What was Italy's gripe with WW1 results?

[Imgran]

Heck think of all the promises made to many nations/groups in both world wars, the Vietnamese, Arabs and others were promised independence.

Italy probably would have been better off however importing goods and selling like the Portugese did in WW2 than get involved in actual combat.

I think Italy was too central to where the war was to remain neutral indefinitely.

One of the concepts behind the sacro egoismo policy that plunged Italy into the war in the first place was that the physical location of Italy, and of the factions that were doing the fighting, made neutrality virtually impossible. The opportunities involved Italy's strategic location made them good real estate for a European war and also a threat to whichever side they were not on. so the answer to which side they were on could not be "neither side" because both factions would interpret that as an indirect threat.

Sooner or later someone was going to pull them off the fence because despite not being a great power the location of Italy made opportunities involved in having the Italians on their side of the war sufficiently great, and the longer they tried to play both ends against the middle, the more and more likely a preemptive strike could be launched by one side or the other out of fear or misunderstanding, similar to certain aspects of German belligerence against the then-neutral US but more intense for Italy being literally right in the middle of things.

So that gives you two choices -- stand in full mobilization for years to ward off such preemptive strikes, draining your finances for no gain at all, take the best deal you can from whichever faction you can and run to war yourself on your own choice. On the choice of which faction to join, I think Italy frankly assessed the enemy they would be asked to fight if they joined each faction and decided to fight Austria rather than France, and that that was the correct tactical assessment on their part. As bad as the Isonzo river was, the western passes into France had been one of the toughest invasion routes in history since the days of Hannibal and the army of a great power stood at the other end. The crumbling legions of the Hapsburgs must have seemed a pushover by comparison.

 

[Stryk9ine]

Wonder what [...] Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, and inhabitants of most of Central America think of that...

Well they were already part of the Spanish empire so they probably thought it was a step up. Spain didn't do crap for any of them.

 

[BBBD316]

I know that there we scant few reinforcements for either the Allies or the CP but wouldn't it have benefitted either side to send some seasoned regiments to bolster the Italians and for the Italians to produce the DOW whilst they were already pushing onto either side? Sneaky and underhanded, but that was the way it played out anyway.

Also if they had of gone to the CP would they have been able to land in Marseille or Toulon? If it was a surprise attack they could have pincered the French Alps defenders and forced a large movement of troops off the Western Front. Or is this impossible in that time frame?

 

[Semper Victor]

Also if they had of gone to the CP would they have been able to land in Marseille or Toulon? If it was a surprise attack they could have pincered the French Alps defenders and forced a large movement of troops off the Western Front. Or is this impossible in that time frame?

Against a French navy concentrated in the Mediterranean and backed by the Royal Navy? Not very likely. As a matter of fact, Italian politicians had already hinted to their German and Austrian allies before 1914 that in the case of Britain entering a war against the Central Powers Italy would not honour its alliance. Italy is a peninsula, and in 1914 it had a colonial empire that would have been very exposed to the superior British navy; even more so than in 1940, when aviation had become more important and the Royal Navy was not as overwhelmingly superior to the Italian one.

 

[DoomBunny]

I know that there we scant few reinforcements for either the Allies or the CP but wouldn't it have benefitted either side to send some seasoned regiments to bolster the Italians and for the Italians to produce the DOW whilst they were already pushing onto either side? Sneaky and underhanded, but that was the way it played out anyway.

Also if they had of gone to the CP would they have been able to land in Marseille or Toulon? If it was a surprise attack they could have pincered the French Alps defenders and forced a large movement of troops off the Western Front. Or is this impossible in that time frame?

Both Germany and the Allies did end up sending troops to the Italian Front when their ally there began to fail. For the Germans, it was the 10th and 11th Battles of the Isonzo together with pessimistic Austro-Hungarian forecasts of eventual defeat that prompted them to dispatch a number of divisions and plan the Caporetto Offensive. For the Allies, it was the (perhaps ultimately needless) desire to prevent an Italian collapse after Caporetto. It should be noted that the Italians stabilised the line on their own, despite much propaganda/myth-making (both Allied and CP) to the contrary.

As for a sneak attack, well that was sort of the original plan. However, two things worked against it. First was the French, who accidentally leaked the information to the Austro-Hungarians allowing them to prepare for the Italian attack. The second was that the Italian army under Cadorna was far too slow and uncommitted to its original attack. The grand plan was to sweep on to Vienna, the actual offensive amounted to a less than full strength Italian army with incredibly conflicted orders. For example, Cadorna ordered commanders to gain as much ground as possible, but on no account to expose their forces to risk of counterattack. Yet another example of the world's greatest military leader in action.

