Was the use of the Atomic Bomb in WWII justified?

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by Neil
You have not provided an argument yet as to why the US should abandon it's principle of unconditional surrender.

But, to be blunt, they did.

The Japanese successfully attached one condition to their surrender, something the Germans certainly didn't manage.

So the need for CoolElephant to provide more argument is rendered rather moot.................................



Well, that's enough "troublemaking" here for the moment.

 

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Originally posted by StJaba
Is it possible the Japanese were using diplomacy simply to buy time? After all, the Japanese had used diplomatic "trickery" in the past, and I'm sure the Americans at the time were at least skeptical at the validity of Japanese peace feelers. And even if they weren't, would a peace that would result in militarists still being in control of Japan been acceptable?

Here is a passage from United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Courtesy of Mr. Wido, in his previous post), which answers some of your questions. I underlined two parts of importance.


The conviction and strength of the peace party was increased by the continuing Japanese military defeats, and by Japan's helplessness in defending itself against the ever-growing weight of air attack on the home islands. On 7 April 1945, less than a week after United States landings on Okinawa, Koiso was removed and Marquis Kido installed Admiral Suzuki as premier. Kido testified to the Survey that, in his opinion, Suzuki alone had the deep conviction and personal courage to stand up to the military and bring the war to an end.

Early in May 1945, the Supreme War Direction Council began active discussion of ways and means to end the war, and talks were initiated with Soviet Russia seeking her intercession as mediator.

The talks by the Japanese ambassador in Moscow and with the Soviet ambassador in Tokyo did not make progress. On 20 June the Emperor, on his own initiative, called the six members of the Supreme War Direction Council to a conference and said it was necessary to have a plan to close the war at once, as well as a plan to defend the home islands. The timing of the Potsdam Conference interfered with a plan to send Prince Konoye to Moscow as a special emissary with instructions from the cabinet to negotiate for peace on terms less than unconditional surrender, but with private instructions from the Emperor to secure peace at any price. Although the Supreme War Direction Council, in its deliberations on the Potsdam Declaration, was agreed on the advisability of ending the war, three of its members, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Navy Minister, were prepared to accept unconditional surrender, while the other three, the Army Minister, and the Chiefs of Staff of both services, favored continued resistance unless certain mitigating conditions were obtained.

On 6 August the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, and on 9 August Russia entered the war. In the succeeding meetings of the Supreme War Direction Council, the differences of opinion previously existing as to the Potsdam terms persisted exactly as before. By using the urgency brought about through fear of further atomic bombing attacks, the Prime Minister found it possible to bring the Emperor directly into the discussions of the Potsdam terms. Hirohito, acting as arbiter, resolved the conflict in favor of unconditional surrender.

The public admission of defeat by the responsible Japanese leaders, which constituted the political objective of the United States offensive begun in 1943, was thus secured prior to invasion and while Japan was still possessed of some 2,000,000 troops and over 9,000 planes in the home islands. Military defeats in the air, at sea and on the land, destruction of shipping by submarines and by air, and direct air attack with conventional as well as atomic bombs, all contributed to this accomplishment.

There is little point in attempting precisely to impute Japan's unconditional surrender to any one of the numerous causes which jointly and cumulatively were responsible for Japan's disaster. The time lapse between military impotence and political acceptance of the inevitable might have been shorter had the political structure of Japan permitted a more rapid and decisive determination of national policies. Nevertheless, it seems clear that, even without the atomic bombing attacks, air supremacy over Japan could have exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender and obviate the need for invasion.

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

Originally posted by Arkestra
Yes.. surely allowing the same leaders that struck without warning in an attack that shocked a nation to its core would spell political suicide for the president doing so?

Actually, the leaders of Japan in 1945 were different from those in December, 1941. Prime Minister Tojo Hideki, Prime Minister in December 1941, resigned after the fall of Saipan. Many other positions changed as well. So, it was different leaders in Summer, 1945, than in December 1941.

The president wouldn't be committing "political suicide" had he not dropped the bombs and tried to work towards the diplomatic peace with Japan: He could have ended the war, and gained the same kind of effect without the use of the bombs. Earlier in my post, I have posted a passage of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report. In it, it tells how the Emperor told to Prince Konoe Fumimaro "to secure peace at any price". This serves as ample proof that the United States could have got what they wanted through diplomacy.

Originally posted by Agelastus
But, to be blunt, they did.

The Japanese successfully attached one condition to their surrender, something the Germans certainly didn't manage.

