Transition from swords to guns

[gagenater]

But isnt't it very hard to keep morale of soldiers ( especially the ones in the front rows ) high ? In medieval warfare, your life depended upon more or less your skill. But muskeeter formations shooting each other from couple of hundreds of meters, you are almost guaranteed to die. From tactical point of view, why does weaker side opt to use the same tactic with stronger side ? I mean, that tight muskeeter formations doesn't seem to include any strategy, just ranks being decimated at a similar rate.

Actually tight ranks IS a strategy for keeping morale high. Men become naturally ashamed of trying to lie down or hide if all their comrades are standing up next to them, and (as noted below) you can't use a musket unless you are standing up. It doesn't matter if your side is stronger or weaker - if you don't stand up to fight, you can only shoot once, so you will loose and loose badly. At least if you stand and fight you can shoot back. At any rate strong and weak are often local and/or temprary. If your 'weak' side doesn't stand up and fight, how are reinforcements ever going to make it to you? Or how can you save/prevent the enemy from doing whatever they want if you don't fight back? And how can you tell you are 'weak' anyway? with your observation planes counting the enemy? It's not as though battles have never been won by the side that was outnumbered, or that a strong stand by a numerically weaker unit in one part of a battlefield has saved an army, or allowed other units in other areas the ability to win the fight in the meantime.

One more thing, wouldn't it be better to lay down while reloading ?

you have to stand to load a musket. It wasn't until the advent of breech loading rifles in the 1850's - 1870's that it became technically possible to reload without standing up.

 

[Denkt]

Tight formations may it easier for the enemy to score hits but at the same time it allows for the concentration of firepower in a smaller area which was often more important, another great advantage is that a tight formation would be much better at charging because of its mass and it would also be harder to charge also thanks to its mass so it would have less trouble with cavalry and other infantry.

Artillery may have been more important in removing the pike from the battlefield than the bayonett.

 

[StephenT]

Our company was now ordered to the front, we soon got into action ... I never remember to be under so sharp a fire in an affair of this kind before. My comrade Brown was wounded in the right leg near the knee and was obliged to go to the rear. Shortly after a ball glanced the inside of my right knee, it deadened the leg for some time and caused some pain.

We were now obliged to give way to superior force. By dusk we had lost nearly a league of ground, without allowing the enemy to gain any other advantage. I think it was the dearest league they ever purchased. I believe a few such bargains and they would be bankrupt. Night put an end to the affair.

Our Brigade lay on our arms all night; altho it rained much during the night I slept well. The Earl of Dalhousie arrived with the remainder of the division before daylight. This put us in high spirits for we were now confident we should give them a good thrashing. A deserter came over to us in the night. From him we learnt that we had been engaged all day with the 3rd Battalion 51st Regt., just arrived from France, and was at the commencement 1400 strong, while our strength including the detachment from England was only 304 rank and file. This I know to be correct, we were in eight divisions of 19 file each. Our losses were severe having killed: Captain Douglas, Lieut. Dodd, 1 Sergeant, 4 Buglers and 30 rank and file. [37 total equals 12% casualty rate].

- letter by Private William Wheeler of the British 51st Regiment, in Spain, 2 September 1813.


What that shows is that a regiment drawn up in formation, outnumbered over 4-1, fighting for almost an entire day, only suffered one in ten killed - and morale was still high the following night. And that was in the Napoleonic Wars, when flintlock muskets were much more reliable and fast-firing than the clumsy arquebuses and matchlocks of earlier centuries. Before the invention of the Minié rifle firearms really weren't all that dangerous in battle. Their effect was primarily attritional, not decisive.

 

[knul]

Not really, it was difficult to hit someone with a musket except at really close range. Smoke obscured the battefield, and in fact there weren't that many shots fired. Perhaps about 10 volleys over a battle which was several hours long.

