What's the plan for Japan if they win the pacific?

[Henry IX]

Just to add to the woes of Japan, even if they win the early battles against the USN, is the strategic problem of Australia. Some people have described Australia as 'cut off' if the Japanese capture New Guinea, but even if they control the seas to the north of Australia the main ports are located 2-3000 km from the nearest Japanese ports, let alone somewhere like Adelaide. Trade and supplies can flow along the southern route between the Americas and freely via the Indian ocean.

In contrast, any ship trying to move goods such as fuel from the East Indies to Japan would be vulnerable to allied raiders and subs operating from secure bases in Australia. The Japanese supply situation was already so bad and so overextended by 1942 that the Japanese invasion force trying to capture Rabul literally starved to death fighting on the Kokoda, with harrowing accounts of Japanese soldiers resorting to eating grass and cannibalizing the dead recorded by both sides. In most of their isolated garrisons the soldiers had to grow their own food to avoid starvation. Whilst all sides conscripted their peasants and turned them into soldiers, the Japanese were the only ones to conscript their soldiers and turn them into peasants.

In any area the Japanese were unable to supplement their rations by looting or farming they starved to death. Even the home islands were running an agricultural deficit, even after food imports are accounted for. They were simply unable to sustain the military forces they already possessed in 1941, let alone managing a more protracted conflict with the U.S. Unless something changes the Japanese empire would have collapsed by the late 1940s if forced to maintain total war for that period.

 

[olm]

When waging war against enemy whose overall war making potential in form of population, resources, and industry are significantly superior to yours, there are two ways to win. You either win quickly by completely knocking them out in a short and decisive campaign, or you wear down their willingness to fight until they decide to make peace instead of protracted conflict. Japanese couldn't do the first option against US, can't invade US mainland, simply not logistically possible. So the only option was to wear down US willingness to continue war. Problem is that while Pearl Harbour was a brilliant military operation, it also ended up as a complete propaganda disaster as US used it extremely successfully to rally its population for war, and could easily absorb early reverses because everyone knew that the fleet needed time to recover.

I sort of feel that the best bet for Japanese to capture Dutch oil would have been to exclusively attack British and Dutch while avoiding touching Americans in any way. Force Roosevelt to find himself an excuse to get involved, and you want that excuse to be as weak as possible, because US willingness to fight protracted war will depend on it. Would be still a massive gamble obviously.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

I sort of feel that the best bet for Japanese to capture Dutch oil would have been to exclusively attack British and Dutch while avoiding touching Americans in any way. Force Roosevelt to find himself an excuse to get involved, and you want that excuse to be as weak as possible, because US willingness to fight protracted war will depend on it. Would be still a massive gamble obviously.

It's something that seems to come up a lot these days (I think HoI4 put it in as National Focus for one) but is that something that was actually proposed in Japanese Naval circles? The options I know are:

Occupy Philippines, attrition USN when it crosses the Pacific and engage them in decisive battle in Western Pacific (the traditional doctrine)
Attack USN base at Pearl Harbor (Yamamoto's deviation from the traditional doctrine)
Attack and invade Oahu (Genda Minoru doubling down on Yamamoto's plan)

 

[olm]

It's something that seems to come up a lot these days (I think HoI4 put it in as National Focus for one) but is that something that was actually proposed in Japanese Naval circles? The options I know are:

Occupy Philippines, attrition USN when it crosses the Pacific and engage them in decisive battle in Western Pacific (the traditional doctrine)
Attack USN base at Pearl Harbor (Yamamoto's deviation from the traditional doctrine)
Attack and invade Oahu (Genda Minoru doubling down on Yamamoto's plan)

I highly doubt that it was ever realistically considered. Japanese seemed very sure that southward expansion will bring immediate US intervention, and propaganda impact of Pearl Harbour wasn't very predictable for them either. Whole surprise attack thing had worked fine against Russia.

 

[Yakman]

Just to add to the woes of Japan, even if they win the early battles against the USN, is the strategic problem of Australia. Some people have described Australia as 'cut off' if the Japanese capture New Guinea, but even if they control the seas to the north of Australia the main ports are located 2-3000 km from the nearest Japanese ports, let alone somewhere like Adelaide. Trade and supplies can flow along the southern route between the Americas and freely via the Indian ocean.