Yes, you are correct: The "unconditional" surrender of Japan in World War II, in fact had conditions. Earlier in this thread, I posted about this.

 

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Originally posted by Meiji-Tenno
In it, it tells how the Emperor told to Prince Konoe Fumimaro "to secure peace at any price". This serves as ample proof that the United States could have got what they wanted through diplomacy.

No, this only serves as ample proof that the Prince didn't follow his instructions very well.

Turn the chess board around and look at it from the other side. The US has no way of communicating directly with the Japanese leadership, except through public statements. There have been no public statements from the Japanese government that signal any desire to surrender, quite the contrary.

Yet you somehow expect the US, using diplomacy, to find out the composition of the peace party in the Japanese government, to approach those individuals and negotiate with them about what steps *they* would need the US to take so that *they* could overcome the deadlock in their own cabinet??

 

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Originally posted by Admiral Yi
No, this only serves as ample proof that the Prince didn't follow his instructions very well.

How did he not follow his instructions well? The mission was canceled, and Konoe didn't go on his mission. So, he did not get to fail or succeed. The point in me saying that was "ample proof" was because it shows that Japan was willing to make peace on American terms.

Turn the chess board around and look at it from the other side. The US has no way of communicating directly with the Japanese leadership, except through public statements. There have been no public statements from the Japanese government that signal any desire to surrender, quite the contrary.

Exactly why Konoe's mission was through Moscow. The United States did intercept messages between the Japanese Embassy in the Soviet Union and Foreign Ministry, and knew that Japan was trying to make peace. They would have received a formal and public statement too, had the Soviet Union accepted to help make peace instead of declaring war.

Yet you somehow expect the US, using diplomacy, to find out the composition of the peace party in the Japanese government, to approach those individuals and negotiate with them about what steps *they* would need the US to take so that *they* could overcome the deadlock in their own cabinet??

I am not sure if I understand this completely.. I am sorry.. I think I understand, so I will reply (But if it is completely different from what you have meant, I have warned you! ):

I have tried to say that the United States should not have dropped the Atomic Bombs. And that they could have made a desirable peace with the Japanese government, without their (the bombs') usage. If the United States could not immediately directly speak to the Japanese government, they could have attempted through neutral parties (as Japan did) to convey peace terms to Japan, or even to open up diplomacy directly with Japan.

 

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Originally posted by Admiral Yi
Turn the chess board around and look at it from the other side. The US has no way of communicating directly with the Japanese leadership, except through public statements. There have been no public statements from the Japanese government that signal any desire to surrender, quite the contrary.

Governs usually don't use public broadcasts, but diplomacy (that, untill a pact is signed, is always secret). When the govern of Badoglio in Italy started negotiation with the Allies, it didn't make a public statement, and the same was done by Hungary (that, by the way, had started secret negotiations already in summer 1943). I don't know much about the surrender of Finland, Romania and Bulgaria, but, expecially for the 2 Balkan states, I don't think they proclaimed their will to surrender before the armistice was signed.

Yet you somehow expect the US, using diplomacy, to find out the composition of the peace party in the Japanese government, to approach those individuals and negotiate with them about what steps *they* would need the US to take so that *they* could overcome the deadlock in their own cabinet??

The USA knew perfectly the Japanese diplomatic dispatches to the ambassador in Moscow. They had only to say to Stalin: let them negotiate. Instead Stalin wanted Manchuria and the Kurils, and the USA, it seems, didn't care of negotiating.
About the different positions within the Japanese govern, where is the problem? The Tenno had the constitutional power and the authority to impose his will on the Govern and the Armed Forces. A similar thing happened in Italy on 8 Sept. 1943: the King and the most important members of the Govern and of the Armed Forces met to decide what to do in the imminence of the proclamation of the armistice. Gen. Carboni, commander of the Intelligence Service, proposed not to apply the armistice (signed on 3 Sept. and that had to be proclaimed in late afternoon of 8 Sept.) and to go on fighting along with the Germans: the majority of the ministers and generals supported this idea, but the King, thanks to his constitutional power and his authority, imposed his decision and let gen. Badoglio proclaim the armistice.
In my opinion, it's difficult to find a govern that completely agrees to surrender, but if the head of the state imposes his will (as Hirohito would has done, if the Americans had at least started negotiations with Japanese diplomats, IMHO), nobody can stop him, expecially if he is a god like the Tenno.

