The Jäger War – The Battle of Cyprus
Extract from ‘The Sublime Porte at War: The Last Gasp of the Sick Man of Europe’ by Ewan Feeler
The Ottoman entry into the war had proven explosive in more ways than one. They had taken the British entirely by surprise on land and sea, managing to launch three invasions into Persia, Egypt and Russia, and also successfully seize the island of Cyprus. The world wondered, and the Central Powers revelled, and the Entente despaired.
However, the decline of the empire was not suddenly reversed or magicked away by a few victories. Once the element of surprise wore away, the British scout planes spotted the Ottoman army well before it reached Suez. The mountains and Russian army halted the Turkish advance northwards. And whilst the Persian invasion continued, the Ottomans were never going to compete with the combined armies of Persia, Afghanistan, and India, all of which were rushing to the frontlines.
Cyprus, perhaps their ‘great’ accomplishment in the war, and the one oft pointed to by Turkish nationalists and contrarian students alike, was indicative of the genuine and terrible weakness of the Ottoman war effort. Yes, it was a black eye for the British to lose so obvious a territory to the perennially weak sultanate. Yes, technically, this was a victory of sorts for the Ottoman Navy, the only one it had in the war.
But it had thrust the Ottomans from a sideshow to a central enemy for the British to fight, and this was not a war the Turks could ever hope to win. To begin with, Cyprus was, at that time, not all that strategically important in the first place. In later decades, the advancement of aircraft and submarine warfare would indeed up the value of a sizeable island in the eastern Mediterranean. However, in 1915, the island had been of nominal importance for decades, since the ending of the Great Game in the Middle East and the capture of Egypt for British dominion. The island itself was no great naval base, it housed at the time one sizeable port, Larnaca Harbour, which served the entire island to the outside world. The British had spent the better part of a decade attempting to clean up the ancient port of Famagusta, a potentially much larger site which had been nonetheless blocked by sediment for many years.
Thus, the Ottomans held an island where both major ports were on the ‘wrong side’, facing south towards Alexandria. They also had to hold it against a far larger fleet than they possessed, and this fleet would be but a fraction of the total strength of the Royal Navy. With much of Cyprus falling in the range of the naval guns of the period (the capital itself barely out of range of the largest guns in the fleet), and the island dependant upon imports, the Turks had essentially locked up their fleet and invading army on an island they could not hope to hold or defend from British reprisal.
This appears to have been foreseen by Turkish naval planners, who argued that, if the island were to be taken, it would be necessary to have an evacuation plan in place that could be fully enacted within a 24-hour period, or less. The prestige of winning such a major prize from the British was obvious, but the wiser heads in Constantinople seemed to be under no illusions that it could be held for any length of time without losing whatever men and equipment remained, and whatever ships present to defend them.
In the end, the Battle for Cyprus was a forgone conclusion, and not a surprise to the Sultanate. Still, it is notable that this intelligence and expectation was not shared to their allies in Germany and Austria, who expected the British to be distracted for far longer with the Ottomans than they ended up being.
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Extract from ‘Great British Sea Battles of the 19th and 20th centuries’, by Arthur Woodcock
The Battle of Cyprus, or more correctly, the Battle for Cyprus, as it comprised various actions on and surrounding the island, was the first major action of the Mediterranean Fleet during the Great War. It is also notable for being the first major command of Admiral Radcliffe, following his triumph and recovery from the Battle by the Norfolk Banks. It was also in this battle that Andrew Cunningham was first recognised and decorated.
HMS Invincible, Indomitable and Inflexible
Radcliffe had been given wide powers and resources to ‘correct’ the stain to British honour that the fall of Cyprus had served as a few months prior. He requested and was granted the pre-war strength of the Mediterranean fleet, which had lost several destroyers to the Grand Fleet’s blockade efforts in 1914. In addition, he gained a few more destroyers, and the battlecruiser HMS Invincible, which had finished repairs and refits a few weeks prior. She joined her two sister ships, Inflexible and Indomitable, as the largest under Radcliffe’s command. Radcliffe also argued, and received, twenty submarines, a large portion of the Navy’s fleet, as he suspected they would be very necessary in the coming battle. The Admiralty was also nervous about the amount of damage the German U-Boats had made to the Dutch Fleet and wished to test their own forces against a fleet comprised of German and British designs.
