If Comrade Rakobolskaja is not using the production budget, I should like to borrow it for a time.
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If Comrade Rakobolskaja is not using the production budget, I should like to borrow it for a time.
((Very Lincoln-esque of you.
))Comrades,
If Comrade Rakobolskaja cannot submit a plan by Wednesday at 10 PM (-6 GMT), I am authorizing Comrade Vatutin to submit a construction plan for 1938.
Stalin
Project Kirov
Kirov is with us
Kirov is with us
Background
This proposed Production Budget follows on from the completion of Project Red Wall, which established the RKKA perimeter on the border of the Soviet Union.
The objective of Project Kirov is to fulfill the material requirements for the RKKA and the VVS with a view to putting the Soviet Union on an effective war footing for defensive and offensive operations within an 18 month timeframe in contrast to the present standing of basic frontier protection.
The general timeline is for 1938 to be a year of production, to take advantage of the industrial efficiencies of recruiting large numbers of brigades on Reserve status whilst still on a Volunteer footing but with War Economy Industrial Capacity. In 1939, the focus is to shift to preparation for imminent operations by running off the tail of production of new units and starting to convert old units (such as cavalry in the Shock Armies) to modern units. The focus in 1940 is to finish off these conversions and then take stock of where to go next.
Proposal
1938 Build Up
The long term goal is to fit out the Rifle Divisions of the Red Wall with Artillery and Anti-tank brigades for punch and to compensate for the fact that most foreign Divisions have greater numbers through 3 Infantry Regts comapred to our 2 Regts per Division. It is proposed that there 150 ART and 145 AT brigades be built over 3 serial runs (the difference in numbers is due to the allocation of ART but not AT to the Mountain Divisions). These runs are to be placed at the bottom of the Production queue to use IC as and when they become available. This will produce a cascade of ART and AT brigades to be allocated 1 of each type per division ((I found it easiest to start from the top of the Rifle Divisions in the scroll down and allocate ART, then when the AT came on line to allocate them with the Divisions with ART so that it filled their 4 slots and took them off the scroll down)). This part of the project will not be completed until mid 1939 because of the delay in waiting for IC to become available after other items are completed.
The more immediate goal is the construction of the 3rd Shock Army of 5 Mechanized Corps of 5 Tank Divisions (Medium Tank + Motorized Infantry + Tank Destroyer + ART (SPART once researched) and the 8th Army comprised of 5 Rifle Corps of 4 Rifle Divisions each (2 INF + 1 ART + 1 AT). Based on what has been produced to date, this requires a further 21 Tank Divisions and 16 Rifle Divisions. We can produce 2 Tank Divisions and 3 Rifle Divisions per annum per serial run. Again, this will take an 18 month period.
For the VVS, it is proposed to have 7 INT Groups of 4 INT’s each and 4 Close Support Groups of 4 CAS each by mid 1939. This would require a further 13 INT’s and 14 CAS. We can produce 2.8 INT’s and 2 CAS per annum per serial run. We are currently producing 5 INT’s and 6 CAS in the Production queue. I suggest cutting these back by 1 of each to 4 and 5 respectively once the existing units are produced to free up IC for ART/AT productions. The INT and CAS construction should be completed by mid 1939.
For the Red Fleet, 4 Transports are to be built to bring the total transport lift capacity to 6. These can be built as a 1 off group of 4 at the start of the year. The IC can then be switched back to other projects in May 1938.
The NKVD has requested 2 MP brigades. These can be built as one offs at the start of the year with the IC sent back to projects once this is completed in March 1938.
1939 Preparation for War
In 1939, there will be a run off of production from the 1938 queues, especially the ART and AT brigades.
We should then add a run of 45 Tank Destroyers and 45 Self Propelled Artillery to fill out the original Tank Divisions of the 1st and 2nd Shock Armies built from the scrapping of the old battleships. This should be placed in priority over the ART/AT brigades so that the Tank Divisions can be combat ready by 3rd quarter 1939.
The Cavalry Regts of the 1st and 2nd Shock Armies are to be converted to Medium Tank Regts. Timing of the conversion will depend heavily on whether we are at peace at the time as this will incapacitate the Division until the conversion is completed.
It is also expected that over this year, there will be a gradual move of IC away from Production to Upgrading, and after the introduction of a draft, to Reinforcement. Depending on whether there are any hostilities it may be necessary to suspend production except for the conversion of units so as to pile IC into Reinforcement and then Upgrading on an emergency basis.
1940 Finishing Touches
Subject to any events which may delay the above, and subject to operational needs from hostilities, 1940 will be mostly just finishing off production from the above steps and conversions. The Cavalry and Garrison regts in Moskva can be converted at this time, as can the NKVD Garrison Regts.