 

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Originally posted by Meiji-Tenno
How did he not follow his instructions well? The mission was canceled, and Konoe didn't go on his mission. So, he did not get to fail or succeed. The point in me saying that was "ample proof" was because it shows that Japan was willing to make peace on American terms.

Just a little attempt at a joke, not important.

But I would say it shows that the *emperor* was willing to make peace, not *Japan.*

Exactly why Konoe's mission was through Moscow. The United States did intercept messages between the Japanese Embassy in the Soviet Union and Foreign Ministry, and knew that Japan was trying to make peace. They would have received a formal and public statement too, had the Soviet Union accepted to help make peace instead of declaring war.

I will grant you that the US probably knew of the *existence* of a peace party in Japan.

I am not sure if I understand this completely.. I am sorry.. I think I understand, so I will reply (But if it is completely different from what you have meant, I have warned you! ):

I have tried to say that the United States should not have dropped the Atomic Bombs. And that they could have made a desirable peace with the Japanese government, without their (the bombs') usage. If the United States could not immediately directly speak to the Japanese government, they could have attempted through neutral parties (as Japan did) to convey peace terms to Japan, or even to open up diplomacy directly with Japan.

Ask yourself this question, please: why didn't the Japanese government simply broadcast their preferred surrender terms over the radio? "We refuse unconditional surrender, but will give up if we can keep the emperor as a figure head."

The US had already opened the negotiation, by putting unconditional surrender on the table. It's the responsibility of the 2nd party to make the counter-offer, not the first party.

 

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Originally posted by Admiral Yi
Just a little attempt at a joke, not important.

Oh, ok! Sorry about that..

But I would say it shows that the *emperor* was willing to make peace, not *Japan.*

Yes, it is true that the Emperor wanted peace. And that is important. Wido has recently said how monarch's constitutional powers can be used influentially. Also, "Japan" wanted peace too. Most of the people were then tired of the war and wanted it to end. Many of the military leaders who fought on, such as Minister of the Army General Anami Korechika, wanted peace as well. Anami wanted peace, but he wanted to ensure that the Emperor was protected (And he believed this could be achieved through winning a decisive battle against the United States). There were other leaders too, who wanted peace with or without the decisive battle.

Ask yourself this question, please: why didn't the Japanese government simply broadcast their preferred surrender terms over the radio? "We refuse unconditional surrender, but will give up if we can keep the emperor as a figure head."

Wido has answered this type of question in his last post. Also, after the bombs, the radio still was not used: Hirohito did use the radio to broadcast to the nation about the surrender beforehand, but it was not used diplomatically to contact the Americans.

The US had already opened the negotiation, by putting unconditional surrender on the table. It's the responsibility of the 2nd party to make the counter-offer, not the first party.

But then also the 2nd party must have a chance to make the counter proposal: The Soviet Union refused the Japanese attempt, Konoe's trip was cancelled, and after the atomic bombs were dropped, Japan had to make contact the U.S. through Switzerland.

 

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The United States Strategic Bombing Survey is not an impartial source of information. At the end of WW2 many people in the upper echelons of the U.S. Army Air Force were pushing very hard for an Air Force independent of any other branch in the armed forces. For this reason many reports concerning the effectivness of strategic and tactical bombings can't be regarded as wholly impartial. The USAAF claimed a large share in the defeat of Japan and Germany through their Strategic Bombing Surveys. However, many military leaders, such as Douglas MacArthur felt that, though the air force did contribute a lot, the idea of air power winning wars independent of ground forces was unproven. MacArthur voiced fears that a prolonged blockade of Japan, or the formation of a ring of air bases around Japan, would perhaps spread resources too thin and give the Japanese forces outside of mainland Japan, numbering some 3,000,000 opportunity to make attacks which could demoralize the Allied citizenry and hurt the peace terms.

The idea of the Japanese maintaining the Emperor was not something Truman or any of the JCS were opposed to. However that was not what the Japanese were asking for in their memos sent to first Sweden and then the USSR. They asked for the maintenance of the imperial system of government. The Allies would never accept a peace that kept Japan's government in the same state it was in prior to the war, they felt this was the cardinal reason the war even started and felt the system of government must be changed in order to bring about a lasting peace.

Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State, proposed to the President late in May that he issue a proclamation urging the Japanese to surrender and assuring them that they could keep the Emperor, Truman thought this a "sound idea."

However, when the Japanese rejected the Potsdam Declaration, American leaders felt that publicy agreeing that they would allow the Emperor to remain would be seen as accepting the Japanese rejection and allowing the imperial system to remain.

