[Video] Why did Hitler halt the Advance on Dunkirk?

[gladius2metal]

The order on 24th of May to halt the German Panzer Divisions just short of Dunkirk has been widely debated ever since. Karl-Heinz Frieser in his book Blitzkrieg Legend gives a detailed overview on the Battle of France and also on the so called "halt order" (Halte-Befehl). In this video I present a short summary of Friesers view.

Also, for those who don't know the difference between the "German Army" and "Wehrmacht", the Army was one branch of the Wehrmacht, which consisted of Army, Air Force and Navy. Further information here:

 

[DoomBunny]

Not something I've read particularly in depth on, nor have I read Freiser's book. However I'd say it's rather damning to assert there was no reasonable basis whatsoever for such an order. That's not to say it was necessarily a correct decision, rather to say that a post-fact appreciation of things makes a very easy base for criticism.

From our perspective, their is a very clear view of Franco-British capabilities. From the contemporary German one, less so. Information about enemy reserves and the inability of Allied CCCI to keep pace with the battle isn't as available. Moreover, it should be considered just how successful the Germans had been, after such initial success it's easy to see why some might have questioned whether it was too good to be true. Given the circumstances, it's easy to see some reasoning for the halt order.

 

[gladius2metal]

From the contemporary German one, less so. Information about enemy reserves and the inability of Allied CCCI to keep pace with the battle isn't as available. Moreover, it should be considered just how successful the Germans had been, after such initial success it's easy to see why some might have questioned whether it was too good to be true. Given the circumstances, it's easy to see some reasoning for the halt order.

basically Rundstedt, his staff officer Sodenstern, Hitler and a very few others were in favor of the halt. The rest was "are you batshit insane". Guderian's disobendience earlier is also mentioned and well known (about 10 days prior), I don't base my arguments (in this video) on post information we have now, but on the accounts given by the generals at that time in their diaries or even orders etc.

the initial success would have never happened if Guderian and some others didn't just push on.

Given the circumstances, it's easy to see some reasoning for the halt order.

as mentioned in the video: the complete German High Command of the Army (OKH) couldn't understand the halt order, nor did the front-line commanders of the Panzer Divisions/Corps... Fast Forward November 1941 conference in Orsha: The front line commanders from Corps up to the Army Groups all were against any major offensive operations, but now the German High Command pushed for the attack. The clear difference is: 1940: only Rundstedt and a few guys are for the order, whereas the majority of commanders - across all levels except Hitler - are against it. In 1941: only the very top was for an attack. Or in other words: in 1940: the feet, the body and the head were mostly in agreement. In 1941 the head wanted do that, while all other parts were "NO!".

Not sure, if I didn't mention that sufficiently in the video, but I thought each slide with showing the "acting" elements several times should have given a good impression that it was not an hindsight commentary, but based on the contemporary views of the people involved. (Frieser my source, usually avoided any post-war comments, because he knows very well that afterwards many just talk bullshit).

 

[stevieji]

It seems to me that the issue isn't really the issuing of the 'halt order' - you have shown that it was possible to argue either way and that the German command were not in complete agreement. That's fine, not a problem - why not take a few days to regroup and assess the situation? What happened, though, was that the order was made on 24 May and the allies then had a full 11 days to set up a perimeter defence and complete the evacuation.

The interesting question is not why the halt order was given, but why the decision was not revisited after the evacuation had begun. One thing you don't seem to mention is the idea that Goering insisted that the Luftwaffe could complete the job. Halder certainly thought this was the case - even though he did not know it at the time, as he says it became clear later. There came a point, I understand, when the Luftwaffe was grounded by bad weather (I'm not sure when exactly) - and this allowed the latter part of the evacuation to be completed much more easily. Perhaps by this time it was too late for the army to intervene.

It just seems so obvious that the advance could have been continued after 5 or 6 days - but by this time perhaps it was just Hitler's obstinacy, or more charitably, his desire to demonstrate that he was in command.

