Proper planning means building landing craft, which means diverting resources from other areas, which means less chance of defeating France, etc.
Was Sea Lion possible?
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Proper planning means building landing craft, which means diverting resources from other areas, which means less chance of defeating France, etc.
Given that the British did correctly figure out the German landing sites, it is not at all an unreasonable assumption to make.
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Exactly, the Germans picked the obvious spots for them to attempt an invasion, and given their complete lack of suitable landing craft and inability to provide naval support, porabably the only places that they could land. In contrast, the Allies had pretty much the whole of the French, Belgian, and Dutch Coast to pick from. They picked a good and unexpected spot while convincing the Germans that they were going to land at a different spot that, to the Germans, seemed like a logical and obvious place to attack: Calais.
I've only ever crossed the English Cannel in one of these.
At 37 kts, Dover to Calais doesn't take very long at all.
And they only run when the weather is reasonable.
They don't have bow doors though. You have to drive through the back.
(I say run. I mean ran. Last time was 20+ years ago.)
OK, so how many assorted fishing boats of various sizes does Germany need to commandeer in order NOT to require river barges for a "credible" attempt? Plainly, using river barges is either a sheer desperation move or else a bluff to scare the opponent into surrender, if it doesn't induce incapacitating fits of laughter. If a river barge can only make 3 knots and the cross current is at 4, that's a nearly fatal flaw to start with. Other boats and small ships can plainly make better headway, and could have been used a bit further up or down the coast, so a lot those massed UK troops (most of which in actuality were far from formidable) would be in the wrong place.
I see two "camps" here:
One insists that the plan "as stated" (no matter how unfathomably stupid it sounds) was the only way it could be or would have been done, and since that's clearly unworkable, the landing couldn't have succeeded. Almost all arguments lean toward proving that some particular aspect that's already obviously unworkable IS unworkable, without considering the possible alternatives to that approach. Germany had a history of doing things in a way that was unexpected, so I would not assume the obvious approach in this case.
The other insists that Germany could have pulled a proverbial rabbit out of Adolf's posterior and landed hundreds of thousands of troops with air superiority they didn't have. That's not to say that it couldn't have been planned for and done, but I don't see it as a workable situation without some prior effort to that effect, which in reality was only minimally done. The few examples, prototypes, and designs show that some thought was given to the matter, but little or no actual implementation was done.
...neither side of which seems to make a convincing argument.
I see two "camps" here:
One insists that the plan "as stated" (no matter how unfathomably stupid it sounds) was the only way it could be or would have been done, and since that's clearly unworkable, the landing couldn't have succeeded. Almost all arguments lean toward proving that some particular aspect that's already obviously unworkable IS unworkable, without considering the possible alternatives to that approach. Germany had a history of doing things in a way that was unexpected, so I would not assume the obvious approach in this case.
The other insists that Germany could have pulled a proverbial rabbit out of Adolf's posterior and landed hundreds of thousands of troops with air superiority they didn't have. That's not to say that it couldn't have been planned for and done, but I don't see it as a workable situation without some prior effort to that effect, which in reality was only minimally done. The few examples, prototypes, and designs show that some thought was given to the matter, but little or no actual implementation was done.
...neither side of which seems to make a convincing argument.
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You are making fair points.
The problem here is that it is difficult to think of a way the Germans could have successfully invaded. Also assuming that the Germans would not have tried the plan suggested missing what happened in Crete. This should ignore what might have happen before September 1940 and work from what actually happened.
Crete is a prime example of what could have happened at the very beginning of an invasion. German paratroops would have been dropped to capture airfields and strategic locations, a port would have been good. Airfields mean you can fly in follow up troops and a port means the crossing of the channel to a secure port. The problem is however you look at this from this point on there are problems without a creditable solution.
RN would be in force in much stronger number with bases much closer. In the Crete operation the seaborne force was stopped by a small RN force with Germany having complete command of the air. The Germans used Fishing boats for the invasion and there were fewer men to transport.
RAF had a few fighters on Crete, in GB there were hundreds of aircraft which would have been involved. To be fair the German Luftwaffe was much stronger and would have caused may problems. The airborne forces including transports were heavily hit with high casualties. Think what this would have been like over GB and how many of the transport aircraft would have been available to supply the spearhead afterwards.