As for an attack on the French Alps. Well, three problems, the same three that confronted the army against AH. One, neither navy nor army was willing to consider major amphibious operations, and the navy in particular were deadset against it even if the army decided for them. Two, the French navy, combined with whatever ships the British had in the Mediterranean could have interfered nastily. Three, an attack on the Alps had been deemed impossible pre-war. Pre-war Italian planning had actually been to commit the bulk of the army to the Rhine in aid of German advances there, with the remainder protecting the homeland against amphibious attack. In the event, Alpine warfare proved as ridiculous as the Italians initially regarded it. An Alpine assault into the (if anything far worse terrain) French Alps would have been just as much of a disaster.

 

[Grosshaus]

How about landing in Dalmatia? Hit Austrian armies fighting Serbia in the back. Additionally have boots on the ground in area Italy hopes to gain in peace talks is always convenient. Especially if the users of those boots have had time time to ensure only the people who will vote correctly in a coming referendum on which country to join remain there.

 

[The Super Pope]

How about landing in Dalmatia? Hit Austrian armies fighting Serbia in the back. Additionally have boots on the ground in area Italy hopes to gain in peace talks is always convenient. Especially if the users of those boots have had time time to ensure only the people who will vote correctly in a coming referendum on which country to join remain there.

The technology did not exist to make amphibious assault that lead to anything other than beachhead stalemates, and the Dalmatian coast is, as I understand, rather rugged and difficult. Plus, Habsburg navy

 

[keynes2.0]

How about landing in Dalmatia? Hit Austrian armies fighting Serbia in the back. Additionally have boots on the ground in area Italy hopes to gain in peace talks is always convenient. Especially if the users of those boots have had time time to ensure only the people who will vote correctly in a coming referendum on which country to join remain there.

This sounds very difficult to me. There are mountains all along the coast and the rail connections between the Dalmatian coast and Hungary weren't really there:
http://bahnbuchshop.de/images/product_images/popup_images/335_0.jpg

 

[Imgran]

Besides which Italy didn't have the logistical capability to sustain an overseas invasion against a large, determined enemy army with no nearby friendly home base.

The best thing Italy could have done in that respect is landing in force in Albania or Montenegro and bolstering the defense of Serbia or opening a new front. If they could have done that, they might have been able to have a greater impact, but they're still fighting in the mountains, not sure how much of an upgrade that is for the Italian army.

 

[DoomBunny]

How about landing in Dalmatia? Hit Austrian armies fighting Serbia in the back. Additionally have boots on the ground in area Italy hopes to gain in peace talks is always convenient. Especially if the users of those boots have had time time to ensure only the people who will vote correctly in a coming referendum on which country to join remain there.

Basically the same problems. Navy-army cooperation was non-existant, the Austro-Hungarian navy was too strong for an amphibious landing, and in addition the Dalmatian coast is utterly unsuited to amphibious warfare. It is rugged terrain with many barrier islands.

The technology did not exist to make amphibious assault that lead to anything other than beachhead stalemates, and the Dalmatian coast is, as I understand, rather rugged and difficult. Plus, Habsburg navy

I'd say that's rather a bold claim given that I can only think of one major amphibious operation during the First World War (Gallipoli) and that was undertaken without conviction against a prepared opposition in poor terrain.

EDIT: Having said that, I've just remembered that the Germans mounted a successful amphibious attack on the Estonian islands in 1917.

Besides which Italy didn't have the logistical capability to sustain an overseas invasion against a large, determined enemy army with no nearby friendly home base.

The best thing Italy could have done in that respect is landing in force in Albania or Montenegro and bolstering the defense of Serbia or opening a new front. If they could have done that, they might have been able to have a greater impact, but they're still fighting in the mountains, not sure how much of an upgrade that is for the Italian army.

The nearby friendly base in question would have been Italy itself.

As for Albania, it did happen. The Italians sent a corps sized force to occupy the Southern part of the country. It wasn't particularly successful in the grand scheme of the war.

 

[Imgran]

you need a "nearby" "friendly" base that is not on the other side of a CONTESTED SEA. You'd have a point if the adriatic were an Italian lake, but the Hapsburg navy was big enough to give the Italians a run for it if they went all in, and the Hapsburgs and Ottomans combined outnumbered Italy outright, so Italy had no control of its own seas during the war.

Since the only base of supply was across a contested water, there's NWIH they could supply a large army in Yugoslavia without friendly supply bases on the Balkan side that they didn't have the power to win on their own.

 

[Beagá]

It seems to me like Italy got most of what it could reasonably expected from WW1, but resentment with the results is often posited as a reason for the rise of Mussolini. Am I missing something? What else did they want?

Long time no see Wiggum, surely you must remember we must ask Paradox to make Victoria 3 ASAP, and kick Habsburg and Bourbon a** out of the mediterranean

 

[keynes2.0]

you need a "nearby" "friendly" base that is not on the other side of a CONTESTED SEA. You'd have a point if the adriatic were an Italian lake, but the Hapsburg navy was big enough to give the Italians a run for it if they went all in, and the Hapsburgs and Ottomans combined outnumbered Italy outright, so Italy had no control of its own seas during the war.