Even after the first bomb was dropped, when the Japanese went to meet with the Soviets and were handed the Soviet declaration of war, the Japanese were insisting on keeping the imperial system.

The United States was not concerned if Hirohito remained emperor, their bone was the imperial system of government that had led Japan. In the end, after the second bomb, and the Soviet entrance into the war, Japan surrendered, with the understanding that the imperial system was to be dismantled, although Hirohito would remain as figurehead. This was what Truman had agreed to in May of 45 privately.

In the end I really don't feel sorry for Japan. They started the war, and their leaders rejected the Potsdam Declaration, showing their disregard for the Japanese people and incurring the wrath of nuclear attack.

 

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Originally posted by OttovonBismark
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey is not an impartial source of information. At the end of WW2 many people in the upper echelons of the U.S. Army Air Force were pushing very hard for an Air Force independent of any other branch in the armed forces. For this reason many reports concerning the effectivness of strategic and tactical bombings can't be regarded as wholly impartial. The USAAF claimed a large share in the defeat of Japan and Germany through their Strategic Bombing Surveys. However, many military leaders, such as Douglas MacArthur felt that, though the air force did contribute a lot, the idea of air power winning wars independent of ground forces was unproven. MacArthur voiced fears that a prolonged blockade of Japan, or the formation of a ring of air bases around Japan, would perhaps spread resources too thin and give the Japanese forces outside of mainland Japan, numbering some 3,000,000 opportunity to make attacks which could demoralize the Allied citizenry and hurt the peace terms.

I must disagree with that the American bombing wasn't so effective: I think it was very effective, not only from the Strategic Bombing Survey, but also from many many other sources, as well as even people who were there (in the cities being bombed). They tell that American bombing had a terrible effect on morale, and made most people want peace.

In fact, here Prince Konoe Fumimaro said "Fundamentally, the thing that brought about the determination to make peace was the prolonged bombing by the B-29s."

On January 20th, General MacArthur sent a 40 page memorandum to the American President Franklin Roosevelt, which contained these peace terms offered by some high Japanese officials

Occupation of Japan and its possessions by Allied troops under American direction.
Complete surrender of all Japanese forces and arms, at home, on island possessions, and in occupied countries.
Japanese relinquishment of all territory seized during the war, as well as Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan.
Regulation of Japanese industry to halt production of any weapons and other tools of war.
Release of all prisoners of war and internees.
Surrender of designated war criminals.


It is quite identical to those accepted in the end, but does not contain any information about the Emperor.

The idea of the Japanese maintaining the Emperor was not something Truman or any of the JCS were opposed to. However that was not what the Japanese were asking for in their memos sent to first Sweden and then the USSR. They asked for the maintenance of the imperial system of government. The Allies would never accept a peace that kept Japan's government in the same state it was in prior to the war, they felt this was the cardinal reason the war even started and felt the system of government must be changed in order to bring about a lasting peace.

I have never read that they have specifically asked to retain the government though (Could you please tell me a source for this information? ).

The USSR was asked to help make peace, and that is where Konoe comes in. Konoe Fumimaro was dispatched to Moscow on a mission to attempt to make peace, and the Emperor gave him orders to "make peace at any price".

Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State, proposed to the President late in May that he issue a proclamation urging the Japanese to surrender and assuring them that they could keep the Emperor, Truman thought this a "sound idea."

Thank you for the information.

I have not denied that the United States didn't agree for keeping the Emperor though. In the end, they agreed to this term.

Even after the first bomb was dropped, when the Japanese went to meet with the Soviets and were handed the Soviet declaration of war, the Japanese were insisting on keeping the imperial system.

Excuse me, but could you please tell me a source of this? I know that Japan still attempted at peace then, but I have never heard of this "keeping of the Imperial System", for after the first atomic bomb was dropped.

The United States was not concerned if Hirohito remained emperor, their bone was the imperial system of government that had led Japan. In the end, after the second bomb, and the Soviet entrance into the war, Japan surrendered, with the understanding that the imperial system was to be dismantled, although Hirohito would remain as figurehead. This was what Truman had agreed to in May of 45 privately.

But previously you have said that the U.S. leaders publicly agreed that "American leaders felt that publicy agreeing that they would allow the Emperor to remain would be seen as accepting the Japanese rejection and allowing the imperial system to remain."

In the end I really don't feel sorry for Japan. They started the war, and their leaders rejected the Potsdam Declaration, showing their disregard for the Japanese people and incurring the wrath of nuclear attack.

