps providing rear area security was acutely felt by von Manstein late at night of October 6th, as strong French forces advancing from Troyes cut his lines of communications in Chaumont. As he quickly formed his forces into a hedgehog defence, the enemy forces engaging II. Panzergruppe were heavily reinforced by several additional divisions from the garrisons of the Maginot line in Alsace-Lorraine. Surrounded and under increasing pressure, von Manstein swallowed his pride and radioed von Bock for help. Worried, the Field Marshall assessed the situation, coming to the conclusion that 6. Armee had to hold its position in Metz or risk being surrounded itself. The best hope of relieving Manstein lay in the Heeresgruppe A reserve, Halder’s 10. Armee and 2.Armee under von Bock’s personal control. He immediately gave orders for these two formations to advance towards Chaumont and relive Manstein’s beleaguered forces. The two armies force-marched throughout the night – and then, at 10:00 on October 7th, von Bock received a frantic plea for help from von Paulus, commander of the 20. Armee at Lille.
Crisis in the West
Nobody at the Staff of Heeresgruppe A, nor in the OKH for that matter, had realized just HOW strong the Allied forces at Lille were. As 20. Armee was about to form a close siege perimeter in the morning of October 7th, the French began a breakout attempt and the would-be besiegers realized with horror that they were badly outnumbered by the besieged. Far from the demoralized, unsupplied and weak forces the Germans were expecting to met at Lille, the troops coming at them were full of piss and vinegar and aching for a fight. Some 20 French and Belgian divisions (the latter being the erstwhile defenders of Antwerpen, which should have given the Germans pause), including two of the feared Moroccan professional divisions, charged the deploying German forces with bayonets and hand grenades, broke up their formation and attacked isolated battalions and companies with overwhelming strength.
German infantry fighting at Lille
German casualties began to mount at an alarming rate as the battle soon degenerated in a disorganized mess where all attempts at direction from 6. Armee HQ were in vain. The survival of the German forces now depended on the skill of their battalion and company commanders and the toughness and bravery of the rank and file troops. Von Paulus immediately realized that he needed support, lots of it, and he needed it yesterday. Upon contacting Heeresgruppe HQ he was dismayed to hear that the HG reserve had been force-marching AWAY from his position for the whole night and would not reach him for days. Desperate, von Paulus then called for the Luftwaffe but even if Kesselring responded wholeheartedly to his pleas, the Germans discovered that it wasn’t just troops that had been concentrated to Lille. The Stukas and Heinkels were intercepted by several squadrons of French fighters, and although the Bf-109E-4/B “Jabos” were able to overcome their resistance after a long day of aerial battle, they had managed to blunt the German bombers long enough that darkness and worsening weather put a stop to continued sorties. As darkness fell, a series of confused close range engagements, often fought with bayonets, sub-machine guns and hand grenades followed throughout the night. German casualties were reaching appalling levels, several divisions having lost 30-40% of their strength and the situation showed no sign of improvement.
Situation September 7th - von Bock is radioed by von Paulus
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What an EXCELLENT AAR! I don't play as Germany, but it looks as though those French are giving you a run for your money. Keep it up, it is interesting reading during my lunch hour.
Hrmmm, so the French won't just roll over and play dead this time...looks like the fight for the Channel coast will be vicious indeed.
