Was Sea Lion possible?

[Swinds]

1. Air supremacy. Almost every historian agrees the luftwaffe literally had the RAF to such a point that within a matter of days, if the assault had continued, air defense capabilites of the isles would have been severely limited in effectiveness. How we translate this can be various but the end result begs the question of how much further could the luftwaffe push home the attack and what would the combat effectiveness of the RAF be during an invasion? What changed? Well we all know Hitler altered the strategic goal of the battle of britain to terror. This gave the fighter defenses breathing room and now we are back to square one. The invasion is impossible. What if the strategic goal had not shifted and appropriate commitment of war production and training to air combat capability been given to the luftwaffe? This could have led to the initial requirements being met. Hitler of course could not have been involved. Once again, as we all know, his ideas early on were difficult to predict therefore offered surprise/shock value and produced results. Once he got involved during the events, he screwed them up quite well generally. Especially mid to late war.

I think this is were I get shout down (pun intended) but I want to contest the 'Almost every historian agrees the luftwaffe literally...' I don't believe that is entirely correct otherwise September the 15th could not have happened.

There are 6 treads to this.

1. Aircraft production, the RAF was never short of aircraft at any point in the BoB. British Fighter production was higher than it's losses and increasing. Castle Bromwich came on stream during the BoB with it's Spitfire IIs. Look up Lord Beaverbrook.

2. Pilots, the RAF was progressively short of pilots. They were being filled but by less experienced pilots, The RAF was getting short of experienced pilots. This was becoming more of a problem over time but was not going to stop the Pilots there were taking off.

3. Tiredness, major issue for both side.

4. Airfields, This was how the Luftwaffe should have won. By making airfields usable it meant that the RAF would have to move further inland and therefore give up local air superiority over the invasion beaches. This was the bit that was really a problem. However the switch to bombing London resolved the issue. How many days / weeks the RAF could have continued to use places like Manston was a mute point.

5. Time, this was the issue for the Luftwaffe. There was not an infinite amount of time to win BoB they had to do it by a specific date. They were running out of time and were pretty battered by the fighting since may 1940 which for them had been continuous.

6. Bomber command, before the war the majority of aircraft production was bombers. During the battle of France the Battle was battered and the Blenheims were given a rough time. However there were still lots of bombers, including the Strategic that did not fight in BoB that could have intervened in any landing.

 

[Swinds]

2. Sea power. Regardless if the U.K. decided to abandon its colonial empire to fully defend the home islands(which i doubt it would) the germans would need a full proof plan to allow for transport of troops, reinforcements and most importantly supply. For arguments sake we will assume the germans have air supremacy. What did the germans have at their disposal and how much time would they need to get two army corps across the channel and supply them? Well they had, as you stated captured french coastal batteries and batteries that they were constructing. Some of these batteries were massive but were not built till after the cancelation of further battleship production and cancelation of sea lion. What if dunkirk were pushed home fully with the annhilation of the entire british expeditionary force, the operation halted till the todt and other batteries could be built and proper quantites of powerful anti ship mines produced for sea corridor establishment? This could have led to a drastic reduction in home guard defense capabilites allowing for a delay of when the operation were to be conducted, allowed for massive and devastating channel firepower and opened up production for a multitude of other options to help push home an invasion attempt along with supply cutting options. Sub production and so forth. Most historians agree if anti shipping warfare had started earlier, it would have been even more devastating. Once again, hitler with his bigger is better mentality screwed up the german navy with grandiose concepts of a navy consisting of BB's far larger than even the Bismark which, if memory serves, was actually 3rd in line to the largest of the classes of BB's he had in mind. So, overwhelming coastal batteries mixed with effective mining of the channel, air supremacy and a direct focus on submarine and further air production puts us in at least a position to assume there was at best a minimal chance.

Can someone explain why loosing a couple of R-class battleships and 4 Cruisers and 12 Destroyers is abandoning the empire?? The RN could have lost all the R-Class and still fielded a strong navy that could contain the German battleships and kept the Italians honest in the med?

