What will deploying endless swarms of troops do?
- Thread starter Wimpola
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G.F Krivosheev, Grif sekretnosti snyat: poteri vooruzhyonnyh sil SSSR v voynah, boevyh deystviyah i voennyh konfliktah.
80% of German losses until the mass surrenders of spring 1945 were caused on the Eastern front.
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Seems like the casaulties kept on being alot higher for the Russians compared to the Germans even in 1943-44...
Battle of Kursk and/or Citadel in 1943 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk
Battle of Kharkov 1943 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Battle_of_Kharkov
Battle of Korsun-Cherkassy pocket 1944 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Korsun–Cherkassy_Pocket
Battle of Narva 1944 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Narva_(1944)
Battle of Tali-Ihantala 1944 (Finland with German support) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tali-Ihantala
I agree the Russians won because they had more men AND because of the recieved LL which made it possible to concentrate Russias resources on tank production. As you wrote Russia could take higher losses.
The war was lost for Germany when the USA entered the war in december 1941.
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Actually, in reality Soviet casualties, while consistently being higher then the Germans until 1945, were not significantly higher then the Germans. For 1943-1944, the ratio was generally 1.5:1.
From Absolute War page 594:
"Although the Russian losses were, again, greater than German, the German casualties were horrific, and they could afford them less. Of about seventy German divisions operating in the Kursk area, thirty had been destroyed and the German figures put their losses at more than half a million killed, seriously wounded, prisoners, or missing in fifty days of fighting. That gives about 10,000 a day. The Russian figures show a remarkable shift from inordinate numbers of dead and missing to a more normal ratio of killed to wounded. During the defensive phase there were 70,000 'irrecoverable losses against 107,517 sick and wounded. In Operation Rumyantsev the Russians lost 71,611 'irrecoverables' against 184,000 sick and wounded - closer to the one-to-three norm. In operation Kutuzov, the figures were 112,529 to 317,361, respectively, again, close to the norm of one-to-three. That must be an indicator of improved Russian medical and evacuation procedures. Russian losses per day were 9,360 in the defensive phase, against a total of 23,483 in the two overlapping counteroffensives. With a very rough German toll of 10,000 killed, prisoners, sick, wounded, and missing per day, that is close to the ratio of one German causality to 1.5 Russian, which would apply for the rest of the war."
The problem here is you are using wiki. For example: wikipedia's source on Kursk there is Zetterling, who to my knowledge has only analyzed German casualties during the thirteen days of what the Soviets refer to as the defensive phase (though the total German losses are too high to be just for that phase of the battle even if they're lower than Bellamy gives, which makes me curious to read the original source), whereas Bellamy is concerned with the additional month or so of Soviet counterattacks - which wikipedia also seems to include in its Soviet casualty figures.
There is, ultimately a grain of truth to the whole "Germans lost because they were outnumbered" myth: the Soviets were, and did, consistently able to take manpower heavier losses then pretty much any other WW2 power, save arguably the Chinese, and keep going. However, the degree to which this applies has been horrendously exaggerated as a result of Cold War mythologizing. By 1944 the Russians no longer considered their divisions that expendable. That the Germans thought they were facing endless hordes many times their own numbers is actually more a tribute to the growing mobility of the Red Army as well as intensive Soviet deception plans that grossly inflated the actual size of the force the Germans were facing (much like the phantom divisions at D-Day - the Germans never cottoned on, and in turn the Russians never felt the need to tell their Western Allies).
By 1945 the Red Army had adopted an increasingly mechanistic method of fighting, using firepower and speed rather than manpower and blood to break enemy defenses. One of their basic strategic tenets had also become the conservation of combat power and rapid regeneration of damaged units. It was realized that fighting divisions until they broke was wasteful and ineffective, and ideally a division would be taken off the line after suffering 30% casualties and allowed to recuperate.
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Yes, Kursk is the longer timeframe and Citadel is the German offensive until ordered to stop.
In both cases or as separate battles Citadel/Kursk - losses are higher for Russia than Germany.
Even in 1944 at the Battle of Narva and others linked to, still shows the higher losses for Russia vs Germany.
