Was Stalin Planning An Offensive Before Barbarossa?

[Semper Victor]

In actual practice, much of Germany's early success came from defensive tactics (as a tool of an offensive strategy), NOT offensive. The Germans would advance rapidly, seize a strategic location before the opponents were ready to oppose the attack, set up machinegun and artillery "killing zones", and then defend it against the inevitable counter-attacks. In the mass confusion of the early war advances, it worked. Once things were allowed to stabilize and there were no easy advances into poorly defended positions, as well as less of an inclination to automatically launch human waves against German positions, things got bloody and expensive, and the German advances stalled. The land mine also had a profound impact on the success or failure of Blitzkrieg, and the Soviets utilized a staggering quantity of land mines to slow the German advance.

Intelligence went from a strong point in the early stages to a weak one, as the attrition rates ground down the scouts, and fresh recruits attempted to do the same tasks that had been allocated to experienced teams. Fuel restrictions limited aerial reconnaissance as well. As more and more of the details of the war were directed from the top, and local recon reports were "overlooked" if they didn't support the "plan", there had to be a sense of futility: "why bother". Possibly as a result, the Germans were too often totally ignorant of what the Soviets were doing, when even a cursory look from the air would have spotted things of major concern.

German intelligence was quite strong at front line level. But the higher the command level, the weaker it became. Barbarossa is the ultimate example of an intelligence f****up of the highest order, or the failure to realise that already in 1939 the Poles had broken their codes. This was the situation in 1939, and it remained so until the end of the war.

German leadership was focused only in operational warfare, everything else was just auxiliary stuff better left to paper-pushers. With such an attitude, they could've won wars in the XVIII or XIX centuries, but not in the XX century. Hitler had a point when he complained about the narrowmindedness of his generals in this respect.

In his postwar memoirs, Guderian reproduced the map with the deployment of Soviet forces that the Germans had used in July 1943 when they launched operation Zitadelle. As David Glantz observed, in this map there are seven whole Soviet armies completely absent, as German intelligence had failed completely to detect them: the entire Steppe Front and the reserves being held in the rearguards of the Bryansk and Western Fronts for launching the Soviet counteroffensive (operation Kutuzov). With this level of incompetence at intelligence gathering, it's remarkable that the Germans achieved so much.

 

[keynes2.0]

With this level of incompetence at intelligence gathering, it's remarkable that the Germans achieved so much.

Well they weren't the only ones. The Germans managed to assemble the longest line of trucks ever before and the French didn't pick up on what that meant. Then the Soviets made a similar failure to see the German invasion coming.

 

[Semper Victor]

Well they weren't the only ones. The Germans managed to assemble the longest line of trucks ever before and the French didn't pick up on what that meant. Then the Soviets made a similar failure to see the German invasion coming.

Yes, but they were the ones who started a world war against overwhelming odds; they had a much smaller margin for mistakes of that caliber than their foes. And just a nitpick, more than an intelligence failure Barbarossa was a failure at the upper political levels, where Stalin and the Politburo made the disastrous (yet very common) mistake of confusing reality with desire, using only the intelligence that already confirmed their views ans discarding everything else. The Red Army high commanders (Timoschenko and Zhukov especially) were not so complacent, and using the intelligence available to them they correctly guessed the German attack; overall Soviet intelligence before Barbarossa was fairly good, but it was utterly misused by the Soviet political leadership.

 

[Kovax]

And just a nitpick, more than an intelligence failure Barbarossa was a failure at the upper political levels, where Stalin and the Politburo made the disastrous (yet very common) mistake of confusing reality with desire, using only the intelligence that already confirmed their views ans discarding everything else.

...and this differs from the Allies in Operation Market Garden how? All of the major powers involved tended to discard intelligence data, at times, that didn't agree with "the plan".

I've read a few things where higher-ranking German officers were complaining about recon not having been done, while the lower ranking officers accused those higher up of having ignored the recon data that was given. There was at least one offensive with a near-total absence of aerial recon, where one of the officers remarked that he hadn't been allocated any fuel to make the runs. Ground-level recon seemed to have been conducted, but was of insufficient depth to see what was needed. The operation went ahead without knowing what was in front of them.

 

[Semper Victor]

...and this differs from the Allies in Operation Market Garden how? All of the major powers involved tended to discard intelligence data, at times, that didn't agree with "the plan".

I've read a few things where higher-ranking German officers were complaining about recon not having been done, while the lower ranking officers accused those higher up of having ignored the recon data that was given. There was at least one offensive with a near-total absence of aerial recon, where one of the officers remarked that he hadn't been allocated any fuel to make the runs. Ground-level recon seemed to have been conducted, but was of insufficient depth to see what was needed. The operation went ahead without knowing what was in front of them.

Well, for starters there's the small difference in scale between Barbarossa and Market Garden. As I said before, German intelligence gathering at a tactical operational was usually good, that was not a problem for the German Army. The real problem was that not only the Nazi leadership, but the professional military leadership, tended to ignore it repeatedly, usually at the strategic level (where mistakes have the most serious consequences) but also at the operational level.