Caveat
If this production goes to plan, it will dilute the existing officer pool significantly to the 50’s % by 1939. This will in turn require a significant allocation of leadership to build up officers in 1939 once drafts are introduced. It will be a very slow process to regain officer percentages (about 1% per month) so we will be relying on numbers and superior equipment rather than tactical leadership to overwhelm the opposition. We should therefore pick wars where we can exploit our overwhelming numbers rather than pick fights where it is 1 on 1.
Proposed Construction Queue (grouped in following order)
2 Factories – To finish 28/II & 13/IV and not renewed
6 ARM Div (Reserve: 1 Medium Tank, 1 Motorised Infantry, 1Tank Destroyer & 1 ART/SPART) – Reduce down to 5 when next division built 15/I and not renewed. Otherwise repeat after each division is built until 3rd Shock Army full
4 INF Div (Reserve: 2 Infantry, 1 ART & 1 AT) – Repeat after each division is built until 8th Army full
2MP – one offs not to be renewed. To be completed by 31/III
4 TRANS – one offs, not to be renewed. To be completed by 19/V
5 INT – Reduce down to 4 after next INT built on 6/I, repeat until 7 INT groups built
6 CAS – Reduce down to 5 after next CAS built on 21/II, repeat until 4 CAS groups built
50 x 3 ART (Reserve)
45 x 3 and 10 x 1 AT (Reserve)
In 1939, add above ART brigades
45 TD (Reserve)
45 SPART (Reserve)
Comrade Vatutin,
Your substitution for Comrade Rakabolskaja is appreciated. The above plan looks well-considered and will surely bring us victory. There are two minor issues though, of which one is within your capabilities to correct. This has to do with our Mountain Divisions. These divisions are formed to operate in mountainous terrain, as the name suggests, and the attachment of a heavy artillery brigade will hamper the division in its effectiveness. The light regimental artillery will suffice in these cases. Rather would I suggest to train more mountain troops, and improve the capabilities of our special divisions by increasing the number of base regiments per division.
The second issue requires some clarification from you, and action from Comrade Yakushev. Your estimate of a 1% growth in officer coverage per month is shocking, and this will mean we need to plan ahead. Which are the parameters you used for the model that yielded these results? Specifically, what was the amount of investments in Officer Training, and did we execute a new draft? Comrade Yakushev, I need to know from you when officer training is to be resumed. It is estimated that drafting the reserves will boost the efficiency of our officer training by up to 50%, so when the time is right, I will call in the reserves.
- Major General Feodor Vasilevich Sokolov, People's Commissar for Justice
Your substitution for Comrade Rakabolskaja is appreciated. The above plan looks well-considered and will surely bring us victory. There are two minor issues though, of which one is within your capabilities to correct. This has to do with our Mountain Divisions. These divisions are formed to operate in mountainous terrain, as the name suggests, and the attachment of a heavy artillery brigade will hamper the division in its effectiveness. The light regimental artillery will suffice in these cases. Rather would I suggest to train more mountain troops, and improve the capabilities of our special divisions by increasing the number of base regiments per division.
The second issue requires some clarification from you, and action from Comrade Yakushev. Your estimate of a 1% growth in officer coverage per month is shocking, and this will mean we need to plan ahead. Which are the parameters you used for the model that yielded these results? Specifically, what was the amount of investments in Officer Training, and did we execute a new draft? Comrade Yakushev, I need to know from you when officer training is to be resumed. It is estimated that drafting the reserves will boost the efficiency of our officer training by up to 50%, so when the time is right, I will call in the reserves.
- Major General Feodor Vasilevich Sokolov, People's Commissar for Justice
Comrade Sokolov
To address your concerns:
1. Mountain troops - Whilst trained for mountain warfare, the Mountain Divisions have been formed into the Stavka Strategic Reserve because of their superior organisation and morale, to be used as shock troops operating in all terrains including possible amphibious operations. Therefore the fact that artillery brigades may slow them up in mountainous terrain, whilst true, is not a real problem. The artillery brigade gives more punch in soft attack than an additional Mountain Regt whilst at the same time adding a hard attack component which Mountain Regts lack, and cost less manpower, and does not have any combat width.
2. Officers - Our army service is presently voluntary. This has the benefit of allowing production of large numbers of cheap units. If we introduce the draft, the cost of the units rises dramatically which will retard the build up of units. On the other hand, we lose 50% of leadership allocated to officers during voluntary recruitment which is inefficient given our greater need for research and espionage. We could introduce a 1 year draft during peace time but this only reduces the leak of leadership to 25%. If we are at war with a minor, we can introduce a 3 year draft which gives a 25% bonus to officer recruitment. My calculations are based on us more than doubling the number of brigades in the Red Army using the above production programme which has the necessary side effect of diluting the number of officers per unit. I have assumed a 1 year draft in 1939 as production tails off with 3 year drafts whenever we can whilst bringing Socialism to some of our neighbours in 1939/40 but the sheer size of the Red Army means that it takes a lot of leadership to refill the officer ranks. It means that research gets cut back to 8-10 projects, diplomacy is all but nil and espionage is the bare minimum. We do get a leadership bonus from having a Great Army (more than 800 brigades) but still it is a long struggle.