In contrast, any ship trying to move goods such as fuel from the East Indies to Japan would be vulnerable to allied raiders and subs operating from secure bases in Australia. The Japanese supply situation was already so bad and so overextended by 1942 that the Japanese invasion force trying to capture Rabul literally starved to death fighting on the Kokoda, with harrowing accounts of Japanese soldiers resorting to eating grass and cannibalizing the dead recorded by both sides. In most of their isolated garrisons the soldiers had to grow their own food to avoid starvation. Whilst all sides conscripted their peasants and turned them into soldiers, the Japanese were the only ones to conscript their soldiers and turn them into peasants.

In any area the Japanese were unable to supplement their rations by looting or farming they starved to death. Even the home islands were running an agricultural deficit, even after food imports are accounted for. They were simply unable to sustain the military forces they already possessed in 1941, let alone managing a more protracted conflict with the U.S. Unless something changes the Japanese empire would have collapsed by the late 1940s if forced to maintain total war for that period.

Australia was a backwoods nightmare state in 1942. It wasn't a threat to Japan's empire w/o the USA and the UK.

 

[bz249]

It's something that seems to come up a lot these days (I think HoI4 put it in as National Focus for one) but is that something that was actually proposed in Japanese Naval circles? The options I know are:

Occupy Philippines, attrition USN when it crosses the Pacific and engage them in decisive battle in Western Pacific (the traditional doctrine)
Attack USN base at Pearl Harbor (Yamamoto's deviation from the traditional doctrine)
Attack and invade Oahu (Genda Minoru doubling down on Yamamoto's plan)

Highly likely that knew the existence of the two ocean navy act... thus they have epsilon chance in 12/41 and they are going to have epsilon squared next year.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

Highly likely that knew the existence of the two ocean navy act... thus they have epsilon chance in 12/41 and they are going to have epsilon squared next year.

They definitely knew of it. The revised Circle 5 (May '41) and the Circle 6 expansion programs (which included the Super-Yamatos, B65s etc.) were explicitly responses to it.

 

[Ming]

I sort of feel that the best bet for Japanese to capture Dutch oil would have been to exclusively attack British and Dutch while avoiding touching Americans in any way. Force Roosevelt to find himself an excuse to get involved, and you want that excuse to be as weak as possible, because US willingness to fight protracted war will depend on it. Would be still a massive gamble obviously.

The Japanese planned with the assumption that if they attacked the Dutch and UK the US would inevitably become involved, and allowing the US the initiative to begin hostilities while holding the Phillipines along Japanese lines of supply was unacceptable.

This was a militarily sound view, though I agree that with hindsight it probably had a better chance of success than what they actually tried.

 

[Herbert West]

In any area the Japanese were unable to supplement their rations by looting or farming they starved to death. Even the home islands were running an agricultural deficit, even after food imports are accounted for. They were simply unable to sustain the military forces they already possessed in 1941, let alone managing a more protracted conflict with the U.S. Unless something changes the Japanese empire would have collapsed by the late 1940s if forced to maintain total war for that period.

Only if by late 40s you mean something like 1948, with a sustained Allied blockade. The Japanese home islands had been under strict rationing and caloric deficits for longer than the US involvement in the pacific war. Japanese were used to this, and there is no indication, civilian or otherwise, that starvation alone would have led to surrender. Barring the atomic bombs AND the all-important but often sidetracked Soviet intervention, mainland Japan was going to have to be taken.

The whole "the war machine of the enemy will collapse if we just blockade them long enough" basically never works. Even the ur-example, Germany in WWI, isnt exactly correct. Besides, this assumes that the USA has the political will to keep up a blockade of the Home Islands, with all the attritional losses from Kamikaze that this entails. Political will for a long war was running short after VE day.