Crisis and recovery
Staff meeting at Heeresgruppe A
Fedor von Bock sensed the mind of Gamelin behind the German misfortunes: he suspected that HG A had walked into a gigantic trap set by the French CiC, who would appear to be far more devious than he would have given him credit for. If these suspicions were accurate, Gamelin had deliberately concentrated his forces on the flanks and left the center weak – the classic tactic for a weaker force seeking a battle of annihilation. Had he hoped that the prospect of an easy capture of Paris would draw the German mobile forces into the jaws of the trap? Not unlikely. And then these jaws would close from east and west…
Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock, Commander Heeresgruppe A
Von Bock could scarcely believe it: a Frenchman, using Paris as bait! And the only reason it hadn’t worked entirely was that the Germans hadn’t gone for Paris in the first instance, but instead used the Panzergruppen to try to isolate the flank forces first, leading to decisive actions being fought prematurely, from the French point of view. And it could still very well work, if one or both of the flank battles ended in German defeat. Now he had some agonizing choices to make. He had to help both Manstein and Paulus and it didn’t seem he could easily spare the forces to do both simultaneously. After some pondering, he decided that Manstein’s gruppe was too valuable to risk, and that the main effort should go towards relieving it. If that could be achieved, then even if the siege of Lille would have to be lifted there would still be hope of salvaging the situation, but should the gruppe be lost… he preferred not to dwell on that, the future course of operations would be the least of his problems, indeed, it would most likely become someone else’s problem entirely. The Führer was not especially tolerant of failure. At 11:00 hours he assembled a staff meeting at AG H headquarters in the Mayors office of Sedan.
The solution von Bock presented to his staff was the following: since the situation that was the hardest to remedy quickly was the one at Lille, and since a double disaster could not be risked under any circumstance, the main effort of HG A would be the relief of II. Panzergruppe. This would be achieved in the following fashion:
Halder’s 10. Army would continue towards Chaumont with all speed, destroy the French forces there and re-establish communications with II. Panzergruppe. With its right flank secured, Liebmann’s 6. Armee would advance from Metz towards Nancy to lend direct aid to Manstein. This would mean leaving Metz undefended, but with Chaumont back in German hands, the loss of Metz would not represent a critical setback. The forces arranged against Manstein were however so strong that even reinforced by 6. Armee he would in all probability not be able to win a decisive victory, and one was badly needed to regain the initiative. The necessary additional strength for this was to be provided not by 2. Armee, as had been previously intended, but by I. Panzergruppe. 2. Armee was to do a turnabout and march with all speed to Lille, in the hope of being able to salvage something when it arrived. In the meantime, the Luftwaffe was to lend all possible support to von Paulus.
At this point there were obvious signs of agitation among von Bock’s staff officers. I. Panzergruppe was alone in Paris, no other forces were close enough to take over the defence of the captured capital, at least not any forces that could be spared for the task. Moving Guderian out of Paris meant giving up the city. It was pointed out that this would constitute a serious blow to German prestige and was sure to enrage Hitler beyond measure. It was very likely the Führer would countermand such an order on the spot and sack its proponent with equal celerity. Von Bock agreed with this assessment but pointed out that loosing prestige was better than loosing armies and regarding Hitler, he wouldn’t tell if none of the present did. The last sentence was delivered in a light tone and with a smile, as if it had been a joke, but it was clear that he had meant exactly what he said – the plan of operations to be adopted by Heeresgruppe A was, at least initially, to be kept secret from the OKW and the Führer! The Staff meeting ended with this extraordinary revelation, and everyone went to work wondering how long it would take for the Gestapo to pounce on the plot.
Guderian abandons Paris
Upon receiving his new orders at 14:00 hours of October 7th, Guderian requested permission to delay the evacuation of Paris until the French forces approaching the capital from the northeast – the shattered remnants of the divisions defeated at Amiens – had been decisively dealt with. Permission was granted and the same evening the erstwhile garrison of Paris was easily overrun as it approached the city. This time the French divisions were all but destroyed and the survivors scattered. Hardly had the last shots of this engagement been fired when Guderian’s Panzers left Paris behind and rolled east with all possible speed.
