Originally posted by OttoVonBismark
Either way, it is a moot point, any nation has the right to refuse to trade with other nations.
But then that nation cannot blame the embargoed country if it attacks it. Moreover an embargo may be considered an act of aggression: the international law isn't clear, but some people think it is an act of aggression per se, like the Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg (author of the Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact) who told it during the discussion of that pact in 1928.
by BismarckThe Japanese, as I've shown were pushing for something ludicrous in their talks with the USSR, preservation of nothing less than the imperial system of government.
This is the ludicrous misinterpretation given by that chapter of a book of the US Army (of course a "very impartial source": you labeled the Strategic Bombing Survey as not impartial, even though it was based on the data collected by 1,000 men of the US Armed Forces and even though its conclusions were the same of people like MacArthur, Leahy, LeMay, Nimitz, Halsey, Hoover, etc.; but we should think that your source is impartial). In the telegrams (that you haven't read, of course) it's never told that the imperial system of goverment had to be kept, but the far less defined "form of govern". Moreover, the simple fact that on 25 July 1945 (the day before the Potsdam dictat), the minister of Foreign Affairs Togo wrote the following quotation explains quite well that the words "form of govern" were about the monarchy, not the control of the Armed Forces on the govern:
For instance, on the 19th [21st] Captain Zacharias --although a member of the United States Office of War Information he broadcasts to Japan as a spokesman for the United States Government--disclosed the substance of surrender terms, saying that Japan had two choices to make. One was to submit to a dictated peace after the complete destruction of Japan; the other, to accept unconditional surrender and receive benefits under the Atlantic Charter. This is considered simple propaganda strategy. Although it is not definitely stated, this is to a certain degree understood to be a means of encouraging surrender. Nevertheless, special attention should be paid to the fact that at this time the United States referred to the Atlantic Charter. As for Japan, it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter. The difficult point is the attitude of the enemy, who continues to insist on the formality of unconditional surrender. Should the United States and Great Britain remain insistent on formality, there is no solution to this situation other than for us to hold out until complete collapse because of this one point alone. On the other hand, since it is possible that the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States may exercise caution and suspect our dispatch of a special envoy may be a peace plot, we have repeatedly advised that what is described above is not a mere "peace feeler" but is in obedience to the Imperial command.
As you can see, not only Japan was seeking for peace honestly, not only it was made under the command of the Emperor, but Japan was also accepting the American offers of a peace based on the
Atlantic Charter (that, by the way, openly states the demilitarization of countries).
by BismarckThe Japanese militarists understood the Atomic Bomb and how destructive it was, they downplayed it to the public however, and successfully. Hirohito was well aware of the bomb's power and after the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima his pushes for peace became even more vigorous.
Hirohito wanted peace, but he didn't push on his govern simply because nobody replyed to Japanese peace offers. If Japanese diplomats had made peace, he would have obliged all the member of the govern to accept it, also without the A-bombs.
And about the militarists, you couldn't been farther from the truth: even after Hiroshima die-hard militarists like gen. Anami didn't change their mind. Only the Emperor forced them to accept peace, and, of course, since he wanted peace also before the A-bombs, there isn't the slightest proof that Hiroito wouldn't have used his power also if Konoe had accomplished his mission.
Undoubtedly the Russian entrance also had a huge effect. You have to wonder if the Russians entered the war earlier (they had originally said they were entering later that year) because of the A-Bomb and a fear that it would bring Japan to it's knees before Russia could grab up Japanese spoils.
You are not explaining why Truman didn't wait the Russian attack. Since, as you tell, it had a huge impact (but not on the militarists), why don't wait it and let the Emperor use it as an excuse to force the extremists to accept peace?
I'd like to know if you know
when the Russians had promised to attack. From your post it seems they were going to wait for months...
Moreover, since the USA had planned the landing on 1st Nov. 1945, why was Truman so in a hurry to drop the bombs in August? This is a good question, whose reply has probably nothing to do with the surrender of Japan.
And, another good question: even if we assume that Hiroshima was truly useful (I don't think it, of course

), why Nagasaki? It was nuked when the council of the Japanese govern and the Emperor had already started, and it hadn't the slightest effect on the decisions made in that meeting.