 

[bz249]

Only if by late 40s you mean something like 1948, with a sustained Allied blockade. The Japanese home islands had been under strict rationing and caloric deficits for longer than the US involvement in the pacific war. Japanese were used to this, and there is no indication, civilian or otherwise, that starvation alone would have led to surrender. Barring the atomic bombs AND the all-important but often sidetracked Soviet intervention, mainland Japan was going to have to be taken.

And direct political action by Emperor Hirohito. Because that's what settled the matter.

 

[Ming]

Japan was far more vulnerable to disruption of domestic logistical and food networks than almost any other country on the planet at the time. Their issue wasn't just raw caloric output, but also distribution. Even if the allies bombed every railroad bridge in Germany there were still roads and river networks that could move a minimum of war materials and food. If U-boats sunk every ship going to Britain, they would still be able to move internal stockpiles to factories and population centers around the country. Japan had a few extremely vulnerable railways and coastal shipping . . . and that was mostly it if you were going to move anything in bulk. If it wasn't already there when the blockade tightened it wasn't going to get there.

I agree that it is unlikely mass starvation would have forced the government to accept humiliating terms, but there was a very real danger that large portions of the home islands would be rendered simultaneously indefensible and starving if the transport network ground to a halt.

While that alone wouldn't dig the military out of their bunkers in front of the 3 beaches that were the only places to land a large-scale invasion,
a.) Mass Starvation (It isn't like doing push ups. You don't get better at the longer it goes on.)
b.) Military powerless to prevent allies bombing Japanese cities from air and sea (and potentially raids or other boots on the ground incursions)
c.) War industries essentially stopped from both absenteeism and lack of materials
c.) Government unable to *govern* beyond their bunkers

Doesn't make for much of a war even if there isn't a surrender.

I have my doubts that the Japanese state could have kept up this state of affairs longer than the US even without soviet entry into the war or atomic bombs.

 

[Henry IX]

Only if by late 40s you mean something like 1948, with a sustained Allied blockade. The Japanese home islands had been under strict rationing and caloric deficits for longer than the US involvement in the pacific war. Japanese were used to this, and there is no indication, civilian or otherwise, that starvation alone would have led to surrender. Barring the atomic bombs AND the all-important but often sidetracked Soviet intervention, mainland Japan was going to have to be taken.

The whole "the war machine of the enemy will collapse if we just blockade them long enough" basically never works. Even the ur-example, Germany in WWI, isnt exactly correct. Besides, this assumes that the USA has the political will to keep up a blockade of the Home Islands, with all the attritional losses from Kamikaze that this entails. Political will for a long war was running short after VE day.

A 1948 date is the timeframe I would guess for the total collapse of the Japanese economy from food shortage if they did not bring home much of their army to restore the agricultural sector.

 

[Kovax]

It's not JUST food shortages. If Japan can't move stuff between the various home islands, each island is effectively cut off by submarines and carrier-based aircraft from industries on the other islands making components or materials. The rail systems are almost entirely along the coasts and vulnerable both to bombing raids and naval bombardment. The roads in the interior are totally insufficient to carry the volumes of materials which are normally moved along or just off the coast. Basically, almost EVERYTHING shuts down, even if there are enough healthy workers left to run the factories.

The Army and Navy commanders were relatively insulated from the most obvious problems, but would have had a lot less options once the supply of ammunition and spare parts for the existing equipment started drying up, and no new equipment could be produced. Sure, they could call back the army from China, but if not done before Japan was almost completely cut off, how many fully loaded transports would be lost in the return?

It might not have resulted in a total economic and governmental collapse until 1948, but the Japanese economy and military would essentially have been rendered mostly ineffective well before that. The situation for the general populace would have become desperate, and lethal.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

It's not JUST food shortages. If Japan can't move stuff between the various home islands, each island is effectively cut off by submarines and carrier-based aircraft from industries on the other islands making components or materials. The rail systems are almost entirely along the coasts and vulnerable both to bombing raids and naval bombardment. The roads in the interior are totally insufficient to carry the volumes of materials which are normally moved along or just off the coast. Basically, almost EVERYTHING shuts down, even if there are enough healthy workers left to run the factories.

