Tirpitz's Risk Theory

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'Risk theory:' Tirpitz oriented his naval strategy toward the major sea power of his period, Britain. He expected that Germany would not need to outbuild the Royal Navy in order to pose a threat to Britain, since British sea power was committed worldwide. If the Royal Navy accepted a battle with a numerically inferior but modern German fleet, it would probably win, but it would suffer such heavy losses that another sea power -- presumably an ally of Germany or a rival of Britain -- would then be able to destroy the victorious British fleet. Thus Britain would run a risk if it went to war with Germany, and its diplomacy would have to take a more supportive attitude toward German colonial aims. A comparatively small but efficient German battle fleet concentrated in the North Sea would represent a diplomatic lever and deterrent. Tirpitz assumed that the German ships would be superior to the British vessels and that their crews would be better trained.

Tirpitz Risk Theory was one of the major ideologies behind Germany's rapid naval build-up in the years prior to WWI. Was Risk theory flawed in concept, or was it merely flaed in Germany's execution of it??

Would a fully armed German navy, with leaders willing to risk the entire navy in battle, unlike the leaders at Jutland, be able to execute the strategy proposed in Risk Theory, i.e., Russia, US, France stepping in and destroying the weakened British navy, or was this theory so off the wall that there was no chance of it being successful in reality??

 

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I think Tirpitz either developed this theory himself or used the theories of Mahan.

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Quote:

Would a fully armed German navy, with leaders willing to risk the entire navy in battle, unlike the leaders at Jutland, be able to execute the strategy proposed in Risk Theory, i.e., Russia, US, France stepping in and destroying the weakened British navy, or was this theory so off the wall that there was no chance of it being successful in reality??

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In my experience that are only fools like Karl XII, Napoleon and Hitler that put so much stake on one decissive battle. Normal military leaders are not willing to risk all their forces in one battle. There may by new enemies or hidden reserves of the present enemy. And what to do when you have destroyed your own force in one battle ?

The only realistic naval competitor to Britain except for Germany 100 years ago was the US. The Russians had some Dreadnoghts, so did Austrians, Italians, French and Japan. But the only ones who had a lager inventory was Britain, Germany and the US.

So the realistic answer must be US then, if Germany had destroyed its owns fleet an crippled the Royal Navy.

 

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Off Topic?...

 

[joak]

It sounds pretty divorced from the realities of the time--a sort of "game theory" approach that figured since other nations would benefit by the destruction of the Royal Navy, other nations would logically leap at the chance to do so.

Reallistically, I can't think of a nation that would have done so. Certainly not in WWI. I agree with Sten that the US was the most likely, but the US was only just active after the Spanish-American war, and had a far better relationship with Britain than Germany (IIRC, there where some US-German tensions over the tiny bits of the planet not already controlled by Europeans). France wasn't going to help out the Germans; Japan, Italy and Spain didn't have the ability, and for geographic reasons it's unlikely the other powers were ever going to devote enough resources to their naval power.

So flawed in theory.

 

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A better place for this tread would be the post 1819 forum.

 

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Originally posted by Sten Sture d:ä
A better place for this tread would be the post 1819 forum.

Yepp, I think so too...

 

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I don't believe that Risk Theory was flawed in theory, only in practice. It makes sense that Britain wouldn't attack a fully armed German fleet that was willing to risk its entire force in one battle, as Britain wouldn't have the means to replace all the ships she lost, and Germany wouldn't need to, as she was primarily a land power.

The theory was flawed in practice, as no German could be expected to be such a devotee of Tirpitz's theory that he would be willing to scuttle the entire high seas fleet in one battle, just so some far off revision of world power could occur.

The only flaw in the theoritical portion of Risk Theory is that Britain couldn't have been expected to wait for the navy to be built up to full strength before executing a "Copenhagen" type attack on German naval bases. Therein lies the flaw of Risk Theory.

 

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While Tirpitz's idea appeals to the strategist in me, I find it unlikely that a nation will risk it's war-making power in the unconfirmed hopes that another country will continue the fight. This is against the basics of sovereignity IMHO! Tirpitz had a good idea, but one that could never actually be tried. Jutland and the resultant German Naval action for the rest of World War I (that is, very very little) is the logical result of Tirpitz's theory.