Just one technical issue - quite early on you're saying that Hitler was saying both Ja und Nein - at which point the hybrid Jein appears - but it's not there long enough to read the explanation of the term - I mean not nearly long enough. Reminded me of my Berlinerisch ex-freundin - so I do know the term, but even so, not enough time.

 

[gladius2metal]

It seems to me that the issue isn't really the issuing of the 'halt order' - you have shown that it was possible to argue either way and that the German command were not in complete agreement. That's fine, not a problem - why not take a few days to regroup and assess the situation? What happened, though, was that the order was made on 24 May and the allies then had a full 11 days to set up a perimeter defence and complete the evacuation.

11 days? It were only 3 days and 8 hours of delay. Hence, there was no time at all to regroup the situation, every hour was crucial. Just about 10 days before Battle of Stonne was beginning. Also as far as I know (returned the book today) in an earlier part they made clear that every hour counts for that matter they supplied a lot if not all men with "doping" to stay awake (I think it were the first 36 hours or 3 days or something). The Germans created a huge pocket with only one proper Channel harbor, this is not the situation one assesses something.

The interesting question is not why the halt order was given, but why the decision was not revisited after the evacuation had begun. One thing you don't seem to mention is the idea that Goering insisted that the Luftwaffe could complete the job. Halder certainly thought this was the case - even though he did not know it at the time, as he says it became clear later. There came a point, I understand, when the Luftwaffe was grounded by bad weather (I'm not sure when exactly) - and this allowed the latter part of the evacuation to be completed much more easily. Perhaps by this time it was too late for the army to intervene.

I heard that Göring stuff so often and I am not entirely sure, but I think it is the typical hogwash. Frieser mentioned something in a sentence, but he mentioned more explicitly that Kesselring and Richthofen told it was a "bad idea". The Luftwaffe was still flying and using a lot of facilites in German territory, thus Dunkirk was at the far reach of the Luftwaffe. Furthermore, it was still used for Army support everywhere else. Yeah, it started raining pretty soon, which also made the attack after the halt order more troublesome because the ground got marshy.

One thing you don't seem to mention is the idea that Goering insisted that the Luftwaffe could complete the job. Halder certainly thought this was the case - even though he did not know it at the time, as he says it became clear later.

do you have a source for this claim?

It just seems so obvious that the advance could have been continued after 5 or 6 days - but by this time perhaps it was just Hitler's obstinacy, or more charitably, his desire to demonstrate that he was in command.

again they halt order "only" delayed the operation 3days and 8 hours, but it completely changed the outcome.

Just one technical issue - quite early on you're saying that Hitler was saying both Ja und Nein - at which point the hybrid Jein appears - but it's not there long enough to read the explanation of the term - I mean not nearly long enough. Reminded me of my Berlinerisch ex-freundin - so I do know the term, but even so, not enough time.

yeah, I know, problem was I didn't want to expand the script/time for that joke and if people are really into it they will pause.

 

[stevieji]

11 days? It were only 3 days and 8 hours of delay.

Halt order - 24 May. Evacuation - 26 May to 4 June. 11 days.
If you're saying that the advance resumed on 27/28 May, then my point is invalid. Is that what you're saying - the advance resumed, but the allied rearguard held off the German army for another 8 days? Seems unlikely, but if so, I've misunderstood.

they supplied a lot if not all men with "doping" to stay awake

The Luftwaffe pilots were also exhausted, apparently, but perhaps this is different to being on the front line.

do you have a source for this claim?