I am sorry, but I really disagree here. I believe that the A-Bombs were a terrible thing. Moreover Japan was attempting to make peace, but the United States would not negotiate or try to work towards peace in diplomatic way.The Soviet Union also did not help, with their declaration of war (and breaking the Non-Aggression Pact). If the United States was using the bombs to "display their power", they didn't need to drop two of them, and they didn't need to drop them on populated cities, when they could have had the same kind of impressive effect by dropping them in some rural, or less populated area. I think that the United States was wrong in dropping the Atomic Bombs.

Yes, Japan did make the first attack of the war by attacking first, but also please remember that the United States also provoked the war with such diplomacy as their trading embargo, among other diplomacy.

 

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Originally posted by OttoVonBismark
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey is not an impartial source of information. At the end of WW2 many people in the upper echelons of the U.S. Army Air Force were pushing very hard for an Air Force independent of any other branch in the armed forces. For this reason many reports concerning the effectivness of strategic and tactical bombings can't be regarded as wholly impartial.

Well, the USSBS has been used, after its publication, both to support and not to support strategic bombing. About the fact that its conclusions aren't impartial, it's obvious (I'd like to find an impartial source about WW2); but data are, per se, impartial. The USSBS is based on a research made by more than 1,000 people of the American Armed Forces, and I don't thik they were all memebers of a lobby supporting an indepentent Air Force (not a few of those men weren't even of the Air Force). The data about the morale of Japanese people, though not completely affidable as all the polls, show clearly that it had dropped already before the A-bombs (by the way, the "pro-Air Force lobby" hadn't a reason to tell that the A-bombs were not the most important cause of Japanese defeatism).

The idea of the Japanese maintaining the Emperor was not something Truman or any of the JCS were opposed to. However that was not what the Japanese were asking for in their memos sent to first Sweden and then the USSR. They asked for the maintenance of the imperial system of government.

I don't know much of modern Japanese way of govern, but, as far as I know, it's not so different from that of pre-WW2, except the importance of the Armed Forces. But, given the fact that the Tenno was far from being satisfied of the militarists in 1945, it is impossible he would has let them the power they had in the 1930's. Moreover, the words "imperial system of govern" were simply about the preservation of monarchy, nothing more.

In the end I really don't feel sorry for Japan. They started the war, and their leaders rejected the Potsdam Declaration, showing their disregard for the Japanese people and incurring the wrath of nuclear attack.

Countries can be pacific only if they can live with the present status quo. Japan had a growing population and an economy based on exportation of goods and importation of raw materials: after the close of American borders to Asiatic immigrants and the protectionism that followed the crisis of 1929 they hadn't other ways than expansion in China. It was American interference with Japanese policy in Far East that forced the Japanese attack. I don't say that the USA were evil because of it (the USA were defending their own interests), but, please, don't tell that it was all a fault of Japan if it started war with the USA.
And the fact that I still don't understand isn't only why the Americans dropped the bombs, but also why they dropped them before even talking with a Japanese diplomat and why they dropped the first bomb on a city and not in a less populated place.

 

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1. I need to search through some papers Meiji, I do have the source where shows the Japanese were asking for the maintenance of the imperial SYSTEM.

2. The U.S. Army Air Force did not want the Army to drop the Atomic bomb because they did not want the Army to have CONTROL of nuclear weapons, they wanted that to be the Air Forces responsibility.

3. Japan was conquering people without provocation, they deserve every embargo they got.

4. Again, if the Japanese leaders would have truly wanted to preserve their people they would have accepted the Potsdam Declaration. Right after the declaration Truman declared, "Refusal to comply will result in the raining down of destruction from the skies the likes of which the world has never seen." Or something very close to that.

5. No, Japan's current system of government is nothing at all like the old system. For one, Japan's constitution today guarantees specific rights, Japan's constition today also specific declares war as no longer a part of state policy except for defense against invasion.

I've not read the Meiji constition but, I've always read it was based on the German Empire's constition. In the German Empire, the Kaiser had all the power. The Kaiser appointed the Chancellor independently of the legislature, and the Chancellor did not require any legislative support to govern, the Chancellor could also ignore the legislature at will and dissolve the legislature. Considering how the Japanese leaders ran the country I'd say that's probably close to how the Meiji constition was.