In both cases or as separate battles Citadel/Kursk - losses are higher for Russia than Germany.
Even in 1944 at the Battle of Narva and others linked to, still shows the higher losses for Russia vs Germany.
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Wiki is a great source as always. Because according to this wiki article elements of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts lost more men than the all four fronts which participated in the fighting in this time period combined.
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1) Page number please - or are you just quoting the Wiki source (which as Wiki notes, lacks a page-number).
2) From what I can see of this source on Wiki it does not support a strength of 34 million. It supports (on the basis of a post-war statistical study) a total number who passed through the Soviet armed forces. You might be able to use this to calculate a final strength at the end of the war, but not the strength at the beginning of 1944.
3) Your assertion that the real strength of the Red Army was much larger than the 6.4 million strength that Anthony Beevor gave for them (which included the STAVKA reserves, and which agrees with multiple other sources quoted above) therefore lacks basis.
And ~2/3rds of Germans in uniform in January 1944 were not on the Eastern Front, which seems something of a counter-point to this statement. Of course, it would not have been possible for all 9.5 million to be deployed to the Eastern Front even had the Western Allies not existed, but many more could have been.
It should also be said that it was not the mere infliction of casualties that won the war, but military victories - which the Soviets also had many of - of which casualties are only one (and not the best) measure.
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I wonder how long 10% equipment divisions will stand up to fully equipped divisions, and if their org regain and staying power is enough to make them a strategic option, or if its like hoi3 where as soon as units are at 0 org, things get messy with stacking penalties and they're just overrun. A 10% equipment division should be able to hold up a fully equipped unit for a couple of days in rough terrain, if there are 30,000 troops, and 3000 rifles, then at 10-1 ratio they should be able to hold up the 1 unit for a couple of days right, enough to send in reinforcements of another 30,000 troops with 3000 rifles. Losses should be high, but they should at least give an attacking unit pause, amirite?
Your reading comprehension needs work. From the very beginning here, people were saying that 34 million was the number who passed through the Soviet armed forces, not the Red Army's strength at any given point.
I own that book and Anthony Beevor specifically noted he was talking about Red Army forces directly facing the Germans, not the total number of men in the Soviet armed forces.
Of the Germans in uniform who were combat troops, the proportion dedicated to the Eastern Front comes out too just under 60% of the total in January 1945.
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Page 139.
"At the beginning of the war (on 22 June 1941) Red Army and Navy consisted of 4 826 907 listed military personnel. Additionally, Narkomat Oborony had 74 965 personnel and army construction workers serving in civilian agency formations.
Over four war years there were mobilized (excluding mobilized twice) another 29 mil. 574.9 thou. people, and together with the pre-war army, army, navy and military formations of other agencies, 34 476 700 people served."
Page 139.
"From 34 mil 746,7 thou people that put on a uniform over the course of the war, over one third (33%) were yearly in the service (10.5-11.5 mil people listed). Half of listed personnel (5.0-6.5 mil people) served in engaged army units, meaning fought on soviet-german front.
I gave you source, page number, and rough translation of the paragraphs with the numbers. Thus, 6.4 mil figure is the number of people in the acting army.
I am not arguing with that. Did you know, that until 1944, a lot of mauled German formations were rotated as garrisons into Western Europe to recuperate?
It should also be said that it was not the mere infliction of casualties that won the war, but military victories - which the Soviets also had many of - of which casualties are only one (and not the best) measure.[/QUOTE]
~80% German KIA and ground vehicles, 50% of German planes were destroyed by soviets. That's a fact.
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Eh? I've done the math for that, and Luftwaffe losses in the East come out to 1/3rd of total.
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I hardly need to point out to you that 6.4 million is not half of the figure you give (more like 2/3rds) and included the STAVKA reserves (which weren't at the front). Probably the 10.5 million figure is including NKVD and navy personnel and so-forth, and thus not the figure for Red Army personnel. Beevor's statement remains accurate as a whole (and is still not the figure only for troops at the front).
