Was the Blitz a mistake?

[fillap]

I was reading the 'was Sea Lion possible' thread, in there obviously the Battle of Britain was discussed. The change in tactics from attacking the airfields to attacking the cities seems to have been accepted as being a tactical and strategic error. However what choice did Goring and Hitler have? By September 1940 the decision to attack the USSR in 1941 had been made, so the obvious need is to get peace with Britain quick. I would argue the Germans didn't have many options to achieve this, other that attacking the cities. A tactic that had reaped rewards in Poland and Holland. We also need to remember that long term strategic bombing was essentially an untested weapon in 1940. Continuing attacks on the RAF bases would be very unlikely to achieve what they needed, ie forcing Britain to peace talks. Whereas attacks on the cities may have done this.

So was it really a mistake, or was it a choice forced on the German leadership by the fact they had picked a fight they couldn't win (in a timetable they were happy with because of their desire to attack Stalin)? Ultimately the Germans 'doubled up' their gamble, as they so often did in the World Wars, in an attempt to win everything. I would be interested if people can see any other options that would achieve a peace with the UK in 1940?

 

[RogalDorn]

Not sure if this thread will remain as it appears to come close to discussion of prohibited topics. But we know that the blitz was a mistake because it didn't work. Annihilating British RAF / Dockyards / Manufacturing centers might have done more for the war effort. Bombing London didn't do anything to help Germany win the war, it just galvanized support against them.

 

[fillap]

You seem to have missed my point. I would suggest that attacking the RAF, no mater how effective would never have brought Britain to the peace table, however attacks on the cities might have brought Britain to the peace talks. To say the attacks were ineffective because they didn't work doesn't mean any alternative is ultimately going to work.

 

[KiwiNoob]

Plus the whole battle of Britain was unlikely to be successful from the get go.

• The German planes (mainly fighters) suffered a lot from operating at the very outer limit of their range
• They had very poor intelligence coming out of Britain
• The British radar and co-ordinated response (Dowding system) was a huge force multiplier

As @RogalDorn said - the moment they switched to civilian targets (which was pretty much only done because Hitler was a sore loser) it made matters worse. The threat of civilian casualties may deter a country from war. Actual civilian casualties harden them.

 

[Victor Cortez]

I suppose they gambled on the fact that Britain was a democracy and that public opinion would force Churchill to resign and accept a compromise peace.
But the destruction they caused was actually little compared to what happened in Germany itself for example. It didn't hinder Britain production capabilities, stiffened the population and gave carte blanche to the goverment (not sure people would have accepted the hardships they were to suffer if they hadn't been aware of the risk they were facing).
So, yeah, it was a mistake because it didn't achieve any of its goals.

Andrew Robers, in The Storm of War, says that if the V1 and V2 had been given full and unconditional support as early as possible, Germany would have had a pretty good weapon in the hand, and maybe something to force Britain to come to terms (I don't find this point of view particularly interesting for a number of reasons, but I like the idea of the extra rocket effort instead of the usual uboots one).

 

[Adonnus]

You seem to have missed my point. I would suggest that attacking the RAF, no mater how effective would never have brought Britain to the peace table, however attacks on the cities might have brought Britain to the peace talks. To say the attacks were ineffective because they didn't work doesn't mean any alternative is ultimately going to work.

Why do you suppose they would have? It didn't work for Germany or Japan (save atomic) and those bombings were tens of times more destructive.

 

[mursolini]

To put it simply, Germany was loosing a war in 1940, even after they destroyed France. They couldn`t defeat GB quickly, and time was slowly running out, as they were contained in Mediterranean and Atlantic, and seeing how USA rearms, and Japan is bogged down in China, they had to try out something. That something could either be a huge deal with SU and a dash for Persia, or attack on USSR. Talks with SU collapsed, so they went for what option they had.

 

[Victor Cortez]

To put it simply, Germany was loosing a war in 1940

Not really. Maybe they were losing it, but not way they were loosing it.

 

[D Inqu]

The BoB was a lost cause from the beginning. British manufacturing capacity was not hurt, and could not be easily hurt with the bomber force Germany had. So Britain easily replaced any lost aircraft.

 

[phantomrider]

To put it simply, Germany was loosing a war in 1940, even after they destroyed France. They couldn`t defeat GB quickly, and time was slowly running out, as they were contained in Mediterranean and Atlantic, and seeing how USA rearms, and Japan is bogged down in China, they had to try out something. That something could either be a huge deal with SU and a dash for Persia, or attack on USSR. Talks with SU collapsed, so they went for what option they had.