In modern day Japan the emperor has absolutely no power whatsoever. The Prime Minister is elected by the Diet (which I think is the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors.) The PM can suffer a vote of no-cofidence in which case he must resign or dissolve the lower house. Japan also has a Judicial system that operates much like the U.S. supreme court in that it has the power of judicial review. Japan's ministries are staffed by well-trained career civil servants and the ministries often are intergral in writing laws. Overall Japan's system of government has important checks on it's power and is also truly representative of the Japanese people since the elected officials hold power. This is nothing at all like the Meiji constitution.

Now, I'm not 100% sure about any of this but I'm sure our Japanese forum members can certainly clarify.

I'd also like to point out that, although I don't feel sorry for the Japanese and their fate in WW2, I'm not "anti-Japanese." I find Japanese history very interesting and Japan has one of the most unique and rich cultures in Asia.

Also, after WW2 the Japanese started to draft a constitution that was very similar to the Meiji constition, MacArthur stepped in and forced many changes, such as demilitarization, and judicial review.

The Meiji era wasn't necessarily "evil" though, certainly not like Nazi germany, I think it unfortunately was in the end corrupted by power-hungry men. But on the whole the Meiji Restoration was a positive force in Japan and the world; providing compulsory education, ending stipends for the samurai, and breaking the power of the old social system.

 

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Originally posted by OttoVonBismark
3. Japan was conquering people without provocation, they deserve every embargo they got.

Japan claimed there were provocations (the accident of the Marco Polo bridge, etc.), but this is the point: the point is that the USA made an embargo on a country without the slightest right to make it. And it wasn't for humanitarian reasons: if it had been for that reason, why the USA didn't make an embargo on Italy in 1935 when we attacked Ethiopia? Not only the USA did nothing against Italy, but their oil was the most vital import for Italy, and gen. Graziani's quick advance in Ogaden was made thanks to American trucks bought with the money given by Italo-Americans.
The embargo on Japan was made only because of American interests (I underline that I think it wasn't a bad action; but certainly it wasn't made because the good American govern wanted to save the world from evil Japanese), moreover the oil embargo was made years after the attack on China.

4. Again, if the Japanese leaders would have truly wanted to preserve their people they would have accepted the Potsdam Declaration. Right after the declaration Truman declared, "Refusal to comply will result in the raining down of destruction from the skies the likes of which the world has never seen." Or something very close to that.

Japanese leaders also wanted to preserve the Empire, just like Japanese people wanted. And the Potsdam declaration was such an arrogant text that nobody with a bit of dignity would has accepted it. Read what is written by William Manchester in his "American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964":
"...the Potsdam declaration in July, demand[ed] that Japan surrender unconditionally or face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled. He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it."
Istead of making the Potsdam declaration, they could at least talk with Japanese diplomats (and the American Govern was perfectly aware of Japanese dispatches to their ambassador in Moscow that shown their will of negotiation).

 

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Originally posted by Wido
Japan claimed there were provocations (the accident of the Marco Polo bridge, etc.), but this is the point: the point is that the USA made an embargo on a country without the slightest right to make it. And it wasn't for humanitarian reasons: if it had been for that reason, why the USA didn't make an embargo on Italy in 1935 when we attacked Ethiopia? Not only the USA did nothing against Italy, but their oil was the most vital import for Italy, and gen. Graziani's quick advance in Ogaden was made thanks to American trucks bought with the money given by Italo-Americans.
The embargo on Japan was made only because of American interests (I underline that I think it wasn't a bad action; but certainly it wasn't made because the good American govern wanted to save the world from evil Japanese), moreover the oil embargo was made years after the attack on China.

Japanese leaders also wanted to preserve the Empire, just like Japanese people wanted. And the Potsdam declaration was such an arrogant text that nobody with a bit of dignity would has accepted it. Read what is written by William Manchester in his "American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964":
"...the Potsdam declaration in July, demand[ed] that Japan surrender unconditionally or face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled. He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it."
Istead of making the Potsdam declaration, they could at least talk with Japanese diplomats (and the American Govern was perfectly aware of Japanese dispatches to their ambassador in Moscow that shown their will of negotiation).

1. America has every right to decide who they will and will not trade with, that was OUR material we were producing, no one NO ONE but the United States as ANY right to decide what the US, a SOVEREIGN NATION, has the right to do with products it creates itself.

The reason for the gap between Japan's invasion of China and embargo was the fact that america doesn't have one ruler who rules for life, or one administration. Public tide turns and new men reach office, the new men that reached office at this time realized Japan was setting up a pacific empire that was an extreme threat to America, earlier president's had been more conceding simply because they wanted to keep an economic status quo going with Japan.