It may not be the Red Army we deserve but it is the Red Army we need right now.
But I would apprecaite any comments if I have got my assumptions/calculations wrong.
Yours fraternally
NF Vatutin (Lt Gen)
NGSh
To address your concerns:
1. Mountain troops - Whilst trained for mountain warfare, the Mountain Divisions have been formed into the Stavka Strategic Reserve because of their superior organisation and morale, to be used as shock troops operating in all terrains including possible amphibious operations. Therefore the fact that artillery brigades may slow them up in mountainous terrain, whilst true, is not a real problem. The artillery brigade gives more punch in soft attack than an additional Mountain Regt whilst at the same time adding a hard attack component which Mountain Regts lack, and cost less manpower, and does not have any combat width.
2. Officers - Our army service is presently voluntary. This has the benefit of allowing production of large numbers of cheap units. If we introduce the draft, the cost of the units rises dramatically which will retard the build up of units. On the other hand, we lose 50% of leadership allocated to officers during voluntary recruitment which is inefficient given our greater need for research and espionage. We could introduce a 1 year draft during peace time but this only reduces the leak of leadership to 25%. If we are at war with a minor, we can introduce a 3 year draft which gives a 25% bonus to officer recruitment. My calculations are based on us more than doubling the number of brigades in the Red Army using the above production programme which has the necessary side effect of diluting the number of officers per unit. I have assumed a 1 year draft in 1939 as production tails off with 3 year drafts whenever we can whilst bringing Socialism to some of our neighbours in 1939/40 but the sheer size of the Red Army means that it takes a lot of leadership to refill the officer ranks. It means that research gets cut back to 8-10 projects, diplomacy is all but nil and espionage is the bare minimum. We do get a leadership bonus from having a Great Army (more than 800 brigades) but still it is a long struggle.
It may not be the Red Army we deserve but it is the Red Army we need right now.
But I would apprecaite any comments if I have got my assumptions/calculations wrong.
Yours fraternally
NF Vatutin (Lt Gen)
NGSh
Regarding the leadership requirements and constraints I acknowledge that full priority must be given to officer training at a certain point in time. However, at that point in time I expect a 3 year draft (at least) to make the best use of training bonuses. Anything less is a terrible waste of leadership, and I will not accept it.
*As a general note to comrade Vatutin's plans I have to stress the complete disregard for a competent Air-force. I am afraid that our enemies will have a free pass over our skies and our troops on the land will suffer greatly. Also, there has been a considerable investment in relevant technologies which will be wasted.
I propose a strategic planning for at least 30 INTs (6 groups of 5 INT each - possibly much more) and one group of 5 CAS (bombing is irrelevant if we cannot achieve air superiority).
Signed,
A.Y.
*As a general note to comrade Vatutin's plans I have to stress the complete disregard for a competent Air-force. I am afraid that our enemies will have a free pass over our skies and our troops on the land will suffer greatly. Also, there has been a considerable investment in relevant technologies which will be wasted.
I propose a strategic planning for at least 30 INTs (6 groups of 5 INT each - possibly much more) and one group of 5 CAS (bombing is irrelevant if we cannot achieve air superiority).
Signed,
A.Y.
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Comrade General Vatutin,
I appreciate your detailed report on the army's philosophy. I would request that, just to make things simple, we keep our production plan to just 1938. ((You'll probably confuse me.))
Stalin
I appreciate your detailed report on the army's philosophy. I would request that, just to make things simple, we keep our production plan to just 1938. ((You'll probably confuse me.
)) Stalin
Comrade Yakushev
In order to assuage your concerns about the VVS, the above plan proposes 7 x 4 INT's (total of 28 INT's) compared to your desire for 6 x 5 INT's (total 30 INT's). I have used groups of 4 instead of 5 as I understand we suffer a penalty to combat efficiency if we have more than 4 INT's in an airspace at the same time.
The CAS also perform an important defensive role as their capacity to pierce armour means they can blunt tank attacks from the more advanced Great Powers we may fight against.
I should add that the cost of INT and CAS production is unaffected by the voluntary/draft problem so we can certainly crank out more once we move to a draft. This plan is really to take us to 1939 before we reconsider options.