Against him was an odd assortment of vessels, some of which, unfortunately, the British had built for the Ottomans. The flagship, Sultân Osmân-ı Evvel, had been intended to be Brazil’s capital ship, and the growing nation had spared no expense with her. She possessed fourteen heavy guns and seven turrets, the most of any dreadnought on the seas. This was a heavily armed and armoured vessel. Her companion, Reşadiye, was less impressive in comparison, but was still for all that a British designed and built battleship. The Germans had added to this potent duo with the gifted SMS Goeben, renamed Yavûz Sultân Selîm, a battlecruiser that was significantly larger and better armoured than the contemporary second generation of British battlecruisers, though were still outclassed by the first generation Invincible and her sisters.
All in all, Radcliffe possessed:
3 Battle cruisers – HMS Invincible, Indominable and Indefatigable
3 pre-dreadnought battleships
8 Cruisers
5 light cruisers
15 destroyers
20 submarines
1 minesweeper, in case of mines already deployed around the island
To contend with the entire Ottoman Fleet:
2 dreadnoughts - Sultân Osmân-ı Evvel and Reşadiye
1 battlecruiser - Yavûz Sultân Selîm
2 pre-dreadnought battleships – Barbaros Hayreddin and Turgut Reis
1 coastal defence ship - Mesûdiye
2 protected cruisers – Hamidiye and Mecidiye
1 light cruiser – Midilli
8 destroyers
This was a supremely uneven fight, and Radcliffe believed the Ottomans knew it. His job was twofold: recapture Cyprus and destroy as much of the Ottoman fleet as possible, given that once the fleet was defeated here, it would no doubt retreat to the Black Sea for the rest of the war, which would make life difficult for the Russians. To that end, he had to know where the fleet was, and how best to draw them out or predict their movements. Upon learning how vulnerable Cyprus was to a specifically British naval invasion, Radcliffe decided that the Ottomans would have either planned an all-out defence of the two southern harbours facing out towards Alexandria or kept their ships on the far side of the island, in order to enact a swift evacuation.
His options therefore were to either blockade the entire island and force the occupation force to surrender, hopefully tempting the enemy fleet out from wherever they were hiding, or storming the southern ports, and then attempt to attack the evacuation efforts in the north.
Radcliffe then made use of his submarines and the British Army’s aircraft in Egypt to scout the island and was surprised to find the Ottomans seemed to have attempted both proposed strategies at once. The Sultân Osmân-ı Evvel was in port at Larnaca Harbour, with the Mesûdiye and destroyers enacting patrols around both Larnaca and Famagusta. The rest of the fleet was split between the northern side of the island and matching ports in Anatolia. That then, was where any evacuation was planned, whilst the Turks had filled the major Cypriot ports with teeth and potential blockages.
However, Radcliffe did not need usable ports. He needed the Ottomans off Cyprus.
The calculus remained the same. He could attempt a blockade and see which if any ships attempted to sally forth to pierce it. He could attack either or both southern ports and secure the island. Or, and this was the option he decided, he could circumvent the island entirely and go after the main fleet in the north, now he knew where they were.
Splitting his forces in two, the faster ships would race up past the western coast and block the escape to the Dardanelles, whilst his other would flank the eastern coast, ensuring the Ottomans could give battle or go to ground in Anatolia. He also split up his submarines. Five each would monitor the southern ports and engage anything that moved from them. He was wary of the Sultân Osmân-ı Evvel and her guns, but a few torpedo hits were now known to shake even a battleship. The remaining ten would lie in wait in the path towards the Dardanelles and ‘safety’, in case any ships did manage to escape or had already left before the battle began. He had more than enough destroyers to screen his heavy ships, and enough firepower to confidently take on everything the Ottomans had, now he knew the two modern dreadnoughts were not sailing together.
On the evening of the 15th September 1915, Radcliffe and his fleet were ready. They would set out under cover of darkness in the early hours of the morning, to avoid detection before they were already at Cyprus. As it was, the British ships were spotted only as they had already split off from each other and were encircling the island, causing the Ottoman response to be confused as to where or even if an attack was coming. By the time they had confirmation that there was indeed not one, but two British flotillas incoming, they were almost out of time. The dreadnought Reşadiye, the battlecruiser Yavûz Sultân Selîm and the two old battleships were clustered together, and so could be made ready for some kind of fight, but the rest of the fleet was separated into various ports, docks and moorings. They had not expected to be the main target of an attack.
In the pre-dawn light, the two British groups rounded their respective coasts and made speed to meet in the middle. Between them, the trapped core of the Ottoman fleet had to decide whether to attempt to fight through the approaching western group and flee to the Dardanelles and on to the Black Sea, abandoning Cyprus and the Ottoman garrison there, or stand, fight, and hope the Sultân Osmân-ı Evvel and her destroyers would return to help them out. Deciding discretion was the better part of valour, the Turkish commanders decided to rush the western ships, hoping they could break through.
