US Civil War: Megathread ***read moderator threadmark before posting***

[Andre Bolkonsky]

The more I read about the Civil War, the more I am convinced that the "leadership" portion is highly exaggerated, and that the success of Confederate commanders in the Eastern theater owed more to their troops being familiar with the terrain than superior leadership.

More specifically, it's telling that the Army of Northern Virginia tends to lose whenever it fights outside of its home state - often making basic navigation errors that characterize Union defeats in the same theater. Longstreet in particular wasn't very effective when he was sent West; and was essentially beaten by the much-maligned Burnside during the Knoxville campaign. By contrast Grant proved capable of handling troops in either theater.

Moreover there was an undercurrent of restraint guiding McClellan's actions - as early in the Civil War there were many in the Union who still hoped that a "silent majority" in the South would eventually rise up and overthrow the Confederacy, as evidenced by how something in the region of 100,000 Union soldiers were actually from Confederate states (which was also why the Confederates were quite ruthless about eliminating pro-Union elements in their own territory).

It wasn't until Grant that Union Army really accepted a "fight to the finish" mindset; which ironically may have been an outgrowth of Grant's experience at Shiloh. Despite winning the battle Grant was very nearly sacked anyway as public opinion was shocked by the losses he incurred - losses that turned out to be the norm for Civil War battle rather than the exception.

If you want to press home the idea the South had no interest in making war on the North by merely defending their borders, you are correct.

However, at the outbreak of the war, the South has professional generals whereas the North frequently makes due with political appointees.

Stonewall Jackson is in possession of a massive map of the Shenandoah Valley marking every road, mountain pass, forest trail, and river ford known. He combines what with very effective training for his 'Foot Cavalry', he puts them in places where they can win until their elan is elite, and he uses speed and knowledge to show up in places he cannot be.

This is not leadership?

 

[Zinegata]

If you want to press home the idea the South had no interest in making war on the North by merely defending their borders, you are correct.

However, at the outbreak of the war, the South has professional generals whereas the North frequently makes due with political appointees.

Stonewall Jackson is in possession of a massive map of the Shenandoah Valley marking every road, mountain pass, forest trail, and river ford known. He combines what with very effective training for his 'Foot Cavalry', he puts them in places where they can win until their elan is elite, and he uses speed and knowledge to show up in places he cannot be.

This is not leadership?

While preparedness is indeed an aspect of military leadership, what you don't realize is that maps of Shenandoah Valley and other areas of Virginia were simply not readily available during the time; and indeed to this day nobody has a very accurate map of the First Bull Run - because the stream's course varies and that's not reflected in any map. You can't laud Stonewall for having complete maps while the Union commanders did not - because such maps were simply not available at all and were often inaccurate; requiring actual local knowledge to correct. This is the real reason why Union units often lost coordination (or simply got lost) in the big early battles in the East; especially when you're reliant on couriers to pass messages along.

That's why I noted how the Army of Northern Virginia tended to run into the same problem too when they're outside of Northern Virginia. It was a common problem for both sides. The Union just happened to be operating under this disadvantage more often in the East as they were attacking.

As for the training aspect - I would frankly consider other Union commanders to be better trainers of military units and leave it at that. The Foot Cavalry was nothing special, especially when compared to how far Grant and Sherman's troopers were marching in the middle of hostile territory in the West. Vicksburg was in many ways as masterfully handled by Grant as Jackson did the Shenandoah campaign; with Grant having a numerically inferior force overall yet being able to catch the Confederates off-guard and outnumber them tactically.

Moreover, of the graduates of West Point, two thirds actually joined the Union and only a third went to the Confederates. The South did not have more "professional" generals if we define them as career officers who've graduated from the primary US military academy. Indeed, it could be argued that part of the timidity of Union strategy was due to the influence of Jomini on West Point; whose precepts Sherman had to explicitly ignore during his March to the Sea. It is quite simply a myth that the Southern Generals were more "professional" - indeed a frequent criticism of Davis is that he picked friends to be promoted into becoming generals of the Confederate Army.

 

[DoomBunny]

I think the bigger issue with McClellan is that he had no ability whatsoever to read a strategic situation. He divided his forces and then insisted that Pope come meet him then abandoned the very offensive that Pope was supposed to support! The entire conduct of the campaign is a mishmash of half measures that have no hope of actually advancing towards an objective but diverted the largest part of the northern war effort. Modern military theory talks about disrupting an opponent's OODA loop in order to paralyze them, McClellan did that to the Union army all on his own.