A good example again is Kursk. In general terms, Fremde Heeres Ost had an accurate picture of the forces that the Red Army had inside of the salient in front of the German lines. In the northern part of the salient, Model also ordered accurate aerial reconaissance to be conducted and as a result he expressed his opposition to the planned attack (which was the correct thing to do, given the state of the Ostheer at that point); even without knowing that the Soviets had amassed huge reserves for their planned couterattack once the Germans "impaled" themselves against the Soviet defensive belts.

In the south though, Manstein had a much more flippant attitude. He did not order a thorough reconaissance as Model did; he requested (and thus received) no long range-artillery (and thus the German guns were systematically outranged by the Soviet batteries) and no special mine-clearing assets. Why? Because judging by his previous personal experience, the Soviets would perform poorly and thus he had full confidence in his ability to get through the Soviet defensive belts. As a matter of fact, Hitler had many more doubts about the whole operation than Manstein or Kluge (Model's superior) ever had.

 

[D Inqu]

...and this differs from the Allies in Operation Market Garden how? All of the major powers involved tended to discard intelligence data, at times, that didn't agree with "the plan".

It's a bit more complicated than that. Higher ups can get multple contradictory intel reports frm different sources, and it essentially become guesswork on "who didn't screw up this time?". Thus all the major powers had to disregard intel, as it coulnt be all correct at the same time. Sometimes (note, this was an exception, not the rule), they were lucky and:
1. The intel sources generally agreed
2. The intel arrived on time
3. The other side did not make last minute changes

Taking the example of Kursk. There was a possibility that even this classic example of "intel success" could be derailed. Hitler could order another delay, or cancel the operation. Or the Soviets could have lost nerve and decided to launch the offensive first. Several senior commander, notably Vatutin, were worried that the Germans would stall until autumn, reducing the time availiable for a Soviet offensive. He petitionned several times, and by late June, Stalin was beginning to lean towards allowing it. So if the Germans delayed Zitadelle by another couple of weeks, it could have been replaced by an all-out Soviet offensive.

 

[bz249]

Taking the example of Kursk. There was a possibility that even this classic example of "intel success" could be derailed. Hitler could order another delay, or cancel the operation. Or the Soviets could have lost nerve and decided to launch the offensive first. Several senior commander, notably Vatutin, were worried that the Germans would stall until autumn, reducing the time availiable for a Soviet offensive. He petitionned several times, and by late June, Stalin was beginning to lean towards allowing it. So if the Germans delayed Zitadelle by another couple of weeks, it could have been replaced by an all-out Soviet offensive.

Kinda strange, that it was again the Bohemian corporal and not the genious generals who felt what is the right thing to do (or the least bad given the options)... maintain the illusion of an offensive, use the reserves of the Wehrmacht as an army in being and deny the initiative for the Soviets.

 

[Semper Victor]

Kinda strange, that it was again the Bohemian corporal and not the genious generals who felt what is the right thing to do (or the least bad given the options)... maintain the illusion of an offensive, use the reserves of the Wehrmacht as an army in being and deny the initiative for the Soviets.

It was not a stroke of genius, it was simply that, contrary to myth, most of the time Hitler listened to his generals. And in the case of Kursk, opinions amongst them were strongly divided. Kluge, Manstein and Zeitzler represented the traditional Prusso-German approach, while Model and Guderian advocated going to a strategic defense while the Ostheer still had some reserves and above all, gained time to rebuild its mobile forces to maximum strength.

With hindsight, this was actually the only realistic option left for Germany in the east. The Heer was desperately short on infantry, and this shortage would only worsen, so strengthening the mechanized arm was the way to go, but given the sluggish rate of German AFV production, that required time. Kluge, Zeitzler and Manstein also had a point because of it; it was dubious that with its scarcity in infantry the Ostheer would survive more massive Soviet offensives while holding such a long line, and they were aware of Hitler's reluctance to concede an inch of ground, and so they considered that conceding the initiative to the Soviets was a recipe for disaster. And Hitler was trapped between these two options; finally he went for the second one, mainly for three reasons:

• Manstein's personal prestige, as he'd recently pulled out the "miracle of Kharkov".
• His almost religious faith in the new technological toys of the Wehrmacht (despite Guderian's warnings that the Panther was not at all ready for mass production).
• His reluctance towards accepting a defensive war of attrition which would almost necessarily imply territorial losses.

About the issue of conceding ground to the enemy, it was not entirely a matter of Hitler being a WW1 trench corporal. He had also serious economic reasons for it: the southern part of the eastern front was dangerously close to the Donbass and to the mines of the lower Dnieper at Nikopol. The resources of this area (particularly manganese ore) were absolutely vital for German arms production if they wanted to keep their technological edge.