The Army and Navy commanders were relatively insulated from the most obvious problems, but would have had a lot less options once the supply of ammunition and spare parts for the existing equipment started drying up, and no new equipment could be produced. Sure, they could call back the army from China, but if not done before Japan was almost completely cut off, how many fully loaded transports would be lost in the return?

It might not have resulted in a total economic and governmental collapse until 1948, but the Japanese economy and military would essentially have been rendered mostly ineffective well before that. The situation for the general populace would have become desperate, and lethal.

all of a sudden you just set up @Graf Zeppelin to come do her lecture on the divide between Army and Navy transports and how Japan was it's own worst logistical problem maker.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

all of a sudden you just set up @Graf Zeppelin to come do her lecture on the divide between Army and Navy transports and how Japan was it's own worst logistical problem maker.

Ya I mean the army even had their own carrier programme

 

[Ming]

Ya I mean the army even had their own carrier programme

Don't forget that the Navy also had a Tank program.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Don't forget that the Navy also had a Tank program.

To be fair, wouldn't that be equivalent to a US Marine armored unit created by contracting industry to provide vehicles? Or is this some special 'no, only WE can have these tanks' kind of a deal like the transports?

 

[Ming]

To be fair, wouldn't that be equivalent to a US Marine armored unit created by contracting industry to provide vehicles? Or is this some special 'no, only WE can have these tanks' kind of a deal like the transports?

IIRC prewar the Navy took over development of amphibious vehicles, ostensibly for use in amphibious landings. The requirements were for the tanks to autonomously travel hundreds of kilometers over water NOT just for river crossings and the like.

They mostly modified existing army designs. . . but there was a helluva lot of engineering work that went into these things. They were a bit more boat that fights on land than Hobart's funnies.

So yes, it was indeed 'only WE can have these tanks' and yet at the same time not as silly as the Army aircraft carriers. At least these were intended for missions the army wouldn't normally be called upon to perform. (The most advanced model was sub launched)

Still a waste of effort and resources and I'd hazard to guess that the navy taking over the project was due in no small part to their inter service turf wars and non-cooperation.

 

[Director]

@Henry IX - I agree with what you said but would point out that the Japanese were moving south over the trails to Port Moresby (and trying end-runs around the 'tail'), not attacking Rabaul.

I'm not sure why, but the Japanese were extremely sentimental about Rabaul.


About the only thing I can add to the information given here is that, after building an airfield at Guadalcanal, the Japanese were considering moving on to Fiji and Samoa. That would have extended shipping distance and time from the US west coast to Australia by a lot, so much so that it might have been more efficient to ship from the US east coast... except for those pesky U-boats, and the fact that Australia's cities and best harbors are on its east coast.

Australian fears on invasion were understandable if not really rational - Americans worried about landings on the west coast, Hawaii and Panama. In my opinion, had Japan invaded Australia the resulting logistical horror would have made Guadalcanal look like a church picnic. And that's without shipping ANZAC troops home from Egypt.

Don't forget that the Navy also had a Tank program.

Don't forget that tanks were developed by the Royal Navy in the first place.

 

[Director]

A 1948 date is the timeframe I would guess for the total collapse of the Japanese economy from food shortage if they did not bring home much of their army to restore the agricultural sector.

I can't remember off the top of my head what date the US Navy and AAF thought a bomb-and-blockade strategy would work by, or if there even was such a projected date, but I do know they estimated Japanese civilian casualties to be in the millions. As has been said, the civilian population had been living on very short rations for a long time; the step from that to pellagra, rickets, scurvy and death is a short one.

Bringing home the troops wasn't really going to be possible, I think - no transports left, no air or naval cover for them and little arable land to farm.

@Kovax - from what I've read, the Japanese government was well aware of civilian suffering: all they had to do was drive through fire-bombed Tokyo. They knew the situation, knew the inevitable result - but could not bring themselves to speak the necessary words. Some of them really, truly were fanatical on the idea that it was better for the entire nation to die rather than surrender; many were convinced that the bloodbath of an invasion would force the Allies to terms.

Whatever Hirohito's war-guilt may have been I do give him credit for the moral courage needed to make it stop.