This is really the other side of the same coin. McClellan's problem really seems to have been a combination of outright narcissism and self-doubt. The man was not a physical coward, but morally seems to have been one. I think what you really have with McClellan is a man who is so convinced of his own value and potential for greatness that he never takes a risk because to do so would risk that reputation becoming fouled. The example you give really demonstrates his uncertainty, which resulted as you say in half measures and flip flopping.

If not for the paralysis that McClellan inflicted, I think the war would have been over by the Christmas of 1863. Union commanders might have blundered into tactical defeats but they could have just hunkered down, regrouped and then marched onwards towards Richmond again. It was only by wasting so much time that McClellan gave the rebellion time to get organized enough to even consider offensives into Maryland. That is what you see in pretty much every other part of the war, the north has setbacks from place to place but they come back again and again so by summer of 1863 and are not just besieging Vicksburg but have also taken New Orleans and every other major seaport. The southern forces never had the luxury of choosing to fight at a time and place of their choosing except when he was in command.

Without McClellan, the Union can be in Richmond in 1862, no question. The Peninsula Campaign in itself was a victim of his sloth, even before a shot was fired, a more aggressive commander could have simply pushed to Richmond through the light screen of enemy forces and potentially taken the city without a major battle. Even if it came to a major fight, the Union still has a massive numerical advantage.

The more I read about the Civil War, the more I am convinced that the "leadership" portion is highly exaggerated, and that the success of Confederate commanders in the Eastern theater owed more to their troops being familiar with the terrain than superior leadership.

More specifically, it's telling that the Army of Northern Virginia tends to lose whenever it fights outside of its home state - often making basic navigation errors that characterize Union defeats in the same theater. Longstreet in particular wasn't very effective when he was sent West; and was essentially beaten by the much-maligned Burnside during the Knoxville campaign. By contrast Grant proved capable of handling troops in either theater.

In Longstreet's case I'd suggest the issue is very much that he wasn't cut out for independent command, rather than that he was off his home turf. His performance in the West against Burnside may have been bad (and there is substantial evidence that he didn't have much of a mind for independent command), but at Chickamauga he did very well. Really Longstreet was probably the best tactical commander on either side, he just needed someone above him to provide the strategic and operational direction.

As far as the home field advantage goes, I think there's certainly something to it. Chancellorsville demonstrates the advantages of being on one's own turf, as it was only through local information that Lee and Jackson knew of the trail which made the flanking attack possible. On the other hand, one can make too much of it. The Maryland Campaign was a very long shot from the start, even before one factored in the Union's home advantage. Gettysburg meanwhile was an issue as much of Lee's improper use of his cavalry and inefficient subordinates as it was anything else.

On the whole though, the primacy of leadership really stands out in several battles. The Seven Days were only a Confederate victory because McClellan chose to withdraw, Antietam was only a draw because he again failed to push, and Chancellorsville was also a failure owing to Hooker's loss of nerve and subsequent decision to go onto the defensive and then retreat. Without this failure of leadership, the Union should have been in Richmond well before 1865.

Moreover there was an undercurrent of restraint guiding McClellan's actions - as early in the Civil War there were many in the Union who still hoped that a "silent majority" in the South would eventually rise up and overthrow the Confederacy, as evidenced by how something in the region of 100,000 Union soldiers were actually from Confederate states (which was also why the Confederates were quite ruthless about eliminating pro-Union elements in their own territory).

It wasn't until Grant that Union Army really accepted a "fight to the finish" mindset; which ironically may have been an outgrowth of Grant's experience at Shiloh. Despite winning the battle Grant was very nearly sacked anyway as public opinion was shocked by the losses he incurred - losses that turned out to be the norm for Civil War battle rather than the exception.

A lot of this is McClellan himself, he wasn't fully behind Lincoln and wanted to treat the South fairly moderately. I'm not sure it was so much a case of his options being restrained as it was his desire to do things differently.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

While preparedness is indeed an aspect of military leadership, what you don't realize is that maps of Shenandoah Valley and other areas of Virginia were simply not readily available during the time; and indeed to this day nobody has a very accurate map of the First Bull Run - because the stream's course varies and that's not reflected in any map. You can't laud Stonewall for having complete maps while the Union commanders did not - because such maps were simply not available at all and were often inaccurate; requiring actual local knowledge to correct. This is the real reason why Union units often lost coordination (or simply got lost) in the big early battles in the East; especially when you're reliant on couriers to pass messages along.