The deterrant factor does have merit. Britain did have to consider the potential of the German force, but the Germans only benefitted if it remained potential. Once engaged, it lost it's power. Shades of global thermonuclear buildup. Great deterrance...as long as they are never used.

O.

 

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The Risikoflotte concept was utterly flawed not least because it was directed at the RN.

If ever there was a service with an almost unbroken record of aggressiveness, it is the Royal Navy. It consistently over the course of centuries court-martialed and disposed of its officers who failed to attack even in numerical inferiority.

To think that it would bawl at the idea of confronting a weaker navy because it might take losses just shows a complete lack of touch with reality and a very real case of delusion and wishful thinking.

It also shows how much the German navy was disconnected from the army, for the strategic plans of the latter were precisely based on the successive defeat of two armies, the French and Russian, each of which weren't that inferior to the German one.

If the navy's concept had been correct, then the army would have steered away from WWI.

As has been pointed out, the "theory" could only be valid if there existed a believable external threat. But if such a threat had been real, then at least some kind of diplomatic feelers would have been sent by either or both parties to coordinate their actions against Britain.

Suppose country X had done precisely this.

If G+X < RN, then the strategic situation isn't meaningfully affected.

If G+X > RN, then we are back to a classical strategic problem of coordinating a superior force split in two parts, each of which is smaller than the ennemy's.

In this latter case, the Risikoflotte concept of engaging the RN in a situation of inferiority actually plays into the RN's hand, for it grants it an attempt at defeating its ennemies in detail.

Need I say more?

 

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The Royal Navy was superior to the German High Seas Fleet, and country X's navy. However, was the fleet dispatched to protect the home islands as large as the German High Seas Fleet and country X's navy. I couldn't see the Royal Navy defeating the entire German navy, and a large arm of a second European country or America's Atlantic fleet. The Royal navy had to defend a large empire with its navy, while Germany had the ability to spend the entire navy in one shot. A German plan could have called for the entire German navy to attack the home fleet, with country X waiting in the wings to finish off whatever vessels survived the major battle.

The Royal Navy also couldn't commit its entire home fleet to a decisive battle, since there was always the option that the battle was a diversion for a land invasion. If the entire home fleet was in the North or Baltic sea, it couldn't have prevented a German land invasion coming from western Germany.

 

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deterence

Riskflotte was a flawed theory because it failed to take account of British naval and national aggressiveness, as already stated above. Also, it was totally akin to thermonuclear deterence. It was aimed at making Britain refrain from joining a continental war against Germany because of fear of the damage to Britain's Navy. The theory failed the day Britain declared war. Probably the vast amount of money, manpower, and material invested could have gone into more productive uses.

The theory could not really fail in execution, because it was already a failure the day Britain declared war on Germany. However, the type of navy the Germans built was incapable of inflicting serious damage without British cooperation. The Germans expected a close blockade, figuring that the British capital ships would take steady attrition from mines and submarines, while still agressively maintaining the close blockade. After substantial attrition on the British, the German navy would then sortie for the damaging battle. This was unrealistic planning, as it assumed the British would be stupid as well as aggressive. And Admiral Jellicoe adopted a policy of caution and the distant blockade, and later even the aggressive Admiral Beatty maintained the policy of caution and distant blockade.

The type of navy the Germans built was incapable of forcing the issue because most capital ships lacked the capability to take the naval war outside the North Sea. Therefore no serious threat existed to Britain's lines of sea communication and commerce untill the U-boat fleet was built up. The German battleships simply lacked operating range.

 

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Brycon, you're postulating that X, while a smaller navy than the RN, would nevertheless be large enough to defeat what would be left of the RN after the Hochseeflotte's defeat.

There weren't that many such navies in the early XXth century. Keep also in mind that strategies aren't formulated in a diplomatic vaccum.

Firstly, in case of a Germano-British war, France and Russia would be likely to jump on the bandwagon, so you must add those two fleets, just as Austria would be likely to join the German side (and Italy too, maybe) and its fleet should also be added.

It's not just historical hindsight. That was the way alliances and antagonisms were set up then.

Bear also in mind that at the time, Japan was allied to Britain and could probably be counted upon to help the RN in the Far East, especially since it would further its own interests.

ALL OF THIS is relevant to assessing the Risikoflotte strategy.