 

[Rudawitz]

Hi Rudawitz I am not sure were you got these figures but they are wrong. Bomber command had many more that 79 bombers for a start.

Hello! But Fighter command and Bomber command are different things though? And the fighters are the important factor here. I doubt that Bomber Command had enough fighters readily available to help Fighter Command improve the 1:3 ratio against the Luftwaffe in a significant way? Anyway, my source is The Second World War p.68 by Spencer C Tucker, a professor at the Virginia Military Institute.

It wouldn't necessarily hurt RAF advantage as the German lines would only be around the airfields. Even if they manage to take the airfields, even if supply planes manage to keep them supplied, there just wasn't enough of a supply to keep a force in Britain that could hold out against even an infantry division. How many airborne troops did the Germans have at all, no matter how many they could supply through hostile skies against an enemy that is outproducing them?

Losing forward airfields wouldn't necessarily hurt the RAF? I'm not sure what you mean. I think the germans had about a divisions worth of paratroopers. But once the airfields are taken, regular infantry can be flown in, right? Don't get me wrong, I too think it's a long shot. Especially ad hoc. But with a bit of planning a head, it might have been plausible. And the necessary build-up (transports, gliders, bigger focus on airborne operations) would not have been as easily detected by the british as a new surface fleet with four Bismarcks and an ersatz aircraft carrier!

 

[Swinds]

Hello! But Fighter command and Bomber command are different things though? And the fighters are the important factor here. I doubt that Bomber Command had enough fighters readily available to help Fighter Command improve the 1:3 ratio against the Luftwaffe in a significant way? Anyway, my source is The Second World War p.68 by Spencer C Tucker, a professor at the Virginia Military Institute.

OK you are summering a little here.

What aircraft do you include in the 1:3 ratio? How many Bf 109s were there? i.e single engined fighters I make it between 900 and 1000. How many single engined fighters did the RAF have 700??

How many minutes were the Bf109 able to be in combat over south England? How many minutes can the Spitfires and Huricanes be in combat?

The Bf110 was found to be useless as a bomber escort and often flew in defensive rings as they could not compete with the single engined fighters.

The RAF had Radar which allows for airfraft to be pointed to were they are needed and to avoid just Fighters.

The RAF never put 100% (check out 10 Group) of the fighters in the south of England so the ratio would have been in the Luftwaffe's favour

1:3 is a great stat but I hope I have show that it is meaningless to the outcome.

 

[hkrommel]

Hello! But Fighter command and Bomber command are different things though? And the fighters are the important factor here. I doubt that Bomber Command had enough fighters readily available to help Fighter Command improve the 1:3 ratio against the Luftwaffe in a significant way? Anyway, my source is The Second World War p.68 by Spencer C Tucker, a professor at the Virginia Military Institute.



Losing forward airfields wouldn't necessarily hurt the RAF? I'm not sure what you mean. I think the germans had about a divisions worth of paratroopers. But once the airfields are taken, regular infantry can be flown in, right? Don't get me wrong, I too think it's a long shot. Especially ad hoc. But with a bit of planning a head, it might have been plausible. And the necessary build-up (transports, gliders, bigger focus on airborne operations) would not have been as easily detected by the british as a new surface fleet with four Bismarcks and an ersatz aircraft carrier!

The RAF's biggest advantage was that pilots who survived being shot down could be returned to service immediately (sometimes it happened in the same day). German pilots became POWs. That means that even if the Germans occupy an airfield or two it isn't going to affect that.

The Germans also didn't have enough paratroopers to appreciably occupy enough forward airfields to make a large enough impact, not to mention it would be difficult if not impossible to supply even a division of paratroopers by air, and outright impossible to fly more troops in. What few paratroopers they could supply would be quickly overrun by superior British forces.

Basically all that plan is good for is killing bunch of paratroopers and transport planes.

 

[Rudawitz]

OK you are summering a little here.

What aircraft do you include in the 1:3 ratio? How many Bf 109s were there? i.e single engined fighters I make it between 900 and 1000. How many single engined fighters did the RAF have 700??

How many minutes were the Bf109 able to be in combat over south England? How many minutes can the Spitfires and Huricanes be in combat?