I would like to see a source for that. From all I have read, there was an extreme focus on firing quickly: most musketeers were supposed to fire twice a minute and the better ones could fire 3-4 per minute. You claim that they shot two or three times per hour.

I do agree that killing a person took a lot of bullets (it was said that you needed a man's weight in lead to kill him), one of the reasons of massing firing. However, that would only point towards firing lots of bullets, not just a couple here and there.

 

[Amallric]

Depends on the time period. In a previous thread the figure was mentioned in relation to 30 years war battles. The rate of fire increased with the introduction of flintock muskets and paper cartridges. But even then, being able to fire twice a minute does not mean you actually do it every minute from the start to the end of the battle. Actually soldiers would quickly run out of ammunition if they had to do that.

 

[Arilou]

I would like to see a source for that. From all I have read, there was an extreme focus on firing quickly: most musketeers were supposed to fire twice a minute and the better ones could fire 3-4 per minute. You claim that they shot two or three times per hour.

I do agree that killing a person took a lot of bullets (it was said that you needed a man's weight in lead to kill him), one of the reasons of massing firing. However, that would only point towards firing lots of bullets, not just a couple here and there.

You could get up a much higher rate of fire, but most armies discouraged this: What they wanted was a few, precise, coordinated volleys, for maximum shock effect. Not people shooting off pell-mell.

Under optimal condition you could fire with a decent chance of success at decent ranges , however, battlefield conditions were far from optimal. Dust, and of course gunpowder smoke. (another reason why high rate of fire wasn't a thing: After the first volley chances are you couldn't see anything anyway) would limit sight very much, hence why most doctrine held for short-range, coordinated volleys.

That said, flintlock muskets were far more reliable than matchlocks (wheellocks were, IIRC, not much worse on the ballistics front, but significantly more complex)

 

[Arilou]

Depends on the time period. In a previous thread the figure was mentioned in relation to 30 years war battles. The rate of fire increased with the introduction of flintock muskets and paper cartridges. But even then, being able to fire twice a minute does not mean you actually do it every minute from the start to the end of the battle. Actually soldiers would quickly run out of ammunition if they had to do that.

IIRC soldiers tended to be given something like a dozen bullets.

 

[CruelDwarf]

IIRC soldiers tended to be given something like a dozen bullets.

This was not about bullets mostly, but gunpowder. Gunpowder was expensive and soldiers usually have enough for 10-20 shots at most.

 

[La Toscana]

IIRC soldiers tended to be given something like a dozen bullets.

I seem to recall that as late as the war of Spanish succession this was the case, with dragoons under the command of Churchill receiving 3 bullets for the entire campaign (admittedly dragoons are not infantry) with little chance of being resupplied at any point.

 

[Arilou]

I seem to recall that as late as the war of Spanish succession this was the case, with dragoons under the command of Churchill receiving 3 bullets for the entire campaign (admittedly dragoons are not infantry) with little chance of being resupplied at any point.

To be fair, bullets were fairly easily made. (soldiers often carried small casts that could be sued for casting bullets from lead) gunpowder was, as mentioned, trickier.

 

[gagenater]

I would like to see a source for that. From all I have read, there was an extreme focus on firing quickly: most musketeers were supposed to fire twice a minute and the better ones could fire 3-4 per minute. You claim that they shot two or three times per hour.

I do agree that killing a person took a lot of bullets (it was said that you needed a man's weight in lead to kill him), one of the reasons of massing firing. However, that would only point towards firing lots of bullets, not just a couple here and there.

Firing rate and number of shots fired in a battle bear no relationship to each other. For most of a battle a unit might be in reserve, not close enough to the enemy to fire, taking cover from artillery fire, formed up to protect a strategic position not under attack, etc. When you did get a chance to shoot you want to shoot accurately and then reload as fast as possible either to shoot again (if the original target is still around) or to be ready for the next time a good target presents itself. Drilling in peacetime for speed was essential for making this easy to do under duress. Also it was practiced over and over again so that it was an 'automatic' activity for the soldiers. They needed to be able to reload under fire, in the dark, after marching for 20-30 hours straight, in a light rain that would damage the powder, etc.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

The Battle of Cynoscephalae says hello.