Troop transports across the channel, there really was only barges hence they took them from the Rhine etc. We all know the issues with them by now.
Heavy Equipment (art and tanks). Getting them across the channel would have been key. How do you get a Panzer Division across the channel, remember we are talking 200-300 tanks of a 1940 Tank Division. These would have been prime targets of the RN and RAF.
British Army with Commonwealth forces added. There was 300,000+ men compared with 27,000 in Crete with many more heavy weapons and tanks. Yes GB lost a lot at Dunkirk but there were still intact division left in GB. The 27,000 nearly win on Crete against the Elite Fallschirmjäger with no air support.
Supplies, an army can't survive without them and how can the Germans get those across the channel? Barges yes and Aircraft yes. You'd better hope that these were not destroyed in the channel or above the channel. Ignoring the level of supplies required this is difficult but possible if things go your way.
Luck there are many many things that need to go the way of the Germans and as we know no plan last longer than the first engagement.
There is a British (American) saying about biting off more than you can chew. I have the greatest respect for the Germans in WW2, they did the imposable again and again. But I have not seen anyone come up with a realistic plan on how to get past the issues listed above.
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I'm not 100% sure I agree with you. The burden of proof is on someone saying that Sea Lion is feasible, because the default situation is no invasion taking place. So, once someone says, "It was impossible for the Luftwaffe to attain the required air superiority," as far as I'm concerned, the burden is on the pro-Sea Lion camp to illustrate how to invade the British Isles, not on the opposition to demonstrate any of a hundred other ways Sea Lion can be stopped.
That being said, I think the original plan the Germans had is an important touchstone. When I think of Sea Lion, I consider that some of the basics of Fuhrer Directive 16 are in play, because some of those basics are so fundamental that they must be addressed. Say what you want about barges, Bismark, paratroopers, or Stukas, but some parts of the plan are pretty damn fundamental no matter who is doing the invasion.
Directive 16 clearly states that the Luftwaffe must control the sky. There is no other option to be considered in this case; there is no substitute. Hell, even with air supremacy, the Allies had anti-Stuka blimps covering the invasion beaches to prevent the slightest chance of bombers messing with the assets off the coast. What other options does Germany have? Is there some panacea I am not aware of that could get Germany around the air power problem?
Directivee 16 also indicates that the RN needs to be out of the way. It doesn't have to be sunk, although that is one way to achieve this goal. But however you do it, the RN has to be out of the way. There is no other option to be considered in this case; there is no substitute for "holy crap, the RN is shooting at our transports!" Even a handful of capital ships could prevent an invasion or make it messy until they are sunk. Now, I have mentioned in this very thread my idea of thinning out Britain's capital ship numbers in cooperation with the IJN and RM, but even then, the goal wasn't "We can cross the Channel while the RN has ships left" but "Britain either has to give up 100% of her overseas possessions and lose contact with Dominions so she can prevent Sea Lion, or try to hold on to the overseas possessions while remaining insufficiently protected at home."
To me, arguing over barges, Luftwaffe expertise at sinking ships, amphibious capabilities of German forces, naval mines, and shore batteries is interesting, but none of it changes the two fundamental problems outlined by Directive 16. I also happen to think that if Germany some how overcame the two problems above, it might also be in a position to solve the smaller issues with barges and whatnot. After all, give me from 1936 to 1940, I can give you enough transports to cross the Channel in style, and train the Luftwaffe to sink ships reliably, and have better naval mines and mine sweeping, and better utilization of shore batteries. It's a pittance compared to building a navy that can secure the Channel or an air force that can defeat RAF Fighter Command.
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There's two aspects of this issue that I can see.
1. The USMC began serious study on the amphib ops problems in the late '20s. The end result at first attempt (Guadalcanal) would have been a disaster if the beaches had been defended. Amphib is one of those things that take a lot of practical application to shake out the bugs. Theory crafting without the practical app in the real with an actual live enemy on the other side only goes so far.
2. I don't see how Germany could have built up an invasion fleet soon enough to be used by '40, without seriously telegraphing their intent to the UK and the rest of the world. Such a thing may well have given FDR enough political juice to get the US ramped up for war sooner too.
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I just want to point out that if there never was a plan for an armoured thrust through Ardennes and the war was fought with more conventional means, historians today would, with an unshakable certainty, be talking about how Germany never had a chance to defeat the overwhelming forces of Allies.