BTW, the correct response to a country saying it doesn't want to give you goods, (which it has every right in the world to refuse to give you) is not a surprise attack on a country at peace.

And Wido, the US did not owe the Japanese a "comfortable peace" they attacked us, and in the end they got the peace Truman wanted all along: peace with only one provision, the preservation of the emperor, AND most importantly: the destruction of the imperial system of government.

 

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Japanese Peace Doc. Info

This isn't the original source that I promised to show earlier, but I found this alternate, fairly similar in nature report.

Parts of the report read:

At the end of June, the Japanese finally approached the Soviet Government directly through Ambassador Sato in Moscow, asking that it mediate with the Allies to bring the Far Eastern war to an end. In a series of messages between Tokyo and Moscow, which the Americans intercepted and decoded, the Japanese Foreign Office outlined the position of the government and instructed Ambassador Sato to make arrangements for a special envoy from the Emperor who would be empowered to make terms for Soviet mediation. Unconditional surrender, he was told, was completely unacceptable, and time was of the essence. But the Russians, on one pretext and another, delayed their answer until mid-July when Stalin and Molotov left for Potsdam. Thus, the Japanese Government had by then accepted defeat and was seeking desperately for a way out; but it was not willing even at this late date to surrender unconditionally, and would accept no terms that did not include the preservation of the imperial system.

Above is from end of page 505/beginning of page 506 of the document (link provided below)

All that remained now was to warn Japan and give her an opportunity to surrender. In this matter Stimson's and Grew's views, as outlined in the memorandum of 2 July, were accepted, but apparently on the advice of the former Secretary of State Cordell Hull it was decided to omit any reference to the Emperor. [74] Hull's view, solicited by Byrnes before his departure for Potsdam, was that the proposal smacked of appeasement and "seemed to guarantee continuance not only of the Emperor but also of the feudal privileges of a ruling caste." And, should the Japanese reject the warning, the proposal to retain the imperial system might well encourage resistance and have "terrible political repercussions" in the United States. For these reasons he recommended that no statement about the Emperor be made until "the climax of Allied bombing and Russia's entry into the war." [75] Thus, the final terms offered to the Japanese in the Potsdam declaration on 26 July made no mention of the Emperor or of the imperial system. Neither did the declaration contain any reference to the atom bomb but simply warned the Japanese of the consequences of continued resistance. [76] Only those already familiar with the weapon could have read the references to inevitable and complete destruction as a warning of atomic warfare. [77]

Above is from page 512/513 of document

This is the biggest mistake made imo, they should have specified what they REALLY wanted. They should have said "You can keep your Emperor, but not the imperial system" this was finally what they got, and what Truman agreed to earlier.

When Premier Suzuki arrived at the palace on the morning of the 9th, he was told that the Emperor believed Japan's only course now was to accept the Potsdam Declaration. The militarists could and did minimize the effects of the bomb, but they could not evade the obvious consequences of Soviet intervention, which ended all hope of dividing their enemies and securing softer peace terms. [89]

From page 517

Again, what the Emperor and finally even the defeated militarists accepted was the Potsdam Declaration, with the only provision being the person of Hirohito would remain as emperor. However they had to accept, what was the primary point of argument, that the system of government had to change.

 

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Sorry, forgot link

Link!

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by OttoVonBismark
The reason for the gap between Japan's invasion of China and embargo was the fact that america doesn't have one ruler who rules for life, or one administration. Public tide turns and new men reach office, the new men that reached office at this time realized Japan was setting up a pacific empire that was an extreme threat to America, earlier president's had been more conceding simply because they wanted to keep an economic status quo going with Japan.

What date are you taking this argument from, given the USA had the same president in 1937 as it did in 1941?

If taken from the earlier annexation of Manchuria, how much did the USA really care about that? It had been dominated by the Japanese since before WW! after all.

 

[King]

The decisions to drop. When it come down to the rights and wrongs here it is very simple. The Bomb killed a lot of people and thus it was wrong to do such a thing. However unfortunately we cannot argue from a narrow right/wrong perspective because as with all such things there was no truly right choice. Regardless what decision was made, people died. The prime argument from those who say it was wrong was that Japan was going to surrender anyway and that made the bomb unnecessary. They also point out that the Russian intervention happened at the same time and we cannot discount the possibility that it was this and not the dropping of the bomb that pushed Japan over the edge.