Comrade Stalin,
The simplified Production Proposal for 1938 is that the various items (including items currently being built) be placed in the queue in the following lots and in the following priority:
2 Factories - Allow to finish production, not to be renewed
6 M Arm Tank Divisions (Reserve box ticked, 1 M Arm, 1 Mot Inf, 1 TD, 1 Art) - When the division is completed on 15 January, do not build a new division in its place, but build a new division as each of the other divisions are completed later on so that we end up with 5 Arm Divisions in the queue at any one time.
4 INF Divisions (Reserve box ticked, 2 INF, 1 AT, 1 ART) - Build a new division as each division is completed so there is always 4 Divisions in the queue.
2 MP brigades (Reserve box ticked) - One off's not to be repeated.
4 TRANSPORT fleets - One off's not to be repeated.
5 INT - When the next INT is completed on 6 January, do not build a new INT but do build a new INT as each of the other 4 INT's are completed so there is 4 INT's in the queue at any one time.
6 CAS - When the next CAS is completed on 21 February, do not build a new CAS but do build a new CAS as each of the other 5 CAS are completed so there is 5 CAS in the queue at any one time.
50 ART brigades (Reserve box ticked and x3 runs)
45 AT Brigades (Reserve box ticked and x3 runs)
10 AT brigades (Reserve box ticked, only 1 run)
Yours fraternally
NF Vatutin (Lt Gen)
NGSh
In order to assuage your concerns about the VVS, the above plan proposes 7 x 4 INT's (total of 28 INT's) compared to your desire for 6 x 5 INT's (total 30 INT's). I have used groups of 4 instead of 5 as I understand we suffer a penalty to combat efficiency if we have more than 4 INT's in an airspace at the same time.
The CAS also perform an important defensive role as their capacity to pierce armour means they can blunt tank attacks from the more advanced Great Powers we may fight against.
I should add that the cost of INT and CAS production is unaffected by the voluntary/draft problem so we can certainly crank out more once we move to a draft. This plan is really to take us to 1939 before we reconsider options.
Comrade Stalin,
The simplified Production Proposal for 1938 is that the various items (including items currently being built) be placed in the queue in the following lots and in the following priority:
2 Factories - Allow to finish production, not to be renewed
6 M Arm Tank Divisions (Reserve box ticked, 1 M Arm, 1 Mot Inf, 1 TD, 1 Art) - When the division is completed on 15 January, do not build a new division in its place, but build a new division as each of the other divisions are completed later on so that we end up with 5 Arm Divisions in the queue at any one time.
4 INF Divisions (Reserve box ticked, 2 INF, 1 AT, 1 ART) - Build a new division as each division is completed so there is always 4 Divisions in the queue.
2 MP brigades (Reserve box ticked) - One off's not to be repeated.
4 TRANSPORT fleets - One off's not to be repeated.
5 INT - When the next INT is completed on 6 January, do not build a new INT but do build a new INT as each of the other 4 INT's are completed so there is 4 INT's in the queue at any one time.
6 CAS - When the next CAS is completed on 21 February, do not build a new CAS but do build a new CAS as each of the other 5 CAS are completed so there is 5 CAS in the queue at any one time.
50 ART brigades (Reserve box ticked and x3 runs)
45 AT Brigades (Reserve box ticked and x3 runs)
10 AT brigades (Reserve box ticked, only 1 run)
Yours fraternally
NF Vatutin (Lt Gen)
NGSh
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((I'm afraid I'm more confused than ever now... what do you mean by "do not the repeat order but do repeat the order...", just that I'm to use the same divisions but fewer of them?))
((Amended to hopefully make it clearer that yes, we reduce the number of those items built to free up IC for other items. Brevis esse laboro, obscuris fio...
Also, thanks for the cookie, Gen Marshall.))
Also, thanks for the cookie, Gen Marshall.))
((Didn't you give me one of those cookies a while back? I seem to remember something about eating the delivery man ))
))
((Using planes in homogenous groups of five is useless. Five INT are exactly as effective as 4, and 5 CAS are less effective than 3. That only gets better past ~20 or so, when doomstack tactics start to take over.))
((As far as I remember, I assigned two cavalry per division, one to become ARM and one to become MOT later.))
(( I haven't done the math, but for INTs I think groups of 5 make more sense than groups of 4 taking consideration the stacking penalty. There was a thread in the general section, I 'll have to look it up.
As for the difference between 28 and 30, I wrote "at least 30", so I would prefer much more ))
As for the difference between 28 and 30, I wrote "at least 30", so I would prefer much more
))
((Well, in theory 5 are slightly better than 4. However, since we're talking about building a inferior airforce, other reasons apply also. One of them is, that the effective gained power of 5 INT over 4 INT is only half the gain you get from 2 to 3 or from 3 to 4.))
((Happy Memorial Day weekend. I will not be around much if at all for the three day weekend. Jeeshadow can have my proxy if something major comes up that cannot wait.))
((If I've read correctly, it's for remembering servicemen and women. I assume it's a US thing.))