Even taking the 10.5 million figure as accurate, people saying that the Germans were overwhelmed by superior Soviet numbers alone are stuck with the basic fact that Soviet strength was roughly comparable to German strength at the time when most of the Soviet victories were won.
You're missing the point: An army that does not get into the fight at all, and instead remains stuck uselessly in a part of Europe, is nearly as defeated as one that is surrounded and destroyed. 2/3rds of German strength in 1944 was not employed fighting on the Eastern Front - if you believe that instead they could have deployed 1/2 their strength or 2/3rds their strength, what do you think the outcome would have been?
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Nope. Here's the exact quote:
You talk about reading comprehension. Yours needs work.
Anyone with any sense knows that "6.4 million men almost entirely on the eastern front" does not mean "6.4 million men on the eastern front". Moreover, anyone with an ounce of sense can see that "6.4 million men in the Red Army" is not saying that this was the strength of the Soviet armed forces, especially when they have pointed out repeatedly that this does not include people in the Navy, NKVD and so-forth.
Glantz describes how the Soviet army was essentially consumed several times over by the war, with at least 29 million military casualties (which is not limited to the dead). Manpower was a serious concern by 1944, since the army and production were both critical demands on the pool of men of military age, and this was so despite the widespread employment of women in the army as well. Units consumed in battle don't carry on to serve as veteran cadres for reinforced or new units, a problem that the Germans escaped for most of the war.
So you comparing Germany's people in uniform to just Red Army portion of Soviet armed forces? Nice one. If you compare men in uniform from the German side, then do the same with men in uniform for the Soviet side. Otherwise you are comparing apples to trees.
Never argued with that.
No, you are missing the point: most of German's land combat strength was on the Eastern Front. Its their fault they had to have 2 men in the rear for every man actually fighting. If soviets had same issues, Red Army front-line strength would have been 3-3.5 million.
1/3 shot down by soviets, 1/3 shot down by allies, 1/3 suffering fatal accidents. That's 50% of those destroyed by enemy my reckoning.
Yes, that what I've repeatedly stated I am doing. Because those are the stats that appear accurate and easily available, not the ones that were calculated post-war by comparing through-put, and don't actually tell you what the strength of the Soviet armed forces at any given time.
Yes, if the Soviets had been threatened by potential amphibious invasions across wide areas, whilst having to defend against a strategic air offensive, whilst trying to conduct a strategic air offensive of their own, whilst conducting a submarine war against a determined enemy, whilst trying to hold down large swathes of occupied territory against partisan resistance, then they too would not have been able to concentrate so many troops on that front. However, the men doing this most definitely were fighting.
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Yep, there it is. He talks about the entire German armed forces personnel (so something which is going to include administrative and air force and SS and auxiliaries) compared to solely the Soviet Red Army on the Eastern Front. Not the Soviet Red Army + administrative personnel + air force + navy like that figure for the Germans is. It's perfectly clear that in terms of actual combat personnel though, the Germans never committed less the 2/3rd to the Eastern Front.
It's also somewhat wrong, given that (just for example) the Red Army maintained another one million men (give or take a few hundred thousand) in the Far East throughout the war. This table table from the 11th volume of the Soviet official history of WW2 showing personnel and equipment strength of Soviet ground forces in the Far East on the relevant dates.
Not on the Eastern front because it is the figure that includes the STAVKA reserves, and because he states that it is not exclusively the figure for troops on the Eastern Front, but otherwise, thanks for saying the same thing that I already said: this is the figure for the Red Army, it does not include the NKVD, Navy etc.
Well, if you want to show that Beevor's stat is wrong you've got a lot more work to do than:
1) Using a plucked-out-of-the-air figure for German commitments to the Eastern Front.
2) Using an unsourced table for far eastern strength (which includes NKVD troops? Navy?).
On the substantive comment about troops with 10% rifles, to keep human levies (which is what you are talking about) from retreating or dissolving would require a desperate position from which they physically could not retreat - the equivalent of a ship at sea, or a sealed pocket against a pitiless foe. Even if they were fearless fanatics, the imbalance in firepower would be very quickly crushing unless the terrain was especially restrictive to an attacker with only very narrow fighting fronts at which the weapons could be deployed.