Now we know that the US was breaking the Japanese Diplomatic codes and they must of known of the Japanese attempts to enlist the efforts of the USSR to end the war. However at the same time the US also knew that the Japanese had ordered Commander Yoshiro Fujimura (the Naval Attaché at Berne) to break of negotiations with the US. These were negotiations initiated by the Japanese themselves and then broken off by the Japanese because they thought it was a plot by the Americans. In my opinion there was a lot of misleading data going around with regards to Japanese peace feelers, this would of made the Americans very wary of them.

The second argument is a more interesting. The fighting between the Japanese and USSR in Manchuria had left the Japanese with respect for the Red Army and a reluctance for them to fight again. The core argument was that the Japanese Army knew they could not win if they fought the USSR as well and it was the USSR joining the War that was last straw for Japan not the A-Bomb. After all the A-Bomb is just a big bomb and Japan had survived a lot of little bombs. Ok we know now that the A-Bomb is more than a big bomb, but the people at the time did not know this. As counter point I wish to put forward the position of the key decision makers in Japan. There were 6 people who truly lead Japan during World War II, known as the Big 6, they gave their decisions to Emperor who would ratify them as policy. The Big 6 where the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the War Minister, the Navy Minister, the Chief of the Army General Staff, and the Chief of the Naval General Staff. Ordinary they would reach unanimity and present this to the Emperor. On the 9th of August the Big Six met for the first time to seriously discuss peace. The result was a hung meeting in which 3 pushed for peace at the terms that were finally agreed and the other 3 argued for more conditions which they all knew were unacceptable (at this time) to the Americans. In affect the pushed to continue the war. They felt that the America would not be willing to pay the price for the conquest of the home islands and would moderate their demands. The hung council allowed the Emperor (for just the second time in his reign) to directly interfere in politics and compel Japan to peace. The record shows that the three men who opposed where the War Minister Anami Korechika, Chief of the Navy General Staff Toyoda Soemu and the Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu Yoshijiro. The question remains if the army was so adamant that if the USSR joined the war was lost, why did the two most senior officers in the Imperial Japanese Army both wish to continue the war?

 

[jacob-Lundgren]

well if the emporer was convenced that the US had unlimited A-bombs, or at least a decent supply, then he would most certainly make sure pece comes since that meens japan wouldnt be invaded, just blow to bits.

 

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Originally posted by Wido
Governs usually don't use public broadcasts, but diplomacy (that, untill a pact is signed, is always secret).<snip>
Secret negotiations for surrender always involve defecting from an alliance, I can't think of any exceptions. There are perfectly valid reasons for keeping the existence of negotiations hidden from your allies. These reasons don't exist for Japan in 45.

The USA knew perfectly the Japanese diplomatic dispatches to the ambassador in Moscow. They had only to say to Stalin: let them negotiate. Instead Stalin wanted Manchuria and the Kurils, and the USA, it seems, didn't care of negotiating.

What exactly did the US know in 45 from these cables?
This is not a rhetorical question, I am interested in the answer.

About the different positions within the Japanese govern, where is the problem? The Tenno had the constitutional power and the authority to impose his will on the Govern and the Armed Forces. <snip>

You are vastly overstating Hirohito's power. He was opposed to the Armies adventures in Manchuria and China proper, yet was incapable of stopping them.

 

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Originally posted by Admiral Yi
What exactly did the US know in 45 from these cables?
This is not a rhetorical question, I am interested in the answer.

Everything. I explain: the USA knew the Japanese diplomatic code: the text of those telegrams was translated and read also by the President Truman. Their text (from American archives) is here as told by Meiji-Tenno: http://www.nuclearfiles.org/redocuments/togo-sato-index.html.

You are vastly overstating Hirohito's power. He was opposed to the Armies adventures in Manchuria and China proper, yet was incapable of stopping them.

The constitution was pretty clear: the Tenno had the power to do almost everything he wanted (see: Meiji Constitution, expecially articles XI-XII-XIII), but the praxis prevented a direct involvement of the Emperor. But, I repeat, if he had really wanted, he had the power to stop those actions.
The true power of the militarists wasn't in the constitution, but in a law (made in the 1930's) that forced the governs to have militars as ministers of War and of the Navy. Moreover, since a govern wasn't able to be formed if it didn't find a militar that wanted to be its member or if militar ministers were against its decisions (if a govern didn't reach unanimity, it resigned), the militars gained a kind of right of veto during the 1930's.