 

[bz249]

It was not a stroke of genius, it was simply that, contrary to myth, most of the time Hitler listened to his generals. And in the case of Kursk, opinions amongst them were strongly divided. Kluge, Manstein and Zeitzler represented the traditional Prusso-German approach, while Model and Guderian advocated going to a strategic defense while the Ostheer still had some reserves and above all, gained time to rebuild its mobile forces to maximum strength.

Yes but neither of the said parties realized that there is a fourth option (apart from: strategic defense, backhand blow, or attack) namely, maintaining the threat of an offensive, but still not attacking. This lead to a situation like that:

http://goblinscomic.com/comic/07292005

Of course in the end they did attack and this screwed everything.

 

[D Inqu]

Yes but neither of the said parties realized that there is a fourth option (apart from: strategic defense, backhand blow, or attack) namely, maintaining the threat of an offensive, but still not attacking.

As explained earlier, this was not an option. Not attacking past mid-July would lead to the soviets launching a mass offensive across the whole front

 

[bz249]

As explained earlier, this was not an option. Not attacking past mid-July would lead to the soviets launching a mass offensive across the whole front

I am not saying they could do it infinitely long... their only realistic option was passive defense and use the reserves to strengthen the front when the eventual Soviet assault starts. However planning an offensive for purely deception purposes could help at postponing the said Soviet offensive (which is not bad for the Ostheer, because longer occupation means more resources for them and less manpower for the Red Army).

 

[roirraw]

Here is Viktor Surorov explaining about his time in the post war USSR and his time with the military as an officer and KGB, his Fathers time in the war and the intent of the USSR based upon the technical needs of equipment produced and the purpose of those vehicles. This was done at the US Naval Academy as a lecture and is about an hour long, but he had wrote a few books with on the topic and is regarded as an expert on his point.

To sum up one of the points, he argues the KV1 was designed to operate specifically in urban environments of Germany or Western Europe with more developed roads for the heaver AFV. Using the technical specifications and letters between agencies at that time of production that started in the 1930s.

Overall this video is really really good for information that isn't usually discussed. Including pictures of Germany and Russian units working together, eating, parading and trading after Polish campaign.

Roughly at the 28 minute mark, the discussion gets into the topic in detail.

 

[Cavalry]

To sum up one of the points, he argues the KV1 was designed to operate specifically in urban environments of Germany or Western Europe with more developed roads for the heaver AFV. Using the technical specifications and letters between agencies at that time of production that started in the 1930s.

Traitor know best! According to this Tiger tanks was probably for defense in Germany homeland!

 

[roirraw]

Haha, that was pretty good.

 

[chepaeff]

This was done at the US Naval Academy as a lecture and is about an hour long, but he had wrote a few books with on the topic and is regarded as an expert on his point.

Suvorov's argumentation is dumb as hell and been smashed many times over.

 

[bz249]

To sum up one of the points, he argues the KV1 was designed to operate specifically in urban environments of Germany or Western Europe with more developed roads for the heaver AFV. Using the technical specifications and letters between agencies at that time of production that started in the 1930s.

Which means exactly nothing, even if you fight for homeland defense is better to defend your territory by occupying enemy land. Scorched earth is much less harmful for your own population (whom you are defending) if it happens on the land of the enemy.

 

[keynes2.0]

To sum up one of the points, he argues the KV1 was designed to operate specifically in urban environments of Germany or Western Europe with more developed roads for the heaver AFV.

Or... maybe the guys who had never made a heavy tank for large scale production didn't design a tank perfectly suited for it's task the first go round!

The French FT-17 would probably have been a better tank for the eastern front then the western front. The turret design would have worked better in those open spaces while rhombus designs like the British worked well for the dense western front. Did that mean that French were planning to invade Imperial Russia as soon as they finished off Germany?

The German A7V would have been great for dry plains where the ground was flat but not so dry it would sink into sand. Does that mean Germany was planning to invade Mexico?

 

[Kovax]

The German A7V would have been great for dry plains where the ground was flat but not so dry it would sink into sand. Does that mean Germany was planning to invade Mexico?

They possibly did formulate such a plan as an "exercise", but not with the idea of implementing it in the short term.

Whether the KV-1 was suited for urban operation and western roads or not is one thing; if it was designed with that as a stated purpose, then it looks a bit more suspicious.

 

[chepaeff]

Whether the KV-1 was suited for urban operation and western roads or not is one thing; if it was designed with that as a stated purpose, then it looks a bit more suspicious.

Personally, I don't know of any case of tanks designed for special terrain or special kind of roads. KV's development story is primitive - after Spain it became obvious that tanks are too vulnerable to AT guns, thus tank directorate gave an order to produce well-protected tank to withstand AT fire and to breakthrough fortified lines.

 

[keynes2.0]

Personally, I don't know of any case of tanks designed for special terrain or special kind of roads. KV's development story is primitive - after Spain it became obvious that tanks are too vulnerable to AT guns, thus tank directorate gave an order to produce well-protected tank to withstand AT fire and to breakthrough fortified lines.

That's too bad, earlier soviet tanks were so fast and stylish.