I disagree with this comment. In 1940 they were winning the war and they had not even attempted to control the Med (or invade Jugoslavia/Greece). My guess is that deploying forces in the Med in 1940 after the fall of France would have allowed Italy to take (Egypt) Suez, Palastine, Syria, Iraq, Malta and if necessary Algeria and Tunesia as well as Greece, Crete etc. and basically exclude the UK from the Med and middle east by the end of 1941. By summer of 1940 Great Britain was fighting alone and no one was really interested in joining them against the Germans. Obviously, that is not the path the Germans took and switching to the East (Soviets) overcame the Soviets reluctance to fight (since they had no choice) and suddenly Britain was not alone (or alone with a little bit of US aid and encouragement).

The switch of the Luftwaffe's efforts from the airfields and channel facitites which were designed to get air superiority over the channel to London was either poor strategy or an admission that Sea Lion would not happen. With air superiority over the channel an invasion of England might be possible and successful. It also was a fight that the Luftwaffe might have been able to win (ranges and time on target times for their planes were much more favorable given the ranges of their aircraft and location of their bases in France than was London). "Strategic bombing of cities either to destroy the moral of the population or to destroy their industrial production turned out to be a lot more difficult to do in practice than it appeared in the textbooks and manuals" And again the Luftwaffe really didn't have the weapons (bombers, bombs, guidance etc) that the allies had later in the war and it still was quite difficult to destroy production and as mentioned above with the probable exception of the atomic weapons (which in some ways were less destructive of production capacity and other measures than some of the more conventional raids) which may have significantly contributed to Japan's decision to surrender rather than fighting to the end (see Okinawa) ineffective in convincing the recipients of the raids to quit.

 

[Victor Cortez]

I disagree with this comment. [...]

I agree with you.
Germany was not losing the war at that time. On the contrary, everything was in their favour.

They should have not declared war on the USSR before having defeated Britain at all costs. I mean, as far as I know, German military doctrine since the dawn of time said that the country should avoid a two front war. And that's what they did, twice in twenty years.

If all the resources used in Barbarossa had been used against Britain, the Blitz would have made maybe more sense, even if it were a failure.
A defeated but not humiliated Britain, a US that cannot be too unhappy about Communism being fought, a France, Baltic countries, Ukraine whose population is not exploited but used against Russia, a middle-east secure... those should have been the main goals before attacking the USSR and the London Blitz has to be considered with those goals in mind. On its own, or the way it happened in real life, seems a bit... pointless.

 

[Adonnus]

I agree with you.
If all the resources used in Barbarossa had been used against Britain, the Blitz would have made maybe more sense, even if it were a failure.
A defeated but not humiliated Britain, a US that cannot be too unhappy about Communism being fought, a France, Baltic countries, Ukraine whose population is not exploited but used against Russia, a middle-east secure... those should have been the main goals before attacking the USSR and the London Blitz has to be considered with those goals in mind. On its own, or the way it happened in real life, seems a bit... pointless.

I never understood this argument. How exactly are you supposed to use Barbarossa resources against Britain? Ramp up fighter production? The Brits would just ramp up theirs. Besides, most of the German Barbarossa army was already extant in late 1940.

 

[Victor Cortez]

I never understood this argument. How exactly are you supposed to use Barbarossa resources against Britain? Ramp up fighter production? The Brits would just ramp up theirs. Besides, most of the German Barbarossa army was already extant in late 1940.

Use them elsewhere, mostly in North Africa (meaning a better navy to protect the convoys there) and take Malta and Gibraltar (well, or Suez if you can) for a start.

 

[WSnova]

I never understood this argument. How exactly are you supposed to use Barbarossa resources against Britain? Ramp up fighter production? The Brits would just ramp up theirs. Besides, most of the German Barbarossa army was already extant in late 1940.

Duh, they should have done a Custom game and deleted the Barbarossa army and use IC days on a modern fleet and transports.

Lets face it, Germany was not going to touch British soil in the near future regardless of what they did post fall of France.

One might argue that maybe capturing the whole BEF might have caused a coup/collapse like in France,but I doubt it. The British Navy would have suicided to prevent a German landing if necessary.

 

[Sanny]

There was a programme on the BBC not long ago regarding the Blitz, as far as we know the Luftwaffe and Nazi intelligence had been planning the bombardment of Britain since 1937-38. I wish I could find the source material but there are Nazi top-secret reconnaissance photos of London that are dated (they'll be in the National Archives). On the programme it was noted that during the bombardment of London, most of the marked targets (e.g. factories and drydocks) were utterly missed and most of the damage was done to residential areas.

So yes, a waste of time for the Luftwaffe and a waste of human life. However on second thought, since Operation Sea Lion failed, the Battle of Britain in 1940 seems to be like a show of force to achieve peace and not necessarily an invasion strategy (as was intended in 1938).

 

[seattle]

Operation A is started with the objective to reach goal X.
A fails to reach X entirely.
Was A a mistake? Well... what do you think?