6. Armee stands its ground
Sensing a turning point had been reached, French and Belgian forces from Chaumont counterattacked 6. Armee at Metz by 7:00 hours on the 7th October, but if they thought German morale was crumbling they were in for a rude surprise. The attacking waves of infantry were met by a murderous fire by MG-34 machine guns and 81mm mortars and in due time the divisional and heavy Korps artillery added their fire to the conflagration. Blasted by heavy direct and indirect fire, the Franco-Belgian attack faltered and finally collapsed. A second attempt by forces from Strasbourg on the next day took longer to defeat and pinned the 6. Armee in place for the remainder of October 8th but ultimately had as little success as the first attempt. The Germans then counterattacked, routing the Allied forces before commencing a drive on Nancy. Liebmann was rushing to Mansteins aid. At midnight 10. Army reached Chaumont and promptly defeated what forces remained there after the failed attacks on Metz. The French troops falling back from the engagement with 6. Armee were caught between two fires and destroyed. At Nancy itself, Manstein's troops were holding their own although fuel and ammunition was becoming scarcer by the hour. The tremendous firepower of the Panzergruppe had so far held the attackers more or less at bay but losses had already been heavy and were mounting by the hour. During the morning hours of October 9th, the French, led by Field Marshal Juin, redoubled their efforts at destroying the trapped Germans and things looked grim for Manstein and his men, but a message from HG headquarters to the effect that relief was on its way helped in maintaining morale high. At noon the sound of Liebman’s artillery could be clearly heard by the men in the pocket and at 15:00 forward elements of 6. Armee fought their way through the siege ring and established contact with the II. Panzergruppe. Now at least, there was an escape route, although the enemy forces still far outnumbered the Germans.
Lille – the carnage continues
Throughout the day of October 9th, the weather in the Lille region remained despicable, preventing the intervention of the Luftwaffe. With the light of day, the Germans were nevertheless able to collect themselves somewhat, re-establish the continuity of their front by strategic withdrawals and mount local counter-attacks to free sub-units trapped behind the French lines. Far too often, these micro-pockets had disintegrated during the course of the ferocious fighting of the previous night and were beyond all help. The German forces were still being pushed back though and as the siege ring around Lille expanded and losses continued to mount, their lines became progressively thinner. The 20. Armee was on its last legs, maintaining itself in the field by a collective act of sheer willpower, but disintegration was now not far away. XIII Armeekorps had suffered even worse, the Cavalry divisions having less than 50% of establishment strength left and the 40. Motorized Division not much better. Still another night of ferocious combat followed, the Allied Forces growing frantic in their attempts to break the siege before reinforcements arrived and von Paulus and his men equally determined to prevent them from doing so, but even unwounded men were now dropping from exhaustion - unless a miracle occurred, von Paulus didn’t expect his forces to last through the following day. One can wonder if von Paulus had made some special bargain with the Almighty, because the next day, October 10th, dawned with a clear blue sky.
A worried von Paulus discusses the situation during the Battle of Lille
The Luftwaffe was not slow to capitalize from this, and from dawn until sunset Kesselring’s bombers pounded the Franco-Belgian forces mercilessly. Artillery positions were given a high priority and the Allied fire slackened considerably, enabling 20. Armee and XIII. Armeekorps to hold out for a few more hours. Then, at 11:00 hours, the first elements of 2. Armee began to arrive at the battlefield. Such was the state of von Paulus forces that von Bock sent his new divisions straight to the attack as soon as they arrived, trying to ease the pressure on 20. Armee. Fortunately, the Allied forces commanded by Belgian Field Marshal Strydonck de Burkel were as exhausted as the besieging Germans. Under the combined battering of the Luftwaffe and the newly arriving divisions, many units finally broke and the breakout attempt was discontinued. Totally exhausted both sides spent the remainder of the day and the following night resting, licking their wounds and taking stock of their losses.
For the Wehrmaht, these had been horrendous. Four of the seven divisions of 20. Armee, and two of the three divisions of XIII. Armeekorps had suffered between 50% and 70% casaualties rates. No division was above 70% strength. Following the Battle of Lille, 20. Armee and XIII. Armeekorps had to be taken out of the line for rest and refit. The XIII Armeekorps was so badly mauled that it would not take any further part in the French campaign.