The Bf110 was found to be useless as a bomber escort and often flew in defensive rings as they could not compete with the single engined fighters.

The RAF had Radar which allows for airfraft to be pointed to were they are needed and to avoid just Fighters.

The RAF never put 100% (check out 10 Group) of the fighters in the south of England so the ratio would have been in the Luftwaffe's favour

1:3 is a great stat but I hope I have show that it is meaningless to the outcome.

Sounds about right, it would have been mainly Bf 109s. The idea is that some of them would operate from southern England, so they should have about the same amount of time in combat I think. That alone would help them out significantly to maintain air superiority for a while. And with air superiority escorting missions become less important. Where were those additional 300-400 RAF-fighters assigned btw?

The RAF's biggest advantage was that pilots who survived being shot down could be returned to service immediately (sometimes it happened in the same day). German pilots became POWs. That means that even if the Germans occupy an airfield or two it isn't going to affect that.

That's true. But with forward airfields and more time in the air the german loss rate may have been significantly smaller than historically. And RAF KIAs may have been higher.

The Germans also didn't have enough paratroopers to appreciably occupy enough forward airfields to make a large enough impact, not to mention it would be difficult if not impossible to supply even a division of paratroopers by air, and outright impossible to fly more troops in. What few paratroopers they could supply would be quickly overrun by superior British forces.

The British didn't have enough material to properly equip two divisions in England after Dunkirk and had just experienced a huge institutional trauma. How many men do you need to occcupy the major airfields in southern England? Why would resupply and reinforcement be impossible? Do you mean that the Germans had already lost too much vital equipment historically or do you mean that they couldn't, with a little foresight have produced enough equipment beforehand?

 

[LTPugh]

Sounds about right, it would have been mainly Bf 109s. The idea is that some of them would operate from southern England, so they should have about the same amount of time in combat I think. That alone would help them out significantly to maintain air superiority for a while. And with air superiority escorting missions become less important. Where were those additional 300-400 RAF-fighters assigned btw?



That's true. But with forward airfields and more time in the air the german loss rate may have been significantly smaller than historically. And RAF KIAs may have been higher.



The British didn't have enough material to properly equip two divisions in England after Dunkirk and had just experienced a huge institutional trauma. How many men do you need to occcupy the major airfields in southern England? Why would resupply and reinforcement be impossible? Do you mean that the Germans had already lost too much vital equipment historically or do you mean that they couldn't, with a little foresight have produced enough equipment beforehand?

I would suggest reading the entire thread and specifically the posts about the number of Commonwealth and English divisions that were already in Englad and armed. Including the armor.

 

[Rudawitz]

I would suggest reading the entire thread and specifically the posts about the number of Commonwealth and English divisions that were already in Englad and armed. Including the armor.

I did, I missed the part where a concensus of their fighting ability and responsiveness was reached however. I have no illusions about how a prolonged battle between allied forces and a few Luftwaffe units would end. I do however believe that the allied forces were in disarray at the moment and that germany was at least near a position in which it could resupply and reinforce those units. Not long enough to sustain a full scale occupation of the isles, but perhaps long enough to make the British leadership loose its nerve and sign an armistice.

EDIT: for clarity

 

[Pugmak]

I think this is were I get shout down (pun intended) but I want to contest the 'Almost every historian agrees the luftwaffe literally...' I don't believe that is entirely correct otherwise September the 15th could not have happened.

There are 6 treads to this.

1. Aircraft production, the RAF was never short of aircraft at any point in the BoB. British Fighter production was higher than it's losses and increasing. Castle Bromwich came on stream during the BoB with it's Spitfire IIs. Look up Lord Beaverbrook.

2. Pilots, the RAF was progressively short of pilots. They were being filled but by less experienced pilots, The RAF was getting short of experienced pilots. This was becoming more of a problem over time but was not going to stop the Pilots there were taking off.

3. Tiredness, major issue for both side.

4. Airfields, This was how the Luftwaffe should have won. By making airfields usable it meant that the RAF would have to move further inland and therefore give up local air superiority over the invasion beaches. This was the bit that was really a problem. However the switch to bombing London resolved the issue. How many days / weeks the RAF could have continued to use places like Manston was a mute point.