That's why I noted how the Army of Northern Virginia tended to run into the same problem too when they're outside of Northern Virginia. It was a common problem for both sides. The Union just happened to be operating under this disadvantage more often in the East as they were attacking.

As for the training aspect - I would frankly consider other Union commanders to be better trainers of military units and leave it at that. The Foot Cavalry was nothing special, especially when compared to how far Grant and Sherman's troopers were marching in the middle of hostile territory in the West. Vicksburg was in many ways as masterfully handled by Grant as Jackson did the Shenandoah campaign; with Grant having a numerically inferior force overall yet being able to catch the Confederates off-guard and outnumber them tactically.

Moreover, of the graduates of West Point, two thirds actually joined the Union and only a third went to the Confederates. The South did not have more "professional" generals if we define them as career officers who've graduated from the primary US military academy. Indeed, it could be argued that part of the timidity of Union strategy was due to the influence of Jomini on West Point; whose precepts Sherman had to explicitly ignore during his March to the Sea. It is quite simply a myth that the Southern Generals were more "professional" - indeed a frequent criticism of Davis is that he picked friends to be promoted into becoming generals of the Confederate Army.

I point out a map no one else has. You tell me I don't realize maps are hard to come by?

The Stonewall Brigade is nothing special?

Grant has a numerically inferior force at Vicksburg, and can only win with a quick attack that keeps the Confederates off guard? At Vicksburg, Grant's Army of the Tennessee has about 77,000 men, Pemberton's Army of Mississippi has about 33,000. It's not a quick attack, it's a seige; digging a massive canal, using sappers to blow entire forts to Kingdom Come, and allowing hunger to bring the fortress low.

Good luck reading about the war, next time go straight to the chapters on Union advantages in manpower and material, the railroads, the telegraphs. It'll help you get to where you are trying to go.

 

[Arilou]

Heck, the fact that Union command was way more proffessional can easily be seen on the strategic level. The Anaconda Plan was just way above the level of anything the Confederates ever came up with.

 

[Klausewitz]

@Arilou:
To be fair the South had very different strategic situation and much less wiggleroom and much less ressources than the Union...

 

[gagenater]

While preparedness is indeed an aspect of military leadership, what you don't realize is that maps of Shenandoah Valley and other areas of Virginia were simply not readily available during the time; and indeed to this day nobody has a very accurate map of the First Bull Run - because the stream's course varies and that's not reflected in any map. You can't laud Stonewall for having complete maps while the Union commanders did not - because such maps were simply not available at all and were often inaccurate; requiring actual local knowledge to correct. This is the real reason why Union units often lost coordination (or simply got lost) in the big early battles in the East; especially when you're reliant on couriers to pass messages along.

That's why I noted how the Army of Northern Virginia tended to run into the same problem too when they're outside of Northern Virginia. It was a common problem for both sides. The Union just happened to be operating under this disadvantage more often in the East as they were attacking.

I agree with all this above.

As for the training aspect - I would frankly consider other Union commanders to be better trainers of military units and leave it at that. The Foot Cavalry was nothing special, especially when compared to how far Grant and Sherman's troopers were marching in the middle of hostile territory in the West. Vicksburg was in many ways as masterfully handled by Grant as Jackson did the Shenandoah campaign; with Grant having a numerically inferior force overall yet being able to catch the Confederates off-guard and outnumber them tactically.

Eventually, the Union had far better soldiers than the south did, and this was indeed thanks to training, but the luxury of conducting that training existed because of the manpower and production advantages the Union had. The Confederacy simply couldn't afford to have any considerable # of it's able bodied soldiers running around wearing out clothes, accidentally breaking tents, eating food,riding horses, breaking their legs in gopher holes and shooting guns just for them to get trained in doing it better. The Union could, and once they got organized enough to realize that they needed to do more intensive training, they did it.

Moreover, of the graduates of West Point, two thirds actually joined the Union and only a third went to the Confederates. The South did not have more "professional" generals if we define them as career officers who've graduated from the primary US military academy. Indeed, it could be argued that part of the timidity of Union strategy was due to the influence of Jomini on West Point; whose precepts Sherman had to explicitly ignore during his March to the Sea. It is quite simply a myth that the Southern Generals were more "professional" - indeed a frequent criticism of Davis is that he picked friends to be promoted into becoming generals of the Confederate Army.

This is true as a whole, but it's also true that when you look at the more senior and more experienced members of the officer corps from the pre-civil war army, a disproportionate number of them were from the south, and stayed with their home states when they succeeded. Specifically this would be officers, West Point trained or not who were already in command positions during the Mexican American war between 1846 and 1848.