Situation on October 10th - another strike on Lille is underway
Staff meeting at Heeresgruppe A
Fedor von Bock sensed the mind of Gamelin behind the German misfortunes: he suspected that HG A had walked into a gigantic trap set by the French CiC, who would appear to be far more devious than he would have given him credit for. If these suspicions were accurate, Gamelin had deliberately concentrated his forces on the flanks and left the center weak – the classic tactic for a weaker force seeking a battle of annihilation. Had he hoped that the prospect of an easy capture of Paris would draw the German mobile forces into the jaws of the trap? Not unlikely. And then these jaws would close from east and west…
Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock, Commander Heeresgruppe A
Von Bock could scarcely believe it: a Frenchman, using Paris as bait! And the only reason it hadn’t worked entirely was that the Germans hadn’t gone for Paris in the first instance, but instead used the Panzergruppen to try to isolate the flank forces first, leading to decisive actions being fought prematurely, from the French point of view. And it could still very well work, if one or both of the flank battles ended in German defeat. Now he had some agonizing choices to make. He had to help both Manstein and Paulus and it didn’t seem he could easily spare the forces to do both simultaneously. After some pondering, he decided that Manstein’s gruppe was too valuable to risk, and that the main effort should go towards relieving it. If that could be achieved, then even if the siege of Lille would have to be lifted there would still be hope of salvaging the situation, but should the gruppe be lost… he preferred not to dwell on that, the future course of operations would be the least of his problems, indeed, it would most likely become someone else’s problem entirely. The Führer was not especially tolerant of failure. At 11:00 hours he assembled a staff meeting at AG H headquarters in the Mayors office of Sedan.
The solution von Bock presented to his staff was the following: since the situation that was the hardest to remedy quickly was the one at Lille, and since a double disaster could not be risked under any circumstance, the main effort of HG A would be the relief of II. Panzergruppe. This would be achieved in the following fashion:
Halder’s 10. Army would continue towards Chaumont with all speed, destroy the French forces there and re-establish communications with II. Panzergruppe. With its right flank secured, Liebmann’s 6. Armee would advance from Metz towards Nancy to lend direct aid to Manstein. This would mean leaving Metz undefended, but with Chaumont back in German hands, the loss of Metz would not represent a critical setback. The forces arranged against Manstein were however so strong that even reinforced by 6. Armee he would in all probability not be able to win a decisive victory, and one was badly needed to regain the initiative. The necessary additional strength for this was to be provided not by 2. Armee, as had been previously intended, but by I. Panzergruppe. 2. Armee was to do a turnabout and march with all speed to Lille, in the hope of being able to salvage something when it arrived. In the meantime, the Luftwaffe was to lend all possible support to von Paulus.
At this point there were obvious signs of agitation among von Bock’s staff officers. I. Panzergruppe was alone in Paris, no other forces were close enough to take over the defence of the captured capital, at least not any forces that could be spared for the task. Moving Guderian out of Paris meant giving up the city. It was pointed out that this would constitute a serious blow to German prestige and was sure to enrage Hitler beyond measure. It was very likely the Führer would countermand such an order on the spot and sack its proponent with equal celerity. Von Bock agreed with this assessment but pointed out that loosing prestige was better than loosing armies and regarding Hitler, he wouldn’t tell if none of the present did. The last sentence was delivered in a light tone and with a smile, as if it had been a joke, but it was clear that he had meant exactly what he said – the plan of operations to be adopted by Heeresgruppe A was, at least initially, to be kept secret from the OKW and the Führer! The Staff meeting ended with this extraordinary revelation, and everyone went to work wondering how long it would take for the Gestapo to pounce on the plot.
Guderian abandons Paris
Upon receiving his new orders at 14:00 hours of October 7th, Guderian requested permission to delay the evacuation of Paris until the French forces approaching the capital from the northeast – the shattered remnants of the divisions defeated at Amiens – had been decisively dealt with. Permission was granted and the same evening the erstwhile garrison of Paris was easily overrun as it approached the city. This time the French divisions were all but destroyed and the survivors scattered. Hardly had the last shots of this engagement been fired when Guderian’s Panzers left Paris behind and rolled east with all possible speed.