5. Time, this was the issue for the Luftwaffe. There was not an infinite amount of time to win BoB they had to do it by a specific date. They were running out of time and were pretty battered by the fighting since may 1940 which for them had been continuous.

6. Bomber command, before the war the majority of aircraft production was bombers. During the battle of France the Battle was battered and the Blenheims were given a rough time. However there were still lots of bombers, including the Strategic that did not fight in BoB that could have intervened in any landing.

re: #4.: I'm not sure the airfields of that day and age could be rendered unusable in any real sense. They weren't the airfields we are accustomed to today and the planes weren't jets with sensitivity to foreign object damage (FOD) to their engines and such like.

An example that I think speaks to this is Henderson Field at Guadalcanal. That field was bombed fair often during field operations periods during the day, and it was shelled by massive numbers of naval artillery in all manner of calibers from 5" to 16" nearly nightly for a lengthy period. Yet, that field was rarely out of operation. And, when it was out of operation, it was usually due to lack of fuel, which had to be smuggled in via submarine during the worst of the siege that Japanese had in place.

 

[hkrommel]

Not long enough to sustain a full scale occupation of the isles, but perhaps long enough to make the British leadership loose its nerve and sign an armistice.

They could maybe land a few brigades successfully, maybe supply them for a few days before it became impossible due to lack of constant air cover or loss of transport planes, and maybe they could take a couple airbases from the military personnel on-base. However, within a day those airfields would be retaken and the paratroopers would be dead. The British wouldn't need heavy equipment, we're talking lightly-armed paratroopers. A garrison division could handle them by sheer numbers alone. It's just a good way to get a lot of paratroopers killed for no appreciable gain. Those airfields would be back in British hands and fully operational within a few days at the most.

That's not going to cause anyone to lose their nerves. Besides, if anything it would strengthen British resolve.

 

[Secret Master]

2. Pilots, the RAF was progressively short of pilots. They were being filled but by less experienced pilots, The RAF was getting short of experienced pilots. This was becoming more of a problem over time but was not going to stop the Pilots there were taking off.

But pilot losses were hurting the Luftwaffe more, right? So, unless the Luftwaffe was going to get 2:1 kill ratios pilot versus pilot (which wasn't going to happen), then the Luftwaffe falls further behind. Looking at the official crew loss statistics, it looks like the Luftwaffe took far more losses.

And Britain could afford to train new pilots. She had the fuel to do it. Germany was facing fuel shortages which impacted pilot training throughout the war.

4. Airfields, This was how the Luftwaffe should have won. By making airfields usable it meant that the RAF would have to move further inland and therefore give up local air superiority over the invasion beaches. This was the bit that was really a problem. However the switch to bombing London resolved the issue. How many days / weeks the RAF could have continued to use places like Manston was a mute point.

I'm not convinced anymore that even continuing bombing RAF airfields would have turned the Battle of Britain around. Rebasing further north outside of bomber range was a possibility.

I'm also not convinced that the historical attacks were doing enough damage. Had more/better attacks been orchestrated, they may have made a bigger difference.

 

[Henry IX]

I just want to point out that if there never was a plan for an armoured thrust through Ardennes and the war was fought with more conventional means, historians today would, with an unshakable certainty, be talking about how Germany never had a chance to defeat the overwhelming forces of Allies.

Everything is certain until it isn't.

Not so much so, no. The Ardennes campaign was one solution to the strategic problems faced by the Wehrmacht - it was a matter of applying superior force to point in the line followed by a rapid exploitation. It was one of several options lead to a crushing of the French army. In the same way that there is still serious debates about whether the Schlieffen was workable or if there was a functional alternative, many historians believe that there were options for the Germans that could have won the war.

Sealion has a fundamental constraint - crossing the channel. There is no alternative plan or option for invading Britain that does not involve crossing the channel or other body of water. The issues with Sealion revolve around the fundamental inability to cross the channel in the face of the RN and RAF. Most proponents of Sealion generally assume once the Germans are across the channel they will automatically defeat the British army. The debate revolves around the ability of the German forces to overcome the fundamental constraint of a channel crossing.