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/mexican-war/mexican-war-generals.html.

If you scroll down to the list of them, it's literally a who's who list of prominent civil war generals, and of the 20 of note, excepting a few cavalry commanders (cavalry had no role of note in the Mexican war) it includes nearly all the ones from both sides generally accepted as good commanders by both sides.

 

[Zinegata]

I point out a map no one else has. You tell me I don't realize maps are hard to come by?

Given that you dismiss the difficulties of not having one, yes.

The Stonewall Brigade is nothing special?

Nope. Indeed, Jackson's Corps suffered the heaviest losses at Chancellorsville. While this may impress people trying to pretend that taking losses makes them the "better man" this to me is simply post-war excuses for bad generalship. Good generals do not needlessly lose men, nor do they stupidly demand that their forces bear such losses through "training".

Grant has a numerically inferior force at Vicksburg, and can only win with a quick attack that keeps the Confederates off guard? At Vicksburg, Grant's Army of the Tennessee has about 77,000 men, Pemberton's Army of Mississippi has about 33,000. It's not a quick attack, it's a seige; digging a massive canal, using sappers to blow entire forts to Kingdom Come, and allowing hunger to bring the fortress low.

You really need to read the actual campaign instead of the Wikipedia summary of just the siege itself.

Grant didn't start the campaign with 77,000 men - he started with 45,000. Meanwhile you counted only Pemberton's Army, and ignored the rest of the Confederate forces in the area including around 15,000 men that were around or enroute to Jackson, Mississippi.

And what you failed to realize here is that I was referring to his force prior to the start of the siege proper and after he had crossed the Mississippi - this was the period of the campaign characterized by a number of small battles such as Champion Hill.

That Grant was on the Confederate side of the river during this time with only a portion of his forces clearly eludes you in favor of just a myopic focus on the siege itself.

It also clearly eludes you that getting on the Confederate side of the river was a prerequisite to prosecuting the siege itself, because otherwise the city could simply be resupplied indefinitely. By hitting Vicksburg from the south, Grant was able to cut off its supply lines.

And again, very frankly, this was in many ways more impressive than the Shenandoah Valley campaign. Jackson beat multiple enemies in home territory. Grant beat multiple enemies in enemy territory.

Good luck reading about the war, next time go straight to the chapters on Union advantages in manpower and material, the railroads, the telegraphs. It'll help you get to where you are trying to go.

No, I don't think I want to read a fanboy version of the war based on a pre-generated narrative that you already decided upon; especially when you clearly don't even know the basics of the Vicksburg campaign and have a very shallow pop-history understanding of it. I can make my own mind up, thank you very much.

 

[Zinegata]

Eventually, the Union had far better soldiers than the south did, and this was indeed thanks to training, but the luxury of conducting that training existed because of the manpower and production advantages the Union had. The Confederacy simply couldn't afford to have any considerable # of it's able bodied soldiers running around wearing out clothes, accidentally breaking tents, eating food,riding horses, breaking their legs in gopher holes and shooting guns just for them to get trained in doing it better. The Union could, and once they got organized enough to realize that they needed to do more intensive training, they did it.

Yes, but I'm responding specifically to the notion that Jackson's Corps was special in its ability to execute many forced marches. They were not. Grant and Sherman did a lot of them too; but nobody ever calls Grant or Sherman's forces "elite".

If you employ a critical analysis of military formations, very often "elite" is simply a post-war appellation based on a very narrow sample. Indeed, many times and "elite" unit is simply "lucky" or "famous".

This is true as a whole, but it's also true that when you look at the more senior and more experienced members of the officer corps from the pre-civil war army, a disproportionate number of them were from the south, and stayed with their home states when they succeeded. Specifically this would be officers, West Point trained or not who were already in command positions during the Mexican American war between 1846 and 1848.

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/mexican-war/mexican-war-generals.html.

If you scroll down to the list of them, it's literally a who's who list of prominent civil war generals, and of the 20 of note, excepting a few cavalry commanders (cavalry had no role of note in the Mexican war) it includes nearly all the ones from both sides generally accepted as good commanders by both sides.

The issue here is that famous generals are only a fraction of the officer corps, which is why I felt the need to highlight the actual number of officers and which sides they picked. It is true to say that the South may have had a disproportionate number of famous generals with pre-war combat experience, but "professional" is distinct and different from this.

