Was there anyway that Germany could conquer the SU?

[King]

First of I have to say that the German plan was never really going to conquer the SU as such, their plan was to establish a military frontier at the Urals and continually fight the Soviet State on that border. This plan could never have succeeded in the longer term, but I guess the question is, could it have been achieved. I have seen two interesting thoeries regarding the Germany invasion of the Soviet Union. The First was that Hitler was right and his Generals were wrong. If we consider Hitler's strategy (for example the decision to turn south to the Ukraine for example), his choice was the very correct von Cluaswitzian solution to defeat the enemies armies in the field rather than sieze objectives. Another example was his decision to encirlce Lenningrad in 1941 and siege it, only for his Army Group North Commander to assault the city anyway and gut two of the Panzer Divisions that were to be used for the assault on Moscow. In fact the theory runs that if only the German Generals had done what they were told the Germans would of been more successful and then who knows what might of happened.

Theory number two runs the opposite and that the German generals fixation with Moscow was in fact the correct strategy. The Soviet Union's transport network is centred on Moscow. Take this and you in effect cripple the Soviet's war making capacity, as the Soviet strategic mobility is serverly compromised by the capture of Moscow. In addition moscow is a key industrial and population centre, take this and the Soviet Union is Industrial and Militarly cripled as well. The arguement runs on two lines, first that although the Germans would suffer crippling supply problems later in the year, while the weather is fine the German supply system could keep the army supplied on it's drive to Moscow. Secondly the diversions of the Two German Panzer Groups to both North and South gave the Soviets Time to rebuild their forces and more improtantly build a reserve up which of course aided the Soviet defence. The arguement runs that a drive to Moscow would of been more practicle in August, the Soviet Defenders would be weaker, the German troops stronger and the German supply situation better. Making the Capture of Moscow a very distinct possibility.

 

[King]

I'd say the first successful attempt at a strategic move was the attack that knocked the Germans away from Moscow in December 1941.

It was failure by the Soviets own plan. They really want to encircle and destory Army Group Centre, or at least a substantial portion of it. So although they did push Army Group Centre back they failed to destroyed it.

 

[King]

Of course, but they disrupted German plans, didn't they?

Same could happen with theoretical counterattack from Kiev area - no great effect of "Stalingrad type", but disruption of German plans in Moscow/Leningrad area.

For Soviets it would be enough. Time was working for them, not for Germans.

With hindsight we know it was enough. However if the Soviet plan had been executed sucessfully there would of been no Stalingrad. The soviet armies failed to find weak points contniued to attack anlong points were they found high levels of resistance and suffered very heavy casulities. The minute the themometer started to rise the German's counterattacked and drove the Soviets back. I also add that the Soviet attacks in the north of the front where the German's had halted their advance and had two months to dig in had far less success. So to sumerise I would say that a large part of the success of the Soviet winter counter offensive was in its almost perfect timming. Catching the Germans just as their offensive power had failed, but before they could switch to a defensive posture. To attack sooner would of caused metting engagements between advancing German units and counter attacking Soviet troops, to attack later would of given time for German troops to dig in and deploy themselves in defensively.

An attack northwards would of come up against a dug in (and still fresh) German Second army would not of enjoyed the kind of success that the Soviet counter attack against the German drive to Moscow would of enjoyed. Budeny's Front south of Kiev was already giving way in the face of Kliest Panzers so this would of divereted troops from any attack to protect the flank.

 

[King]

@King: Re: Moscow 1941

Fully agree, but that's not the point.

I see it that way - historically, Germans destroyed armies in Kiev cauldron in september 1941, stopping the attack on Moscow.

In hipotetical scenario with German attack on Moscow instead of closing cauldron, they would have to deal with flank attack from Kiev area. I'm fully aware, that they would deal with that. I'm also pretty sure, that it would have resulted in destruction of Soviet forces. But it could considerably slow down German attack on Moscow enough to give Soviets some time, especially when we consider, why German offensive slowed down in reality (logisitics, replacing losses).

Well here is the nub of the agruement either attacking Kiev was the right decision. Seeking the von Cluaswitz destruction of armies and the Germans should of stopped the offensive on Moscow after the intial victories. They destroyed more Svoiet forces in the opening battles there than they did the Kiev Cauldron. Having destroyed the Soviet forces they should of gone into winter quarters and waited for Spring to finish the job. Also note that this strategy would of robbed the Soviet counter offensive of much of its power.

OR

Taking Moscow was the right objective, in which case the attack on Kiev was an unnecesary diverstion. The soviet troops facing northward (the 5th Army) were primarly shattered remains from the frontier battles and would of been in no possistion to organise effective attack. While the baulk of troops facing westward were pinned down by Army Group South and were unable to turn north to save themselves from destruction, they are unlikely to have been able to turn northwards for any other reason.

Notice the interesting thing about either of these hypothises is that the Germans paid the price for trying to take too may objectives. The same problem they would suffer again in 1942. The Southern forces divided between Stalingrad and the oil fields further South. Divisions sent north to try and take Leningrad. The German military machine constantly streached trying to achieve all objectives and ending up achieving none of them.

 

[King]

No.
Clausewitz also talks about destroying enemy will to fight - and that was not going to happen by destroying Soviet divisions, when they popped new ones in no time. After seeing this, Germans should have attempted to destroy the Soviet will to fight by capturing their centres - and Moscow was quite a centre of everything: industry, power, railroad, ...

My own personal take on Von Clausewitz was that the object was to destroy the enemies ability to fight. Destroying divisions reduces the enemy's ability to do that. Mosocw is a tempting target for all the reasons you state, plus it is the one city the Soviets would always defend to the last. The Germans believed (falsely as it turns out) that the Soviets were almost out of men. A drive to Moscow was force the Soviets to use their final reserves and bring Germans the final battle they required for victory. We know now that the Soviets still had a large stock of reserves available (from the far eastern military districts), still at the time the German plan seemed sound.

About the possible Soviet counteroffensive from the Kiev region: I assume Germans would see just an uncoordinated procession of tired Soviet divisions coming from the Pripiat' swamps or trying to cross the Sozh river - things that the 4th Army alone could handle. In the meantime, the rest of Army Group Centre and the most of Army Group North would push onto Moscow - with only Eremenko in person trying to stop them... while Rundstedt would finally move his aristocratic a$$ and enter Kiev by his own, since Budienny would have commited his forces to the north.

The reason the diversion south was so tempting was caused in part by the Soviet troop deployments. The Largest deployments were to the South of the Marshes while the Germans deployed the majority of the Troops to the north. So the Northern Amry groups enjoyed far more success while Rundstedt's forces face deeply echeloned troops, with stroing reserves commanded by probably the most compatent of the Soviet special military district commanders. However by the time we come to choice of weather to trun the Panzers South or drive on to Moscow the Soviet frontlien resistance is breaking down and the SGerman troops are driving for the Dnieper. The Majority of the troops handed to Budenny's Southern Direction were hastily raised resrves and these divisions lacked mobility. The Kiev front could of held for longer without Guderians turn South but I do not think it could of held. The Germans crossed the river (in the end) fairly easily.