 

[Swinds]

I'm not convinced anymore that even continuing bombing RAF airfields would have turned the Battle of Britain around. Rebasing further north outside of bomber range was a possibility.

I'm also not convinced that the historical attacks were doing enough damage. Had more/better attacks been orchestrated, they may have made a bigger difference.

To get my figures correct I found my 'RAF Fighter Command 1936-1968' by Norman Franks ISDN 1-85260-344-5

I have much more to write but I will wait till my lunch. There is specific reference to Airfields of southern England being a problem after being attacked and from this point of the Luftwaffe were making progress to stop the RAF operating. I should also make the point again all that the Luftwaffe had to do was have local air superiority not GB wide air superiority. They had done this at specific points during the Battle of France.

 

[Swinds]

Sounds about right, it would have been mainly Bf 109s. The idea is that some of them would operate from southern England, so they should have about the same amount of time in combat I think. That alone would help them out significantly to maintain air superiority for a while. And with air superiority escorting missions become less important. Where were those additional 300-400 RAF-fighters assigned btw?

As I said in the post, having looked up the numbers in said book I will explain my figures, heads up 11 Group had an average establishment of its fighter squadrons of 196. 12 Group and 11 Group helped more later.

 

[Swinds]

re: #4.: I'm not sure the airfields of that day and age could be rendered unusable in any real sense. They weren't the airfields we are accustomed to today and the planes weren't jets with sensitivity to foreign object damage (FOD) to their engines and such like.

An example that I think speaks to this is Henderson Field at Guadalcanal. That field was bombed fair often during field operations periods during the day, and it was shelled by massive numbers of naval artillery in all manner of calibers from 5" to 16" nearly nightly for a lengthy period. Yet, that field was rarely out of operation. And, when it was out of operation, it was usually due to lack of fuel, which had to be smuggled in via submarine during the worst of the siege that Japanese had in place.

I will put a quote in from the book mentioned above to clarity this.

 

[Earl Uhtred]

Problem is, the moment the Germans show their hand by landing in England, the Luftwaffe is shackled to the beaches if the Germans want to maintain that local air superiority. Given in particular the short operational range of the Me-109, to say nothing of the Ju-87, there is no chance of sustaining air superiority over a given beachhead in the UK against a competent British defence, especially if the Germans try the 'broad front' landings contemplated in September. Just to add to the fun for whatever supply craft the Germans manage to pull together.

 

[Swinds]

Nearest OOB for Bomber command is Jan 1940 from 'British Bombers since 1912' Putman.

Hampden 10 Sqns
Wellington 10 Sqns
Whitley 8 Sqns
Blenhiem 17 Sqns (6 in France)
Battle 11Sqns (8 in France)
Beaufort 1 Sqn (22 Sqn Torpedo Bomber at Thorney Island Hampshire)
Vildebest 1 Sqn (42 Sqn Torpedo Bomber)

As I said there were a lot of Bombers.

14 July Fighters in Fighter command from the Fighter Command book mentioned above.
Spitires Hurricane Defiant
A/C Sqns A/C Sqn A/C Sqn
10 Group 29 2 26 2
11 Group 79 7 134 12 12 1
12 Group 60 5 76 6 12 1
13 Group 65 5 80 5

Total 233 19 316 25 24 2

The are two noted problems with these figures

1. Some Squadrons only listed 12 aircraft even if they had more
2. These are aircraft not Pilots.

Same book, same date

Established number of Spitfire and Hurricane pilots is 1248
Number of Fighter pilots in Fighter command is 1132
159 of these are not fully operational.

 

[brovahkiin]

I like how we have spent 12 pages agreeing in slightly different ways

 

[Swinds]

I like how we have spent 12 pages agreeing in slightly different ways

Slightly sad this is by far my most replied to tread and there have been far better ones

 

[Alliegorical]

But it should still be possible in HoI, for the same reason that winning the Sino-Japanese war as Japan should be possible: if you can't, what's the point?