6. Armee stands its ground
Sensing a turning point had been reached, French and Belgian forces from Chaumont counterattacked 6. Armee at Metz by 7:00 hours on the 7th October, but if they thought German morale was crumbling they were in for a rude surprise. The attacking waves of infantry were met by a murderous fire by MG-34 machine guns and 81mm mortars and in due time the divisional and heavy Korps artillery added their fire to the conflagration. Blasted by heavy direct and indirect fire, the Franco-Belgian attack faltered and finally collapsed. A second attempt by forces from Strasbourg on the next day took longer to defeat and pinned the 6. Armee in place for the remainder of October 8th but ultimately had as little success as the first attempt. The Germans then counterattacked, routing the Allied forces before commencing a drive on Nancy. Liebmann was rushing to Mansteins aid. At midnight 10. Army reached Chaumont and promptly defeated what forces remained there after the failed attacks on Metz. The French troops falling back from the engagement with 6. Armee were caught between two fires and destroyed. At Nancy itself, Manstein's troops were holding their own although fuel and ammunition was becoming scarcer by the hour. The tremendous firepower of the Panzergruppe had so far held the attackers more or less at bay but losses had already been heavy and were mounting by the hour. During the morning hours of October 9th, the French, led by Field Marshal Juin, redoubled their efforts at destroying the trapped Germans and things looked grim for Manstein and his men, but a message from HG headquarters to the effect that relief was on its way helped in maintaining morale high. At noon the sound of Liebman’s artillery could be clearly heard by the men in the pocket and at 15:00 forward elements of 6. Armee fought their way through the siege ring and established contact with the II. Panzergruppe. Now at least, there was an escape route, although the enemy forces still far outnumbered the Germans.
Lille – the carnage continues
Throughout the day of October 9th, the weather in the Lille region remained despicable, preventing the intervention of the Luftwaffe. With the light of day, the Germans were nevertheless able to collect themselves somewhat, re-establish the continuity of their front by strategic withdrawals and mount local counter-attacks to free sub-units trapped behind the French lines. Far too often, these micro-pockets had disintegrated during the course of the ferocious fighting of the previous night and were beyond all help. The German forces were still being pushed back though and as the siege ring around Lille expanded and losses continued to mount, their lines became progressively thinner. The 20. Armee was on its last legs, maintaining itself in the field by a collective act of sheer willpower, but disintegration was now not far away. XIII Armeekorps had suffered even worse, the Cavalry divisions having less than 50% of establishment strength left and the 40. Motorized Division not much better. Still another night of ferocious combat followed, the Allied Forces growing frantic in their attempts to break the siege before reinforcements arrived and von Paulus and his men equally determined to prevent them from doing so, but even unwounded men were now dropping from exhaustion - unless a miracle occurred, von Paulus didn’t expect his forces to last through the following day. One can wonder if von Paulus had made some special bargain with the Almighty, because the next day, October 10th, dawned with a clear blue sky.
A worried von Paulus discusses the situation during the Battle of Lille
The Luftwaffe was not slow to capitalize from this, and from dawn until sunset Kesselring’s bombers pounded the Franco-Belgian forces mercilessly. Artillery positions were given a high priority and the Allied fire slackened considerably, enabling 20. Armee and XIII. Armeekorps to hold out for a few more hours. Then, at 11:00 hours, the first elements of 2. Armee began to arrive at the battlefield. Such was the state of von Paulus forces that von Bock sent his new divisions straight to the attack as soon as they arrived, trying to ease the pressure on 20. Armee. Fortunately, the Allied forces commanded by Belgian Field Marshal Strydonck de Burkel were as exhausted as the besieging Germans. Under the combined battering of the Luftwaffe and the newly arriving divisions, many units finally broke and the breakout attempt was discontinued. Totally exhausted both sides spent the remainder of the day and the following night resting, licking their wounds and taking stock of their losses.
For the Wehrmaht, these had been horrendous. Four of the seven divisions of 20. Armee, and two of the three divisions of XIII. Armeekorps had suffered between 50% and 70% casaualties rates. No division was above 70% strength. Following the Battle of Lille, 20. Armee and XIII. Armeekorps had to be taken out of the line for rest and refit. The XIII Armeekorps was so badly mauled that it would not take any further part in the French campaign.
Situation on October 10th - another strike on Lille is underway
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