Moreover, both sides had officer shortages to begin with; which is why so many non-professional officers had to be drafted to begin with (and some of them got their commissions due to politics). This was not an exclusively a Union problem, and the idea that the South was a more tight-nit team of professional officers instead of a mixed bag is simply yet another Lost Cause myth.

 

[Zinegata]

A lot of this is McClellan himself, he wasn't fully behind Lincoln and wanted to treat the South fairly moderately. I'm not sure it was so much a case of his options being restrained as it was his desire to do things differently.

It may certainly be on McClellan - he has enough people detracting him on his timidity - but I feel it is only fair to point out that Grant was almost sacked for Shiloh despite winning due to the heavy losses he incurred.

Shiloh moreover happened around the same time the Peninsular Campaign started, and having the newspapers calling for Grant to be sacked for creating a "bloodbath" would have likely influenced the conduct of any commander of the Peninsular Campaign.

With regards to the terrain vs leadership - yes, I agree one can also weigh too much on the terrain factor. It's more a mix of both; I am just more inclined to side with it more at present because most commentators don't even consider it.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

(cavalry had no role of note in the Mexican war)

An untrue statement.

Cavalry is indespensible for recon and scouting the lines of advance, in several places it is used to unmask, encircle, and trap Mexican ambushes.

Due to the urban nature of the war, and the vastly superior quality of the American Army and its leadership, you are correct there is no grand cavalry charge during a major battle.

 

[DoomBunny]

Heck, the fact that Union command was way more proffessional can easily be seen on the strategic level. The Anaconda Plan was just way above the level of anything the Confederates ever came up with.

The issue the South has in terms of strategy, aside from the fact that they never really agreed on one, is that no strategy would really have ticked all the boxes. You really have two options;

1) The offensive/Lee strategy of not giving ground, attempting to win a decisive battle, and even taking the fight to the Union. The problem here is that you are very hard pressed to win a decisive battle, that even if you do the Union may not necessarily surrender, and that you're risking largescale defeats.

2) The defensive/play for time strategy of using your vast geographic resources to draw the Union in, harassing them and gradually wearing them down defensively whilst potentially waiting for a diplomatic solution (hopefully involving Britain and France). The problem here is that the Union may not get tired, that you are a confederation of independent states and therefore ceding territory from one state without a fight is politically tricky, and that most of your population and industry is concentrated at the borders of your territory meaning any retreat sacrifices them.

It may certainly be on McClellan - he has enough people detracting him on his timidity - but I feel it is only fair to point out that Grant was almost sacked for Shiloh despite winning due to the heavy losses he incurred.

Shiloh moreover happened around the same time the Peninsular Campaign started, and having the newspapers calling for Grant to be sacked for creating a "bloodbath" would have likely influenced the conduct of any commander of the Peninsular Campaign.

I don't feel this fits for two reasons.

Firstly, before Shiloh we have plenty of evidence for McClellan being somewhat timid; he took an age to actually begin the Peninsula Campaign, and then even when he finally assembled his forces he took another age to begin the advance (and that at terrifically slow pace). As Shiloh happens McClellan is stalled at Yorktown (after a slow start in itself) and this is even without allowing for information time lag.

Secondly, McClellan's future conduct doesn't really fit either. Certainly one can argue he didn't want to risk an annihilating defeat that would ruin his reputation, but at the same time, this doesn't necessarily justify his approach. At the Seven Days for example, retreating doesn't really salvage one's reputation, as much as run it through the mud even more; something like Malvern Hill could have resulted in a renewed holding action, but instead McClellan bottled it.

McClellan may have looked to Grant's example, but really I think the main problem was that he was just not very good at battlefield command.

With regards to the terrain vs leadership - yes, I agree one can also weigh too much on the terrain factor. It's more a mix of both; I am just more inclined to side with it more at present because most commentators don't even consider it.

Research, write, put in journal (or just send it to some lecturer)?

 

[Eusebio]

@Arilou:
To be fair the South had very different strategic situation and much less wiggleroom and much less ressources than the Union...

To be fair the South's grand strategy was rather incompetent with what resources they had. The cotton embargo has to be one of the worst ideas in the annals of geopolitics.

 

[Klausewitz]

To be fair the South's grand strategy was rather incompetent with what resources they had. The cotton embargo has to be one of the worst ideas in the annals of geopolitics.

And yet the idea of 'They need us more than we need them so we simply gonna threaten them with blowing our own head off' recently reared its head again in the Brexit... is that maybe a fault line of the human psyche?