It was a brave decision, but a costly one. Abandoning their smaller ships in port, the capital ships raced towards the waiting British vessels, whom upon sighting, opened fire. By the time the eastern group arrived on the scene, the Yavûz Sultân Selîm was ablaze and listing heavily to port, and the two pre-dreadnought battleships were badly damaged. Only the Reşadiye had escaped much harm and was slowly gaining a lead on the destroyers that were in pursuit.
Then they hit the submarine line. In turning to avoid three torpedoes, they hit two more, which allowed the HMS Scorpion, itself close enough to have to dodge torpedoes, to fire three shots which destroyed the bridge and bow of the ship. Whilst the battleship limped on, further shots from the submarines and the Scorpion took out the steering and engines, before the ship finally rolled over and exploded.
The core of the Ottoman Navy had been sunk in a few hours work, at the cost of one destroyer, HMS Aurora, which was outright rammed by the frantic Turkish ships. Radcliffe’s battlecruisers took a turn about the northern coastline of Cyprus, managing to catch two further ships attempting to make a run for safety, whilst the rest of the ship shadowed the Anatolian coast, looking to do much the same but finding few takers. What they did find was that the defences became increasingly fearsome the closer they came to the Dardanelles, and the submarines confirmed there were plentiful mines in the seas all around the area. The Black Sea was firmly locked up tight by the Ottomans.
Returning back to the island in force, by which time it had passed into early afternoon, Radcliffe signalled left a holding force on the north side whilst his main fleet returned to the south. By now, the garrison on the island was aware something had gone very wrong, and the northern units had seen part of the battle off the coast. As for the Sultân Osmân-ı Evvel and her destroyers, they were now trapped in the two harbours they happened to be in when the British showed up, save for the two that had already been caught on the open water and sank.
Now with all the time in the world, Radcliffe signalled the battleship to surrender and prepare to be boarded, which received no response. He also sent word to Alexandria of his success, and to prepare troops for landing on the island. If the Ottomans did not surrender, five landing sites across the island had already been chosen for amphibious landings, and with the support of heavy naval firepower, the limited Ottoman garrison could do some damage, but not hope to prevail. It was now a matter of when they decided to give up, and how many lives would be lost before that happened.
The Battle for Cyprus was not as impactful or spectacular as the Broad Fourteens or Norfolk Banks, but it was actually an incredibly significant learning experience for the Royal Navy. The use of aviation for scouting, submarines and destroyers working in tandem, and the proven value of a battlecruiser’s speed and flexibility when contending with dreadnoughts were all first combined here. It marked a return to British dominion over the Mediterranean for the rest of the war, and the decade. It made the careers of several young officers, not least of which was Commander Cunningham, captaining the Scorpion. His actions earnt a grilling from Radcliffe and a promotion to Captain.
The later amphibious landings and their aftermath also taught the British valuable, albeit somewhat costly, lessons about how to plan and execute them, and that a determined defender with means of resupply and reinforcement would be extremely difficult to displace from a landing sight without the element of surprise and hefty amounts of supporting firepower from naval guns. This was reinforced when Radcliffe later also stormed Rhodes, a defeat which stunned the Ottomans and pinned a sizeable defence force on the opposite mainland for the rest of the war. Much as the army was learning, slowly, defence was king in this new era of modern warfare.
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Excerpt from ‘The First World War’, by Martin Gilbert
The Autumn Offensives carried out against the Ottoman Empire were notable in that they were, unlike every other attack carried out by Entente forces up to that point, fairly successful in achieving their objectives whilst also regaining the initiative along their fronts.
On the Russian frontier, the Ottomans had seen some further success south of the Terek River, but continued to fail to gain any ground along the Caspian Sea. This would prove problematic for them, as further south, the British were on the march.
In Persia, the Ottomans were finally halted and pushed back by the Indian army, with aid from Persia and Afghanistan forces. By the end of the year, they would have even advanced into the Sultanate itself, with hopes for a meeting of Russian lines thought possible before the Turks managed to curtail that thrust. The fact they were capable of doing such belies such talk that the fall of Cyprus and Rhodes marked the end of true military competence of the Ottomans.
It also no doubt added credence to the need for an Arab Revolt, the rumblings of which had been favourably stoked by the successful advance of the advance of the Egyptian army through the desert and into the Levant. With the Ottomans in retreat, but fighting hard every step of the way, the British forces became emboldened across the world, and doubly so when German East Africa formally surrendered, despite the German guerrilla army still fighting in the bush.
After a year and a half of heavy fighting, it looked as though the British might win the war outside Europe after all.