 

[Secret Master]

One might argue that maybe capturing the whole BEF might have caused a coup/collapse like in France,but I doubt it. The British Navy would have suicided to prevent a German landing if necessary.

Depending on Germany's terms, and who is in power in Britain, losing the entire BEF might have brought Britain to the table. (Keep in mind Churchill is in power on 10 May, and the BEF evacuates on 24 May. Even small changes in the political landscape might move these dates or change who is offered the post of PM.)

But the terms Germany has to offer need to fall within these parameters:

Germany cannot add any significant ports or put troops/fortifications on the Channel. If Germany grabs more ports of fortifies the Channel, it challenges British naval supremacy. This would be completely unacceptable for any major party in Britain in 1940. (See this part of the wiki regarding AGNA and how the Admiralty viewed Germany's plans.)

France has to be left independent and relatively intact. (They'd accept A-L going to Germany, I suppose.) A puppet France would not be acceptable to Britain or its government.

Belgium and the Netherlands need to be independent and intact.

Switzerland's neutrality needs to be maintained.

Denmark and Norway need to be independent and intact.

If Germany won't agree to these terms, there is no offer of peace the British should accept as long as the RN is in the fight. Each of these terms ensure that Britain can maintain a superior naval position to any European power or combination of powers (short of France + Spain + Italy + Germany + Soviets). If she accepts a peace offer that does not have these terms, she may be eclipsed in naval power in the future. In such a case, she will be open to invasion later.

 

[aitaituo]

You seem to have missed my point. I would suggest that attacking the RAF, no mater how effective would never have brought Britain to the peace table, however attacks on the cities might have brought Britain to the peace talks. To say the attacks were ineffective because they didn't work doesn't mean any alternative is ultimately going to work.

I've said something similar to this recently, but the thing is that bringing Britain to the peace table with a bombing campaign would take years and would almost certainly require Churchill getting ousted. For the most part, Britain's military strategy would have been the same no matter who was in charge, but when it came to negotiations, Churchill was as stubborn as a Welsh mountain. Even in the face of a successful Sea Lion and the establishment of Vichy Britain, Churchill would have fled to Canada or somewhere and maintained a UK-in-the-Commonwealth government.

 

[yerm]

I never understood this argument. How exactly are you supposed to use Barbarossa resources against Britain? Ramp up fighter production? The Brits would just ramp up theirs. Besides, most of the German Barbarossa army was already extant in late 1940.

Not that the argument isn't WILDLY misused...

Unlike in video games, armies sitting around at home are not costing you NEARLY what ones marching across a vast and plundered eastern Europe do. You obviously cannot simply pull 3 million troops out of the east and have them swim over the channel, but you can save a shitload of fuel, trucks, horses, engineers, etc. and use those supplies (and maybe a fraction of those troops) in another theater. That fuel was valuable anywhere.

 

[Adonnus]

Use them elsewhere, mostly in North Africa (meaning a better navy to protect the convoys there) and take Malta and Gibraltar (well, or Suez if you can) for a start.

Ok. Let's say you don't bother preparing for Barbarossa. How are you going to get a better navy to protect those convoys? Sure, a small ship might only take a year to build, but the IJN had plenty of small ships and still had huge problems supplying its overseas troops against the vastly superior Allied fleets.

Not sure how Gibraltar was to be taken. As for Malta, that would have been a good decision, and far better than Crete as it was a natural stepping stone to Libya. But this isn't going to beat the UK any time soon.

But the terms Germany has to offer need to fall within these parameters:

Germany cannot add any significant ports or put troops/fortifications on the Channel. If Germany grabs more ports of fortifies the Channel, it challenges British naval supremacy. This would be completely unacceptable for any major party in Britain in 1940. (See this part of the wiki regarding AGNA and how the Admiralty viewed Germany's plans.)

France has to be left independent and relatively intact. (They'd accept A-L going to Germany, I suppose.) A puppet France would not be acceptable to Britain or its government.

Belgium and the Netherlands need to be independent and intact.

Switzerland's neutrality needs to be maintained.

Denmark and Norway need to be independent and intact.

If Germany won't agree to these terms, there is no offer of peace the British should accept as long as the RN is in the fight. Each of these terms ensure that Britain can maintain a superior naval position to any European power or combination of powers (short of France + Spain + Italy + Germany + Soviets). If she accepts a peace offer that does not have these terms, she may be eclipsed in naval power in the future. In such a case, she will be open to invasion later.

Seriously though, how do you think Britain is going to do all this thinking about naval supremacy without even considering the purpose they went to war for in the first place? Besides, they have never really bowed to any continental tyrant, not Napoleon after Austerlitz and I highly doubt after the Fall of France even if the BEF was lost. Furthermore they know from experience that whatever deal they sign today Hitler will violate tomorrow.