 

[Eusebio]

And yet the idea of 'They need us more than we need them so we simply gonna threaten them with blowing our own head off' recently reared its head again in the Brexit... is that maybe a fault line of the human psyche?

Fair point.

 

[The-Doc]

To be fair the South's grand strategy was rather incompetent with what resources they had. The cotton embargo has to be one of the worst ideas in the annals of geopolitics.

The necessity of King Cotton and the coercive power it granted was a long held truth in parlor rooms, at dining tables, and in editorial pages. Strange how something everyone accepts as matter of fact can turn out completely wrong.

As for the quality of generals I'm with Sherman; Grant is the greatest general that America has ever had.

 

[gagenater]

To be fair the South's grand strategy was rather incompetent with what resources they had. The cotton embargo has to be one of the worst ideas in the annals of geopolitics.

It might not have been the worlds greatest idea, but what other choices did they have? At the time the embargo was announced, most cotton was getting out of the south by private blockade runners. This was enriching the captains who ran the blockades, and the owners of the cotton, but none of that money was making it's way back to the confederate government in the form of taxes or other remuneration. The Confederate government had no monetary potential for loss by cutting this trade off, and at least in theory a potential for diplomatic gain,so why not try it?

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

It might not have been the worlds greatest idea, but what other choices did they have? At the time the embargo was announced, most cotton was getting out of the south by private blockade runners. This was enriching the captains who ran the blockades, and the owners of the cotton, but none of that money was making it's way back to the confederate government in the form of taxes or other remuneration. The Confederate government had no monetary potential for loss by cutting this trade off, and at least in theory a potential for diplomatic gain,so why not try it?

This is not entirely correct. It was never about taxes or profit, but the importation of arms, material, medical supplies, etc - supplies in short supply but vital to the Confderacy's survival.

The Blockade Runners made fortunes. Their trading partners in England and France, and the intermediaries in the Carribean, made a fortune. The shipyards in Europe made a fortune building custom rigged ships for the smugglers. Now, it is easier and more profitable to import silk, brandy, and French fashions than cannon and gunpowder, and smugglers are smugglers at the end of the day. Steps are taken to prevent this, too little, too late. But the Blockade Runners kept the South in the game longer than would have happened otherwise.

 

[Zinegata]

I don't feel this fits for two reasons.

Firstly, before Shiloh we have plenty of evidence for McClellan being somewhat timid; he took an age to actually begin the Peninsula Campaign, and then even when he finally assembled his forces he took another age to begin the advance (and that at terrifically slow pace). As Shiloh happens McClellan is stalled at Yorktown (after a slow start in itself) and this is even without allowing for information time lag.

Secondly, McClellan's future conduct doesn't really fit either. Certainly one can argue he didn't want to risk an annihilating defeat that would ruin his reputation, but at the same time, this doesn't necessarily justify his approach. At the Seven Days for example, retreating doesn't really salvage one's reputation, as much as run it through the mud even more; something like Malvern Hill could have resulted in a renewed holding action, but instead McClellan bottled it.

McClellan may have looked to Grant's example, but really I think the main problem was that he was just not very good at battlefield command.

I don't think we are really disagreeing with regards to McClellan, I'm just pointing out that it's only fair to note that any Union commander leading the Peninsular Campaign would have been under pressure to avoid a bloodbath.

Research, write, put in journal (or just send it to some lecturer)?

Frankly, I feel we are reaching the point wherein the orthodox ideas about the Civil War are too entrenched among academic circles to make this fruitful unless there is significant traction in the public consciousness first.

That's what happened to a large extent in tank history research. It wasn't until the "superior German armor" myths started getting debunked on the Internet that more established authors also began looking into it and realized they had a point. Indeed, it resulted in quite a few "Internet experts" ending up legitimized because of it with their own published books.

 

[Zinegata]

To be fair the South's grand strategy was rather incompetent with what resources they had. The cotton embargo has to be one of the worst ideas in the annals of geopolitics.

The issue with the South's grand strategy was that it was ultimately one conceived and directed by a very specific section of the population - namely the plantation owners and the overseer class they employed; rather than one that was rooted in any genuine desire to create a stable nation-state. That people still romanticize the Lost Cause narrative and present it as a genuine people's war rather than one fought ultimately for economic self-interest is one of the big reasons why the Civil War remains one of the most grossly misunderstood wars in popular memory; and this wrong understanding of its realities has enormously negative effects to how modern America understands its own past and present problems.