"During the following days... it became known that Hitler's decision was mainly influenced by Goering. To the dictator the rapid movement of the Army, whose risks and prospects of success he did not understand because of his lack of military schooling, became almost sinister. He was constantly oppressed by a feeling of anxiety that a reversal loomed..."
— Halder, in a letter of July 1957.[7]

7. Shirer 1959, p. 879.

Halder wrote in his diary on 30 May:
"Brauchitsch is angry ... The pocket would have been closed at the coast if only our armour had not been held back. The bad weather has grounded the Luftwaffe and we must now stand and watch countless thousands of the enemy get away to England right under our noses."[9]

9. Shirer 1959, p. 883.

Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959. ISBN 0-330-70001-4

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Dunkirk#Halt_order

 

[keynes2.0]

but based on the contemporary views of the people involved

You spill a lot of words establishing that but dont give more then a throw away line to the proposition that the Germans actually would have met with more success if they had attacked sooner. These generals were caught up in the moment of their success, feeling invincible. After the war there was an entire cottage industry built around searching their memoirs for reasons to blame Hitler and insist that any military setback was the result of his meddling.

Of course the topic of the video is "why" not "what if". Still I get the impression that the video operates from the assumption that the "what if" is great success without Hitler's meddling.

 

[gladius2metal]

attack resumed on 27th of May. The point was on May 24th just a few companies were defending and good weather, May 27th, divisions and bad weather.

"During the following days... it became known that Hitler's decision was mainly influenced by Goering. To the dictator the rapid movement of the Army, whose risks and prospects of success he did not understand because of his lack of military schooling, became almost sinister. He was constantly oppressed by a feeling of anxiety that a reversal loomed..."
— Halder, in a letter of July 1957.[7]

After war memoirs are usually hogwash, because of our memory changes all the time (see Daniel Schacter the Seven Sins of Memory) on this and also usually also with a certain intention in mind. Don't know if it is true in this case, but after the war the generals blamed all on Hitler and the nazis. This fits perfectly into this narrative. Also both Hitler and Göring were long dead at this point in time. inention: good generals, good wehrmacht, bad nazis.
If I get the book again I will look into the Göring stuff, but I think it was only one part. I think the part when Hitler shows up at Rundstedt's HQ and wants to talk about the deployment of tanks and Hitler tells him: I don't have any, they were transfered to Heeresgruppe B that he freaked out and of course the anxiety of reversal, which both Hitler and Rundstedt had.


ahh, now I get what you meant with the second sentence here:

One thing you don't seem to mention is the idea that Goering insisted that the Luftwaffe could complete the job. Halder certainly thought this was the case - even though he did not know it at the time, as he says it became clear later.

I thought you were referring to "could complete the job" and not on the "Göring insist" part.


About Shirer, the book is from 1959 back then most historian just believed what the generals told them and many of the sources were still "closed". Frieser is from 1996 and even that is old, but I know he used many German and French sources. (Although in this particular case French sources are not really important.)

 

[gladius2metal]

After the war there was an entire cottage industry built around searching their memoirs for reasons to blame Hitler and insist that any military setback was the result of his meddling.

Of course the topic of the video is "why" not "what if". Still I get the impression that the video operates from the assumption that the "what if" is great success without Hitler's meddling.

Yeah, exactly and THUS Frieser uses the CONTEMPORARY sources of that moment NOT their after-war hogwash.

I am very well aware that the generals blamed a lot on Hitler. Basically, without Hitler they would probably never got a Luftwaffe. The early parts movements of the Military Resistance in the German Army, which culminated in the 20th of July 1940, actually started around 1938, when some generals got scared that Hitler would lead them into a war that they would lose and thus all their power (and toys and money) would have been gone.

 

[keynes2.0]

Yes, I know they were contemporary sources. But people make decisions afterwards about what personal records to play up and which ones to downplay.

 

[gladius2metal]

Of course the topic of the video is "why" not "what if". Still I get the impression that the video operates from the assumption that the "what if" is great success without Hitler's meddling.

in this case yes, but without Hitler's meddling the German Army would have had still around 100 000 men, paper tanks and no airplanes. Furthermore, no Austria, Sudentenland, etc.