If you now add up the two sides' fleet strengths, even with Italy's added to the Central powers', it becomes obvious that seriously threatening the British strategic position with a suicidal battle in the North Sea was a hopeless proposition.

Of course, A large German navy could be an asset in a diplomatic offensive designed to shift this strategic balance.

It would however be hard to convince potential partners that such a large navy wouldn't lead to Germany seeking to expand her colonial possetions at the expense of somebody else's.

Of course, the target might be Britain's or France's colonies, but wouldn't it be easier to pick on a weaker country, such as Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, etc...?

The only power that wouldn't feel threatened would be the US, but an anti-British US-German alliance would have required considerable political shifts in both the US and Britain, and seems to me quite unlikely (it took both unrestricted submarine warfare and the Zimmerman telegram to bring the US into the war on the Allies' side, after all).

So the Risikoflotte looks to me like a hopeless proposition militarily speaking, and a very dubious diplomatic asset, as history would proceed to show duriong WWI.

 

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I postulate that an x-German naval alliance could destroy the home fleet. I believe that there was no realistic alliance in 1910 that could eliminate the entire British Navy, but the Russians, Italians, or the US had the ability to unite with the German Navy and eliminate the fleet defending the home islands. Germany had no reason to attack the fleet defending Hong Kong and Singapore, or the fleet defending India or South Africa, but they had the ability to eliminate the fleet defending Britain itself.

Russia had only been allied with the French for 20 years, and economic help notwithstanding, Russia was a more natural ally of Germany than France due to family relations and governmental system. They could have been counted on to switch sides, although the majority of their fleet was in the Black Sea, so they would have been pretty useless in a battle with the home fleet.

Italy was nominally allied with Germany in 1910, but again, it would have been hard for an Italian fleet to break out of the Mediterranean to help the Germans in the North Sea.

The US was the only likely candidate to help Germany, but economics and politics dictated that the US would never help revise European power, so I guess Risk Theory had no practical chance of success.

BTW, the German naval program was an important social program, as it gave an outlet for military command for members of the Bourgeousie. The Socialists were in favor of the naval bills at the expense of army bills, as they saw the Junkers as more of a threat to their power than the Bourgeousie were. So there were few in Germany willing to put the naval money to better use, as the Socialists and Zentrum were supporters of the program,

 

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Originally posted by BRYCON316

Would a fully armed German navy, with leaders willing to risk the entire navy in battle, unlike the leaders at Jutland, be able to execute the strategy proposed in Risk Theory, i.e., Russia, US, France stepping in and destroying the weakened British navy, or was this theory so off the wall that there was no chance of it being successful in reality??

Here I think is the fatal flaw - underestimating the superiority of command in the Royal Navy (or its importance in engagements), and overestimating the ability to increase one's own leaders. It was not a coincidence that Germany lacked the leaders at Jutland. More than any other theatre of war, the Navy is dependent on a long line of well trained and experienced naval leaders, which only comes with strong naval traditions.

 

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Re: Re: Tirpitz's Risk Theory

Originally posted by Ludovico


Here I think is the fatal flaw - underestimating the superiority of command in the Royal Navy (or its importance in engagements), and overestimating the ability to increase one's own leaders. It was not a coincidence that Germany lacked the leaders at Jutland. More than any other theatre of war, the Navy is dependent on a long line of well trained and experienced naval leaders, which only comes with strong naval traditions.

Not only this, a long experience in putting ships at sea is also VERY important.

Young navies tend to underestimate the importance of seakeeping, properly designed crew quarters, etc... and often go for strange naval engineering solutions.

For instance, why the Germans stuck to three-shaft designs for their big ships beats me.

 

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Re: Re: Tirpitz's Risk Theory

Originally posted by Ludovico


Here I think is the fatal flaw - underestimating the superiority of command in the Royal Navy (or its importance in engagements), and overestimating the ability to increase one's own leaders. It was not a coincidence that Germany lacked the leaders at Jutland. More than any other theatre of war, the Navy is dependent on a long line of well trained and experienced naval leaders, which only comes with strong naval traditions.

The British did have a great naval tradition, and there was no naval tradition of any kind in non-Hanseatic cities in Germany. The German Naval High Command was made up of the sons of industrialists, who had limited experience in forming policy compared to the commanders of the Admiralty.