The Ottoman navy was basically a nonentity. The Greek navy had in fact forced it into harbor during that first Balkan war.
http://www.naval-history.net/WW1NavyTurkish.htm
http://www.naval-history.net/WW1NavyGreek.htm

The Italian and Austrian navies were roughly at parity but even a a partial commitment from the French would give the Italians a decisive advantage.

 

[BBBD316]

Well it seems that a large part of the French fleet was invested in the adriatic, perhaps a joint attack by the A-H and Italian navies could have caused major damage to the French fleet there, once that patrol fleet is gone the joint navies could possibly bottle the French in Toulon?

 

[keynes2.0]

Didn't the French commit to the Adriatic after the Italians joined the war? I believe before then they were based at Malta and Algeria. The Italians were based at Taranto and the Austrians in Croatia so there isn't much chance of a sneak attack on the French fleet given the distance involved.

 

[Beagá]

Well it seems that a large part of the French fleet was invested in the adriatic, perhaps a joint attack by the A-H and Italian navies could have caused major damage to the French fleet there, once that patrol fleet is gone the joint navies could possibly bottle the French in Toulon?

I don´t see any realistic scenario in 1914 where Italy would join with A-H. It was public opinion that made the italian government not honor their alliance AND declare war one year later. Sounds like two nations that hated each other.

If it´s about alternative scenarios that disregard everything, then yes a russian-italian-german-austrian-american alliance would indeed lock the french fleet in Toulon. Is it worth discussing?

 

[DoomBunny]

you need a "nearby" "friendly" base that is not on the other side of a CONTESTED SEA. You'd have a point if the adriatic were an Italian lake, but the Hapsburg navy was big enough to give the Italians a run for it if they went all in, and the Hapsburgs and Ottomans combined outnumbered Italy outright, so Italy had no control of its own seas during the war.

Since the only base of supply was across a contested water, there's NWIH they could supply a large army in Yugoslavia without friendly supply bases on the Balkan side that they didn't have the power to win on their own.

None of which was your original point, and all of which was addressed elsewhere in my post.

On the note of enemy naval forces, I'll point out again that there was also a unwillingness on the part of both Italian services to countenance amphibious operations. Even if opposition had been lighter, you would still have encountered the problem of inter-service cooperation, itself partially a knock-on of the failure of civil-military relations in Italy. Essentially, nothing much worked in Italy at the time.

I don´t see any realistic scenario in 1914 where Italy would join with A-H. It was public opinion that made the italian government not honor their alliance AND declare war one year later. Sounds like two nations that hated each other.

If it´s about alternative scenarios that disregard everything, then yes a russian-italian-german-austrian-american alliance would indeed lock the french fleet in Toulon. Is it worth discussing?

Public opinion had little to do with it actually. The Salandra government entered the war despite highly mixed feelings amongst the people and the services (Cadorna himself actually voiced some negativity as to Italian readiness, perhaps one of only two things he ever got right). It was a move of pragmatism and opportunism more than anything else. When Italy did go to war, the Italian reaction was rather non-committal, and the Salandra government continued to disregard popular opinion until its fall.

 

[StephenT]

Public opinion had little to do with it actually. The Salandra government entered the war despite highly mixed feelings amongst the people and the services.

Public opinion was strongly anti-Austria-Hungary, which does explain why Italy didn't join the war on the side of the Central Powers. You are right that there was no counter-pressure for them to join the Allies, and that decision was pushed through by a faction in the government without any great popular support.

(Also, for the record; Italy's official stance was that the Triple Alliance was a defensive treaty and as such didn't oblige them to join in a war in which Austria and Germany were the aggressors. As far as they were concerned they didn't break the alliance in August 1914; it remained in force until 1915. Obviously it was broken when they declared war on Austria-Hungary...)

 

[DoomBunny]

Public opinion was strongly anti-Austria-Hungary, which does explain why Italy didn't join the war on the side of the Central Powers. You are right that there was no counter-pressure for them to join the Allies, and that decision was pushed through by a faction in the government without any great popular support.

(Also, for the record; Italy's official stance was that the Triple Alliance was a defensive treaty and as such didn't oblige them to join in a war in which Austria and Germany were the aggressors. As far as they were concerned they didn't break the alliance in August 1914; it remained in force until 1915. Obviously it was broken when they declared war on Austria-Hungary...)

I agree with you, there was strong sentiment against AH. Interesting though how little of it translated into a genuine war effort until after Caporetto, perhaps indicative of a desire to see AH fail but little desire to pay the cost of actively making it fail.

It would be an interesting subject for research.