I meant late medieval Pike formations, not a Phalanx.

 

[gagenater]

I meant late medieval Pike formations, not a Phalanx.

They are remarkably similar though. So much so that when military thinkers in the renaissance era were looking for ideas about how to use pike formations more effectively that they studied Hoplite battles and drill techniques. In many ways the social conditions that led to pile formations were similar to those that led to hoplites also.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

They are remarkably similar though. So much so that when military thinkers in the renaissance era were looking for ideas about how to use pike formations more effectively that they studied Hoplite battles and drill techniques.

Certainly but how are Roman legions relevant ? Are you guys arguing with me now that pikes did not started to dominate at some point ? They have been used on the offense and very succesfull too.

Both, defense and offence

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Nancy

 

[Arilou]

They are remarkably similar though. So much so that when military thinkers in the renaissance era were looking for ideas about how to use pike formations more effectively that they studied Hoplite battles and drill techniques. In many ways the social conditions that led to pile formations were similar to those that led to hoplites also.

And some theoreticians (Machiavelli, and even the spanish with their sword-and-buckler-men) looked to the roman legions in order to counter them. (with limited success, since pikes could now be supported with more firepower than in roman times)

 

[Enravota]

Certainly but how are Roman legions relevant ?

Rodeleros

 

[CruelDwarf]

Rodeleros

Still not very relevant because two reasons:
1. Rodeleros weren't succesful against pike formations at all and quickly died out.
2. They have nothing in common with Roman Legionaries both in equipment and tactics.

 

[Enravota]

Still not very relevant because two reasons:
1. Rodeleros weren't succesful against pike formations at all and quickly died out.
2. They have nothing in common with Roman Legionaries both in equipment and tactics.

They were a renaissance interpretation of the legionnaire. Imitation of Antiquity was after all the defining characteristic of the era.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

You guys interpret to much in what I said or put it out of context.
Again.
Someone said pikes werent good in the offence.
I said they have been used very succesfull in the offence, thats all.

 

[Easy-Kill]

IIRC soldiers tended to be given something like a dozen bullets.

According to 'Directions for Musters: Wherein is Shewed the order of Drilling for the Musket and Pike (Cambridge 1638) recommended that the musketeer carried a Musket with a 'good musket, the barrel of 4 foot long, the bore of 12 bullets to the pound of [of lead] rowling [rolling] in, a musket rest, Bandelier, Head piece, a good sword, girdle and hangers.' The Bandelier (bandoleer) consisted of a leather strap with 12 wooden boxes for powder. That is, the soldier carried 12 shots worth of ammunition for battle. The musket rest was removed once a lighter musket (but still 4 foot barrel and 12 bullets to the pound) was introduced in the 1630s.

Orders placed by (the English) Parliament to French and Holland in 1642 for a lighter 'bastard' musket, firing 16 bullets to the pound and costing 11s 6d each. Along with this, a contract for Bandoleers was placed, specifying boxes of 16 boxes wood, leather straps and strings to attach them to. (G.I. Mungeam 'Contracts for the Supply of Equipment in the New Model', in Journal of the Arms and Armour - 1967). A steal at 20pence a 'peece'.

If I get my timing correct, the main 'exchange' during the battle of Edgehill lasted between 3-4 hours (from about 3PM to nightfall). While I doubt that all units were engaged for the entire time, you can imagine how few shots were fired.

In the English Civil War, during the formation of the 'New Model Army', musketeers were issued with a lighter 'full Musket'. This musket had a barrel of 4 foot long (i.e. not a Bastard Musket, but also one which did not require a rest), fired shot of 12 bullets to the pound of lead. Along with this musket, a bandoleer was issued with 12 wooden boxes for carrying powder