BTW, does anyone think that Risk Theory was successful because the British never attacked the German navy in a Copenhagen-type assault before the war, thereby affirming that the British were not willing to attack the Germans, for fear of losing so much of their navy that they would cease to be the world's largest power??

 

[Dark Knight]

Originally posted by BRYCON316

BTW, does anyone think that Risk Theory was successful because the British never attacked the German navy in a Copenhagen-type assault before the war, thereby affirming that the British were not willing to attack the Germans, for fear of losing so much of their navy that they would cease to be the world's largest power??

No, a "Copenhagen" style attack was feared by both Britain and Germany, and I believe at one point Fisher proposed carrying out such an attack on the German fleet. However, it requires the leadership of a country to be willing to carry out a treacherous, unprovoked surprise attack and this was something that democratic Britain certainly couldn't do at this time (as opposed to Japan, for example). Fisher's plan was rejected.

 

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Originally posted by Dark Knight

No, a "Copenhagen" style attack was feared by both Britain and Germany, and I believe at one point Fisher proposed carrying out such an attack on the German fleet. However, it requires the leadership of a country to be willing to carry out a treacherous, unprovoked surprise attack and this was something that democratic Britain certainly couldn't do at this time (as opposed to Japan, for example). Fisher's plan was rejected.

How was the British attitude in the early 20th century different from that of the early 19th?? I know that the British were willing to do whatever was necessary to stop Napoleon, hence the Copenhagen attack. It seems the British were willing to do whatever it took to stop the German rise to power. The British put to rest a 500 year rivalry with France, and allied with the French in the face of the united German Empire. The government of 19th century Britain differed little from that of the 20th, as the British were very pragmatic in foreign policy, and were willing to dance with whatever devil helped them achieve their goals. So why would the 1900's government be unwilling to launch a preemptive suprise attack on the German fleet, when the 1800's government was more than willing to do so??

Also, I have heard from British members of the forum that the British were willing to attack the US navy in coordination with Japan in the early 20th century, in order to prevent a US rise to naval supremacy. Is this true, or is it more of a myth??

 

[Aetius]

its a new thread

 

[Johnny Canuck]

Originally posted by BRYCON316
How was the British attitude in the early 20th century different from that of the early 19th?? I know that the British were willing to do whatever was necessary to stop Napoleon, hence the Copenhagen attack. It seems the British were willing to do whatever it took to stop the German rise to power. The British put to rest a 500 year rivalry with France, and allied with the French in the face of the united German Empire. The government of 19th century Britain differed little from that of the 20th, as the British were very pragmatic in foreign policy, and were willing to dance with whatever devil helped them achieve their goals. So why would the 1900's government be unwilling to launch a preemptive suprise attack on the German fleet, when the 1800's government was more than willing to do so??

There was really zero chance that the British navy would launch a Copenhagen against the German fleet. However, there were some voices in favour of such a move. A few voices in the press (most prominently Arnold White) advocated a sneak attack. More importantly, Admiral Fisher was advocating such a course in 1904. However, no one else in government took him seriously on this or considered it as a realistic option. When Fisher told the King his idea, the King replied: "My God, Fisher, you must be mad!" After Fisher extolled the virtues of such an attack to the current First Lord, Lord Selborne, the latter informed Prime Minister Balfour to register his shock at the idea and at Fisher's seriousness. At no time did the Royal Navy evolve any detailed plans regarding a sneak attack against the German Fleet (at least outside of Fisher's head). Every British plan of war I have ever seen involved either a close blockade or a distant blockade (the latter prevailing by 1913/14).

Also, I have heard from British members of the forum that the British were willing to attack the US navy in coordination with Japan in the early 20th century, in order to prevent a US rise to naval supremacy. Is this true, or is it more of a myth??

This is a myth. I have been working as a research assistant for a professor on a book on the RN from the rise of Fisher to the end of WWI. I have never come across any formal plan or indication of such a plan in any primary document that the British ever planned an offensive war against the US, either in conjunction with Japan or by itself. There was some occasional discussion of defensive measures if the Americans allied with the Germans (such as Fisher's comments on the 1908 war plans), but even these were never really very detailed. It was well recognized that Britain could not afford a rivalry with the US, & that besides that Canada was completely defenseless against the Americans. The closure of Esquimalt & Halifax as RN bases would never had occured if the possibility of war with the US was taken seriously.