Everything is certain until it isn't.
Everything is certain until it isn't.
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I compare it to assaulting a medieval castle without any siege equipment other than ladders. By the time you have a sizeable force in the oppositions territory you've lost a fair some of your own.
I fully agree that the onus is on the pro-sea lion camp to come up with a valid argument as to how it could happen with the allies doing nothing differently than they did.
I fully agree that the onus is on the pro-sea lion camp to come up with a valid argument as to how it could happen with the allies doing nothing differently than they did.
Not to mention without harming their build-up for the ground war with France that is necessary to put them in position to invade Britain in the first place. The steel for those tanks had to come from somewhere, after all.
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That was Erhard Milch. "If we leave the British in peace for four weeks it will be too late". The idea was to let airborne units capture airfields directly after Dunkirk and let the Luftwaffe operate from southern England. Maybe not feasible in the long run, but I'm not sure the stiff upper lip would have been maintained for longer.
The British Army would be dispersed for some time. It lacked even basic small arms after Dunkirk. However, it would not take long to dig out WWI leftovers to rearm a few divisions.
Of course, no one can be certain about the success of such an operation, but I am fairly sure it would have started well. A few airfields and a port or two could certainly have been taken with minimal losses. The big question is if Germany would have been able to ferry reinforcements to the ports before the British could drive out the initial invasion force
Crete was a success--it was expensive, but it also 5 times greater distance. The LW would have had overwhelming air power to support such operations--not having to worry about stopping the RN or protecting an invasion fleet from certain bomber attacks--a totally different game. This also would have robbed the RAF of a good part of its home turf advantage.
I think there would have been a reasonable chance of success for such an operation until perhaps the second week of July. After that, the chance of success would fall off sharply--by August, not a chance.
One thing is certain about the germans, they were just as ingenious as the allies. I am in no way pro-axis but i do feel they are consistantly underestimated by historians because of one factor. Hitler. They never mention him as the reason but he is behind every single bizarre early success while also behind every failure once the allies started playing ball.
So lets look at some of your points. Before i start, ill make it a point to state that i believe sea lion would have been impossible at worst and extremely difficult at best.
For devils advocate sake, lets play a very detailed arm chair historian role to see what could have happened. I am doing this for fun so just bare with me. It will probably be long.
1. Air supremacy. Almost every historian agrees the luftwaffe literally had the RAF to such a point that within a matter of days, if the assault had continued, air defense capabilites of the isles would have been severely limited in effectiveness. How we translate this can be various but the end result begs the question of how much further could the luftwaffe push home the attack and what would the combat effectiveness of the RAF be during an invasion? What changed? Well we all know Hitler altered the strategic goal of the battle of britain to terror. This gave the fighter defenses breathing room and now we are back to square one. The invasion is impossible. What if the strategic goal had not shifted and appropriate commitment of war production and training to air combat capability been given to the luftwaffe? This could have led to the initial requirements being met. Hitler of course could not have been involved. Once again, as we all know, his ideas early on were difficult to predict therefore offered surprise/shock value and produced results. Once he got involved during the events, he screwed them up quite well generally. Especially mid to late war.
2. Sea power. Regardless if the U.K. decided to abandon its colonial empire to fully defend the home islands(which i doubt it would) the germans would need a full proof plan to allow for transport of troops, reinforcements and most importantly supply. For arguments sake we will assume the germans have air supremacy. What did the germans have at their disposal and how much time would they need to get two army corps across the channel and supply them? Well they had, as you stated captured french coastal batteries and batteries that they were constructing. Some of these batteries were massive but were not built till after the cancelation of further battleship production and cancelation of sea lion. What if dunkirk were pushed home fully with the annhilation of the entire british expeditionary force, the operation halted till the todt and other batteries could be built and proper quantites of powerful anti ship mines produced for sea corridor establishment? This could have led to a drastic reduction in home guard defense capabilites allowing for a delay of when the operation were to be conducted, allowed for massive and devastating channel firepower and opened up production for a multitude of other options to help push home an invasion attempt along with supply cutting options. Sub production and so forth. Most historians agree if anti shipping warfare had started earlier, it would have been even more devastating. Once again, hitler with his bigger is better mentality screwed up the german navy with grandiose concepts of a navy consisting of BB's far larger than even the Bismark which, if memory serves, was actually 3rd in line to the largest of the classes of BB's he had in mind. So, overwhelming coastal batteries mixed with effective mining of the channel, air supremacy and a direct focus on submarine and further air production puts us in at least a position to assume there was at best a minimal chance.