 

[gladius2metal]

Yes, I know they were contemporary sources. But people make decisions afterwards about what personal records to play up and which ones to downplay.

yeah, so we should just not read anything or what? You know, I am a historian, Friesers work was published by the MGFA (German Military History Research Institute) and also recommended by my professors. I also read that account. Thus that mean it is right, no of course not, but it sounded pretty plausible (EDIT: + and was freaking well sourced). After all, he made it even more clear that it was Rundstedt's decision, because Hitler gave him free reign.

 

[keynes2.0]

I didn't say that.

 

[DoomBunny]

But again, even if these leaders were in a minority, it's easy to see why they might have regarded a halt as necessary. Nothing in the video or your reply, other than the assertion that these generals were a minority (not in itself a mark of incompetence), suggests that there weren't legitimate reasons behind their decision. I'm not arguing for or against, simply saying that it is very easy, now knowing the result, to say that these men were not formulating reasoned opinions based on the evidence as they saw it.

I think a better way to approach the topic would be through an examination of the intelligence reports/communications that reached each level of command. In that way one can perhaps see what influenced the decision making process.

 

[gladius2metal]

reading helps

 

[Imgran]

Frankly I wonder if they wanted britain to attempt a rescue with the idea that they would have to use the Royal Navy to do it, and doing so would allow Germany to strike at and weaken Britain's strongest defense in a situation where they would know exactly where to go to find said navy and inflict damage on it with the Luftwaffe.

If I had an air advantage, and I knew I'd have to destroy my enemy's navy to defeat them, that might be a situation I'd exploit to force my enemy's navy to be where I could strike them easily from the air. And in fact the Luftwaffe did a lot of damage to the Dunkirk flotilla, although probably not nearly as much as the Germans had hoped

 

[gladius2metal]

Frankly I wonder if they wanted britain to attempt a rescue with the idea that they would have to use the Royal Navy to do it, and doing so would allow Germany to strike at and weaken Britain's strongest defense in a situation where they would know exactly where to go to find said navy and inflict damage on it with the Luftwaffe.

If I had an air advantage, and I knew I'd have to destroy my enemy's navy to defeat them, that might be a situation I'd exploit to force my enemy's navy to be where I could strike them easily from the air. And in fact the Luftwaffe did a lot of damage to the Dunkirk flotilla, although probably not nearly as much as the Germans had hoped

interesting point, the problem was most of the Luftwaffe still had many bases and equipment based in Germany. Frieser brought up an example where bombers flew from Bavaria and I think they were refueled somewhere more close to the front. Above Dunkirk it was a small Battle of Britain, basically the 109s were operating at the limit of their effective range, whereas the Brits "just flew over the Channel". Kesselring and Richthofen protested, because the Luftwaffe was mostly occupied with supporting the Army, which makes sense because Germany at that time wasn't an industrial Juggernaut nor was the Wehrmacht a completely modernized armed force. After all the army was still using Panzer 1s and Panzer 2s tanks that were not intended for combat. No specialist in Air Force matters, but changing plans and everything from close air support roles for the army to hunting ships in a matter of days is something that is probably quite problematic.

 

[DoomBunny]

reading helps

Not if one is attempting to read palms.

 

[gladius2metal]

I think a better way to approach the topic would be through an examination of the intelligence reports/communications that reached each level of command. In that way one can perhaps see what influenced the decision making process.

not 100 % sure, but I think Frieser mentioned in a sentence that intelligence didn't indicate any major threats. And as stated before many generals at almost all levels of command clearly disagreed with the halt-order and they "probably" read their intelligence reports. Frieser examined the orders and war diaries of that time.

 

[gladius2metal]

Not if one is attempting to read palms.

either missed that part below (from my first answer to you) or you are just trolling

Not sure, if I didn't mention that sufficiently in the video, but I thought each slide with showing the "acting" elements several times should have given a good impression that it was not an hindsight commentary, but based on the contemporary views of the people involved. (Frieser my source, usually avoided any post-war comments, because he knows very well that afterwards many just talk bullshit).