3. Invasion fleet. Anything is possible. A joke right? Well lets use the reverse to show just how true saying anything is possible is. At dunkirk, the british evacuated their entire expeditionary force along with some scattered french forces in about a week. I am trying to remeber the total number but it was something north of 300k troops. No immediate organisation options. No known way to do it. This isnt two corps of troops we are talking about. This is army and army group size we are talking about here. All this during a war and during pressured combat where anything is possible. So lets look at it from a perspective of the germans. They have a window where they can, with reasonable air protection, get troops across. The channel is heavily mined compensating for the lack of naval capability and further backed by exceptional coastal battery support. How do they get across? It seems almost comedic to have an army cross in tug boats and fishing trawlers doesn't it? Well i agree. At best id save that kind of passage for supplies if anything. I just can't see that happening but anything is possible. At this point id have to suggest further commitment to proper landing craft which COULD be possible if the proper commitment was made without interference from Hitler. Again, another uncertainty.
4. Supply. The single most important factor. Getting it, keeping it and making it effective. I have read studies that did hard mathmatical crunching of numbers to show precisely how much supply a german rifle, mechanized and panzer division would need to remain in a full combat effective state upon landing on the isle. These numbers, while in the hundreds of tons, are lost in my memory. I wanna say it was something like 600-800 tons a day or something like that. Thats combat supply and most probably for a Pz div. You can correct me if i am wrong about that. Regardless, the point here is supply shipment. The study pointed out what a reasonable port to landing site shipment tonnage could have been and also a french fully operational port to british fully operational port shipment could be in tons. Two things are taken into account. The french port is fully operational and so is the british port. The study showed that the germans would have a net loss of supply shipment the first week of invasion at a nonport landing site severely depleting the combat capability of the divisions landed and only making it worse as time progressed as more troops landed. Upon capture of a british port, assuming the brits didnt completely annhilate the port, the study showed that even the best southeastern port in fully operational order could only have received upwards of 800-1000 tons of shipping per day. The only option the germans had would be alternative shipment methods. Planes being the most probable but even here we have a problem. During stalingrad, there was an attempt at air supply and this was horribly inefficient and insufficient.
So to summarize. I cannot get passed the supply option. They might have been able to get air superiority. They might have been able to control the channel just long enough with very specific options used. They even might have been able to get across the channel and land making some headway into the country. The problems i run into once they land are ammo, dietary consumables, maintenance capability and other misc supply needs. Put simply, they would have starved or turned into foraging battlegroups further disrupted by lack of fighting equipment needed to remain combat effective causing morale to drop.
Just thought id have fun with this. Never really wrote down my thoughts on it before.
I'm not sure they would, certainly not without further reinforcements. Close air support would help I guess. However, with airfields captured it would not be impossible rapidly get in at least some reinforcements and supply. The RAF Fighter Command was already battered, they had 334 serviceable fighters in early June and 79 bombers (some of which would undoubtedly have been captured or destroyed in a successful airborne operation) Luftwaffe had 980 fighters and about 1500 bombers at the time. And what the captain said:
If we also allow ourselves to imagine that the Dunkirk evacuation was hindered somehow, the chances are better.
In June 1940 there were about 20 British infantry divisions available, mostly at about 50% strength. The major issue was the lack of artillery and shells.
As for the German paratrooper assaults and supply runs, the Germans had lost over 250 (over half) of their Ju52 transports in their surprise assault on the Netherlands airfields.
Hi Rudawitz I am not sure were you got these figures but they are wrong. Bomber command had many more that 79 bombers for a start.
It wouldn't necessarily hurt RAF advantage as the German lines would only be around the airfields. Even if they manage to take the airfields, even if supply planes manage to keep them supplied, there just wasn't enough of a supply to keep a force in Britain that could hold out against even an infantry division. How many airborne troops did the Germans have at all, no matter how many they could supply through hostile skies against an enemy that is outproducing them?